Voyager Plummets (Merged)
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
Bigbux, I believe there is another widely ignored rule that I recall from the dim and distant past, namely imagery taken on duty is Crown Copyright.
Of course this is as meaningful today as sketching was to the OSA 1911
Of course this is as meaningful today as sketching was to the OSA 1911
hg:-
I think that you have overlooked the suspended prison sentence.
Just a thought...
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And yet one doesn't have to look too hard on Social Media to find images like this, posted or re-tweeted by official accounts.
http://https://twitter.com/70sqna400m/status/832554522685890561
http://https://twitter.com/70sqna400m/status/832554522685890561
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I dont know the legal ramifications of this but a suspended sentence wont mean jail time which could have been the sweetener for discharge from the Service. I would definitely prefer that to even a few days in jail!
I was just getting at the point of there being a plethora of legal wrangling back and forth that ends up with a 'win' for both sides.
I was just getting at the point of there being a plethora of legal wrangling back and forth that ends up with a 'win' for both sides.
ends up with a 'win' for both sides
While I know what you're getting at, I wouldn't say both sides win. Any management system which establishes, tolerates, or fails to detect latent errors is an accident-enabling system; it, not the final act of the pilot, is the most serious deficiency. The way this has been (mis) managed conveniently body-swerves system failures.
hg, I'm afraid I have to disagree with you and say instead that this is more of a lose/lose situation for defendant and the Royal Air Force. The whole ethos of Flight Safety seems to have been lost sight of in the last three years. A combination of a loose article, a convenient ledge, and a vulnerable control stick were brought violently together by a fourth feature, the arm rest that could be set to such a seemingly pointless low angle that when propelled by its motorised seat resulted in the near loss of this aircraft and its occupants. The only redeeming part of this dreadful scenario was the built in self preservation features of Airbus FBW aircraft. A very low tech accident ameliorated by very high tech design!
That is the aviation bit then, and no doubt a combination of revisions to the FOB, training, and arm rest settings have since been enacted. What we do all know is that the wretched seat occupant has faced CM for Perjury, Lying, and Negligent Performance of his Duties (in that he introduced the loose article into the trap described above). Not Guilty, Not Guilty, Guilty. Fair cop and banged to rights, but does the punishment fit the crime? Not in my book.
A Dishonourable Discharge with a Criminal Record, for doing what others here have put their hands up to (and now me!), ie using a camera in the Flight Deck? We now all know that the ledge was the last place that he should have put it down on, but he was tried for what he did, not what is now so apparent. Does his employer not bear some responsibility for that trap? Does the aircraft designer?
It strikes me that the severity of this sentence owes more to the legal implications for those last two participants. The severity of this sentence isn't about Flight Safety nor even Service Discipline, it's about politics and money and quite frankly it stinks!
That is the aviation bit then, and no doubt a combination of revisions to the FOB, training, and arm rest settings have since been enacted. What we do all know is that the wretched seat occupant has faced CM for Perjury, Lying, and Negligent Performance of his Duties (in that he introduced the loose article into the trap described above). Not Guilty, Not Guilty, Guilty. Fair cop and banged to rights, but does the punishment fit the crime? Not in my book.
A Dishonourable Discharge with a Criminal Record, for doing what others here have put their hands up to (and now me!), ie using a camera in the Flight Deck? We now all know that the ledge was the last place that he should have put it down on, but he was tried for what he did, not what is now so apparent. Does his employer not bear some responsibility for that trap? Does the aircraft designer?
It strikes me that the severity of this sentence owes more to the legal implications for those last two participants. The severity of this sentence isn't about Flight Safety nor even Service Discipline, it's about politics and money and quite frankly it stinks!
don't agree with Tuc. Any safety system needs a 'just' culture where those knowingly breaking the 'rules' are dealt with. Blaming the system for not stopping those who knowingly subvert the protections in that system seems illogical and ultimately impossible.
You'd spend inordinate amounts of time and money trying to double-think all the possible scenarios and you'd end up restricting the flexibility of the resultant system to a point where it is actually more dangerous by being rigid by design.
You'd spend inordinate amounts of time and money trying to double-think all the possible scenarios and you'd end up restricting the flexibility of the resultant system to a point where it is actually more dangerous by being rigid by design.
Sandy Parts
Nothing you say is at odds with my last post. I agree with you, but the point is that MoD's perfectly good regulatory system is not implemented properly. This is a quite deliberate act. It is not an oversight. In fact, we have had legal reviews (Haddon-Cave, Lord Philip) and internal audits (Director of Flight Safety, Director Internal Audit) which have stated that it is not implemented properly. The MAA was formed as a result of the evidence to the Nimrod Review (despite what its Technical Director claims). As the MAA has made little or no progress in addressing the systemic failings - it has yet to even admit them - then it remains an accident enabling system. That being so, it is unfair to place sole blame on the pilot.
Your last point is also correct, but there are surprisingly few areas where you have to "double think" a scenario. The classic example was ESF in Hercules. The regulations list the threats - you don't have to think them up. The first on the list was "inert projectiles", and the laid down mitigation was ESF. Somebody MUST have made a conscious decision - Hercules will NEVER be at risk of being hit by projectiles. Instead, MoD denied all knowledge of ESF, and was caught committing perjury in court when its own ESF specifications were produced. In that case, what was the more serious breakdown? MoD's deliberate lies, poor oversight or the mistaken decision not to fit ESF? I suggest the lies, because that is a cultural failing and very difficult to correct.
I explained earlier the simple process of design reviews that avoids having to overthink this current failure. You don't have to spend extra time or money, because the reviews have to be held anyway. (Despite what MoD says). I've already opined (and I accept some might disagree) that the solution is not expensive re-design. You issue a directive - no cameras. Or, issue a definitive approved list of carry on equipment. This is routine work during development. Just because this aircraft is a variant of a commercial one doesn't mean the work can be waived. (I think there is more to come on this subject).
Finally, I wholeheartedly agree that those who knowingly break the rules should be dealt with. Let's start with a certain Assistant Chief of the Air Staff and Chief Engineer. (Making false record, and lying). Then Director General Air Systems 2 and the Chief of Defence Procurement. (Condoning making false record and lying). What of those who INSTRUCT staff to make false record and lie? Each and every one of them has committed far more serious offences than the pilot was charged with, never mind found guilty of.
Nothing you say is at odds with my last post. I agree with you, but the point is that MoD's perfectly good regulatory system is not implemented properly. This is a quite deliberate act. It is not an oversight. In fact, we have had legal reviews (Haddon-Cave, Lord Philip) and internal audits (Director of Flight Safety, Director Internal Audit) which have stated that it is not implemented properly. The MAA was formed as a result of the evidence to the Nimrod Review (despite what its Technical Director claims). As the MAA has made little or no progress in addressing the systemic failings - it has yet to even admit them - then it remains an accident enabling system. That being so, it is unfair to place sole blame on the pilot.
Your last point is also correct, but there are surprisingly few areas where you have to "double think" a scenario. The classic example was ESF in Hercules. The regulations list the threats - you don't have to think them up. The first on the list was "inert projectiles", and the laid down mitigation was ESF. Somebody MUST have made a conscious decision - Hercules will NEVER be at risk of being hit by projectiles. Instead, MoD denied all knowledge of ESF, and was caught committing perjury in court when its own ESF specifications were produced. In that case, what was the more serious breakdown? MoD's deliberate lies, poor oversight or the mistaken decision not to fit ESF? I suggest the lies, because that is a cultural failing and very difficult to correct.
I explained earlier the simple process of design reviews that avoids having to overthink this current failure. You don't have to spend extra time or money, because the reviews have to be held anyway. (Despite what MoD says). I've already opined (and I accept some might disagree) that the solution is not expensive re-design. You issue a directive - no cameras. Or, issue a definitive approved list of carry on equipment. This is routine work during development. Just because this aircraft is a variant of a commercial one doesn't mean the work can be waived. (I think there is more to come on this subject).
Finally, I wholeheartedly agree that those who knowingly break the rules should be dealt with. Let's start with a certain Assistant Chief of the Air Staff and Chief Engineer. (Making false record, and lying). Then Director General Air Systems 2 and the Chief of Defence Procurement. (Condoning making false record and lying). What of those who INSTRUCT staff to make false record and lie? Each and every one of them has committed far more serious offences than the pilot was charged with, never mind found guilty of.
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Whilst I agree with all you say Tuc, you will find that the best protection you can have is an Ivory Tower. Totally impervious to all know projectiles 
They just bounce off and fall on the poor sods standing below!
They just bounce off and fall on the poor sods standing below!
Tuc, I think you are absolutely spot on and should be cited in mitigation at appeal, should the harshly treated pilot IMO care to go down that route. Especially the last paragraph.
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The root cause of this incident was the pilot motoring his seat forward. I hope that one of the lessons learned is that the handling pilot should always be seated correctly such that he can assume full manual control of the aircraft at any time. This captain clearly was not in a position to do that. Did he have his seat back before the co-pilot left the flight deck? Did he motor it back while he was alone on the flight deck? Given the apparent distrust he had of Voyager's autopilot that was a rash move indeed.
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The root cause of this incident was the pilot motoring his seat forward. I hope that one of the lessons learned is that the handling pilot should always be seated correctly such that he can assume full manual control of the aircraft at any time. This captain clearly was not in a position to do that. Did he have his seat back before the co-pilot left the flight deck? Did he motor it back while he was alone on the flight deck? Given the apparent distrust he had of Voyager's autopilot that was a rash move indeed.
Brian, SD, root cause - seat. So why punish an individual if the activity might be widespread, both military and civil.
Safety, human performance, involves behaviour; behaviour can be monitored.
Thus the outcome could reflect the failure to monitor, to detect or acknowledge the behaviour and change the system.
No such thing as 'root cause'?
Safety, human performance, involves behaviour; behaviour can be monitored.
Thus the outcome could reflect the failure to monitor, to detect or acknowledge the behaviour and change the system.
No such thing as 'root cause'?
Gentleman Aviator
Does the guy retain his accumulated pension rights on dismissal?
One shared an office once with one of the RAF's top P1 gurus, who had spent most of his career in that specialisation, had never known a forfeited pension (once IPP had passed of course).
Naturally the conversation began - er - below the belt one might say - concerning a pulchritudinous PA in an adjacent office. Taking her roughly (consensually of course) across the photocopier would result in instant dismissal, but NOT loss of pension.........
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
TH, many years ago our accounts officer was cashiered and he retained his pension.