Just Culture
The big problem for military Flight Safety is the "alpha male'' commander/manager type that exists within the command structure. Their tenure is short and they don't want anything happening to bugger up their chances of promotion on their watch. This pervades the whole system - all they way to the top They want to know everything and are only too happy to apportion blame where they see fit - and which is rarely on their own doorstep.
I was a FSO in the RAF and am now a FSO in an airline. Airlines too tend to have just culture issues which stem from the managers not wanting to leave the system alone and let it run naturally. They cite responsibility and legal liability as reasons for their attempts to micro manage safety which often have the effect of stemming the flow of information and effectively destroy the concept of a just culture.
The need for a just culture.
But the problem with any data system related to safety is that management can view it as a useful tool for monitoring. Using collected data to police your employees is empowering and attractive to the manager who has limited trust in his safety system. They sometimes feel that their corporate and legal responsibility is to know about and deal with any; or even all transgressions. However, data collections systems can only pick up certain recordable and tangible errors. There are many more which cannot be recorded and for a safety management system to be informed of these errors through voluntary reporting; there has to be trust. Another way of describing this is that a ‘just culture’ must exist and be seen to exist. A manager must accept that there are certain events which they may get to hear about and that they can do little in response. This can make managers feel vulnerable; but they receive greater remuneration and benefits to shoulder such risks. The increased flow of information from voluntary reporting completes the ‘safety picture’ and it is an industry accepted view that this enlightened safety culture is in fact the best policy.
However, this runs the risk of some individuals treating this as a ‘get out of jail free’ card. This is not and can never be the case and the workforce must be made to realise that any such action in the category of recklessness will be dealt with. How this is dealt with is again a case for conjecture and depends on the circumstances and the transgressor. A defined system of discipline and in the extreme cases, punishment must be in place. But using punishment must be done in only the most severe instances, as often the transgressor will attract a level of sympathy from their peers and the safety system will suffer. A very effective form of discipline can be maintained if the peers themselves highlight the fault and let the transgressor know that they have overstepped the mark. Their professionalism will always refuse to accept one of their members taking risks and in such cases, non-acceptance of an action by one’s peers is often far more powerful a deterrent than admonishment or a penalty administered by a manager.
I was a FSO in the RAF and am now a FSO in an airline. Airlines too tend to have just culture issues which stem from the managers not wanting to leave the system alone and let it run naturally. They cite responsibility and legal liability as reasons for their attempts to micro manage safety which often have the effect of stemming the flow of information and effectively destroy the concept of a just culture.
The need for a just culture.
But the problem with any data system related to safety is that management can view it as a useful tool for monitoring. Using collected data to police your employees is empowering and attractive to the manager who has limited trust in his safety system. They sometimes feel that their corporate and legal responsibility is to know about and deal with any; or even all transgressions. However, data collections systems can only pick up certain recordable and tangible errors. There are many more which cannot be recorded and for a safety management system to be informed of these errors through voluntary reporting; there has to be trust. Another way of describing this is that a ‘just culture’ must exist and be seen to exist. A manager must accept that there are certain events which they may get to hear about and that they can do little in response. This can make managers feel vulnerable; but they receive greater remuneration and benefits to shoulder such risks. The increased flow of information from voluntary reporting completes the ‘safety picture’ and it is an industry accepted view that this enlightened safety culture is in fact the best policy.
However, this runs the risk of some individuals treating this as a ‘get out of jail free’ card. This is not and can never be the case and the workforce must be made to realise that any such action in the category of recklessness will be dealt with. How this is dealt with is again a case for conjecture and depends on the circumstances and the transgressor. A defined system of discipline and in the extreme cases, punishment must be in place. But using punishment must be done in only the most severe instances, as often the transgressor will attract a level of sympathy from their peers and the safety system will suffer. A very effective form of discipline can be maintained if the peers themselves highlight the fault and let the transgressor know that they have overstepped the mark. Their professionalism will always refuse to accept one of their members taking risks and in such cases, non-acceptance of an action by one’s peers is often far more powerful a deterrent than admonishment or a penalty administered by a manager.
Dan Winterland:
I have extracted the above three as these are the issues caused by in the main lack of understanding by management of what they think is being promoted by a Just Culture and protecting their careers, and this is within the military and civilian industry supporting it.
You are also correct that some think it is a 'no blame' culture and again it has been by the use of the previously mentioned FAIR tool, that if the occurrence steps over the culpability line then some form of discipline will be forthcoming, again this is a education, communication and understanding process as the whole Human factors process is, get it wrong and base it on incorrect assumptions and 'interpretation' and it is going to fail.
They cite responsibility and legal liability as reasons for their attempts to micro manage safety which often have the effect of stemming the flow of information and effectively destroy the concept of a just culture.
A manager must accept that there are certain events which they may get to hear about and that they can do little in response
The increased flow of information from voluntary reporting completes the ‘safety picture’ and it is an industry accepted view that this enlightened safety culture is in fact the best policy.
You are also correct that some think it is a 'no blame' culture and again it has been by the use of the previously mentioned FAIR tool, that if the occurrence steps over the culpability line then some form of discipline will be forthcoming, again this is a education, communication and understanding process as the whole Human factors process is, get it wrong and base it on incorrect assumptions and 'interpretation' and it is going to fail.
I have been involved in an RAF technical investigation where - as a civilian witness - I felt as though it was me going through a court marshal!
It will inevitably vary from station to station and/or fleet to fleet and it will be best served by individuals not by the systems used, but as long as you have investigations and routines conducted in a rough-shod black-and-white manner your culture will remain negative despite any reporting culture you pretend to have. (works like this on the outside too, BTW)
It will inevitably vary from station to station and/or fleet to fleet and it will be best served by individuals not by the systems used, but as long as you have investigations and routines conducted in a rough-shod black-and-white manner your culture will remain negative despite any reporting culture you pretend to have. (works like this on the outside too, BTW)
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Good thread and worth the effort to reply. The main problem with the Just Culture is the chaps don’t believe the ‘leaders’ in their world do it; it is not a blame free culture but the higher you go the more toward blame it goes.
Problem across the MoD
Navy – Pretty good but do not like others having ideas they should have had.
Army – It has always been this way and who are you to tell me I am wrong?
RAF – We are the Air Superiority expert so how can we be wrong?
DE&S – Why would I possible interested in what the Armed Services think?
Answer, take the process out of the single service domain and put all Assurance, Audit, Trending and SI/OSI into the Joint Force Command so there cannot be any parochial behavior and we would also be independent a la Haddon Cave; we are not at the moment. (And not fill the top up with one service!!!!! – Mr G?)
I totally agree that there is fatigue with visits and this must be a number one priority if we are going to take the body of the Kirk with us – I feel for the worker bees, they are over persecuted!!! Pilots, thechs get over your rivalry and work together!
Problem across the MoD
Navy – Pretty good but do not like others having ideas they should have had.
Army – It has always been this way and who are you to tell me I am wrong?
RAF – We are the Air Superiority expert so how can we be wrong?
DE&S – Why would I possible interested in what the Armed Services think?
Answer, take the process out of the single service domain and put all Assurance, Audit, Trending and SI/OSI into the Joint Force Command so there cannot be any parochial behavior and we would also be independent a la Haddon Cave; we are not at the moment. (And not fill the top up with one service!!!!! – Mr G?)
I totally agree that there is fatigue with visits and this must be a number one priority if we are going to take the body of the Kirk with us – I feel for the worker bees, they are over persecuted!!! Pilots, thechs get over your rivalry and work together!
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Just culture and open reporting.
The civil aviation world has talked often about a just culture and open reporting of incidents, the way companies deal with this varies greatly.
The best practice in this field I have seen is in the Scandinavian airline that I currently fly for, they encourage Incident reporting as the best way of getting flight safety issues out in the open, this along with the statistical data from the FDM (with the crews identity removed) and you have a very powerful flight safety tool that enables the company's training department to address the common shortcomings and errors made by the crews in the simulator training. By UK standards the whole thing feels a bit touchy- feely but it works well, no one is reluctant to report any problems that they have had and the management is pleased to get the truth from the coal face as if they use the data properly it can stop problems almost as soon as they start. Most important is the managements positive attitude to reporting of the honest mistakes that pilots have made.
Another LOCO airline in the UK takes quite a different view of FDM with any event resulting in instant removal of the crew from the flying program and retraining before that crew member can resume flying, I am told that this is at the insistence of the company lawyers who take the view that if they don't carry out "retraining" and there is another Incident or accident involving the crew member the company might find Its self in legal hot water. I can only shudder to think how little real world feedback the company generates and how little the training department can taylor the recurrent training to the real world situations that the crew are likely to face.
The RAF has a very difficult square to circle in that military discipline has to be maintained and this usually results in very clearly defined individual responsabilitys that if not met can result in disciplinary action and on the other hand the knowledge that people make unintentional errors has to be recognized. The flight safety system needs data about these errors to identify root cause and if they are common put in place a system of training to correct the issues.
A blame culture will only encourage those who make a mistake to cover it up if they can, if one person makes a mistake you can be sure that others have made the same mistake. In the Scandinavian airline these mistakes would be reported and published in the monthly flight safety review, this data would also be reviewed for inclusion in the six monthly simulator practice. In the RAF if an open culture is not encouraged the first thing that is known about these problems is when an accident has happened and a number of people in the crew room comment quietly to friends that they were almost a victim of the same problem!
As the blame culture is largely due to the management shifting blame as a necessity for career progression any change is going to require a big change in the attitude at the very top, the only question is do the RAF have a person in the upper management who is capable to take a very statesman like approach to the ingrained blame culture and remove it.
I know that the military have a hard time differentiating between a mistake and negligence and tend to treat the victim of the former like the perpetrator of the latter but if the culture can be changed it will have far reaching positive effects on flight safety without any negative effect on military discipline.
The best practice in this field I have seen is in the Scandinavian airline that I currently fly for, they encourage Incident reporting as the best way of getting flight safety issues out in the open, this along with the statistical data from the FDM (with the crews identity removed) and you have a very powerful flight safety tool that enables the company's training department to address the common shortcomings and errors made by the crews in the simulator training. By UK standards the whole thing feels a bit touchy- feely but it works well, no one is reluctant to report any problems that they have had and the management is pleased to get the truth from the coal face as if they use the data properly it can stop problems almost as soon as they start. Most important is the managements positive attitude to reporting of the honest mistakes that pilots have made.
Another LOCO airline in the UK takes quite a different view of FDM with any event resulting in instant removal of the crew from the flying program and retraining before that crew member can resume flying, I am told that this is at the insistence of the company lawyers who take the view that if they don't carry out "retraining" and there is another Incident or accident involving the crew member the company might find Its self in legal hot water. I can only shudder to think how little real world feedback the company generates and how little the training department can taylor the recurrent training to the real world situations that the crew are likely to face.
The RAF has a very difficult square to circle in that military discipline has to be maintained and this usually results in very clearly defined individual responsabilitys that if not met can result in disciplinary action and on the other hand the knowledge that people make unintentional errors has to be recognized. The flight safety system needs data about these errors to identify root cause and if they are common put in place a system of training to correct the issues.
A blame culture will only encourage those who make a mistake to cover it up if they can, if one person makes a mistake you can be sure that others have made the same mistake. In the Scandinavian airline these mistakes would be reported and published in the monthly flight safety review, this data would also be reviewed for inclusion in the six monthly simulator practice. In the RAF if an open culture is not encouraged the first thing that is known about these problems is when an accident has happened and a number of people in the crew room comment quietly to friends that they were almost a victim of the same problem!
As the blame culture is largely due to the management shifting blame as a necessity for career progression any change is going to require a big change in the attitude at the very top, the only question is do the RAF have a person in the upper management who is capable to take a very statesman like approach to the ingrained blame culture and remove it.
I know that the military have a hard time differentiating between a mistake and negligence and tend to treat the victim of the former like the perpetrator of the latter but if the culture can be changed it will have far reaching positive effects on flight safety without any negative effect on military discipline.
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When ASIMS and the D-FSOR were first conceived, the situation discussed by A&C was the ultimate goal in the long term (and I mean "long" term). As we've seen from the many replies on this thread there still appears to be some way to go, but it's a big and diverse organisation so it was always going to take a while. Without doubt the key thing is leadership. Years of hard work can be undone with a single ill thought out response to a safety incident.
None of this really should be a surprise to anyone though, at least not these days. But after the turmoil of the past few years in military aviation and since the establishment of the MAA are there enough senior officers out there setting the right example?
None of this really should be a surprise to anyone though, at least not these days. But after the turmoil of the past few years in military aviation and since the establishment of the MAA are there enough senior officers out there setting the right example?
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A Broader Perspective
Delighted to see Wg Cdr Spry starting such an interesting if not potentially toxic thread.
The contributions cover a broad range, some are well informed and recognise Spry's efforts to gain a wider appreciation of how RAF personnel, aviators and engineers in particular feel about Just Culture. Other contributions are less helpful but may reflect an individuals experience in the past, when subject to the desire of a zealous commander keen to make an impression.
That said, a Just Culture is NOT a blame free culture. If someone has been properly trained and makes a mistake without good reason or cause, that is blameworthy. They should not expect a pat on the back and some kind words before being told to 'carry on'. Aviation is complex and potentially dangerous, it involves peoples lives - all RAF personnel are well trained and paid good money to avoid simple or inexcusable mistakes. That said, the FAIR tool still allows for errors caused by systemic pressure or organisational failings - so I think it reasonable to say that the RAF attitude to a Just culture is, at the middle management level, considered and effective.
My concern is that our senior officer cadre continue to look up and careless for those doing their best. No doubt the Inspector is doing his bit to change that approach but ask the various AOC's who are vying for 3 star rank and they have very little real interest in the personnel under their command. Until we can break that self centred and mainly self serving command cycle, things will never change and trust will be a distant hope.
I hope that we see some feedback or comment from the good Wg Cdr very soon.
The contributions cover a broad range, some are well informed and recognise Spry's efforts to gain a wider appreciation of how RAF personnel, aviators and engineers in particular feel about Just Culture. Other contributions are less helpful but may reflect an individuals experience in the past, when subject to the desire of a zealous commander keen to make an impression.
That said, a Just Culture is NOT a blame free culture. If someone has been properly trained and makes a mistake without good reason or cause, that is blameworthy. They should not expect a pat on the back and some kind words before being told to 'carry on'. Aviation is complex and potentially dangerous, it involves peoples lives - all RAF personnel are well trained and paid good money to avoid simple or inexcusable mistakes. That said, the FAIR tool still allows for errors caused by systemic pressure or organisational failings - so I think it reasonable to say that the RAF attitude to a Just culture is, at the middle management level, considered and effective.
My concern is that our senior officer cadre continue to look up and careless for those doing their best. No doubt the Inspector is doing his bit to change that approach but ask the various AOC's who are vying for 3 star rank and they have very little real interest in the personnel under their command. Until we can break that self centred and mainly self serving command cycle, things will never change and trust will be a distant hope.
I hope that we see some feedback or comment from the good Wg Cdr very soon.
The trickiest area of the FAIR system is the treatment of non-culpable errors. I know that some are under the impression that genuine, honest mistakes should not result in action being taken against their maker. However, as we know, student pilots who repeatedly make mistakes (however honestly) are liable to be suspended for lack of ability. Reaching the front line does not render one 'safe' and the suspension process continues to be avaialable throughout an individual's career. Night AAR is one example that occasionally catches out those who think they have 'made it' when they join their first squadron! This is only right and proper, but it does make application of FAIR a bit of a pickle. How many genuine mistakes can someone make before they become a cause for concern? Should you apply a remedial training package to every mistake, or wait for a second, related mistake?
It all comes down to judgement, and it is easy to see how mis-perceptions can arise. 'Pilot A', a capable pilot with a good track record, might land below diversion fuel, debrief the incident appropriately to the Duty Auth, submit a DASOR and hear nothing more of it. 'Pilot B', with a chequered flying training record and a propensity for minor errors, might land below diversion fuel, submit a DASOR and find himself in front of Flt Cdr Trg signing review paperwork ahead of a remedial training package. To those without knowledge of the individuals involved, it's easy to see everything through the FAIR lens and view this as unjust, whereas it's actually the flying supervision system going about its normal business.
It's important to note that suspension from flying duties for lack of ability is not a disciplinary matter!
It all comes down to judgement, and it is easy to see how mis-perceptions can arise. 'Pilot A', a capable pilot with a good track record, might land below diversion fuel, debrief the incident appropriately to the Duty Auth, submit a DASOR and hear nothing more of it. 'Pilot B', with a chequered flying training record and a propensity for minor errors, might land below diversion fuel, submit a DASOR and find himself in front of Flt Cdr Trg signing review paperwork ahead of a remedial training package. To those without knowledge of the individuals involved, it's easy to see everything through the FAIR lens and view this as unjust, whereas it's actually the flying supervision system going about its normal business.
It's important to note that suspension from flying duties for lack of ability is not a disciplinary matter!
Last edited by Easy Street; 29th Oct 2013 at 00:19.
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It has been interesting to see the various comments on this thread and particularly the different interpretations of Just Culture. I am sure that a lot of the differences are simply about the use of terminology, I would like to pick up Arthur Daley on the comment about the concept that Just Culture is not a blame free culture. The simple fact that military aviation personnel are well paid and well trained doesn't step away from the fact that the foundation of Human Factors and Just Culture is the concept that to err is human. The suggestion that making a mistake is blameworthy in any way shows that there is still some way to go in the understanding of Just Culture in the middle management as well as the senior management.
Humans will make mistakes by their very nature and a good organisation should encourage people to report their "simple" mistakes so that others can learn from them. My take on it, for what it's worth, is that what we actually mean is that people who break the rules without good reason or cause should be blameworthy. There is quite a significant difference between the 2 and that is the difference between a good safety culture and a bad one, where people are scared to report their mistakes for fear of the consequences.
However, what the FAIR system and Just Culture is not there to do, is to replace the normal activities of a functioning supervisory system. It is easy to confuse the 2 things and I think that Easy Street has hit the nail on the head. FAIR should not lead people to expect that their performance won't be appropriately managed just because the Just Culture says they aren't blameworthy.
Humans will make mistakes by their very nature and a good organisation should encourage people to report their "simple" mistakes so that others can learn from them. My take on it, for what it's worth, is that what we actually mean is that people who break the rules without good reason or cause should be blameworthy. There is quite a significant difference between the 2 and that is the difference between a good safety culture and a bad one, where people are scared to report their mistakes for fear of the consequences.
However, what the FAIR system and Just Culture is not there to do, is to replace the normal activities of a functioning supervisory system. It is easy to confuse the 2 things and I think that Easy Street has hit the nail on the head. FAIR should not lead people to expect that their performance won't be appropriately managed just because the Just Culture says they aren't blameworthy.
Last edited by thefodfather; 29th Oct 2013 at 07:16.
thefodfather
Quite correct, when I posted reference to the FAIR tool I only gave an example of what was considered an attempt at mis-use (bit one sided I realise now), we on the whole do look at the people involved and still thankfully get people to hold there hands up to mistakes and personnel are told that allthough disciplinary action is not required there has been education, training and communication to individuals and the whole work force as appropriate, via supervisors and management.
We have several times in the past caused engineers to stop reporting errors/mistakes as different managers reverted back to blame/discipline culture, again thankfully that was a quite a few years back.
However, what the FAIR system and Just Culture is not there to do, is to replace the normal activities of a functioning supervisory system. It is easy to confuse the 2 things and I think that Easy Street has hit the nail on the head. FAIR should not lead people to expect that their performance won't be appropriately managed just because the Just Culture says they aren't blameworthy.
We have several times in the past caused engineers to stop reporting errors/mistakes as different managers reverted back to blame/discipline culture, again thankfully that was a quite a few years back.
Many of the posts discuss mistakes. MoD is in the poo because of deliberate acts and concealing those acts; not mistakes. The likes of FAIR helps address the former, but the latter can only be addressed by instant dismissal. IMHO.
I have some old MoD literature from 2002 on the subject which is poor on presentation, but eventually gets there. Under the title of “A “Blame-free” Environment”, it says;
“Safety Culture requires an atmosphere in which individuals are not unduly punished or blamed for their mistakes – a “blame-free” environment. This is an ideal which is difficult to achieve in practice: when things really do go wrong, people’s reaction is often to protect themselves by pointing the finger of blame at others.
Even an organisation that strives to achieve a blame-free environment is still subject to rules and legal regulations. A “Just” culture is one in which individuals are not free of blame if they are culpably negligent, and where the organisation gives due regard to honesty. Errors and mistakes are inevitable, and safety can only be improved if the organisation can learn from its mistakes”.
I think a “However” if required before “A Just Culture” to separate the two concepts.
In MoD certain levels ARE free of blame when culpably negligent, honesty is NOT given due regard and lessons aren’t learned. And somebody from MoD has to post here, now, asking for opinions?
I have some old MoD literature from 2002 on the subject which is poor on presentation, but eventually gets there. Under the title of “A “Blame-free” Environment”, it says;
“Safety Culture requires an atmosphere in which individuals are not unduly punished or blamed for their mistakes – a “blame-free” environment. This is an ideal which is difficult to achieve in practice: when things really do go wrong, people’s reaction is often to protect themselves by pointing the finger of blame at others.
Even an organisation that strives to achieve a blame-free environment is still subject to rules and legal regulations. A “Just” culture is one in which individuals are not free of blame if they are culpably negligent, and where the organisation gives due regard to honesty. Errors and mistakes are inevitable, and safety can only be improved if the organisation can learn from its mistakes”.
I think a “However” if required before “A Just Culture” to separate the two concepts.
In MoD certain levels ARE free of blame when culpably negligent, honesty is NOT given due regard and lessons aren’t learned. And somebody from MoD has to post here, now, asking for opinions?
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Arthur1Daley
I am afraid, although valid, your parochial and possible blinkered comments direction is why we will not get to the Just Culture soon - Note my comment on the RAF's view on others. We are not the only show in town and if you look at ‘accidents v’s Hrs v’s airframes - the RAF are no shining beacon. Let’s get this done with the 4 worlds and 4 Services (even the Civvies if we have to!). We already get bad rep for being snobs, lets not fuel that rep – and – why have the RAF got 4 layers in the 1,2,3rd party assurance piece.
1st Party – Base/Station
2nd Party – ODH
3rd Party – MAA
Where do RAF FS (or should it be AS) and GP fit into this system that is meant to be simplified according to the accepted HC report? Are we again just saying we will and ignoring everyone else? Not sure the Army or Navy have kept this complicated over layered approach that must make it harder to administer a just culture?
PS – ‘Military Aircrew’ isn’t a single service term? Should we start an RAF only Forum?
I am afraid, although valid, your parochial and possible blinkered comments direction is why we will not get to the Just Culture soon - Note my comment on the RAF's view on others. We are not the only show in town and if you look at ‘accidents v’s Hrs v’s airframes - the RAF are no shining beacon. Let’s get this done with the 4 worlds and 4 Services (even the Civvies if we have to!). We already get bad rep for being snobs, lets not fuel that rep – and – why have the RAF got 4 layers in the 1,2,3rd party assurance piece.
1st Party – Base/Station
2nd Party – ODH
3rd Party – MAA
Where do RAF FS (or should it be AS) and GP fit into this system that is meant to be simplified according to the accepted HC report? Are we again just saying we will and ignoring everyone else? Not sure the Army or Navy have kept this complicated over layered approach that must make it harder to administer a just culture?
PS – ‘Military Aircrew’ isn’t a single service term? Should we start an RAF only Forum?
If the RAF operates a truly Just Culture regime, how come it still blames the Mull pilots for that tragedy, despite the palpably unjust Wratten-Day Finding being set aside, and those Air Officers that ordered the Chinook HC2 into service via an illegal RTS go on being protected? I suspect that the Wing Co will once again remind us that such matters are way above his pay grade and that he is simply trying to do his job. In fairness to him he can't, while the MAA is hamstrung by the Star Chamber.
All that is left now for RAF Flight Safety (or whatever it is rebadged to), is to go through the motions of publishing magazines online, putting up posters, and keeping people occupied with threads such as this.
If RAF Flight Safety were all about presentation then it would no doubt receive "Publisher of the Year" awards aplenty. It is of course about avoiding air accidents, and learning what it can about those that are not avoided in order to avoid them in future. The present arrangement of self-regulation and self-investigation is a sure way to ensure that does not happen, witness the Airworthiness Related Fatal Air accident threads on this forum that account for 62 deaths alone.
Someone, somewhere, has to stop just doing their job and start the MAA and the MAAIB on their way to complete independence from the MOD and of each other. Then they'll have to learn to do their jobs properly, which will be a very steep climb indeed!
All that is left now for RAF Flight Safety (or whatever it is rebadged to), is to go through the motions of publishing magazines online, putting up posters, and keeping people occupied with threads such as this.
If RAF Flight Safety were all about presentation then it would no doubt receive "Publisher of the Year" awards aplenty. It is of course about avoiding air accidents, and learning what it can about those that are not avoided in order to avoid them in future. The present arrangement of self-regulation and self-investigation is a sure way to ensure that does not happen, witness the Airworthiness Related Fatal Air accident threads on this forum that account for 62 deaths alone.
Someone, somewhere, has to stop just doing their job and start the MAA and the MAAIB on their way to complete independence from the MOD and of each other. Then they'll have to learn to do their jobs properly, which will be a very steep climb indeed!
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Well, soon enough, if we have another "Biggie", the RAF and MOD will learn as a whole that self-regulation isnt a god given right, as some seem to think it is, its a privilege that as I understand it, was nearly pulled post HC
Name and Shame!
Just culture? Not always. If it were, no one would have to submit a DASOR to the Sqn executive before pressing send.
Last edited by VinRouge; 31st Oct 2013 at 17:27.
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Troop the buggers once in a while, if the procedure is in the book and they willfully ignore it, they are breaking the rules and need to be told so.
Keep the flying program going and we'll look the other way until the board of enquiry at which point your on your own.
Ladies and Gentlemen RAF Aviators,
Nobody in your promotional /Management Line-manager/sqn chain actually gives a flying **** about you, despite their smiley assurances. Yes, you may receive a Christmas card from your boss whatever level you are at this Christmas but when they/you leave the sqn do you ever hear from them again? No of course you don't. Shallow ****s.
Just don't **** up ever--or they will screw you. It is truly dog-eat-dog-except you don't have a dog to eat.
Nobody in your promotional /Management Line-manager/sqn chain actually gives a flying **** about you, despite their smiley assurances. Yes, you may receive a Christmas card from your boss whatever level you are at this Christmas but when they/you leave the sqn do you ever hear from them again? No of course you don't. Shallow ****s.
Just don't **** up ever--or they will screw you. It is truly dog-eat-dog-except you don't have a dog to eat.
Well, soon enough, if we have another "Biggie", the RAF and MOD will learn as a whole that self-regulation isnt a god given right, as some seem to think it is, its a privilege that as I understand it, was nearly pulled post HC
Quote:
Just culture? Not always. If it were, no one would have to submit a DASOR to the Sqn executive before pressing send.
Name and Shame!
Quote:
Just culture? Not always. If it were, no one would have to submit a DASOR to the Sqn executive before pressing send.
Name and Shame!
Do I win a prize?