The big problem for military Flight Safety is the "alpha male'' commander/manager type that exists within the command structure. Their tenure is short and they don't want anything happening to bugger up their chances of promotion on their watch. This pervades the whole system - all they way to the top They want to know everything and are only too happy to apportion blame where they see fit - and which is rarely on their own doorstep.
I was a FSO in the RAF and am now a FSO in an airline. Airlines too tend to have just culture issues which stem from the managers not wanting to leave the system alone and let it run naturally. They cite responsibility and legal liability as reasons for their attempts to micro manage safety which often have the effect of stemming the flow of information and effectively destroy the concept of a just culture.
The need for a just culture.
But the problem with any data system related to safety is that management can view it as a useful tool for monitoring. Using collected data to police your employees is empowering and attractive to the manager who has limited trust in his safety system. They sometimes feel that their corporate and legal responsibility is to know about and deal with any; or even all transgressions. However, data collections systems can only pick up certain recordable and tangible errors. There are many more which cannot be recorded and for a safety management system to be informed of these errors through voluntary reporting; there has to be trust. Another way of describing this is that a ‘just culture’ must exist and be seen to exist. A manager must accept that there are certain events which they may get to hear about and that they can do little in response. This can make managers feel vulnerable; but they receive greater remuneration and benefits to shoulder such risks. The increased flow of information from voluntary reporting completes the ‘safety picture’ and it is an industry accepted view that this enlightened safety culture is in fact the best policy.
However, this runs the risk of some individuals treating this as a ‘get out of jail free’ card. This is not and can never be the case and the workforce must be made to realise that any such action in the category of recklessness will be dealt with. How this is dealt with is again a case for conjecture and depends on the circumstances and the transgressor. A defined system of discipline and in the extreme cases, punishment must be in place. But using punishment must be done in only the most severe instances, as often the transgressor will attract a level of sympathy from their peers and the safety system will suffer. A very effective form of discipline can be maintained if the peers themselves highlight the fault and let the transgressor know that they have overstepped the mark. Their professionalism will always refuse to accept one of their members taking risks and in such cases, non-acceptance of an action by one’s peers is often far more powerful a deterrent than admonishment or a penalty administered by a manager.