Just Culture
Splash,
Do enlighten us on how the MAA does this. Unlike the CAA, which is wholly independent from the operators and government, the MAA is not independent of the RAF, nor the MoD.
it assures airworthiness
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By the use of SQEP (Suitably Qualified and Experienced Personnel) staff, who have the appropriate skill and qualfications to review, monitor and audit. It isn't rocket science, but needs both sides to be professional, diligent, aware and not cut corners. At times therefore it may be initially painful, but ultimately beneficial.
I'd question how independant the CAA is of Government as it is funded by them and sits below DfT. Probably not too much more or less than the MAA in many ways and effectiveness. The real difference is between the MAAIB and AAIB and the MAA and CAA!!
I'd question how independant the CAA is of Government as it is funded by them and sits below DfT. Probably not too much more or less than the MAA in many ways and effectiveness. The real difference is between the MAAIB and AAIB and the MAA and CAA!!
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Splash,
I might be able to help here a little. I'd argue that the MAA really is all about Air Safety. Its website gives these definitions:
MISSION
Enhance the delivery of operational capability through continual improvement in military Air Safety, appropriate culture, regulation and practice.
VISION
A world class military Air Safety regulatory and assurance model that is proactive, innovative, modern, efficient and effective.
Now that looks to me like a fairly clear 'Air Safety' focus. Regulation and the rest is how it delivers the Air Safety.
Inter-service bickering - not sure how that affected the events that led to Haddon-Cave and the MAA. However, there were certainly big politics played by the RAF in the aftermath.
We now have an allegedly independent regulator whose head, according to its own internal rules, has to be a three star with aviation command experience - neat. That would be an RAF officer then then. Has been ACAS twice in a row now. And this for an organisation that was brought about by an inquiry into the failings of the MoD' airworthiness management systems that were devised and led by senior RAF officers. Go figure.
My preference (not that it matters in the least) would be for the MAA to be aligned with the rest of the Defence Safety boards (nuclear, explosive, ship, etc) and headed by a two star civilian brought in from outside the MoD to encourage fresh thinking and transference across all areas of Defence safety management. Honestly, I'm not sure that 'Air Safety' is any more demanding than nuclear safety, or any of the other safety management areas.
Oh, and I'd take the accident investigators out of MAA, relocate them into the AAIB, and require all three Commands to provide properly trained and accredited investigators to that organisation. Not expensive and can provide a very effective organisation. (The FAA did it for many years).
Not that any of that is going to happen any time soon, but always nice to see an open, polite and interesting debate taking place.
Best Regards as ever to all those actually contributing to safer military aviation,
Engines
I might be able to help here a little. I'd argue that the MAA really is all about Air Safety. Its website gives these definitions:
MISSION
Enhance the delivery of operational capability through continual improvement in military Air Safety, appropriate culture, regulation and practice.
VISION
A world class military Air Safety regulatory and assurance model that is proactive, innovative, modern, efficient and effective.
Now that looks to me like a fairly clear 'Air Safety' focus. Regulation and the rest is how it delivers the Air Safety.
Inter-service bickering - not sure how that affected the events that led to Haddon-Cave and the MAA. However, there were certainly big politics played by the RAF in the aftermath.
We now have an allegedly independent regulator whose head, according to its own internal rules, has to be a three star with aviation command experience - neat. That would be an RAF officer then then. Has been ACAS twice in a row now. And this for an organisation that was brought about by an inquiry into the failings of the MoD' airworthiness management systems that were devised and led by senior RAF officers. Go figure.
My preference (not that it matters in the least) would be for the MAA to be aligned with the rest of the Defence Safety boards (nuclear, explosive, ship, etc) and headed by a two star civilian brought in from outside the MoD to encourage fresh thinking and transference across all areas of Defence safety management. Honestly, I'm not sure that 'Air Safety' is any more demanding than nuclear safety, or any of the other safety management areas.
Oh, and I'd take the accident investigators out of MAA, relocate them into the AAIB, and require all three Commands to provide properly trained and accredited investigators to that organisation. Not expensive and can provide a very effective organisation. (The FAA did it for many years).
Not that any of that is going to happen any time soon, but always nice to see an open, polite and interesting debate taking place.
Best Regards as ever to all those actually contributing to safer military aviation,
Engines
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Splash1983
The CAA is not funded by the government, it is funded by the fees it charges the industry................ And it feels like my company is funding most of it !
So can anyone say what part the MAA plays in fitness for purpose? I only ask because IIRC this caused confusion at an inquest. Can't recall which one.
Engines. Really good post sir.
Engines. Really good post sir.
Yes, really good post Engines, thank you. I'm afraid that my distrust of the MOD regarding suborning of the Regulations and the subsequent cover up, would not enable me to have confidence in any Board that came under its umbrella though. I am now starting to worry about Nuclear, Explosives, and Ship Safety, but one thing at a time perhaps. 
One thing that you mentioned confuses me though, ie:-
Why on earth should Air Accident Investigators be within the MAA in the first place? As soon as we have yet another airworthiness related Military Air Accident, will we have Investigators employed by the Regulatory Authority responsible for that Airworthiness investigating it? How does that work, other than very badly?
Splas1983, this is all about Flight Safety (or Air Safety if you insist). It is also all about independence, the lack of which led to the "malaise that befell certain IPTs" and a whole lot more.
As for SQEPs (who invents this dross?), the MOD used to be awash with them, and very "Q" and very "E" every man jack of them was! It sacked them, or at least the ones that would not obey illegal orders to suborn the Regs. That is what must never happen again. The MAA as it exists now, together with the MAAIB, cannot ensure that it won't.
One thing that you mentioned confuses me though, ie:-
I'd take the accident investigators out of MAA, relocate them into the AAIB, and require all three Commands to provide properly trained and accredited investigators to that organisation
Splas1983, this is all about Flight Safety (or Air Safety if you insist). It is also all about independence, the lack of which led to the "malaise that befell certain IPTs" and a whole lot more.
As for SQEPs (who invents this dross?), the MOD used to be awash with them, and very "Q" and very "E" every man jack of them was! It sacked them, or at least the ones that would not obey illegal orders to suborn the Regs. That is what must never happen again. The MAA as it exists now, together with the MAAIB, cannot ensure that it won't.
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Dervish,
Hope I can help a bit here. 'Fitness for purpose' or 'fit for purpose' appears all over the MAA regulations set, in a number of contexts. Personally, I think it's a bit of a vague phrase, and used too liberally, probably because the politicians started appropriating it. I have a sinking feeling that the MAA probably thought it would look jazzy in the regs.
But to address a very good point you made - when looking at whether an aircraft's design (or a modification) meets operational 'fitness for purpose', my feeling is that the MAA regs have not much to offer. There is one clear link to the phrase in a recent update to 00-970 that includes the following:
Def Stan 00-970 is not intended to provide requirements to ensure the fitness for purpose of Type Designs or Major Changes.
Here's my take. It's probably wrong, but here goes anyway. When assessing a project, I put requirements into three (probably overlapping) bins:
1. Pure 'air safety' - the 00-970 stuff
2. Fitness for purpose
3. Operational effectiveness
To illustrate the idea, here's those three 'bins' applied to requirements for a new radio:
1. Pure air safety - does it catch fire? Does it fall out of the aircraft and kill someone? Does it irradiate users? EMC, Etc.
2. Fitness for purpose - can it be used by the aircrew without spending excessive time heads in? Does it clearly tell the user what it's condition and state is? Can it be maintained? Is it reliable? Does its basic performance meet the requirement (range, clarity, etc) Lots of HMI stuff here.
3. Operational effectiveness - does the HQ/crypto function work? Does it meet operational requirements for coalition/joint ops? Will the OEU accept it for service?
Like I say, these three may overlap, especially the last two, but I found that they help project teams work out the boundaries between the ATEC ITE folk and the OEU. They also help build a good requirements set, which is the foundation of any project.
So who's responsible? My call is that the project team are responsible for delivering a product to the user that is 'fit for purpose' as defined in the requirements PLUS (important point) any other aspects that they could reasonably be expected to apply to the job. (After all, they are supposed to be the procurement professionals, right?). And they're accountable to the user for doing this.
The Duty Holder is then responsible for accepting the system. Or rejecting it. Once accepted, the user maintains that 'fitness for purpose' via their CAMO and aircrew and personnel training systems.
In both cases, they are required to apply the relevant MAA regs while they discharge these responsibilities.
Now, does all this actually happen all the time in the real world? That's the big question, to which I don't have the answer.
Hope this helps a little, best regards as ever to all those reading these big books,
Engines
Hope I can help a bit here. 'Fitness for purpose' or 'fit for purpose' appears all over the MAA regulations set, in a number of contexts. Personally, I think it's a bit of a vague phrase, and used too liberally, probably because the politicians started appropriating it. I have a sinking feeling that the MAA probably thought it would look jazzy in the regs.
But to address a very good point you made - when looking at whether an aircraft's design (or a modification) meets operational 'fitness for purpose', my feeling is that the MAA regs have not much to offer. There is one clear link to the phrase in a recent update to 00-970 that includes the following:
Def Stan 00-970 is not intended to provide requirements to ensure the fitness for purpose of Type Designs or Major Changes.
Here's my take. It's probably wrong, but here goes anyway. When assessing a project, I put requirements into three (probably overlapping) bins:
1. Pure 'air safety' - the 00-970 stuff
2. Fitness for purpose
3. Operational effectiveness
To illustrate the idea, here's those three 'bins' applied to requirements for a new radio:
1. Pure air safety - does it catch fire? Does it fall out of the aircraft and kill someone? Does it irradiate users? EMC, Etc.
2. Fitness for purpose - can it be used by the aircrew without spending excessive time heads in? Does it clearly tell the user what it's condition and state is? Can it be maintained? Is it reliable? Does its basic performance meet the requirement (range, clarity, etc) Lots of HMI stuff here.
3. Operational effectiveness - does the HQ/crypto function work? Does it meet operational requirements for coalition/joint ops? Will the OEU accept it for service?
Like I say, these three may overlap, especially the last two, but I found that they help project teams work out the boundaries between the ATEC ITE folk and the OEU. They also help build a good requirements set, which is the foundation of any project.
So who's responsible? My call is that the project team are responsible for delivering a product to the user that is 'fit for purpose' as defined in the requirements PLUS (important point) any other aspects that they could reasonably be expected to apply to the job. (After all, they are supposed to be the procurement professionals, right?). And they're accountable to the user for doing this.
The Duty Holder is then responsible for accepting the system. Or rejecting it. Once accepted, the user maintains that 'fitness for purpose' via their CAMO and aircrew and personnel training systems.
In both cases, they are required to apply the relevant MAA regs while they discharge these responsibilities.
Now, does all this actually happen all the time in the real world? That's the big question, to which I don't have the answer.
Hope this helps a little, best regards as ever to all those reading these big books,
Engines
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Chug,
Saw your post after I'd posted my last one - sorry.
We're loudly agreeing on one point. The accident investigators should never have been put in the MAA in my view. Haddon-Cave made a passing reference to how the RAF did accident investigation, made a number of incomplete and inaccurate statements about the other services and then produced a wholly unrelated recommendation. That then got hijacked into the MAA 'land grab'.
I will gently differ from you on ownership and independence. The MoD has a duty to endure the safe operation of its systems, and that is properly discharged via what was called the Defence Safety Board, which is where the nuclear and explosive safety boards (e.g. the old CINO) used to report into. MAA should have plugged straight into that.
My concern has always been that making the MAA a three star reporting directly to S of S was an overreaction to Haddon Cave, that was not required and gave the MAA a level of 'heft' it didn't actually need.
True and complete independence is always going to be a problem - 'who watches the watchmen'? The MAA's own Safety Advisory Committee is supposed to 'challenge' the MAA, but looking at it's composition (Chair is a retired Air Marshal), it's doesn't look as independent as it might - just too much hefty blight blue stuff around for my comfort - but I'm probably biased.
Best regards as ever to all those who damn well care,
Engines
Saw your post after I'd posted my last one - sorry.
We're loudly agreeing on one point. The accident investigators should never have been put in the MAA in my view. Haddon-Cave made a passing reference to how the RAF did accident investigation, made a number of incomplete and inaccurate statements about the other services and then produced a wholly unrelated recommendation. That then got hijacked into the MAA 'land grab'.
I will gently differ from you on ownership and independence. The MoD has a duty to endure the safe operation of its systems, and that is properly discharged via what was called the Defence Safety Board, which is where the nuclear and explosive safety boards (e.g. the old CINO) used to report into. MAA should have plugged straight into that.
My concern has always been that making the MAA a three star reporting directly to S of S was an overreaction to Haddon Cave, that was not required and gave the MAA a level of 'heft' it didn't actually need.
True and complete independence is always going to be a problem - 'who watches the watchmen'? The MAA's own Safety Advisory Committee is supposed to 'challenge' the MAA, but looking at it's composition (Chair is a retired Air Marshal), it's doesn't look as independent as it might - just too much hefty blight blue stuff around for my comfort - but I'm probably biased.
Best regards as ever to all those who damn well care,
Engines
Chug
Interesting that on the MAA website it defines "independent" as "external to the MoD."
Military Aviation Authority | MAA Safety Advisory Committee
Engines
Thanks for reply. Something to ponder. Thinking about it I believe it was the C130 IPTL who stated in court he didn't know how to achieve fitness for purpose or who was responsible. Glad to be corrected if wrong.
Interesting that on the MAA website it defines "independent" as "external to the MoD."
Military Aviation Authority | MAA Safety Advisory Committee
Engines
Thanks for reply. Something to ponder. Thinking about it I believe it was the C130 IPTL who stated in court he didn't know how to achieve fitness for purpose or who was responsible. Glad to be corrected if wrong.
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It's an interesting discussion as ever, although starting to creep away from original Just Culture question.
I'd just like to come back on a few points. Firstly, regarding Splash' comment about Air Safety, my understanding is that Air Safety = Flight Safety + Airworthiness + All the other new MAA stuff. I remember when DASC was formed it was all about Aviation Safety = FS + AW, but whilst it was a nice idea the reality was somewhat different.
In terms of independence, perhaps a radical approach is for the European Defence Agency to assume an EASA type role, at least in terms of airworthiness.
Finally, to come back to Just Culture. Normally, it is considered in the personal sense but I think more needs to be done to consider Just Culture in the organisational context. When organisational failings are identified then there should also be a way to hold parts of an organisation to account for deliberately breaking rules.
Sorry, too many points in one message but hopefully you get my drift.
I'd just like to come back on a few points. Firstly, regarding Splash' comment about Air Safety, my understanding is that Air Safety = Flight Safety + Airworthiness + All the other new MAA stuff. I remember when DASC was formed it was all about Aviation Safety = FS + AW, but whilst it was a nice idea the reality was somewhat different.
In terms of independence, perhaps a radical approach is for the European Defence Agency to assume an EASA type role, at least in terms of airworthiness.
Finally, to come back to Just Culture. Normally, it is considered in the personal sense but I think more needs to be done to consider Just Culture in the organisational context. When organisational failings are identified then there should also be a way to hold parts of an organisation to account for deliberately breaking rules.
Sorry, too many points in one message but hopefully you get my drift.
dervish:-
I see that they are referring not to the MAA itself, but to their Safety Advisory Committee, which as has been pointed out already by Engines is headed by a retired Air Marshal! I seem to remember that the MAA used to trumpet itself as being independent once, perhaps pennies are beginning to drop even there?
Engines:-
The $64,000 question of course. I would merely point out that when they are Regulators and Investigators they may have have less compunction about enforcing Regulation and performing stringent Investigation when it is not directed at their employer.
It is that simple, and the mess that is UK Military Airworthiness and Air Accident Investigation can be traced back to that one factor. Perhaps Explosives and Nuclear Devices have their own ways of discouraging messing about with. As to ships, they seem to be much in the news recently and, as one who used to disgrace himself while on a Paddle Steamer ride around Bournemouth Bay, I am in no position to comment either on their seaworthiness or fitness for purpose. It may of course just be the difference between Air Marshals and Admirals...
Chug
Interesting that on the MAA website it defines "independent" as "external to the MoD."
Interesting that on the MAA website it defines "independent" as "external to the MoD."
Engines:-
'who watches the watchmen'?
It is that simple, and the mess that is UK Military Airworthiness and Air Accident Investigation can be traced back to that one factor. Perhaps Explosives and Nuclear Devices have their own ways of discouraging messing about with. As to ships, they seem to be much in the news recently and, as one who used to disgrace himself while on a Paddle Steamer ride around Bournemouth Bay, I am in no position to comment either on their seaworthiness or fitness for purpose. It may of course just be the difference between Air Marshals and Admirals...
