RAF Rivet Joint
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Let us remind ourselves of a couple of statements made by Haddon-Cave in his Nimrod Review report
(1) Like a case in law, the Safety Case is a body of evidence presented as a reasoned argument. Unlike most areas of the law, the activities are not presumed innocent until proven guilty: the Safety Case must prove that a system is safe.
(2) The concept of an“implicit Safety Case” does not comply with Lord Cullen’s concept of a “thorough assessment” of the risks posed by a platform. This is because, in effect, the notion assumes that a legacy aircraft is safe merely because it was built to design and has been operating without mishap for a number of years.
"It seems to have function safely for the last x years", is not acceptable
DV
(1) Like a case in law, the Safety Case is a body of evidence presented as a reasoned argument. Unlike most areas of the law, the activities are not presumed innocent until proven guilty: the Safety Case must prove that a system is safe.
(2) The concept of an“implicit Safety Case” does not comply with Lord Cullen’s concept of a “thorough assessment” of the risks posed by a platform. This is because, in effect, the notion assumes that a legacy aircraft is safe merely because it was built to design and has been operating without mishap for a number of years.
"It seems to have function safely for the last x years", is not acceptable
DV
Cgb:-
No, and AFAIK no-one has ever claimed that because no-one has ever proved what caused the Mull crash, least of all of course the RO's. What has been proved was that whatever caused the crash it was an Airworthiness Related Accident because the aircraft, along with all its sister Mk2's at the time, was released into RAF service in a knowingly Grossly Unairworthy Condition under an illegal RTS.
If airworthiness had been accorded a higher priority, indeed any priority, by those fighting the RO's Grossly Unjust Finding then not only might it have been reversed years earlier but the malevolent attack by VSOs on UK Military Air Safety might also have been revealed years earlier.
So much water, so many bridges...
Err, can anyone prove that (lack of) airworthiness caused the Mull crash? Thought not.
If airworthiness had been accorded a higher priority, indeed any priority, by those fighting the RO's Grossly Unjust Finding then not only might it have been reversed years earlier but the malevolent attack by VSOs on UK Military Air Safety might also have been revealed years earlier.
So much water, so many bridges...
The Snatch replacement programme was called Future Northern Ireland Patrol Vehicle (FNIPV). Its ISD was, from memory, mid-00s. It was an endorsed programme in the late 90s. To achieve such a timescale it would have been staffed in the mid-90s. The Pinzgauer was already in service in, for example, 2002, before FNIPV selection had taken place. (Perhaps before, I'm only going from personal experience). I don't know if it was actually selected, or shortlisted, as the programme died a death. As of 2003 it was not part of FRES.
My point is that it is another example of MoD misleading by omission and commission when challenged over deaths, and similarly of them misleading/lying in Ministerial briefs. When Ministers of the day said Snatch was fit for purpose, effectively what they were saying was Iraq/Afg were more benign environments than NI.
The links to, for example, C130 XV179 are clear. Threat and Vulnerability Assessments would have immediately flagged Snatch was due for replacement, and why. This would, or should, have immediately brought forward the replacement programme, with an updated spec due to the T&VAs. This didn't happen until after many deaths and adverse publicity. In the same way the T&VAs for C130 showed she did not meet the design and airworthiness requirements for the use to which she was being put. Similarly, Nimrod and Chinook. The latter was deemed vulnerable to SAMs, but on 2.6.94 the status of any self protection kit was "not to be relied upon in any way whatsoever".
The common denominator is senior staffs in MoD knowingly took the decision to conceal these risks. One cannot say "Accept" because the facts were withheld and attempts made to conceal them from subsequent inquiries.
My point is that it is another example of MoD misleading by omission and commission when challenged over deaths, and similarly of them misleading/lying in Ministerial briefs. When Ministers of the day said Snatch was fit for purpose, effectively what they were saying was Iraq/Afg were more benign environments than NI.
The links to, for example, C130 XV179 are clear. Threat and Vulnerability Assessments would have immediately flagged Snatch was due for replacement, and why. This would, or should, have immediately brought forward the replacement programme, with an updated spec due to the T&VAs. This didn't happen until after many deaths and adverse publicity. In the same way the T&VAs for C130 showed she did not meet the design and airworthiness requirements for the use to which she was being put. Similarly, Nimrod and Chinook. The latter was deemed vulnerable to SAMs, but on 2.6.94 the status of any self protection kit was "not to be relied upon in any way whatsoever".
The common denominator is senior staffs in MoD knowingly took the decision to conceal these risks. One cannot say "Accept" because the facts were withheld and attempts made to conceal them from subsequent inquiries.
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Saxon
Originally Posted by tucumseh
The Snatch replacement programme was called Future Northern Ireland Patrol Vehicle (FNIPV).
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"Cowardice in Leadership" Link
I understand why NoVANav is upset with my post regarding the Rivet Joint maintenance program. Pride is a very difficult barrier to overcome. In posting #506, Tucumseh asked that I provide a link to my eBook, “Cowardicein Leadership”. Other forum members have privately asked for the link. Please pass this information on to the MAA and the MoD. I’m certain that it was withheld from them. https://secure.mybookorders.com/order/george-sarris.
Not sure if this is the same, but it's what we ended up with; dreadful vehicle!
Cowardice in Leadership: A lesson in Harassment, Intimidation and Reprisals
cpants, thanks for the link to your ebook re the harassment you have experienced, following your revelations of RC-135 airworthiness to Congress. Those who have followed the painful and tortuous threads on this Forum, re the demolition of UK Military Airworthiness, will immediately pickup on a similar process visited upon one of our members on this side of the pond. Another aspect no doubt of our 'special relationship'!
For those of us who do frequent this region, your book may be found in Kindle form here:-
I would beg the mods to let this stay, for this is hardly a premium priced article, and is completely in accordance with the OP. It is also a matter of vital importance to the RAF, a matter literally of life and death!
I revealed to Congress in 2008 that the United States Air Force was operating a fleet of specialized reconnaissance aircraft (RC-135s) that were not airworthy. The agency retaliated with an immediate attack on my character to divert attention away from the maintenance issues that I had reported. The diversion included a trip through the Pentagon, Congress, and the Nebraska State Court system. Eventually, government investigations substantiated the non-airworthy conditions that I had reported, but not before the United States had secured a 1.3 billion dollar foreign military sale to the United Kingdom for the same type of aircraft.
I would beg the mods to let this stay, for this is hardly a premium priced article, and is completely in accordance with the OP. It is also a matter of vital importance to the RAF, a matter literally of life and death!
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DV & others
I can see the issues of the past are seared into everyone's brain - my question is it possible to move on?
I totally agree with " The concept of an“implicit Safety Case” does not comply with Lord Cullen’s concept of a “thorough assessment” of the risks posed by a platform. This is because, in effect, the notion assumes that a legacy aircraft is safe merely because it was built to design and has been operating without mishap for a number of years.
On the other hand IF an aircraft has been operated for many years without mishap there is clearly a body of evidence (or a statistical number) that it is not as unsafe as (say) the F-104G or an Indian Mig-21.
For example the Boeing 777 has many years of safe flying with (perhaps) one airframe incident - it is statistically clearly safe - or safer - than just about any other airliner.
Does the Safety Case have to examine every possible issue and put a risk on it??
And how do we risk the "known unknowns"??
FYI I have been involved with a number of Safety Cases outside the aircraft industry and this is a problem everyone has to deal with when legacy infrastructure & systems are involved- I'm seriously interested in how different people approach this......
I can see the issues of the past are seared into everyone's brain - my question is it possible to move on?
I totally agree with " The concept of an“implicit Safety Case” does not comply with Lord Cullen’s concept of a “thorough assessment” of the risks posed by a platform. This is because, in effect, the notion assumes that a legacy aircraft is safe merely because it was built to design and has been operating without mishap for a number of years.
On the other hand IF an aircraft has been operated for many years without mishap there is clearly a body of evidence (or a statistical number) that it is not as unsafe as (say) the F-104G or an Indian Mig-21.
For example the Boeing 777 has many years of safe flying with (perhaps) one airframe incident - it is statistically clearly safe - or safer - than just about any other airliner.
Does the Safety Case have to examine every possible issue and put a risk on it??
And how do we risk the "known unknowns"??
FYI I have been involved with a number of Safety Cases outside the aircraft industry and this is a problem everyone has to deal with when legacy infrastructure & systems are involved- I'm seriously interested in how different people approach this......
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This Book
CPants you are one angry dude. I hope in writing your book you have cast aside some demons. I wish you a long and happy retirement. Spend time maintaining the Warbirds at your Commemorative Air Force or what ever you call it. I am sure that is more rewarding than the 55th and your skills will not be wasted. I do have some empathy for your situation.
WRT these three airplanes we have acquired I hope they have not been through the facility at Offurt you describe. Out of date rubbers, no inspections on high pressure cylinders. misplaced spacers, incorrectly routed cables chaffing through fairleads etc. As I understand, these three aircraft which may have been subject to blue fluid leaks and urine have been completely rebuilt by L3 at Greenville. You state that the TOs (APs in English) have been updated to reflect the latest build standard. I am sure our representatives will have validated the publications and maintenance schedules by crawling all over the aircraft at Greenville and over here. I know when I bought some US kit that was subject to ITAR we were forbidden from taking the lid off the box. This was the first thing we did and found out why! not all us Brits are that gullible.
I hope the MAA the Royal Air Force and the Air Seeker IPT can find a way to understand and mitigate the "known unknowns", demonstrate that the safety target is achieved etc.
Not sure if it is down to Tuc to send them a copy of your book.
WRT these three airplanes we have acquired I hope they have not been through the facility at Offurt you describe. Out of date rubbers, no inspections on high pressure cylinders. misplaced spacers, incorrectly routed cables chaffing through fairleads etc. As I understand, these three aircraft which may have been subject to blue fluid leaks and urine have been completely rebuilt by L3 at Greenville. You state that the TOs (APs in English) have been updated to reflect the latest build standard. I am sure our representatives will have validated the publications and maintenance schedules by crawling all over the aircraft at Greenville and over here. I know when I bought some US kit that was subject to ITAR we were forbidden from taking the lid off the box. This was the first thing we did and found out why! not all us Brits are that gullible.
I hope the MAA the Royal Air Force and the Air Seeker IPT can find a way to understand and mitigate the "known unknowns", demonstrate that the safety target is achieved etc.
Not sure if it is down to Tuc to send them a copy of your book.
Harry
Excellent post.
As dragartist says, the aircraft have been stripped and rebuilt by L-3. The problem you have to contend with is how to reconcile the differences between the new standard (rebuilt to different standards) and what has "operated for many years without mishap".
If the differences are minor, then the MAA may choose to give more weight to this historical evidence.
However, if the cumulative differences are great, there is no supporting evidence to plug gaps in knowledge and the Aircraft DA is reluctant to sign up to changes, then the MAA may play the red card. The evidence suggests something like this has occurred.
It boils down to "engineering judgement". As MoD admits it lacks this expertise, Philip Hammond will presumably bring his to bear.
Excellent post.
On the other hand IF an aircraft has been operated for many years without mishap there is clearly a body of evidence (or a statistical number) that it is not as unsafe as (say) the F-104G or an Indian Mig-21.
As dragartist says, the aircraft have been stripped and rebuilt by L-3. The problem you have to contend with is how to reconcile the differences between the new standard (rebuilt to different standards) and what has "operated for many years without mishap".
If the differences are minor, then the MAA may choose to give more weight to this historical evidence.
However, if the cumulative differences are great, there is no supporting evidence to plug gaps in knowledge and the Aircraft DA is reluctant to sign up to changes, then the MAA may play the red card. The evidence suggests something like this has occurred.
It boils down to "engineering judgement". As MoD admits it lacks this expertise, Philip Hammond will presumably bring his to bear.
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There is, of course, another less worrying possibility... maybe the full documentation, including the performance figures, is quite expensive and therefore delivery (and hence the payment for this) has been slipped to the next financial year to save costs? (not an unknown state of affairs). If this is the case then the aircraft will certainly be up and operating by the end of the year as stated by the MOD to local TV.
W. (clutching at straws).
W. (clutching at straws).
"If this is the case then the aircraft will certainly be up and operating by the end of the year as stated by the MOD to local TV."
'Operating' may be a mute point that will continue to fuel the debate, but 'up' is more tangible. With Waddington's runway due for major work from early July if its not 'up' by then it won't be for some considerable time.
Part of the plan - we would fly it but unfortunately can't because of the runway repairs.....??
CAEBr
'Operating' may be a mute point that will continue to fuel the debate, but 'up' is more tangible. With Waddington's runway due for major work from early July if its not 'up' by then it won't be for some considerable time.
Part of the plan - we would fly it but unfortunately can't because of the runway repairs.....??
CAEBr
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CPants Comments and Book: Nothing to do with Rivet Joint!
The aircraft and incidents CPants writes about concern RC-135E Rivet Amber, which disappeared over the Bering Sea in Jun 1969. This WAS NOT a Rivet Joint aircraft!
My error in reading very similiar tail numbers. The aircraft in question was a TC-135, converted into an aerodynamic Rivet Joint configuration as a "bounce bird". It does not carry mission equipment.
CPants made the local news with his claims for about one day. Not a factor in fully-configured Rivet Joint aircraft.
For the record, two Cobra Ball RC-135s have crashed at Shemya AFB and one RC-135 trainer near Valdez, Alaska, in addition to the Rivet Amber. All except Rivet Amber were the result of pilot error.
No Rivet Joints or Combat Sents, current operational RC-135V, W, and Us, have ever crashed or caused an airborne loss of life.
My error in reading very similiar tail numbers. The aircraft in question was a TC-135, converted into an aerodynamic Rivet Joint configuration as a "bounce bird". It does not carry mission equipment.
CPants made the local news with his claims for about one day. Not a factor in fully-configured Rivet Joint aircraft.
For the record, two Cobra Ball RC-135s have crashed at Shemya AFB and one RC-135 trainer near Valdez, Alaska, in addition to the Rivet Amber. All except Rivet Amber were the result of pilot error.
No Rivet Joints or Combat Sents, current operational RC-135V, W, and Us, have ever crashed or caused an airborne loss of life.
Last edited by NoVANav; 22nd Apr 2014 at 20:31. Reason: Correct error.
The aircraft and incidents CPants writes about concern RC-135E Rivet Amber
I refer you to post 510 (Orac's question) and cpants reply at post 517
I understand Rivet Amber was the name given to a single aircraft which was lost in 1969. Plenty of learned stuff readily available. LFH
To ORAC
cpants makes proper reference to RC-135 (62-4127). Rivet Amber was not a player in his 2008 disclosure to Congress.
cpants makes proper reference to RC-135 (62-4127). Rivet Amber was not a player in his 2008 disclosure to Congress.
Last edited by Lordflasheart; 22nd Apr 2014 at 14:37.