The morale aspect is interesting, however may I proffer the following?
The British strategy for re-taking the Falklands was that of unopposed amphibious landing followed by advance to contact and infantry battle.
I have read that the Argetinians suspected (as a result of USMC thinking) that the Brits would mount an opposed landing ivo Stanley itself.
But I tend to think that the infantry battles fought mainly at night were the crux of the conflict. Whoever won those won the war. It is possible that the Argentinians could have stopped them by disrupting the British supply chain or by sinking the amphibious shipping prior to disembarkation. So to me Stanley becomes a bit of a side show. It would not have been a side show had we managed to close it (through bombing, NGS etc) but we didn't and our strategy was not that of 'laying seige' because we had a time pressure from the South Atlantic winter. Thus the Argentinians had to win the air-sea battle at San Carlos or the battles in the mountains. The British had to win both.
From what I have seen of the battlefields the Argentinian infantry had decent kit, were fed (although accounts vary as to how well) and certainly never ran out of ammunition.
Maybe our Argentinian sources could reflect on the effect the bombing of Stanley had on those in defensive positions elsewhere? Other than the C-130 kill by FRS 1 were any re-supply flights cancelled or turned back due to CAP, NGS or bombing?