Decision to axe Harrier is "bonkers".
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"Lets hope we don't make similar mistakes when it comes to procuring F35C. Buy enough!!! "
Your senior officer would have to be crazy to refuse you!
BAAAAAAAAAAAAA!!!!!
with due apologies to Blackadder.
Your senior officer would have to be crazy to refuse you!
BAAAAAAAAAAAAA!!!!!
with due apologies to Blackadder.
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Wrath,
It's a given that the larger the force, the larger the operation they can sustain. However, I'm afraid that unless the Harrier force had got a lot less efficient than it was, you absolutely could maintain a decent CAS CAP from a carrier off the coast with 50 aircraft. We used to practice it back in SHAR days from similar sized fleet. I agree that an airborne CAP is better than having an 'alert' type aircraft on the deck - that's why I said airborne CAP from the carrier. And I must assure you that you can get a hell of a lot of 'air' from a small number of aircraft on a carrier if you are organised and practiced.
JAJ, Yes, artillery can be a very fleeting target indeed. It's called 'shoot and scoot' and the Libyan Army can doubtlessly do it. Remember those pesky Scuds we couldn't find? Artillery can be far more mobile than that.
Yes, the cupboard was bare, and yes, the choices had to be made. However, the fact was that the RAF decided to sacrifice maritime strike to maintain the GR4 force. There was an option to draw down some GR4 and maintain Harrier, among others, but that was not taken up, at the behest of the RAF. I truly don't accept that a mixed force would not have been able to offer a viable capability for the nation, but there we will have to differ.
What can't be denied is that conducting the Libyan op from land bases a long way away is going to put more strain and usage on the strike, AD and tanker aircraft and the crews than doing it from a closer boat. The fact that the RAF are managing to get anything over the targets is a tribute to their professionalism, which I always take care to recognise.
Last post from me here, as ever,
very best regards
Engines
It's a given that the larger the force, the larger the operation they can sustain. However, I'm afraid that unless the Harrier force had got a lot less efficient than it was, you absolutely could maintain a decent CAS CAP from a carrier off the coast with 50 aircraft. We used to practice it back in SHAR days from similar sized fleet. I agree that an airborne CAP is better than having an 'alert' type aircraft on the deck - that's why I said airborne CAP from the carrier. And I must assure you that you can get a hell of a lot of 'air' from a small number of aircraft on a carrier if you are organised and practiced.
JAJ, Yes, artillery can be a very fleeting target indeed. It's called 'shoot and scoot' and the Libyan Army can doubtlessly do it. Remember those pesky Scuds we couldn't find? Artillery can be far more mobile than that.
Yes, the cupboard was bare, and yes, the choices had to be made. However, the fact was that the RAF decided to sacrifice maritime strike to maintain the GR4 force. There was an option to draw down some GR4 and maintain Harrier, among others, but that was not taken up, at the behest of the RAF. I truly don't accept that a mixed force would not have been able to offer a viable capability for the nation, but there we will have to differ.
What can't be denied is that conducting the Libyan op from land bases a long way away is going to put more strain and usage on the strike, AD and tanker aircraft and the crews than doing it from a closer boat. The fact that the RAF are managing to get anything over the targets is a tribute to their professionalism, which I always take care to recognise.
Last post from me here, as ever,
very best regards
Engines
Justanopinion/Wrathmonk
The late 2009 reduction in Harrier numbers was a stealthy hit against the RN.
Likewise, the reduction in active Harrier numbers — from around 60 to around 40, unless I’m mistaken — translates into “less embarked time at sea for Joint Force Harrier squadrons,” Stanhope said.
I heard a rumour that the First Sea Lord at the time would have been willing to sacrifice ships to protect Harrier numbers....
Engines
I also wondered why the Sea Harrier force had been able to keep up a high operational tempo with around thirty aicraft - but this couldn't be done nowadays? I assume that the high sortie rate wasn't just down to the Sea Harrier squadrons, but to the CVS crews, from chockheads experienced in working with live jets on the flight deck down to the ME watchkeepers?
Which brings us back to basics - how will the skills been kept/regenerated for the future? I know there is talk of limited numbers of personnel going on exchange, but...
I would suggest that basics are basics, regardless of whether the future is V/STOL or involves "Cats and traps". Will there be exchanges for lots of chockheads - moving live jets on deck 24 hours a day in all weather in rough sea states, the people who fuel, arm and work on aircraft on deck - amongst jet blast (and FOD issues) the OOW and bridge team - who have to put the ship in the right place, direction and speed for aircraft to take off or land, Ops Room personnel - who have to operate sensors/weapons and talk to aircraft, maintainers of this equipment, landing aids maintainers, the ME watchkeepers keeping a nice level deck and increasing speed when needed, ATC types, Fighter Controllers, senior Officers in the carrier (Cdr(Air), Lt Cdr(Flying), Captain, XO) - they need to know how to run things, senior Officers elsewhere (MOD, Navy Command, task group commanders) who need to know how aircraft are used as task group weapons, etc?
Did the people who made this decision (the Prime Minister himself apparently, and CAS and the then CDS) understand this? The First Sea Lord did....
The MOD website recently had this story about the new defence agreement with France. Surely having an OPERATIONAL carrier (with aircraft) would help?
Back to Libya, where it now appears that there are gaps in the implementation of the no fly zone - maybe having bases so far away is making things difficult?
Gaddafi destroys Misrata rebels' fuel supply in air raid
Light aircraft normally used for spraying pesticides were deployed for the overnight attack in Qasr Ahmed, close to the port, rebel spokesman Ahmed Hassan said today.
Bombs were dropped on four large storage tanks, destroying them and sparking a huge blaze that spread to four more, he said.
Nato was notified by the rebels about the planes before the attack but did not respond, said Hassan.
Time=Distance/Speed strikes again?
Also reported by Sky News. Also by the BBC:
There were also unconfirmed reports from rebels that pro-Gaddafi forces were using helicopters with the Red Cross or Red Crescent insignia to carry out their assault on Misrata.
Some time ago a mention was made of the possible use of naval gunfire. Well, it has happened - see here. More specifically, see this (in French). I believe the following is a decent translation:
For the first time other than for exercise, a French Navy frigate has opened fire against land targets with its main gun. This action occurred on the night of 7 May. The frigates Billhook and Jean Bart were on a mission monitoring the Libyan coast when the Billhook spotted fire from a battery of rocket launchers on the coastal strip to the south east of the beseiged city of Misurata. The French unit opened fire with its 100mm mounting to stop the bombardment of the civilian population. At least one of the rocket launcher vehicles was destroyed.
"This action underlines the complementary nature of the naval embargo and air component in the French involvement with the implementation of Resolution 1973 aimed at protecting the civilian population", explained the French Navy.
This engagement by the Billhook also demonstrates the utility of the gun in littoral operations. In this case, gunfire enabled the neutralisation of the threat effectively and at low cost.
A Fayette type frigate, the Courbet has a Mk 68 100mm turret with stealth shape and upgraded technology. The mounting weighs a total of 22 tons, has a rate of fire of 80 rounds per minute and a maximum range of 20 km. Targeting is conducted using the CTM Fire Control System which can track a target at night as easily as by day. The mounting can be used against aircraft, targets on the surface or targets on the coast.
The MOD also has a story about the logistics of RAF operations in Libya:
Transporting vital equipment for Libya operations
To date, in support of Operation ELLAMY, 2 MT Squadron personnel, based at RAF Wittering, have travelled the equivalent distance of eight times around the world and transported 1,680 tonnes of kit down to the airfield at Gioia del Colle to support 906 Expeditionary Air Wing.
So why do people seem to pretend there are no logistical (or security) issues with deploying to an airfield in a friendly nation? Later...
Some are still deployed in Italy and France maintaining the sustainment supply convoys that continue to leave RAF Wittering on a regular basis.
Will there be "lessons learnt" at some point?
The late 2009 reduction in Harrier numbers was a stealthy hit against the RN.
Likewise, the reduction in active Harrier numbers — from around 60 to around 40, unless I’m mistaken — translates into “less embarked time at sea for Joint Force Harrier squadrons,” Stanhope said.
I heard a rumour that the First Sea Lord at the time would have been willing to sacrifice ships to protect Harrier numbers....
Engines
I also wondered why the Sea Harrier force had been able to keep up a high operational tempo with around thirty aicraft - but this couldn't be done nowadays? I assume that the high sortie rate wasn't just down to the Sea Harrier squadrons, but to the CVS crews, from chockheads experienced in working with live jets on the flight deck down to the ME watchkeepers?
Which brings us back to basics - how will the skills been kept/regenerated for the future? I know there is talk of limited numbers of personnel going on exchange, but...
I would suggest that basics are basics, regardless of whether the future is V/STOL or involves "Cats and traps". Will there be exchanges for lots of chockheads - moving live jets on deck 24 hours a day in all weather in rough sea states, the people who fuel, arm and work on aircraft on deck - amongst jet blast (and FOD issues) the OOW and bridge team - who have to put the ship in the right place, direction and speed for aircraft to take off or land, Ops Room personnel - who have to operate sensors/weapons and talk to aircraft, maintainers of this equipment, landing aids maintainers, the ME watchkeepers keeping a nice level deck and increasing speed when needed, ATC types, Fighter Controllers, senior Officers in the carrier (Cdr(Air), Lt Cdr(Flying), Captain, XO) - they need to know how to run things, senior Officers elsewhere (MOD, Navy Command, task group commanders) who need to know how aircraft are used as task group weapons, etc?
Did the people who made this decision (the Prime Minister himself apparently, and CAS and the then CDS) understand this? The First Sea Lord did....
The MOD website recently had this story about the new defence agreement with France. Surely having an OPERATIONAL carrier (with aircraft) would help?
Back to Libya, where it now appears that there are gaps in the implementation of the no fly zone - maybe having bases so far away is making things difficult?
Gaddafi destroys Misrata rebels' fuel supply in air raid
Light aircraft normally used for spraying pesticides were deployed for the overnight attack in Qasr Ahmed, close to the port, rebel spokesman Ahmed Hassan said today.
Bombs were dropped on four large storage tanks, destroying them and sparking a huge blaze that spread to four more, he said.
Nato was notified by the rebels about the planes before the attack but did not respond, said Hassan.
Time=Distance/Speed strikes again?
Also reported by Sky News. Also by the BBC:
There were also unconfirmed reports from rebels that pro-Gaddafi forces were using helicopters with the Red Cross or Red Crescent insignia to carry out their assault on Misrata.
Some time ago a mention was made of the possible use of naval gunfire. Well, it has happened - see here. More specifically, see this (in French). I believe the following is a decent translation:
For the first time other than for exercise, a French Navy frigate has opened fire against land targets with its main gun. This action occurred on the night of 7 May. The frigates Billhook and Jean Bart were on a mission monitoring the Libyan coast when the Billhook spotted fire from a battery of rocket launchers on the coastal strip to the south east of the beseiged city of Misurata. The French unit opened fire with its 100mm mounting to stop the bombardment of the civilian population. At least one of the rocket launcher vehicles was destroyed.
"This action underlines the complementary nature of the naval embargo and air component in the French involvement with the implementation of Resolution 1973 aimed at protecting the civilian population", explained the French Navy.
This engagement by the Billhook also demonstrates the utility of the gun in littoral operations. In this case, gunfire enabled the neutralisation of the threat effectively and at low cost.
A Fayette type frigate, the Courbet has a Mk 68 100mm turret with stealth shape and upgraded technology. The mounting weighs a total of 22 tons, has a rate of fire of 80 rounds per minute and a maximum range of 20 km. Targeting is conducted using the CTM Fire Control System which can track a target at night as easily as by day. The mounting can be used against aircraft, targets on the surface or targets on the coast.
The MOD also has a story about the logistics of RAF operations in Libya:
Transporting vital equipment for Libya operations
To date, in support of Operation ELLAMY, 2 MT Squadron personnel, based at RAF Wittering, have travelled the equivalent distance of eight times around the world and transported 1,680 tonnes of kit down to the airfield at Gioia del Colle to support 906 Expeditionary Air Wing.
So why do people seem to pretend there are no logistical (or security) issues with deploying to an airfield in a friendly nation? Later...
Some are still deployed in Italy and France maintaining the sustainment supply convoys that continue to leave RAF Wittering on a regular basis.
Will there be "lessons learnt" at some point?
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OK, this is probably a silly question and I expect to get my head bitten off, but... its seems an interesting one to ask. How easy (and costly) would it be to knock up a fleet of say 100 new-build "super harriers" based on existing, but modern technology? I was thinking of something that revisited / updated the P.1154 concept with supersonic plenum-chamber burning Pegasus, modern lightweight composite structure, with electronics / avionics kit adapted from the Typhoon, and as far as possible stealth-equipped OK I realise the stealth may be difficult to meet, but surely something with a similar stealth performance to a Typhoon should be possible? Surely it must be possible to put together an aircraft which offered low development risk, using existing available technology and materials and would offer a low-cost carrier alternative to the F-35? After all the plenum-burning Pegasus was sorted as a concept years ago, you'd just need to work out how to hide the IR signature a bit. But overall, surely there must have been enough work already done on updated Harrier concepts for someone to be able to put together a low-risk design fairly quickly? and cheaply?
French frigate FNS Courbet has been targeting Gadaffi forces near Misrata during the night of 7th and 8th May.
Mer et Marine : Toute l'actualité maritime
TJ
Mer et Marine : Toute l'actualité maritime
TJ
HMS Liverpool has done some NGS too, as reported by Navy News:
Pro-government forces have made sustained attempts to block the approaches to Misrata port with mines, including one thwarted by HMS Brocklesby a fortnight ago when the Portsmouth-based minehunter blew up a mine laid a mile or so off the harbour.
Last night Liverpool and other NATO warships were sent in to intercept inflatable boats seen approaching Misrata; the small fast craft are used to lay and anchor the mines to the seabed.
As the force moved in, one of the regime’s coastal batteries fired a salvo at Liverpool – which missed – and the destroyer immediately sent a response of steel and fire in the direction of the rocket launchers which promptly ceased firing.
The sweep by the Allied warships also caused the pro-Gaddafi boats to abandon their mining operation before laying their deadly ‘eggs’.
Carrier based aircraft (like Harrier) would be useful in providing a rapid response to rogue aircraft (see above post), rocket and artillery positions, and small boats. Additionally the embarked Sea King and Merlin helicopters would add to situational awareness, and help make up for lack of a UK MPA capability, not to mention the command and control, and intelligence gathering capabilities of the CVS herself.
The Liverpool NGS event was also mentioned here:
HMS Liverpool’s tangle with Libyan forces was the Royal Navy’s most-significant war action since the First Gulf War, a leading historian said.
Top naval historian Professor Andrew Lambert, of King’s College London, said: ‘In 1991, a silkworm missile was fired at a US warship and HMS Gloucester intercepted it with a Sea Dart missile. That was the last big thing until now.’
Prof Lambert argues yesterday’s attack demonstrates the increasing desperation of the Libyan regime.
He said: ‘It’s a highly unusual thing to happen. I sense Gaddafi is feeling the pressure and lashed out.
‘The role navies are playing is destroying Gaddafi’s Libya. Libya exports oil and the blockade has meant he has lost his ability to make money from the sea. This would not have been a random attack. These ships are squeezing the life out of Gaddafi’s regime and he’s fighting back.’
Given Gaddafi's reported use of light aircraft and helicopters, which suggest gaps in the no fly zone, does this mean there is a potential air threat off of the Libyan coast? Are we sure he doesn't still have a few MiGs safely tucked away, ready for a bolt out of the blue attack? What about attacks against vulnerable MCMVs, or against ships' helicopters?
On the topic of carriers and Libya: Despite criticism, aircraft carriers stake new claims at forefront of naval power
“The whole idea is about being able to project power,” said Rear Adm. Philippe Coindreau, commander of the French navy task force that has led the air strikes on Libya since March 22.
“An aircraft carrier is perfectly suited to these kinds of conflicts, and this ship demonstrates it every day,” he said in an interview aboard the French carrier Charles de Gaulle, which has been launching daily raids against Moammar Gadhafi’s forces since the international intervention in the Libyan conflict began March 22.
The 42,000-ton nuclear-powered carrier has been joined in this task by another smaller ship, Italy’s 14,000-ton Giuseppe Garibaldi.
Going back to the more general topics of this thread, Defence News reports the public comments of the First Sea Lord:
Loss of Carrier Strike Capability Top Concern of Royal Navy Chief
Giving evidence alongside the heads of the Army and Air Force on the impact of last year's defense review, Stanhope said that retaining HMS Ark Royal and its fleet of Harrier strike aircraft would have been his top priority if the government's strategic defense review and associated four-year defense spending plan could be revisited.
Later....
Withdrawing Ark Royal and the Harriers earlier this year was by far the most controversial element of the defense spending cuts. Stanhope later indicated he would not oppose resurrecting the Harrier force if possible and if money was made available to support the aircraft.Stanhope and Air Marshal Sir Stephen Dalton, the chief of the Air Staff, were asked by a defense committee member whether returning the Harrier force to service had gone beyond the point of no return.
Dalton said it had. But Stanhope responded that while Dalton's statement was correct, he would "like to think that should a decision [be made to reassess the Harrier force, we could], look again. It all comes down to money."
Stanhope said the Royal Navy is faced with the task of regenerating the carrier force in the latter half of the decade as a new aircraft carrier and the F-35C fighter become available. Rebuilding an aircraft carrier force around 2019 could only be done with the assistance of allied carrier operators France and the U.S., he said. Such a program is now being developed, Stanhope said.
Also: British Military Warns It Is Stretched to Capacity
Sir Mark also said he regretted the decision to retire Britain's two aircraft carriers and said it will be a "major challenge" to regenerate that capability when new carriers are brought into service in around ten years time, given the loss of relevant skills.
Pompey news also covers this: Navy chief sounds carrier warning
The First Sea Lord is a former CVS Captain are therefore has an understanding of all the different parts of ship involved in safe and efficient fixed wing flying operations. He opposed the axing of Harrier, and gave his support to the idea of using Reservists to maintain a small number of Harriers.
You may also be interested in this video of the three Service Chiefs giving evidence to the House Of Commons Defence Commitee. The issue of losing fixed wing carrier aviation capability, and then having to regenerate it later this decade, is mentioned by the First Sea Lord from the 37 minute point onwards. The issue of whether Harrier is too far gone seems to be another area where 1SL and CAS are not exactly in agreement. In fact the Admiral appears to be completely unable to say whether or not he agrees with CAS.
Pro-government forces have made sustained attempts to block the approaches to Misrata port with mines, including one thwarted by HMS Brocklesby a fortnight ago when the Portsmouth-based minehunter blew up a mine laid a mile or so off the harbour.
Last night Liverpool and other NATO warships were sent in to intercept inflatable boats seen approaching Misrata; the small fast craft are used to lay and anchor the mines to the seabed.
As the force moved in, one of the regime’s coastal batteries fired a salvo at Liverpool – which missed – and the destroyer immediately sent a response of steel and fire in the direction of the rocket launchers which promptly ceased firing.
The sweep by the Allied warships also caused the pro-Gaddafi boats to abandon their mining operation before laying their deadly ‘eggs’.
Carrier based aircraft (like Harrier) would be useful in providing a rapid response to rogue aircraft (see above post), rocket and artillery positions, and small boats. Additionally the embarked Sea King and Merlin helicopters would add to situational awareness, and help make up for lack of a UK MPA capability, not to mention the command and control, and intelligence gathering capabilities of the CVS herself.
The Liverpool NGS event was also mentioned here:
HMS Liverpool’s tangle with Libyan forces was the Royal Navy’s most-significant war action since the First Gulf War, a leading historian said.
Top naval historian Professor Andrew Lambert, of King’s College London, said: ‘In 1991, a silkworm missile was fired at a US warship and HMS Gloucester intercepted it with a Sea Dart missile. That was the last big thing until now.’
Prof Lambert argues yesterday’s attack demonstrates the increasing desperation of the Libyan regime.
He said: ‘It’s a highly unusual thing to happen. I sense Gaddafi is feeling the pressure and lashed out.
‘The role navies are playing is destroying Gaddafi’s Libya. Libya exports oil and the blockade has meant he has lost his ability to make money from the sea. This would not have been a random attack. These ships are squeezing the life out of Gaddafi’s regime and he’s fighting back.’
Given Gaddafi's reported use of light aircraft and helicopters, which suggest gaps in the no fly zone, does this mean there is a potential air threat off of the Libyan coast? Are we sure he doesn't still have a few MiGs safely tucked away, ready for a bolt out of the blue attack? What about attacks against vulnerable MCMVs, or against ships' helicopters?
On the topic of carriers and Libya: Despite criticism, aircraft carriers stake new claims at forefront of naval power
“The whole idea is about being able to project power,” said Rear Adm. Philippe Coindreau, commander of the French navy task force that has led the air strikes on Libya since March 22.
“An aircraft carrier is perfectly suited to these kinds of conflicts, and this ship demonstrates it every day,” he said in an interview aboard the French carrier Charles de Gaulle, which has been launching daily raids against Moammar Gadhafi’s forces since the international intervention in the Libyan conflict began March 22.
The 42,000-ton nuclear-powered carrier has been joined in this task by another smaller ship, Italy’s 14,000-ton Giuseppe Garibaldi.
Going back to the more general topics of this thread, Defence News reports the public comments of the First Sea Lord:
Loss of Carrier Strike Capability Top Concern of Royal Navy Chief
Giving evidence alongside the heads of the Army and Air Force on the impact of last year's defense review, Stanhope said that retaining HMS Ark Royal and its fleet of Harrier strike aircraft would have been his top priority if the government's strategic defense review and associated four-year defense spending plan could be revisited.
Later....
Withdrawing Ark Royal and the Harriers earlier this year was by far the most controversial element of the defense spending cuts. Stanhope later indicated he would not oppose resurrecting the Harrier force if possible and if money was made available to support the aircraft.Stanhope and Air Marshal Sir Stephen Dalton, the chief of the Air Staff, were asked by a defense committee member whether returning the Harrier force to service had gone beyond the point of no return.
Dalton said it had. But Stanhope responded that while Dalton's statement was correct, he would "like to think that should a decision [be made to reassess the Harrier force, we could], look again. It all comes down to money."
Stanhope said the Royal Navy is faced with the task of regenerating the carrier force in the latter half of the decade as a new aircraft carrier and the F-35C fighter become available. Rebuilding an aircraft carrier force around 2019 could only be done with the assistance of allied carrier operators France and the U.S., he said. Such a program is now being developed, Stanhope said.
Also: British Military Warns It Is Stretched to Capacity
Sir Mark also said he regretted the decision to retire Britain's two aircraft carriers and said it will be a "major challenge" to regenerate that capability when new carriers are brought into service in around ten years time, given the loss of relevant skills.
Pompey news also covers this: Navy chief sounds carrier warning
The First Sea Lord is a former CVS Captain are therefore has an understanding of all the different parts of ship involved in safe and efficient fixed wing flying operations. He opposed the axing of Harrier, and gave his support to the idea of using Reservists to maintain a small number of Harriers.
You may also be interested in this video of the three Service Chiefs giving evidence to the House Of Commons Defence Commitee. The issue of losing fixed wing carrier aviation capability, and then having to regenerate it later this decade, is mentioned by the First Sea Lord from the 37 minute point onwards. The issue of whether Harrier is too far gone seems to be another area where 1SL and CAS are not exactly in agreement. In fact the Admiral appears to be completely unable to say whether or not he agrees with CAS.
Last edited by WE Branch Fanatic; 18th May 2011 at 20:31.
All the talk of even more defence cuts is depressing - particularly as we seem to have got ourselves into what could be a very lengthy commitment. Perhaps if the Prime Minister had not intervened at the last minute before the SDSR announcement was due (source) then would we be in this position? Perhaps reduced numbers of Tornados AND Harriers would have delivered greater savings?
In Libya related news, the amphibious exercise in the Med has started. Cyprus is not too many days sailing distance from Libya - is this part of cranking up the pressure against Tripoli?
As part of this, Apache has fired Hellfire at sea for the first time. This is interesting for three reasons:
1. It suggests possible use of Hellfire against FIACs and other asymetric threats - in other words the ship with a large deck (CVS/LPH/some RFAs - and LPD if hangar not essential) can provide a degree of force protection that a ship with a single helicopter cannot. A single boghammer with RPGs or even a explosive laden boat is not much of a threat - swarms of FIACs are, which is why we need carriers for future littoral operations. See this (PDF format) paper for more.
2. Apache/Hellfire could be based aboard Ocean and flown against shore targets. A big deck that moves is nice, isn't it Mr Cameron?
3. The story proves that the complex task of aircraft/ship integration (and weapons) is no easy feat:
Despite the majority of 656 Squadron having seen recent service in Afghanistan, the maritime environment presents many new challenges. Understanding shipborne life and learning new procedures for the preparation and movement of ammunition from the ship’s magazine to the deck, efficiently and safely, was no small achievement.
Apache first went to sea back in 2004, as Navy News reported back then. So that is SEVEN years from the first embarkations to the first Hellfire firings....
In Libya related news, the amphibious exercise in the Med has started. Cyprus is not too many days sailing distance from Libya - is this part of cranking up the pressure against Tripoli?
As part of this, Apache has fired Hellfire at sea for the first time. This is interesting for three reasons:
1. It suggests possible use of Hellfire against FIACs and other asymetric threats - in other words the ship with a large deck (CVS/LPH/some RFAs - and LPD if hangar not essential) can provide a degree of force protection that a ship with a single helicopter cannot. A single boghammer with RPGs or even a explosive laden boat is not much of a threat - swarms of FIACs are, which is why we need carriers for future littoral operations. See this (PDF format) paper for more.
2. Apache/Hellfire could be based aboard Ocean and flown against shore targets. A big deck that moves is nice, isn't it Mr Cameron?
3. The story proves that the complex task of aircraft/ship integration (and weapons) is no easy feat:
Despite the majority of 656 Squadron having seen recent service in Afghanistan, the maritime environment presents many new challenges. Understanding shipborne life and learning new procedures for the preparation and movement of ammunition from the ship’s magazine to the deck, efficiently and safely, was no small achievement.
Apache first went to sea back in 2004, as Navy News reported back then. So that is SEVEN years from the first embarkations to the first Hellfire firings....
Last edited by WE Branch Fanatic; 12th Aug 2011 at 09:53.
WEBF
As has been pointed out many times before there has been the same number of Tornado squadrons reduced as there were Harrier 
As for your
can you post that in the Libya thread (or is this just an attempt to keep bumping the Harrier thread....
.... like I've just done)
However, it is good to see that 656 Squadron have managed to adapt to the maritime environment without ever having done it before. Just like much of the RN will have to do when the QEII launches. Granted, it will be a bigger challenge but if the Army can do it then it can't be that difficult.....!
Perhaps reduced numbers of Tornados AND Harriers would have delivered greater savings?
As for your
In Libya related news
.... like I've just done)However, it is good to see that 656 Squadron have managed to adapt to the maritime environment without ever having done it before. Just like much of the RN will have to do when the QEII launches. Granted, it will be a bigger challenge but if the Army can do it then it can't be that difficult.....!
I have now edited the last post, which now notes that Apache first went to sea in 2004, but has only achieved weapon firings seven years later, so it cannot be that easy...
Now that we are talking about attacking targets at sea.....
With the loss of Harrier, the RN has lost Maverick. This is unfortunate as it could not only attack ground targets, but maritime ones too, as a US Navy P3 Orion recently did:
Further in the operation, U.S. Navy and coalition units came to aid of the Libyan people to engage Libyan Coast Guard vessel Vittoria and two smaller craft who were firing indiscriminately at merchant vessels in the port of Misrata, Libya, during the late evening of March 28.
Commander, Task Force (CTF) 65 led by Capt. Dan Shaffer, analyzed their collected data to move appropriate Joint Force Maritime Component Command (JFMCC) forces into position to observe real time events, making this operation the first time that a Sea Combat Commander has coordinated and executed a combined strike against hostile naval forces.
Vittoria was engaged and fired upon by a U.S. Navy P-3C Maritime Patrol aircraft with AGM-65 Maverick missiles; the first time that these missiles have ever been fired on a hostile vessel by a P-3C.
This seems like a useful capability that we are losing - we can no longer attack surface vessels beyond the range of frigate based Harpoons or Spearfish armed SSNs. For many vessels Harpoon or Spearfish would be unsuitable. Although attack hostile surface vessels is a Lynx role, less frigates means less Lynx platforms. Also would we risk Lynx in potentially hostile airspace?
Recently Gaddafi has used light aircraft and helicopters to attack rebel positions, taking advantage of the problems NATO faces in enforcing the no fly zone. I cannot help but wonder if he perhaps has a few surviving MiGs hidden from NATO. He has also shown an increasing willingness to attack NATO forces. Additionally there have been MiGs and attack helicopters operated by or on behalf of the rebels, and now Sea Shepherd are joining in.
What if Gaddafi loyalists attempt an air attack, perhaps against NATO warships (or their helicopters), as a propaganda coup? I suspect that the ROE for ships offshore from Libya will be very restrictive, and no ship based weapon or sensor can positively identify an aircraft. How useful would it be to have a manned jet, available as an organic asset, that can visually identify suspicious aircraft (and fire Sidewinder at them if needed)?
Incidentally, the Auriga deployment of 2010 featured the Ark Royal based Harrier GR9s doing air to air work against Hornets, both in self defence whilst doing ground attack and in air defence of the task group - directed on to the target by the ASaCS Sea King and shipborne fighter controllers. I think I am correct in thinking that the Harrier GR7/9 has splashed various jets in exercises.
As the current operations are the first post SDSR conflict, and the decision to axe Harrier was a last minute part of the SDSR, it is only right and proper that these issues are discussed here.
Now that we are talking about attacking targets at sea.....
With the loss of Harrier, the RN has lost Maverick. This is unfortunate as it could not only attack ground targets, but maritime ones too, as a US Navy P3 Orion recently did:
Further in the operation, U.S. Navy and coalition units came to aid of the Libyan people to engage Libyan Coast Guard vessel Vittoria and two smaller craft who were firing indiscriminately at merchant vessels in the port of Misrata, Libya, during the late evening of March 28.
Commander, Task Force (CTF) 65 led by Capt. Dan Shaffer, analyzed their collected data to move appropriate Joint Force Maritime Component Command (JFMCC) forces into position to observe real time events, making this operation the first time that a Sea Combat Commander has coordinated and executed a combined strike against hostile naval forces.
Vittoria was engaged and fired upon by a U.S. Navy P-3C Maritime Patrol aircraft with AGM-65 Maverick missiles; the first time that these missiles have ever been fired on a hostile vessel by a P-3C.
This seems like a useful capability that we are losing - we can no longer attack surface vessels beyond the range of frigate based Harpoons or Spearfish armed SSNs. For many vessels Harpoon or Spearfish would be unsuitable. Although attack hostile surface vessels is a Lynx role, less frigates means less Lynx platforms. Also would we risk Lynx in potentially hostile airspace?
Recently Gaddafi has used light aircraft and helicopters to attack rebel positions, taking advantage of the problems NATO faces in enforcing the no fly zone. I cannot help but wonder if he perhaps has a few surviving MiGs hidden from NATO. He has also shown an increasing willingness to attack NATO forces. Additionally there have been MiGs and attack helicopters operated by or on behalf of the rebels, and now Sea Shepherd are joining in.
What if Gaddafi loyalists attempt an air attack, perhaps against NATO warships (or their helicopters), as a propaganda coup? I suspect that the ROE for ships offshore from Libya will be very restrictive, and no ship based weapon or sensor can positively identify an aircraft. How useful would it be to have a manned jet, available as an organic asset, that can visually identify suspicious aircraft (and fire Sidewinder at them if needed)?
Incidentally, the Auriga deployment of 2010 featured the Ark Royal based Harrier GR9s doing air to air work against Hornets, both in self defence whilst doing ground attack and in air defence of the task group - directed on to the target by the ASaCS Sea King and shipborne fighter controllers. I think I am correct in thinking that the Harrier GR7/9 has splashed various jets in exercises.
As the current operations are the first post SDSR conflict, and the decision to axe Harrier was a last minute part of the SDSR, it is only right and proper that these issues are discussed here.
Last edited by WE Branch Fanatic; 18th May 2011 at 23:04.
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Harrier force association party
www.hfassoc.org/
Harrier Force Association for everyone who has had a connection with the Harrier; pilots, engineers and support personnel; officers, SNCOs, other ranks and civilians
On the 16th July the Harrier Force Association will be having a get together at RAF Wittering. Food and Drinks with air displays/ bands etc laid on.
Anyone who has worked on the Harrier be it in an Engineering capacity or god forbid those who flew are welcome to attend.
To attend you first need to register on the above link and give us a small dit about your Harrier connection.
On the day of the party there will be a small cost we estimate this to be approx £10 to £15.
It will be a chance to catch up with old friends and a chance to make new friends and to celebrate all the people who made this great aircraft great!
Harrier Force Association for everyone who has had a connection with the Harrier; pilots, engineers and support personnel; officers, SNCOs, other ranks and civilians
On the 16th July the Harrier Force Association will be having a get together at RAF Wittering. Food and Drinks with air displays/ bands etc laid on.
Anyone who has worked on the Harrier be it in an Engineering capacity or god forbid those who flew are welcome to attend.
To attend you first need to register on the above link and give us a small dit about your Harrier connection.
On the day of the party there will be a small cost we estimate this to be approx £10 to £15.
It will be a chance to catch up with old friends and a chance to make new friends and to celebrate all the people who made this great aircraft great!
The Prime Minister does not agree with 1SL, CGS, or CAS: David Cameron rebukes Armed Forces chiefs
Presumably he seems no problem in us losing the fixed wing carrier capability, and then having to build it up again from scratch. Since he talk a lot about the US and France helping us, what would happen if the US Chief of Naval Operations or the Chief of Staff of the French Navy also told him that losing the carrier capability and then regenerating later in the same decade it is both daft and dangerous?
The issue of the last minute ripping up of the SDSR, and it being distorted purely for PR reasons will not go away, as noted here in The Economist.
And had the SDSR not decided that Britain could take the risk of going a decade without an aircraft-carrier, the already decommissioned HMS Ark Royal and its Harrier jets would have joined carriers from France, Italy and America off the Libyan coast. Able to respond more quickly than the Tornados that are flying from Italy, the Harriers would have been especially handy for attacking Muammar Qaddafi’s tanks and mobile rocket-launchers. It turns out that much of the “legacy equipment for which there is no requirement”—to quote the SDSR—is still pretty useful.
This leads to an important question:
The basic question for British strategy is whether the ways and means implied by the SDSR can support the government’s still-ambitious military goals. Or, to put it another way, whether the government’s eyes for embarking on high-minded adventures of the Libyan kind are bigger than its stomach for resourcing them.
Presumably he seems no problem in us losing the fixed wing carrier capability, and then having to build it up again from scratch.
Since he talk a lot about the US and France helping us, what would happen if the US Chief of Naval Operations or the Chief of Staff of the French Navy also told him that losing the carrier capability and then regenerating later in the same decade it is both daft and dangerous?The issue of the last minute ripping up of the SDSR, and it being distorted purely for PR reasons will not go away, as noted here in The Economist.
And had the SDSR not decided that Britain could take the risk of going a decade without an aircraft-carrier, the already decommissioned HMS Ark Royal and its Harrier jets would have joined carriers from France, Italy and America off the Libyan coast. Able to respond more quickly than the Tornados that are flying from Italy, the Harriers would have been especially handy for attacking Muammar Qaddafi’s tanks and mobile rocket-launchers. It turns out that much of the “legacy equipment for which there is no requirement”—to quote the SDSR—is still pretty useful.
This leads to an important question:
The basic question for British strategy is whether the ways and means implied by the SDSR can support the government’s still-ambitious military goals. Or, to put it another way, whether the government’s eyes for embarking on high-minded adventures of the Libyan kind are bigger than its stomach for resourcing them.
Last edited by WE Branch Fanatic; 12th Aug 2011 at 09:54. Reason: Keyboard dyslexia
This morning, I saw the following article from Navy News: Life is breathed back in Lusty
The same story is on the RN site. She still has her ski jump - I had a slight fear that our politicians would demand its removal. She can still embark Harriers, now what was it the First Sea Lord said (source - Defense News)?
Giving evidence alongside the heads of the Army and Air Force on the impact of last year's defense review, Stanhope said that retaining HMS Ark Royal and its fleet of Harrier strike aircraft would have been his top priority if the government's strategic defense review and associated four-year defense spending plan could be revisited.
Later....
Withdrawing Ark Royal and the Harriers earlier this year was by far the most controversial element of the defense spending cuts. Stanhope later indicated he would not oppose resurrecting the Harrier force if possible and if money was made available to support the aircraft. Stanhope and Air Marshal Sir Stephen Dalton, the chief of the Air Staff, were asked by a defense committee member whether returning the Harrier force to service had gone beyond the point of no return.
Dalton said it had. But Stanhope responded that while Dalton's statement was correct, he would "like to think that should a decision [be made to reassess the Harrier force, we could], look again. It all comes down to money."
Stanhope said the Royal Navy is faced with the task of regenerating the carrier force in the latter half of the decade as a new aircraft carrier and the F-35C fighter become available. Rebuilding an aircraft carrier force around 2019 could only be done with the assistance of allied carrier operators France and the U.S., he said. Such a program is now being developed, Stanhope said.
I also think we need to consider the basics that we risk losing. To quote myself:
I would suggest that basics are basics, regardless of whether the future is V/STOL or involves "Cats and traps". Will there be exchanges for lots of chockheads - moving live jets on deck 24 hours a day in all weather in rough sea states, the people who fuel, arm and work on aircraft on deck - amongst jet blast (and FOD issues) the OOW and bridge team - who have to put the ship in the right place, direction and speed for aircraft to take off or land, Ops Room personnel - who have to operate sensors/weapons and talk to aircraft, maintainers of this equipment, landing aids maintainers, the ME watchkeepers keeping a nice level deck and increasing speed when needed, ATC types, Fighter Controllers, senior Officers in the carrier (Cdr(Air), Lt Cdr(Flying), Captain, XO) - they need to know how to run things, senior Officers elsewhere (MOD, Navy Command, task group commanders) who need to know how aircraft are used as task group weapons, etc?
Out of interest, how many AV8Bs have the US got wrapped up in Arizona? Swap a greater number of GR9s for a smaller number of AV8Bs (I guess they might be more willing to lease/lend ones that didn't get the + conversion, ie without radar but that would still be better than the alternative) - as I suggsted somwhere on this thread)?
This evening, two news stories caught my eye. Firstly another volcano erupting in Iceland, with possible disruption to UK aviation. Are RAF sorties still being flown all the way from the UK to Libya? If so, this may be something of a problem.
More significantly, the UK is now opting to deploy Ocean based Apaches to Libya, as mentioned here by the Telegraph, and on this PPRuNe thread.
So is this an admission that the Tornado GR4, for all its strengths, isn't quite as good for Close Air Support as Harrier would have been? Or is it an admission that in this case, even with friendly air bases being used, land based jets based 600 miles away are unable to respond quickly enough to deal with urgent (and fleeting) targets?
I have already mentioned the potential use of Hellfire or Maverick against maritime targets and Gaddafi's increasing willingness to attempt attacking NATO forces.
The same story is on the RN site. She still has her ski jump - I had a slight fear that our politicians would demand its removal. She can still embark Harriers, now what was it the First Sea Lord said (source - Defense News)?
Giving evidence alongside the heads of the Army and Air Force on the impact of last year's defense review, Stanhope said that retaining HMS Ark Royal and its fleet of Harrier strike aircraft would have been his top priority if the government's strategic defense review and associated four-year defense spending plan could be revisited.
Later....
Withdrawing Ark Royal and the Harriers earlier this year was by far the most controversial element of the defense spending cuts. Stanhope later indicated he would not oppose resurrecting the Harrier force if possible and if money was made available to support the aircraft. Stanhope and Air Marshal Sir Stephen Dalton, the chief of the Air Staff, were asked by a defense committee member whether returning the Harrier force to service had gone beyond the point of no return.
Dalton said it had. But Stanhope responded that while Dalton's statement was correct, he would "like to think that should a decision [be made to reassess the Harrier force, we could], look again. It all comes down to money."
Stanhope said the Royal Navy is faced with the task of regenerating the carrier force in the latter half of the decade as a new aircraft carrier and the F-35C fighter become available. Rebuilding an aircraft carrier force around 2019 could only be done with the assistance of allied carrier operators France and the U.S., he said. Such a program is now being developed, Stanhope said.
I also think we need to consider the basics that we risk losing. To quote myself:
I would suggest that basics are basics, regardless of whether the future is V/STOL or involves "Cats and traps". Will there be exchanges for lots of chockheads - moving live jets on deck 24 hours a day in all weather in rough sea states, the people who fuel, arm and work on aircraft on deck - amongst jet blast (and FOD issues) the OOW and bridge team - who have to put the ship in the right place, direction and speed for aircraft to take off or land, Ops Room personnel - who have to operate sensors/weapons and talk to aircraft, maintainers of this equipment, landing aids maintainers, the ME watchkeepers keeping a nice level deck and increasing speed when needed, ATC types, Fighter Controllers, senior Officers in the carrier (Cdr(Air), Lt Cdr(Flying), Captain, XO) - they need to know how to run things, senior Officers elsewhere (MOD, Navy Command, task group commanders) who need to know how aircraft are used as task group weapons, etc?
Out of interest, how many AV8Bs have the US got wrapped up in Arizona? Swap a greater number of GR9s for a smaller number of AV8Bs (I guess they might be more willing to lease/lend ones that didn't get the + conversion, ie without radar but that would still be better than the alternative) - as I suggsted somwhere on this thread)?
This evening, two news stories caught my eye. Firstly another volcano erupting in Iceland, with possible disruption to UK aviation. Are RAF sorties still being flown all the way from the UK to Libya? If so, this may be something of a problem.
More significantly, the UK is now opting to deploy Ocean based Apaches to Libya, as mentioned here by the Telegraph, and on this PPRuNe thread.
So is this an admission that the Tornado GR4, for all its strengths, isn't quite as good for Close Air Support as Harrier would have been? Or is it an admission that in this case, even with friendly air bases being used, land based jets based 600 miles away are unable to respond quickly enough to deal with urgent (and fleeting) targets?
I have already mentioned the potential use of Hellfire or Maverick against maritime targets and Gaddafi's increasing willingness to attempt attacking NATO forces.
Last edited by WE Branch Fanatic; 12th Aug 2011 at 09:55.
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So is this an admission that the Tornado GR4, for all its strengths, isn't quite as good for Close Air Support as Harrier would have been? Or is it an admission that in this case, even with friendly air bases being used, land based jets based 600 miles away are unable to respond quickly enough to deal with urgent (and fleeting) targets?
Firstly another volcano erupting in Iceland, with possible disruption to UK aviation. Are RAF sorties still being flown all the way from the UK to Libya? If so, this may be something of a problem
More significantly, the UK is now opting to deploy Ocean based Apaches to Libya, as mentioned here by the Telegraph, and on this PPRuNe thread
Honestly WEBF, I'm all in favour of a strong Navy and think that having Harriers would be better than not having Harriers (I suspect few would disagree), but since we have cuts forced upon us I'm not sure what I would ditch instead to pay for them.
"I'm not sure what I would ditch instead to pay for them."
Absolutely the key question.
So, WEBF, where should the NAVY take cuts to find £2Bn to pay for Harrier?
(Not from Air, 'cause we're not the ones trying to reverse SDSR.)
Absolutely the key question.
So, WEBF, where should the NAVY take cuts to find £2Bn to pay for Harrier?
(Not from Air, 'cause we're not the ones trying to reverse SDSR.)
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Easy. Ditch Trident, hand the nuclear role back to the RAF and let them carry the burden! Could be done easy and cheaply too, just bolt a bucket of instant sunshine to all the GR4s and when on the nuclear mission you get twice the range, because if they go for real they ain't coming back...
Nick,
Personally, I don't know enough of the issue to take a view. BUT - I don't think a C2 change substantially affects the amount that Defence as a whole is paying for the capability does it?
Bringing Harrier back would have a massive impact on the need to find further savings. Too many Service personnel assume that footing the bill is something for the civvies to worry about.
"You want me on that wall. You need me on that wall...."
Personally, I don't know enough of the issue to take a view. BUT - I don't think a C2 change substantially affects the amount that Defence as a whole is paying for the capability does it?
Bringing Harrier back would have a massive impact on the need to find further savings. Too many Service personnel assume that footing the bill is something for the civvies to worry about.
"You want me on that wall. You need me on that wall...."