Wrath,
It's a given that the larger the force, the larger the operation they can sustain. However, I'm afraid that unless the Harrier force had got a lot less efficient than it was, you absolutely could maintain a decent CAS CAP from a carrier off the coast with 50 aircraft. We used to practice it back in SHAR days from similar sized fleet. I agree that an airborne CAP is better than having an 'alert' type aircraft on the deck - that's why I said airborne CAP from the carrier. And I must assure you that you can get a hell of a lot of 'air' from a small number of aircraft on a carrier if you are organised and practiced.
JAJ, Yes, artillery can be a very fleeting target indeed. It's called 'shoot and scoot' and the Libyan Army can doubtlessly do it. Remember those pesky Scuds we couldn't find? Artillery can be far more mobile than that.
Yes, the cupboard was bare, and yes, the choices had to be made. However, the fact was that the RAF decided to sacrifice maritime strike to maintain the GR4 force. There was an option to draw down some GR4 and maintain Harrier, among others, but that was not taken up, at the behest of the RAF. I truly don't accept that a mixed force would not have been able to offer a viable capability for the nation, but there we will have to differ.
What can't be denied is that conducting the Libyan op from land bases a long way away is going to put more strain and usage on the strike, AD and tanker aircraft and the crews than doing it from a closer boat. The fact that the RAF are managing to get anything over the targets is a tribute to their professionalism, which I always take care to recognise.
Last post from me here, as ever,
very best regards
Engines