Decision to axe Harrier is "bonkers".
Not so sure a quick sale would be possible, after all these aircraft are essentially an American design. No doubt in there is some small widget or other that under ITAR regulations means HMG will have to ask for permission and go through years of hoop jumping to retain our special relationship.
Now that is a very interesting point Harley.
After reading the Sun story back in April I couldn't resist having a little more correspondence with my MP/MinAF over the Harrier issue.
Basically I said that I was not surprised and realised that the RNR operated Harrier idea was a long shot, but noted that we could continue to embark USMC Harriers aboard Illustrious/Queen Elizabeth, which would not only help maintain the skills needed for the future (see above) but also strengthen our relationship with the US Marine Corps. I suggested that some or most of our redundant Harriers could be sent to the US (there was a rumour they were going Stateside anyway) for spares/training/attrition replacements in exchange a smaller number (twelve?) of AV8Bs - and an MOU in exchange for continued USMC embarkations. Apart from filling the gap in fixed wing carrier aviation, this would allow us to retain not only the skills aboard the carrier, it would enable to RN to retain a cadre of both Pilots and Air Engineers - instead of having to start almost from scratch on a few years time. See also this earlier post.
I finished by noting the Telegraph story about the Charles De Gaulle being moved closer to the Libyan shore, and noted the high sortie rates achieved not only by the Charles De Gaulle but also by AV8Bs from the USS Kearsarge. I noted that Charles De Gaulle will have to leave the theatre sometime, perhaps a post refit Lusty (with Harriers) could relieve her?
Got a reply on Thursday, though it was dated the end of May. Basically the party line again. The letter said that we need to work with allies to regenerate the skills needed in the future, including working closely with allies, particularly the US and France. HMS Illustrious is coming out of refit in an amphibious role, and that the Harrier pilots and other personnel needed to support carrier operations have been re-employed, including postings to the US or France. No comment was made about the stored Harriers - due to potential buyers(??), but Libya was mentioned, as basing and overflight tights were expected. It was stressed that it was down to money.
With respect to the ongoing Libyan operations, I see that the Minehunter HMS Bangor has been sent to the Mediterranean, at the request of NATO, to replace HMS Brocklesby. Does this mean that NATO expects to be in it for the long haul? If so, it raises some questions:
1. The First Sea Lord said that the commitment of a frigate/destroyer and a MCMV would cause problems with other commitments if it became a long term thing.
2. Many of the arguments against a CVS with Harriers have focussed on the cost of the task group, yet we do seem to have a task group in the Gulf of Sirte, and the RAF participation is not without cost - discussed here and here.
3. Charles De Gaulle cannot stay on station forever. However, about a quarter of NATO sorties have been flown from her (noted here) - how will she be relieved?
4. If operations continue so long that Ocean is relieved by Illustrious, could Harriers (US perhaps?) embark on her? If only we had our own..
5. I believe the number of Apaches that were marinised was low, so does that mean that the Apache can only be committed to ship based operations for limited periods?
One last thing. Very basic Queueing theory shows what should be obvious - the a fast food restaurant can serve the same number of eating in customers as a conventional one. Likewise other situations where there is a time delay in achieving an objective and being able to achieve another. Applied to aircraft - the ones nearer the target have shorter transit time, and hence higher sortie rates. For Italy based jets to be able to respond as fast as carrier based ones would mean travelling at about Mach 5! This ignores the need for tanking and other support.
Of course, this sort of logical analysis is different to the last minute political interference that took place just before SDSR was announced.
After reading the Sun story back in April I couldn't resist having a little more correspondence with my MP/MinAF over the Harrier issue.
Basically I said that I was not surprised and realised that the RNR operated Harrier idea was a long shot, but noted that we could continue to embark USMC Harriers aboard Illustrious/Queen Elizabeth, which would not only help maintain the skills needed for the future (see above) but also strengthen our relationship with the US Marine Corps. I suggested that some or most of our redundant Harriers could be sent to the US (there was a rumour they were going Stateside anyway) for spares/training/attrition replacements in exchange a smaller number (twelve?) of AV8Bs - and an MOU in exchange for continued USMC embarkations. Apart from filling the gap in fixed wing carrier aviation, this would allow us to retain not only the skills aboard the carrier, it would enable to RN to retain a cadre of both Pilots and Air Engineers - instead of having to start almost from scratch on a few years time. See also this earlier post.
I finished by noting the Telegraph story about the Charles De Gaulle being moved closer to the Libyan shore, and noted the high sortie rates achieved not only by the Charles De Gaulle but also by AV8Bs from the USS Kearsarge. I noted that Charles De Gaulle will have to leave the theatre sometime, perhaps a post refit Lusty (with Harriers) could relieve her?
Got a reply on Thursday, though it was dated the end of May. Basically the party line again. The letter said that we need to work with allies to regenerate the skills needed in the future, including working closely with allies, particularly the US and France. HMS Illustrious is coming out of refit in an amphibious role, and that the Harrier pilots and other personnel needed to support carrier operations have been re-employed, including postings to the US or France. No comment was made about the stored Harriers - due to potential buyers(??), but Libya was mentioned, as basing and overflight tights were expected. It was stressed that it was down to money.
With respect to the ongoing Libyan operations, I see that the Minehunter HMS Bangor has been sent to the Mediterranean, at the request of NATO, to replace HMS Brocklesby. Does this mean that NATO expects to be in it for the long haul? If so, it raises some questions:
1. The First Sea Lord said that the commitment of a frigate/destroyer and a MCMV would cause problems with other commitments if it became a long term thing.
2. Many of the arguments against a CVS with Harriers have focussed on the cost of the task group, yet we do seem to have a task group in the Gulf of Sirte, and the RAF participation is not without cost - discussed here and here.
3. Charles De Gaulle cannot stay on station forever. However, about a quarter of NATO sorties have been flown from her (noted here) - how will she be relieved?
4. If operations continue so long that Ocean is relieved by Illustrious, could Harriers (US perhaps?) embark on her? If only we had our own..
5. I believe the number of Apaches that were marinised was low, so does that mean that the Apache can only be committed to ship based operations for limited periods?
One last thing. Very basic Queueing theory shows what should be obvious - the a fast food restaurant can serve the same number of eating in customers as a conventional one. Likewise other situations where there is a time delay in achieving an objective and being able to achieve another. Applied to aircraft - the ones nearer the target have shorter transit time, and hence higher sortie rates. For Italy based jets to be able to respond as fast as carrier based ones would mean travelling at about Mach 5! This ignores the need for tanking and other support.
Of course, this sort of logical analysis is different to the last minute political interference that took place just before SDSR was announced.
Last edited by WE Branch Fanatic; 12th Aug 2011 at 10:00.
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after all these aircraft are essentially an American design
Royal Navy pilots forced to learn French - Telegraph
WTF................you couldn't make this up!!!
WTF................you couldn't make this up!!!
Last edited by Could be the last?; 12th Jun 2011 at 14:37.
Originally Posted by Could be the last?
Royal Navy pilots forced to learn French - Telegraph
WTF................you couldn't make this up!!!
WTF................you couldn't make this up!!!
Note the RN officer in the photo.
Originally Posted by webf
Applied to aircraft - the ones nearer the target have shorter transit time, and hence higher sortie rates. For Italy based jets to be able to respond as fast as carrier based ones would mean travelling at about Mach 5! This ignores the need for tanking and other support.
just another jocky - Carrier-based missions are flown i.a.w. the ATO too. Reportedly the 20 or so FJ from the Charles de Gaulle have been conducting 35 to 40 strike sorties per day over Libya (link), weather permitting. These have constituted over a quarter of the 4,050 NATO strike sorties up to 11 June (link) (link).
Accepting that the carrier-based a/c and the similar number of RAF a/c based in Italy require air tanking to different degrees, what apart from the two-hour 1,200 mile round trip between Gioia del Colle and the Libyan coast accounts for the land-based FJ having a significantly lower sortie rate than their carrier-based counterparts? Lower in the pecking order for some reason?
Accepting that the carrier-based a/c and the similar number of RAF a/c based in Italy require air tanking to different degrees, what apart from the two-hour 1,200 mile round trip between Gioia del Colle and the Libyan coast accounts for the land-based FJ having a significantly lower sortie rate than their carrier-based counterparts? Lower in the pecking order for some reason?
The Apaches have been busy.
At sea, a NATO vessel conducting surveillance operations detected high speed inflatable boats approaching Misratah. These craft have previously been used by Qadhafi’s special forces in attempts to attack the harbour.
The British Army Apaches aboard HMS Ocean were duly alerted and intercepted the boats, destroying two with 30mm cannon fire. The British Army Apaches then successfully engaged a ZSU-23-4 self-propelled anti-aircraft system on the coast near Zlitan.
Twitter
TJ
At sea, a NATO vessel conducting surveillance operations detected high speed inflatable boats approaching Misratah. These craft have previously been used by Qadhafi’s special forces in attempts to attack the harbour.
The British Army Apaches aboard HMS Ocean were duly alerted and intercepted the boats, destroying two with 30mm cannon fire. The British Army Apaches then successfully engaged a ZSU-23-4 self-propelled anti-aircraft system on the coast near Zlitan.
TJ
Originally Posted by FODPlod
just another jocky - Carrier-based missions are flown i.a.w. the ATO too. Reportedly the 20 or so FJ from the Charles de Gaulle have been conducting 35 to 40 strike sorties per day over Libya (link), weather permitting. These have constituted over a quarter of the 4,050 NATO strike sorties up to 11 June (link) (link).
Accepting that the carrier-based a/c and the similar number of RAF a/c based in Italy require air tanking to different degrees, what apart from the two-hour 1,200 mile round trip between Gioia del Colle and the Libyan coast accounts for the land-based FJ having a significantly lower sortie rate than their carrier-based counterparts? Lower in the pecking order for some reason?
Accepting that the carrier-based a/c and the similar number of RAF a/c based in Italy require air tanking to different degrees, what apart from the two-hour 1,200 mile round trip between Gioia del Colle and the Libyan coast accounts for the land-based FJ having a significantly lower sortie rate than their carrier-based counterparts? Lower in the pecking order for some reason?
If you only had one ac, and it could fly for 23 hours then land and turn in one hour, it would have a sortie rate of one per day, yet provide cover for 23 hours (or 21 if you subtract transit time of 1hr).
Another sole ac flying 10 x 2 hour sorties a day is providing 10x the sortie rate yet is actually providing far less actual coverage (20 hours minus 20x transit times).
These are merely examples used to highlight the point. I'm not suggesting that carrier-borne ac fly 10 sorties, nor that land-based ac fly for 23 hours.
Sortie rates are irrelevant. It's time on task that is important, irrespective of wherever you take-off from or land. This is obviously not the whole story, but highlights the point I hope.
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Sortie rates are irrelevant. It's time on task that is important
More time on task for carrier based ops, without wasting fuel in transit from 600 miles away - i get it.
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surely the point is how many bombs / missiles / rockets you can drop on those below?
In the scenario in the last post
"If you only had one ac, and it could fly for 23 hours then land and turn in one hour, it would have a sortie rate of one per day!" and only one payload per day!
"Another sole ac flying 10 x 2 hour sorties a day is providing 10x the sortie rate yet is actually providing far less actual coverage (20 hours minus 20x transit times)." But it gets to drop 10 payloads per day...
OK not all aircraft are equal and some carry more than others, but given the act that you're in a war of aggression, trying to destroy as much enemy infrastructure as possible, surely the quantity of ordnance dropped is what counts?
In the scenario in the last post
"If you only had one ac, and it could fly for 23 hours then land and turn in one hour, it would have a sortie rate of one per day!" and only one payload per day!
"Another sole ac flying 10 x 2 hour sorties a day is providing 10x the sortie rate yet is actually providing far less actual coverage (20 hours minus 20x transit times)." But it gets to drop 10 payloads per day...
OK not all aircraft are equal and some carry more than others, but given the act that you're in a war of aggression, trying to destroy as much enemy infrastructure as possible, surely the quantity of ordnance dropped is what counts?
Of course there's an extra cost in fuel if yr further away.
I'm not trying to say that land-based ops 1000miles away are morer efficient than carrier-based ones 100nm away, merely trying to point out that sortie rate is irrelevant.
jamesdevice - yr correct, that's what I meant by it's not the whole story.
I'm not trying to say that land-based ops 1000miles away are morer efficient than carrier-based ones 100nm away, merely trying to point out that sortie rate is irrelevant.
jamesdevice - yr correct, that's what I meant by it's not the whole story.
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yr correct, that's what I meant by it's not the whole story.
Anyone who tries to argue that Tornadoes and Typhoons (+ huge support tail) based 1200 miles away in Gioia is more effective than carrier based air 20nm off Libya is nuts. There will be times when shore based air is better but Libya is not the example.
I know this is posted on all the other Harrier / Carrier debates but the 1SL does concede that the AD elements could have only been launched from shore based assets.
Prolonged Libya effort unsustainable, warns Navy chief | UK news | The Guardian
So as ever, if money permits, having a good mix of capabilities is a good thing.
But we dodn't have the cash at the time of SDSR (which was pre-Libya)
Prolonged Libya effort unsustainable, warns Navy chief | UK news | The Guardian
So as ever, if money permits, having a good mix of capabilities is a good thing.
But we dodn't have the cash at the time of SDSR (which was pre-Libya)
That depends upon the capabilities of the embarked ac. Modern warfare is about providing an effect. The how is just a method.
lj101 - there's a storm off the coast, jets can't launch. Pointless examples from both of us proving nothing.
lj101 - there's a storm off the coast, jets can't launch. Pointless examples from both of us proving nothing.
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I'm not trying to say that land-based ops 1000miles away are morer efficient than carrier-based ones 100nm away, merely trying to point out that sortie rate is irrelevant.
Storm off the coast, ship moves. Storm at Gioia, yours..
The First Sea Lord was also worried (and I guess still is) about skills loss post Harrier - see here.
Quoting myself again....
Go on journos, get stuck in...
Quoting myself again....
If the Royal Navy has no capacity to operate fixed wing aircraft at sea for a decade, then all the skills that are needed will be lost. It is generally reckoned that building these skills up from being non existent to the level we currently have would take approximately ten years – maybe longer. Of course, the pilots can be sent to work with the US Navy or someone else, to build up experience of carrier operations. However, operating fixed wing aircraft (and helicopters to a certain extent) is a whole ship activity. It does not only involve the aircrew and flight deck personnel, but virtually everyone. There is no way we can send hundreds of sailors to work in American carriers, and most of these specialist skills need to be maintained by constant practice. Many are carrier specific.
On the flight deck, aircraft handlers need to be able to speedily and safely move aircraft around the flight deck, both by giving visual cues to pilots and by using vehicles. They also need to be able to deal with any fires or other incidents that might occur. The RN School of Flight Deck Operations at RNAS Culdrose has a dummy deck, dubbed HMS Siskin, where aircraft handlers learn their trade. Real aircraft, including a number of retired Sea Harriers, are used and move under their own power to simulate a carrier deck. However, they cannot simulate the movement of a ship at sea in variable sea conditions, pitching and rolling. Nor can they simulate things such the carrier increasing speed to launch aircraft and the sudden wind over the deck. Getting experience of these things and building experience and confidence requires people to spend time at sea working with aircraft for real. This is a key skill area that will decline very rapidly if we have no flying from carriers.
Other personnel may also need to work on the flight deck, amongst the aircraft. These include the people who maintain the aircraft, and those who fuel and arm them. They too need experience of doing it for real.
Beyond the flight deck, lots of other personnel in different parts of the ship are involved. These include the Navigating Officer and the Officer of the Watch and his/her team on the bridge, who must ensure that the ship is on the right heading for flying operations. The Commander (Air) and his team are responsible for running aviation activities. The marine engineering watchkeepers in the Ship Control Centre are responsible for increasing the speed of the carrier’s engines when needed for launching aircraft, they also carry out adjustments to things such as the ship’s trim, so as to maintain a level deck for flying. There are various sensors, communications systems and landing aids that need to be maintained and operated. All of these are things that demand time spent practising at sea.
Air Traffic Control is of critical importance, as are others who are involved in airspace management. A carrier is unlike any airfield in that she moves. Land based ATC cannot provide the same experience. Her command team must also consider the constraints put on her movements by the maritime environment, by her escorts, and by the need to be aware of the existence of things such as merchant shipping or fishing boats. The aircrew that fly from the deck also need to have an understanding of all these issues. They must also understand how they fit in with the rest of the ship and task group. Finally, no carrier operations mean that in ten years time, there will be no senior naval officers with experience or understanding of these complex issues.
Most of these things cannot be taught on a dummy deck, or in a simulator, but need developing by real flying aboard real decks. The RN has been doing this for many decades, and the experience and expertise, much of it won at great cost, handed down. It seems unlikely that the body of experience would survive a ten year gap of non use. Interestingly, young officers entering the training pipeline to become pilots or observers have been told that to go from scratch to the level of expertise we currently have would take ten years – this is based on the experience of others Navies like those of Spain and Italy who have gained carriers more recently than us.
Some of my comments here are based on what I was fortunate to witness aboard HMS Illustrious in late 2007. Although I had a pretty good idea of what to expect, the number of different parts of ship involved in maintaining safe and effective flying operations took me by surprise. The teamwork was impressive. If a mere [me - a Reservist junior rate] can see this, why does the review turn a blind eye? Whilst in the dinner queue one evening I looked in a magazine I found loafing, there was an article in which a senior aviator (ex Sea Harrier) commented on the danger of future Fleet Air Arm personnel becoming unfamiliar with the shipboard environment and deck operations. My path has crossed with aviation connected personnel at other times, and they have all expressed similar views.
And....I would suggest that basics are basics, regardless of whether the future is V/STOL or involves "Cats and traps". Will there be exchanges for lots of chockheads - moving live jets on deck 24 hours a day in all weather in rough sea states, the people who fuel, arm and work on aircraft on deck - amongst jet blast (and FOD issues) the OOW and bridge team - who have to put the ship in the right place, direction and speed for aircraft to take off or land, Ops Room personnel - who have to operate sensors/weapons and talk to aircraft, maintainers of this equipment, landing aids maintainers, the ME watchkeepers keeping a nice level deck and increasing speed when needed, ATC types, Fighter Controllers, senior Officers in the carrier (Cdr(Air), Lt Cdr(Flying), Captain, XO) - they need to know how to run things, senior Officers elsewhere (MOD, Navy Command, task group commanders) who need to know how aircraft are used as task group weapons, etc?
Have these issues been picked up by the media? Somehow I don't think so, mind you they don't seem to have picked up on the deployment of the Cougar task group to Libya. Are there any journalists looking at this thread?
Air Forces Monthly have produced a special publication, UK Airpower 2011, which shows the Sea Harriers sent to the SFDO Dummy Deck at Culdrose as the only RN fast jets, it comments that they are still in service although no longer flying, and are the only way that aircraft handlers will have any experience of working with jet aircraft this decade, and provide the means to embark US, Italian, or Spanish Harriers this decade. What a shocking state of affairs!
Back to the topic of Libyan operations. This report suggests that the Apaches from Ocean have been fired upon on their first mission. Elsewhere, Dr Fox says that the use of Apache is not plan B - Liam Fox denies Apache strikes are a change of tactics:
The use of the attack helicopters is a logical extension of we have already been doing. We already have fast jets in action, this gives us a chance to target new targets in a way we weren't able to do.
What does that mean? That Apache is better suited to dealing wih the current target set than Tornado/Typhoon? Or that a slower aircraft based close to the action is more responsive than a faster one based 600 nautical miles away?
On the flight deck, aircraft handlers need to be able to speedily and safely move aircraft around the flight deck, both by giving visual cues to pilots and by using vehicles. They also need to be able to deal with any fires or other incidents that might occur. The RN School of Flight Deck Operations at RNAS Culdrose has a dummy deck, dubbed HMS Siskin, where aircraft handlers learn their trade. Real aircraft, including a number of retired Sea Harriers, are used and move under their own power to simulate a carrier deck. However, they cannot simulate the movement of a ship at sea in variable sea conditions, pitching and rolling. Nor can they simulate things such the carrier increasing speed to launch aircraft and the sudden wind over the deck. Getting experience of these things and building experience and confidence requires people to spend time at sea working with aircraft for real. This is a key skill area that will decline very rapidly if we have no flying from carriers.
Other personnel may also need to work on the flight deck, amongst the aircraft. These include the people who maintain the aircraft, and those who fuel and arm them. They too need experience of doing it for real.
Beyond the flight deck, lots of other personnel in different parts of the ship are involved. These include the Navigating Officer and the Officer of the Watch and his/her team on the bridge, who must ensure that the ship is on the right heading for flying operations. The Commander (Air) and his team are responsible for running aviation activities. The marine engineering watchkeepers in the Ship Control Centre are responsible for increasing the speed of the carrier’s engines when needed for launching aircraft, they also carry out adjustments to things such as the ship’s trim, so as to maintain a level deck for flying. There are various sensors, communications systems and landing aids that need to be maintained and operated. All of these are things that demand time spent practising at sea.
Air Traffic Control is of critical importance, as are others who are involved in airspace management. A carrier is unlike any airfield in that she moves. Land based ATC cannot provide the same experience. Her command team must also consider the constraints put on her movements by the maritime environment, by her escorts, and by the need to be aware of the existence of things such as merchant shipping or fishing boats. The aircrew that fly from the deck also need to have an understanding of all these issues. They must also understand how they fit in with the rest of the ship and task group. Finally, no carrier operations mean that in ten years time, there will be no senior naval officers with experience or understanding of these complex issues.
Most of these things cannot be taught on a dummy deck, or in a simulator, but need developing by real flying aboard real decks. The RN has been doing this for many decades, and the experience and expertise, much of it won at great cost, handed down. It seems unlikely that the body of experience would survive a ten year gap of non use. Interestingly, young officers entering the training pipeline to become pilots or observers have been told that to go from scratch to the level of expertise we currently have would take ten years – this is based on the experience of others Navies like those of Spain and Italy who have gained carriers more recently than us.
Some of my comments here are based on what I was fortunate to witness aboard HMS Illustrious in late 2007. Although I had a pretty good idea of what to expect, the number of different parts of ship involved in maintaining safe and effective flying operations took me by surprise. The teamwork was impressive. If a mere [me - a Reservist junior rate] can see this, why does the review turn a blind eye? Whilst in the dinner queue one evening I looked in a magazine I found loafing, there was an article in which a senior aviator (ex Sea Harrier) commented on the danger of future Fleet Air Arm personnel becoming unfamiliar with the shipboard environment and deck operations. My path has crossed with aviation connected personnel at other times, and they have all expressed similar views.
And....I would suggest that basics are basics, regardless of whether the future is V/STOL or involves "Cats and traps". Will there be exchanges for lots of chockheads - moving live jets on deck 24 hours a day in all weather in rough sea states, the people who fuel, arm and work on aircraft on deck - amongst jet blast (and FOD issues) the OOW and bridge team - who have to put the ship in the right place, direction and speed for aircraft to take off or land, Ops Room personnel - who have to operate sensors/weapons and talk to aircraft, maintainers of this equipment, landing aids maintainers, the ME watchkeepers keeping a nice level deck and increasing speed when needed, ATC types, Fighter Controllers, senior Officers in the carrier (Cdr(Air), Lt Cdr(Flying), Captain, XO) - they need to know how to run things, senior Officers elsewhere (MOD, Navy Command, task group commanders) who need to know how aircraft are used as task group weapons, etc?
Have these issues been picked up by the media? Somehow I don't think so, mind you they don't seem to have picked up on the deployment of the Cougar task group to Libya. Are there any journalists looking at this thread?
Air Forces Monthly have produced a special publication, UK Airpower 2011, which shows the Sea Harriers sent to the SFDO Dummy Deck at Culdrose as the only RN fast jets, it comments that they are still in service although no longer flying, and are the only way that aircraft handlers will have any experience of working with jet aircraft this decade, and provide the means to embark US, Italian, or Spanish Harriers this decade. What a shocking state of affairs!
Back to the topic of Libyan operations. This report suggests that the Apaches from Ocean have been fired upon on their first mission. Elsewhere, Dr Fox says that the use of Apache is not plan B - Liam Fox denies Apache strikes are a change of tactics:
The use of the attack helicopters is a logical extension of we have already been doing. We already have fast jets in action, this gives us a chance to target new targets in a way we weren't able to do.
What does that mean? That Apache is better suited to dealing wih the current target set than Tornado/Typhoon? Or that a slower aircraft based close to the action is more responsive than a faster one based 600 nautical miles away?
After reading the Sun story back in April I couldn't resist having a little more correspondence with my MP/MinAF over the Harrier issue.
Basically I said that I was not surprised and realised that the RNR operated Harrier idea was a long shot, but noted that we could continue to embark USMC Harriers aboard Illustrious/Queen Elizabeth, which would not only help maintain the skills needed for the future (see above) but also strengthen our relationship with the US Marine Corps. I suggested that some or most of our redundant Harriers could be sent to the US (there was a rumour they were going Stateside anyway) for spares/training/attrition replacements in exchange a smaller number (twelve?) of AV8Bs - and an MOU in exchange for continued USMC embarkations. Apart from filling the gap in fixed wing carrier aviation, this would allow us to retain not only the skills aboard the carrier, it would enable to RN to retain a cadre of both Pilots and Air Engineers - instead of having to start almost from scratch on a few years time. See also this earlier post.
I finished by noting the Telegraph story about the Charles De Gaulle being moved closer to the Libyan shore, and noted the high sortie rates achieved not only by the Charles De Gaulle but also by AV8Bs from the USS Kearsarge. I noted that Charles De Gaulle will have to leave the theatre sometime, perhaps a post refit Lusty (with Harriers) could relieve her?
Got a reply on Thursday, though it was dated the end of May. Basically the party line again. The letter said that we need to work with allies to regenerate the skills needed in the future, including working closely with allies, particularly the US and France. HMS Illustrious is coming out of refit in an amphibious role, and that the Harrier pilots and other personnel needed to support carrier operations have been re-employed, including postings to the US or France. No comment was made about the stored Harriers - due to potential buyers(??), but Libya was mentioned, as basing and overflight tights were expected. It was stressed that it was down to money.
With respect to the ongoing Libyan operations, I see that the Minehunter HMS Bangor has been sent to the Mediterranean, at the request of NATO, to replace HMS Brocklesby. Does this mean that NATO expects to be in it for the long haul? If so, it raises some questions:
1. The First Sea Lord said that the commitment of a frigate/destroyer and a MCMV would cause problems with other commitments if it became a long term thing.
2. Many of the arguments against a CVS with Harriers have focussed on the cost of the task group, yet we do seem to have a task group in the Gulf of Sirte, and the RAF participation is not without cost - discussed here and here.
3. Charles De Gaulle cannot stay on station forever. However, about a quarter of NATO sorties have been flown from her (noted here)- how will she be relieved?
4. If operations continue so long that Ocean is relieved by Illustrious, could Harriers (US perhaps?) embark on her? If only we had our own..
5. I believe the number of Apaches that were marinised was low, so does that mean that the Apache can only be committed to ship based operations for limited periods?
One last thing. Very basic Queueing theory shows what should be obvious - the a fast food restaurant can serve the same number of eating in customers as a conventional one. Likewise other situations where there is a time delay in achieving an objective and being able to achieve another. Applied to aircraft - the ones nearer the target have shorter transit time, and hence higher sortie rates. For Italy based jets to be able to respond as fast as carrier based ones would mean travelling at about Mach 5! This ignores the need for tanking and other support.
Of course, this sort of logical analysis is different to the last minute political interference that took place just before SDSR was announced.
What will NATO do when Charles de Gaulle has to leave the area of operations?
I wonder if our politicians are able to learn..... Maybe there is something in my suggestion of leasing a dozen or so AV8Bs in exchange for (most of if not all) our now disused (still with support costs) Harriers (plus continued USMC embarkations aboard Lusty/QE - which would be useful to us too). Someone please suggest this to Their Lordships and to the Government - it would solve both problems (lack of carrier aviation in a crisis AND skill loss pre CVF) and could be legitimately viewed as a positive outcome. It would also be cheaper than bringing the previous Joint Force Harrier set up back into service, and mean that we are no longer paying for disused Harriers under the RAB system.
Basically I said that I was not surprised and realised that the RNR operated Harrier idea was a long shot, but noted that we could continue to embark USMC Harriers aboard Illustrious/Queen Elizabeth, which would not only help maintain the skills needed for the future (see above) but also strengthen our relationship with the US Marine Corps. I suggested that some or most of our redundant Harriers could be sent to the US (there was a rumour they were going Stateside anyway) for spares/training/attrition replacements in exchange a smaller number (twelve?) of AV8Bs - and an MOU in exchange for continued USMC embarkations. Apart from filling the gap in fixed wing carrier aviation, this would allow us to retain not only the skills aboard the carrier, it would enable to RN to retain a cadre of both Pilots and Air Engineers - instead of having to start almost from scratch on a few years time. See also this earlier post.
I finished by noting the Telegraph story about the Charles De Gaulle being moved closer to the Libyan shore, and noted the high sortie rates achieved not only by the Charles De Gaulle but also by AV8Bs from the USS Kearsarge. I noted that Charles De Gaulle will have to leave the theatre sometime, perhaps a post refit Lusty (with Harriers) could relieve her?
Got a reply on Thursday, though it was dated the end of May. Basically the party line again. The letter said that we need to work with allies to regenerate the skills needed in the future, including working closely with allies, particularly the US and France. HMS Illustrious is coming out of refit in an amphibious role, and that the Harrier pilots and other personnel needed to support carrier operations have been re-employed, including postings to the US or France. No comment was made about the stored Harriers - due to potential buyers(??), but Libya was mentioned, as basing and overflight tights were expected. It was stressed that it was down to money.
With respect to the ongoing Libyan operations, I see that the Minehunter HMS Bangor has been sent to the Mediterranean, at the request of NATO, to replace HMS Brocklesby. Does this mean that NATO expects to be in it for the long haul? If so, it raises some questions:
1. The First Sea Lord said that the commitment of a frigate/destroyer and a MCMV would cause problems with other commitments if it became a long term thing.
2. Many of the arguments against a CVS with Harriers have focussed on the cost of the task group, yet we do seem to have a task group in the Gulf of Sirte, and the RAF participation is not without cost - discussed here and here.
3. Charles De Gaulle cannot stay on station forever. However, about a quarter of NATO sorties have been flown from her (noted here)- how will she be relieved?
4. If operations continue so long that Ocean is relieved by Illustrious, could Harriers (US perhaps?) embark on her? If only we had our own..
5. I believe the number of Apaches that were marinised was low, so does that mean that the Apache can only be committed to ship based operations for limited periods?
One last thing. Very basic Queueing theory shows what should be obvious - the a fast food restaurant can serve the same number of eating in customers as a conventional one. Likewise other situations where there is a time delay in achieving an objective and being able to achieve another. Applied to aircraft - the ones nearer the target have shorter transit time, and hence higher sortie rates. For Italy based jets to be able to respond as fast as carrier based ones would mean travelling at about Mach 5! This ignores the need for tanking and other support.
Of course, this sort of logical analysis is different to the last minute political interference that took place just before SDSR was announced.
What will NATO do when Charles de Gaulle has to leave the area of operations?
I wonder if our politicians are able to learn..... Maybe there is something in my suggestion of leasing a dozen or so AV8Bs in exchange for (most of if not all) our now disused (still with support costs) Harriers (plus continued USMC embarkations aboard Lusty/QE - which would be useful to us too). Someone please suggest this to Their Lordships and to the Government - it would solve both problems (lack of carrier aviation in a crisis AND skill loss pre CVF) and could be legitimately viewed as a positive outcome. It would also be cheaper than bringing the previous Joint Force Harrier set up back into service, and mean that we are no longer paying for disused Harriers under the RAB system.
Last edited by WE Branch Fanatic; 12th Aug 2011 at 10:02.
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Here's a novel idea to save money, don't get involved with events that don't concern us.
Suddenly the nation's forces are not overstretched.
Job jobbed.
(really hope the demic approves of my post)
Suddenly the nation's forces are not overstretched.
Job jobbed.
(really hope the demic approves of my post)