Why no helo transport? Are we condemning our diggers to an easy victimology?
MTOW,
are you certain that a B206B-1 Kiowa and UH1H Gunship (with any weapons load and SLB in the back) could fly out of Kandahar (6500ft AMSL) at 40deg celsius?
I am yet to read/see the glossy brochures on those figures for the trusty/rusty old steeds.
As for the Tiger I have only read Shephard press Rotorhub, Janes Defence Weekly, AirForces Monthly and a few newspaper articles. It is reported that the Tiger the ADF purchased is more capable than the French and German Tigers (it fires Hellfire Missiles 8km range
- don't see that weapon system integrated on any Hueys (classic or upgraded)
French have been flying/fighting their Tigers out of Kandahar (6500ft AMSL) carrying a fighting fuel/weapons load for about 18 months now. There is a video on YouTube (search "French Tigers smashing Taliban") of a French Tiger firing at and killing Taliban fighters from 2150m utilising an Off Axis 30mm Cannon (don't see those on any of the old steeds either)it uses approx 30rds to kill multiple fighters in the engagement. I would suggest that it would take a lot more "pea shooter" 7.62mm rounds and firing from "I can smell their breath, oh **** their weapon range matches mine"
very close ranges to achieve one kill in that horrid stoney country.
I do not know about the intimacies of either the MRH (yet to be flown in an operational environment) or the Tiger. However it would appear from those reputable publications that I mentioned, that the Tiger is carrying it's jockeys into battle and doing a very fine job (they did crash one on 4/5 Feb which the internet says hit the ground at 70kts and both crew walked away, can't see a Jetranger or Huey crew surviving those kinds of impacts.
Google "French Tiger Crash Afghanistan").
This brings us back to the thread title - are we condemning our diggers to an easy victomology? Big questions should be asked as to why the French are operating their (less capable Tigers according to the latest AirForces Monthly) Tigers in Afghanistan but Australia is not. Is it that the Australian Government is too risk averse? It is likely that a number of patrols in Afghanistan would have been less likely to be engaged if they had Tigers overhead? I know that Senator Johnson raised the need for Attack Helicopters (Tigers) and Tanks (Abrams) to be deployed to Afghanistan and was yelled down by both senior military "commanders" and the PM. Yet, the USMC deployed Abrams tanks into Helmand Province in Dec and the latest Janes Defence Weekly states that they are bringing a phenomenal success to the battlefield. Maybe Sen Johnson was correct?
I am happy to be directed to facts/figures capabilities (not glossy brochures unproven) of past systems and their flight performance capabilities, yet that would still leave the question of large Calibre Off Axis Cannon and Hellfire Missiles that they were not/are not fitted with.
I think we need to accept that the past is the past, build a bridge and get over it about Huey etc. Like a fart it is gone, at the time it had a lethal effect on those in close proximity, but now it is gone. Questioning the efficiency of the ADF/DMO whatever the Public Servants are called is without doubt a worthy cause.
But the ships are being built, the Helicopters are here and it appears that the "Slow" SuperHornets are battle worthy. (I know I would rather be in a Superhornet at Mach 1.5? than a Starfighter / Mirage (lovely aircraft) at Mach 2.5-3.
Doors Off
are you certain that a B206B-1 Kiowa and UH1H Gunship (with any weapons load and SLB in the back) could fly out of Kandahar (6500ft AMSL) at 40deg celsius?
I am yet to read/see the glossy brochures on those figures for the trusty/rusty old steeds. As for the Tiger I have only read Shephard press Rotorhub, Janes Defence Weekly, AirForces Monthly and a few newspaper articles. It is reported that the Tiger the ADF purchased is more capable than the French and German Tigers (it fires Hellfire Missiles 8km range
- don't see that weapon system integrated on any Hueys (classic or upgraded)French have been flying/fighting their Tigers out of Kandahar (6500ft AMSL) carrying a fighting fuel/weapons load for about 18 months now. There is a video on YouTube (search "French Tigers smashing Taliban") of a French Tiger firing at and killing Taliban fighters from 2150m utilising an Off Axis 30mm Cannon (don't see those on any of the old steeds either)
it uses approx 30rds to kill multiple fighters in the engagement. I would suggest that it would take a lot more "pea shooter" 7.62mm rounds and firing from "I can smell their breath, oh **** their weapon range matches mine" very close ranges to achieve one kill in that horrid stoney country. I do not know about the intimacies of either the MRH (yet to be flown in an operational environment) or the Tiger. However it would appear from those reputable publications that I mentioned, that the Tiger is carrying it's jockeys into battle and doing a very fine job (they did crash one on 4/5 Feb which the internet says hit the ground at 70kts and both crew walked away, can't see a Jetranger or Huey crew surviving those kinds of impacts.
Google "French Tiger Crash Afghanistan").This brings us back to the thread title - are we condemning our diggers to an easy victomology? Big questions should be asked as to why the French are operating their (less capable Tigers according to the latest AirForces Monthly) Tigers in Afghanistan but Australia is not. Is it that the Australian Government is too risk averse? It is likely that a number of patrols in Afghanistan would have been less likely to be engaged if they had Tigers overhead? I know that Senator Johnson raised the need for Attack Helicopters (Tigers) and Tanks (Abrams) to be deployed to Afghanistan and was yelled down by both senior military "commanders" and the PM. Yet, the USMC deployed Abrams tanks into Helmand Province in Dec and the latest Janes Defence Weekly states that they are bringing a phenomenal success to the battlefield. Maybe Sen Johnson was correct?
I am happy to be directed to facts/figures capabilities (not glossy brochures unproven) of past systems and their flight performance capabilities, yet that would still leave the question of large Calibre Off Axis Cannon and Hellfire Missiles that they were not/are not fitted with.
I think we need to accept that the past is the past, build a bridge and get over it about Huey etc. Like a fart it is gone, at the time it had a lethal effect on those in close proximity, but now it is gone. Questioning the efficiency of the ADF/DMO whatever the Public Servants are called is without doubt a worthy cause.
But the ships are being built, the Helicopters are here and it appears that the "Slow" SuperHornets are battle worthy. (I know I would rather be in a Superhornet at Mach 1.5? than a Starfighter / Mirage (lovely aircraft) at Mach 2.5-3. Doors Off
Last edited by Doors Off; 22nd Feb 2011 at 19:25.
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Getting intimate close air support in perspective
Hello Doors Off. I am not with your SLB jargon and there is more emotive stuff than fact in your post #164.
There is abundant video footage of Kiowa versions being operated successfully in Iraq and Afghanistan.
A Huey II Bushranger version could hover in ground effect at maximum operating gross weight (10,500 pounds internal load) at about 12,000 feet in ISA +20C conditions. That is published performance data direct from Bell Helicopter and not from 'glossy brochures'. If you wish to compare performance of other types for IGE hover at MOGW, then you need to get their manufacturer figures for the same ISA conditions.
USMC UH-1Y Venom (Super Huey) are operating in Afghanistan and Hellfire is an optional fit, also easily adapted to Huey II; but really only justifiable for high value targets, not knocking over a few doped-up Taliban. I believe each Hellfire round costs upwards of $75,000!
The French Tigers operating out of Kandahar (6,500 feet AMSL) are restricted to 18 rockets and about 250 rounds of 30mm HE, but nothing seen publicly whether they have also had to reduce fuel loading. A Huey II Bushranger with full fuel would carry 9,000 rounds for 2 miniguns, 500 rounds of 20mm HE for 2 cannons, 3,000 rounds of 7.62mm for 4 doorguns, with refuel/rearm turnaround of 15 minutes.
Off-boresight shooting is not on for intimate close air support; just too dangerous in close quarters engagements like when the guys on the ground are brawling within cricket pitch proximity. That scenario might sometimes require a utility helo hovering over friendlies gun muzzles when they are pinned down and cannot move so you can drop ammunition right where they need it and then winch out their casualties (while the ongoing din of battle I assure you is very noisy). Gunship suppression with HE cannon is unsuited to such situations due to HE fragmentation safety distances, but accurate high density minigun suppression from fixed forward firing weaponry does the very close quarters job best, including in jungle.
Bushranger operations during the Vietnam War were conducted in a mix of jungle, swamp, wide-open rice padi, urban areas and rocky mountains; not too unlike what might be encountered in our neighbouring regional tropical archipelago. Iroquois ground-fire hit statistics were US Army 1 in 1,147 and RAAF 1 in 9,512 sorties and shoot down statistics were US Army 1 in 13,461 and RAAF 1 in 79,270 sorties (more prudent operating practices). Adequately supporting the guys on the ground in those environs meant being prepared to get eyeball to eyeball with the opposition at firing ranges from about 700 metres down to maybe 100 metres (in pressing situations) before breakaway, as the essential accuracy is not achievable with longer range shooting. Maybe those who feel a bit timid regarding close quarters gunship operations should perhaps think about another job.
You are way off track DO regarding Iroquois prang survivability. The semi-monocoque fuselage construction is strong and contains the crew pretty well when other bits might be shed. The crew sustained only minor injuries in this operational accident.
But reality is, best usage will have to be figured out for Tiger, MRH90, LPD as the politicians are unlikely to flog them off to offset hugely reckless defence spending.
Project Air 87 acquired the Tiger '... to replace the capability currently represented by the Bell 206B-1 (Kiowa) and UH1-H (Iroquois) gunship helicopters with a new reconnaissance and fire support capability for the land force early in the next century.' Tiger will of course have some different attributes, but it clearly will not adequately replace either of the mentioned capabilities.
A retiring engineer/pilot colleague from fighter days has managed airworthiness oversight of the Tiger and mentions some good and deficient features. The manufacturer has apparently taken weight-saving shortcuts in airframe design leading to some weaknesses (also evident in MRH90) which will likely show up downstream.
It seems improved engines are in mind for Tiger, but whether the taxpayer gets slugged again remains to be seen. The high recoil 30mm cannon, which will pound the airframe and also has a restrictive cooling cycle, was rejected by the Germans pending development of their own low recoil weapon. I would substitute a low recoil 20mm weapon (as in the NC621 pod), also fit NC621 20mm pods and/or minigun pods (as appropriate) in lieu of rockets. The aircraft would then have more suitable firepower and essential gun redundancy, going some way toward substituting for the forfeited Bushranger gunship capability; but still not comparable with a Huey II Bushranger version for effective intimate close air support.
There is abundant video footage of Kiowa versions being operated successfully in Iraq and Afghanistan.
A Huey II Bushranger version could hover in ground effect at maximum operating gross weight (10,500 pounds internal load) at about 12,000 feet in ISA +20C conditions. That is published performance data direct from Bell Helicopter and not from 'glossy brochures'. If you wish to compare performance of other types for IGE hover at MOGW, then you need to get their manufacturer figures for the same ISA conditions.
USMC UH-1Y Venom (Super Huey) are operating in Afghanistan and Hellfire is an optional fit, also easily adapted to Huey II; but really only justifiable for high value targets, not knocking over a few doped-up Taliban. I believe each Hellfire round costs upwards of $75,000!
The French Tigers operating out of Kandahar (6,500 feet AMSL) are restricted to 18 rockets and about 250 rounds of 30mm HE, but nothing seen publicly whether they have also had to reduce fuel loading. A Huey II Bushranger with full fuel would carry 9,000 rounds for 2 miniguns, 500 rounds of 20mm HE for 2 cannons, 3,000 rounds of 7.62mm for 4 doorguns, with refuel/rearm turnaround of 15 minutes.
Off-boresight shooting is not on for intimate close air support; just too dangerous in close quarters engagements like when the guys on the ground are brawling within cricket pitch proximity. That scenario might sometimes require a utility helo hovering over friendlies gun muzzles when they are pinned down and cannot move so you can drop ammunition right where they need it and then winch out their casualties (while the ongoing din of battle I assure you is very noisy). Gunship suppression with HE cannon is unsuited to such situations due to HE fragmentation safety distances, but accurate high density minigun suppression from fixed forward firing weaponry does the very close quarters job best, including in jungle.
Bushranger operations during the Vietnam War were conducted in a mix of jungle, swamp, wide-open rice padi, urban areas and rocky mountains; not too unlike what might be encountered in our neighbouring regional tropical archipelago. Iroquois ground-fire hit statistics were US Army 1 in 1,147 and RAAF 1 in 9,512 sorties and shoot down statistics were US Army 1 in 13,461 and RAAF 1 in 79,270 sorties (more prudent operating practices). Adequately supporting the guys on the ground in those environs meant being prepared to get eyeball to eyeball with the opposition at firing ranges from about 700 metres down to maybe 100 metres (in pressing situations) before breakaway, as the essential accuracy is not achievable with longer range shooting. Maybe those who feel a bit timid regarding close quarters gunship operations should perhaps think about another job.
You are way off track DO regarding Iroquois prang survivability. The semi-monocoque fuselage construction is strong and contains the crew pretty well when other bits might be shed. The crew sustained only minor injuries in this operational accident.
Project Air 87 acquired the Tiger '... to replace the capability currently represented by the Bell 206B-1 (Kiowa) and UH1-H (Iroquois) gunship helicopters with a new reconnaissance and fire support capability for the land force early in the next century.' Tiger will of course have some different attributes, but it clearly will not adequately replace either of the mentioned capabilities.
A retiring engineer/pilot colleague from fighter days has managed airworthiness oversight of the Tiger and mentions some good and deficient features. The manufacturer has apparently taken weight-saving shortcuts in airframe design leading to some weaknesses (also evident in MRH90) which will likely show up downstream.
It seems improved engines are in mind for Tiger, but whether the taxpayer gets slugged again remains to be seen. The high recoil 30mm cannon, which will pound the airframe and also has a restrictive cooling cycle, was rejected by the Germans pending development of their own low recoil weapon. I would substitute a low recoil 20mm weapon (as in the NC621 pod), also fit NC621 20mm pods and/or minigun pods (as appropriate) in lieu of rockets. The aircraft would then have more suitable firepower and essential gun redundancy, going some way toward substituting for the forfeited Bushranger gunship capability; but still not comparable with a Huey II Bushranger version for effective intimate close air support.
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 23rd Feb 2011 at 21:52.
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Doors Off, where your argument fails is along the same fault line as ARH Tiger's - you talk about French Tigers doing a good job in Afghanistan.
The question to ask is why we can't get ours up and running to provide indigenous air support to our soldiers in Afghanistan. (I don't care what the US and Australian Army PR people say to Tony Abbott - saying that the US assets will always be there every time they're needed, and more importantly, when they're needed, has a rather hollow sound to it to me.)
Why does the French version work, but our "better, more capable" version of the same product doesn't? Could we look back into very recent history and ask why the New Zealand Navy's almost off the shelf Seasprites are working fine, but our "better, more capable" version, modified at our request to be a total one off and like no other Seasprite anywhere in the world, was a horribly expensive disaster that delivered NOTHING but a huge bill to the taxpayer?
The question to ask is why we can't get ours up and running to provide indigenous air support to our soldiers in Afghanistan. (I don't care what the US and Australian Army PR people say to Tony Abbott - saying that the US assets will always be there every time they're needed, and more importantly, when they're needed, has a rather hollow sound to it to me.)
Why does the French version work, but our "better, more capable" version of the same product doesn't? Could we look back into very recent history and ask why the New Zealand Navy's almost off the shelf Seasprites are working fine, but our "better, more capable" version, modified at our request to be a total one off and like no other Seasprite anywhere in the world, was a horribly expensive disaster that delivered NOTHING but a huge bill to the taxpayer?
The Tiger was the wrong choice.
Although AIR 87 wasn't the worse conceived and run project - "Super" Seasprite takes that prize - it continually changed scope, and ended up being for an armed recce helo. (The project had at various times also included wide area surveillance by SAR and as well as a UGS surveillance component!)
There were ample warnings that Tiger had underperforming engine problems - alarm bells should have rung that "high and hot" performance was not going to cut it. Alas, still no IOC with AAAv.
While orphans like Rooivalk and Mangusta would also have been problematic, we maybe should have overcooked it and gone for AH-64D in the name of Coalition interoperability. Failing that, a mix of AH-1Z and UH-1Y would have been better than the problems that have been foisted upon the ADF.
French Tiger ops in Afghanistan? Yes they are there, probably as a martketing ploy by the tricky Frogs. What they are tasked with, the availability, and ability to achieve the mission is a different matter.
Although AIR 87 wasn't the worse conceived and run project - "Super" Seasprite takes that prize - it continually changed scope, and ended up being for an armed recce helo. (The project had at various times also included wide area surveillance by SAR and as well as a UGS surveillance component!)
There were ample warnings that Tiger had underperforming engine problems - alarm bells should have rung that "high and hot" performance was not going to cut it. Alas, still no IOC with AAAv.
While orphans like Rooivalk and Mangusta would also have been problematic, we maybe should have overcooked it and gone for AH-64D in the name of Coalition interoperability. Failing that, a mix of AH-1Z and UH-1Y would have been better than the problems that have been foisted upon the ADF.
French Tiger ops in Afghanistan? Yes they are there, probably as a martketing ploy by the tricky Frogs. What they are tasked with, the availability, and ability to achieve the mission is a different matter.
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Tiger deployability
Hi BBadanov; and I would add supportability in the field.
Reading 'APACHE' and other tomes, it seems there is a pretty big technical and logistic support tail for a Brit deployment of about 8 of that aircraft type in Afghanistan. US and Dutch forces would of course have parallel experience.
Presumably, Tiger would have similar overheads and considering the ADF system of outsourced maintenance, questions begged are does the contractor own all of the support gear and will their civilian employees have to be deployed to keep the birds on line?
Maybe the Tiger people can inform us re the envisaged structure of, say, a 4 aircraft detachment deployed to a remote area.
Reading 'APACHE' and other tomes, it seems there is a pretty big technical and logistic support tail for a Brit deployment of about 8 of that aircraft type in Afghanistan. US and Dutch forces would of course have parallel experience.
Presumably, Tiger would have similar overheads and considering the ADF system of outsourced maintenance, questions begged are does the contractor own all of the support gear and will their civilian employees have to be deployed to keep the birds on line?
Maybe the Tiger people can inform us re the envisaged structure of, say, a 4 aircraft detachment deployed to a remote area.
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British AH-64Ds in Afghanistan
Some very interesting discussion on the title thread following post #6 by SASless.
It seems realization is now emerging re the differing capabilities of versatile helo gunships versus AAH. Need for lots of ammunition and multiple gun redundancy to assure staying in the fight for as long as possible.
The Australian Army religiously pursued the Hueycobra whereas the Air Force advised retaining the versatile Huey Bushranger gunship capability, which if upgraded to Huey II could have substituted 2 x NC621 20mm low recoil cannon pods with 500 rounds total of HE for 14 x 17 pound warhead rockets (see my post #164)
Roughly another 600 pounds would have been available for fire control features/defensive suites. Given outstanding hot and high performance, a Huey II Bushranger would have out-performed all other RW firepower for close air support available in Afghanistan.
Alas; AAAvn shot itself in the foot via Tony Fraser's ridiculous ADF helicopter fleet rationalization plan which sheds proven valuable capabilities.
But how can the problem be fixed to provide adequate integral utility helo and fire support for ADF elements in Afghanistan? Pretty easy really; just recover the UH-1H Iroquois not yet shed and put them through the US Huey II upgrade program, plus buy a few more if necessary via Bell from stored reserves. Funding? Less than $100million would be required for 50 aircraft which could probably be shaved from other very costly programs.
The question begged is of course would Australian political and military leaders have the fortitude to admit capabilities planning failings?
It seems realization is now emerging re the differing capabilities of versatile helo gunships versus AAH. Need for lots of ammunition and multiple gun redundancy to assure staying in the fight for as long as possible.
The Australian Army religiously pursued the Hueycobra whereas the Air Force advised retaining the versatile Huey Bushranger gunship capability, which if upgraded to Huey II could have substituted 2 x NC621 20mm low recoil cannon pods with 500 rounds total of HE for 14 x 17 pound warhead rockets (see my post #164)
Roughly another 600 pounds would have been available for fire control features/defensive suites. Given outstanding hot and high performance, a Huey II Bushranger would have out-performed all other RW firepower for close air support available in Afghanistan.
Alas; AAAvn shot itself in the foot via Tony Fraser's ridiculous ADF helicopter fleet rationalization plan which sheds proven valuable capabilities.
But how can the problem be fixed to provide adequate integral utility helo and fire support for ADF elements in Afghanistan? Pretty easy really; just recover the UH-1H Iroquois not yet shed and put them through the US Huey II upgrade program, plus buy a few more if necessary via Bell from stored reserves. Funding? Less than $100million would be required for 50 aircraft which could probably be shaved from other very costly programs.
The question begged is of course would Australian political and military leaders have the fortitude to admit capabilities planning failings?
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 25th Apr 2011 at 01:17.
"However, US diplomats reported to Washington their belief that the Australian military is beset with ''ingrained problems'' involving ''poor budgeting, cost overruns and delays in delivering new equipment exacerbated by efforts to prop up local defence industries''
I won't take the thread off target by pointing out why that is so.....as we can all come up with lots of programs, projects, aircraft, spare engines, and the like the US Military has wasted multiple Billions of Dollars upon and are still doing.
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And; regarding profligate spending on defence worldwide, consider this article and numerous others on the same website: http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/Article27737.html
Pardon the slight thread drift, but a cost-effective approach to defence planning will likely eventually be forced upon Australia by emerging world economic circumstances.
We could reasonably quickly fix some capabilities gaps by just storing deficient/inappropriate hardware, shaving or killing off some problematic programs and spending more modest funding on refurbishing/optimising in-service hardware like C-130H, Sea Kings, Blackhawks and Iroquois awaiting disposal. The primary aim should be to restore/enhance some lost capabilities ASAP.
Pardon the slight thread drift, but a cost-effective approach to defence planning will likely eventually be forced upon Australia by emerging world economic circumstances.
We could reasonably quickly fix some capabilities gaps by just storing deficient/inappropriate hardware, shaving or killing off some problematic programs and spending more modest funding on refurbishing/optimising in-service hardware like C-130H, Sea Kings, Blackhawks and Iroquois awaiting disposal. The primary aim should be to restore/enhance some lost capabilities ASAP.
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 25th Apr 2011 at 23:17.
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It is easy to sit back in your younger years, confident that you have all the answers of today, and would it not be great if that was the situation.
Bushranger deserves a little more respect than some posters seem to want to extend. Bushranger is not only a senior officer but also is a very experienced helecopter pilot in his own right.
Comes from the era of the Air Force flying and picking the helicopters, not like the garbage of today's line up. The Blackhawke was the last aircraft chosen by the RAAF and we must agree that their performance just as the UHIH was well above what we see today. He also comes from the era of crews who used to fly 1000 hours a year and I would suggest that most of today's helicopter pilots strugle to do a quarter of that.
The problem is that it is hard to impart years of doing things without actually living and doing the walk.
Yes things change over the years but the garbage that the army has bought is really not fit for purpose. The best helicopters in my and many other opinions come out of the USA, UK and Russia. Ones from Europe look nice, have lots of nice things but I suspect would not cut the mustard in today's conflicts any better than many others operating.
Perhaps you might like to consider how well your combat flying compares with Bushranger. If I were you I would suck up every comments he makes, it could save your life one day.
Best of luck to you all
Regards
Col
Bushranger deserves a little more respect than some posters seem to want to extend. Bushranger is not only a senior officer but also is a very experienced helecopter pilot in his own right.
Comes from the era of the Air Force flying and picking the helicopters, not like the garbage of today's line up. The Blackhawke was the last aircraft chosen by the RAAF and we must agree that their performance just as the UHIH was well above what we see today. He also comes from the era of crews who used to fly 1000 hours a year and I would suggest that most of today's helicopter pilots strugle to do a quarter of that.
The problem is that it is hard to impart years of doing things without actually living and doing the walk.
Yes things change over the years but the garbage that the army has bought is really not fit for purpose. The best helicopters in my and many other opinions come out of the USA, UK and Russia. Ones from Europe look nice, have lots of nice things but I suspect would not cut the mustard in today's conflicts any better than many others operating.
Perhaps you might like to consider how well your combat flying compares with Bushranger. If I were you I would suck up every comments he makes, it could save your life one day.
Best of luck to you all
Regards
Col
The last very well cared for UH-1H's flying for the US Army in Europe are about to be given to the Afghans.....perhaps some senior folks in Oz could try to prevail upon the US Army to divert them and fund the upgrade to Huey II's and the Australian government fund the armament and other proprietary mods.
Yes Toto....there are still Huey's flying for the US Army!
Yes Toto....there are still Huey's flying for the US Army!
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the garbage that the army has bought is really not fit for purpose.
If I were you I would suck up every comments he makes
Many of the people who have expressed an alternate viewpoint have equally valid points of view, based on their own experience, research and employment. There is room in this debate for differing points of view without resorting to the 'get some time up sonny' debating posture.
BR71 - I don't reckon there are any of the over-weight, single engined versions of the Kiowa (such as the ones that we have) operating in the Middle East. And whilst the Iroquois was undoubtedly a robust, much loved and respected aircraft, you cannot seriously compare the crash-worthiness of the design in comparison to modern helicopters.
Anyway, I reckon Sweden might have the right idea: Sweden in final negotiations for Black Hawk fleet
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Hi SASless; your post $172 very interesting. More than 200 Huey II are now in service around the world with the UH-1H factory upgrade program ongoing. That of course says they have adequate crashworthiness features for multiple military and civil operators, although apparently not Australia.
A few months back, I wrote to the Australian Minister for Defence pointing out the utility helicopter capability gap being created by disposal of UH-1H, intent to shed Blackhawk and acquisition of the medium lift MRH90 in lieu of both. A response from one of his advisors stated in part:
...The future mix of Defence helicopters delivered through this process must provide aircraft with contemporary levels of crash protection for Defence personnel...
If the supposed Iroquois deficiencies in this regard relate to seating design, then I am sure that is easily remedied and I ponder what (if anything) has been done in that respect for the UH-1Y Venom (Super Huey). Additionally, what about the Bell 412 leased by Army Aviation?
There is a hugely dominating bureaucracy in Australia that generates very restrictive workplace occupational health and safety regulations which hamper industry and business enormously, with similar effects on the military. Additionally, it has been pretty common practice within the DoD to write new military hardware requirements around features that might not exist in competitor types or others in service that are cost-effectively upgradable.
Felix; although the UH-60M is a good aircraft, it is twice as heavy and 10 times more expensive to acquire than the Huey II with more than 4 times the operating cost based on DoD figures for Year 2007. But now, the ADF is stuck with the unproven hugely costly MRH90 which is also heavy and quite unsuited in my view for utility battlefield support roles. And, the Huey II has superior hot and high performance to both types.
AAAvn shed the Iroquois Bushranger gunship capability mid-2004 so the Service Chiefs have been accepting of a close fire support capability gap ever since with Tiger being an inadequate replacement for that role in my opinion, and who knows when that type might be adequately operational!
It is thus contradictory for politicians and the Defence hierarchy to argue that we had to acquire Super Hornets because the JSF program was turning to worms and shedding of the F-111 would create a capability gap. Also acquisition of C-17 (a good move) because the C-130 fleet was being flogged with airlift capability diminishing. And short-notice purchase of a Bay Class amphibious support ship (another good move) because amphibious capability has declined.
The flawed helicopter fleet rationalization plan will leave the ADF sans any adequate light utility battlefield support capability for the foreseeable future as funding for any downstream costly replacements for Iroquois and Blackhawk will become scarce.
The simple modest cost solution is to put what remains of the ADF UH-1H fleet through the US Huey II upgrade program and acquire some more through Bell Helicopter if necessary. Shaving maybe $50-100million off other foundering programs ought to be easily achievable; but it would require DoD planners, including Service Chiefs, to admit shortcomings in the helicopter fleet rationalisation plan, which seems unlikely under the present regime.
A few months back, I wrote to the Australian Minister for Defence pointing out the utility helicopter capability gap being created by disposal of UH-1H, intent to shed Blackhawk and acquisition of the medium lift MRH90 in lieu of both. A response from one of his advisors stated in part:
...The future mix of Defence helicopters delivered through this process must provide aircraft with contemporary levels of crash protection for Defence personnel...
If the supposed Iroquois deficiencies in this regard relate to seating design, then I am sure that is easily remedied and I ponder what (if anything) has been done in that respect for the UH-1Y Venom (Super Huey). Additionally, what about the Bell 412 leased by Army Aviation?
There is a hugely dominating bureaucracy in Australia that generates very restrictive workplace occupational health and safety regulations which hamper industry and business enormously, with similar effects on the military. Additionally, it has been pretty common practice within the DoD to write new military hardware requirements around features that might not exist in competitor types or others in service that are cost-effectively upgradable.
Felix; although the UH-60M is a good aircraft, it is twice as heavy and 10 times more expensive to acquire than the Huey II with more than 4 times the operating cost based on DoD figures for Year 2007. But now, the ADF is stuck with the unproven hugely costly MRH90 which is also heavy and quite unsuited in my view for utility battlefield support roles. And, the Huey II has superior hot and high performance to both types.
AAAvn shed the Iroquois Bushranger gunship capability mid-2004 so the Service Chiefs have been accepting of a close fire support capability gap ever since with Tiger being an inadequate replacement for that role in my opinion, and who knows when that type might be adequately operational!
It is thus contradictory for politicians and the Defence hierarchy to argue that we had to acquire Super Hornets because the JSF program was turning to worms and shedding of the F-111 would create a capability gap. Also acquisition of C-17 (a good move) because the C-130 fleet was being flogged with airlift capability diminishing. And short-notice purchase of a Bay Class amphibious support ship (another good move) because amphibious capability has declined.
The flawed helicopter fleet rationalization plan will leave the ADF sans any adequate light utility battlefield support capability for the foreseeable future as funding for any downstream costly replacements for Iroquois and Blackhawk will become scarce.
The simple modest cost solution is to put what remains of the ADF UH-1H fleet through the US Huey II upgrade program and acquire some more through Bell Helicopter if necessary. Shaving maybe $50-100million off other foundering programs ought to be easily achievable; but it would require DoD planners, including Service Chiefs, to admit shortcomings in the helicopter fleet rationalisation plan, which seems unlikely under the present regime.
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 27th Apr 2011 at 21:56.
There are design aspects of the UH-1 that fall far short of the UH-60 re survivability and crash worthiness. I guess there is a trade off between holding to the new standards and accepting the risks that occur when one uses less well designed equipment.
The current fighting in Afghanistan is not all that unlike the situation when the ol' Huey was in its prime. The major threat now days is not all different than when the Huey was doing its thing...RPG's, Small Arms, 7.62/.51 Caliber automatic weapons. The threat of Manpads exists but does not seem to be very prevalant now.
The Kiowa and Huey are peas in a pod as to their design dates....thus an argument against using the Huey again would also argue against using the Kiowa in my view.
Without getting into specifics....ROE's determine what weapon systems would be the proper fit.
The ol' Huey is long in the tooth...but reliable, well known, and if souped up...could still be very useful due to its low cost and ease of maintenance.
The USMC is doing just that with their new Y model. (What happens after "Z" one wonders!)
The current fighting in Afghanistan is not all that unlike the situation when the ol' Huey was in its prime. The major threat now days is not all different than when the Huey was doing its thing...RPG's, Small Arms, 7.62/.51 Caliber automatic weapons. The threat of Manpads exists but does not seem to be very prevalant now.
The Kiowa and Huey are peas in a pod as to their design dates....thus an argument against using the Huey again would also argue against using the Kiowa in my view.
Without getting into specifics....ROE's determine what weapon systems would be the proper fit.
The ol' Huey is long in the tooth...but reliable, well known, and if souped up...could still be very useful due to its low cost and ease of maintenance.
The USMC is doing just that with their new Y model. (What happens after "Z" one wonders!)
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Perhaps my final input to this interesting thread.
Much of the manufacture-generated hype re battlefield survivability and crash-worthiness emerged during the UTTAS competition and of course added appreciably to the cost of the competing airframes. Military types cannot expect to be cocooned against harm in war-fighting and defence planners ought really be focused more on cost-effectiveness in hardware acquisition. The high unit cost of some helo types and their operating costs have been more or less shrugged off by the Australian DoD, including the Service Chiefs, but there will have to be more accountability in this regard as defence expenditure is tightened - the money tree is going to be pruned. Rigorous cost-benefit analysis of all hardware projects would highlight the wisdom of enhancing proven gear in service with adequate capabilities.
Agree SASless and the coal face of combat will foreseeably always embrace close quarters engagement with pretty basic weaponry. Operating techniques are of course adapted according to the threat although MANPADS have hitherto not dominated any battlefield to the degree predicted. Stand-off weaponry like Hellfire is great stuff but very expensive and hardly justifiable for use in knocking over a few insurgents. The basic need still applies of eye-balling the opposition within gun range and being able to deliver accurate helo fire support very close to friendlies during ammunition resupplies and casualty hoisting in particular.
In finality, an attempt to crystallize the theme question: 'Why no helo transport?...'. Unquestionably, flawed defence planning in not maintaining continual adequate military preparedness through progressive optimisation of in-service assets. Shedding of capabilities and/or running down availability of various types before proposed replacements (Tiger, MRH90) have adequate operational capability is really inexcusable. Australian military leaders have been complicit in helo capability gaps emerging by endorsing the very flawed ADF helicopter fleet rationalisation plan, whereas their obligation is to ensure that adequate military preparedness is continually maintained. Exercise of command authority also requires accountability.
There are design aspects of the UH-1 that fall far short of the UH-60 re survivability and crash worthiness. I guess there is a trade off between holding to the new standards and accepting the risks that occur when one uses less well designed equipment.
The current fighting in Afghanistan is not all that unlike the situation when the ol' Huey was in its prime. The major threat now days is not all different than when the Huey was doing its thing...RPG's, Small Arms, 7.62/.51 Caliber automatic weapons. The threat of Manpads exists but does not seem to be very prevalant now.
In finality, an attempt to crystallize the theme question: 'Why no helo transport?...'. Unquestionably, flawed defence planning in not maintaining continual adequate military preparedness through progressive optimisation of in-service assets. Shedding of capabilities and/or running down availability of various types before proposed replacements (Tiger, MRH90) have adequate operational capability is really inexcusable. Australian military leaders have been complicit in helo capability gaps emerging by endorsing the very flawed ADF helicopter fleet rationalisation plan, whereas their obligation is to ensure that adequate military preparedness is continually maintained. Exercise of command authority also requires accountability.
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There are design aspects of the UH-1 that fall far short of the UH-60 re survivability and crash worthiness. I guess there is a trade off between holding to the new standards and accepting the risks that occur when one uses less well designed equipment.
Let's take this to the ridiculous. What if you could buy a combat body armour that was impervious to all kinetic attack at all angles, weighed absolutely nothing and allowed the wearer to become completely invisible for periods of up to three minutes; but you could only afford enough of those to equip one third of the combat troops? Would you buy it? Or would you say 'Nice to have, but let's get real and buy something that is cheap enough so that we can get it for everyone so that everyone has an equal chance of survival?'
Who is being looked after here?
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okay ramblings of a half drunk man - here I'll pull to pin, throw the nade and run like hell.
We all agree the MRH90 is crap - however in defence to army, they did not pick it there is DMO, pollie's, lying europeans and a host of people who decided this is what the army needs. The only replacement for a blackhawk is a new blackhawk.
Why are our blackhawks not there - because defence in it's infinite wisdon have spent next to nothing upgrading it - still with the same engines and avioincs we bought it with. Think how many times the F/a-18 has been updated in it's lifetime. Fact of the matter they are old and do not have the performance. Can remeber going to the mary feature in timor and having to fly ractracks to burn enough fuel to fly an approach - cause we had 3 pax on board.
Blackhawk does have struts that compress at about 11G, seats which collapse with a heavy landing, an actual seat for the loadmaster - my memory of a huey was seeing he loady knealing on the floor - okay for 60's and 70's but does cut it this century (unless you're in a MRH90).
As stated earlier - buy american, fit into their spares supply network. Stop buying products with promises on paper and buy what is tried, tested and current. That's why we do not have any helo's in the MEAO as we didn't buy american. Look at the recent defence programs - C-17, F/A-18E/F quickly up and running as opposed to KC30, tiger and MRH90. Don't even go awacs - who else is using that radar?
Sorry but huey won't be bought even though it may be updated, it's associated as a backward step, just like the new cobra. They look old and pollies want shiny shiny.
More red wine please
Frazzled
We all agree the MRH90 is crap - however in defence to army, they did not pick it there is DMO, pollie's, lying europeans and a host of people who decided this is what the army needs. The only replacement for a blackhawk is a new blackhawk.
Why are our blackhawks not there - because defence in it's infinite wisdon have spent next to nothing upgrading it - still with the same engines and avioincs we bought it with. Think how many times the F/a-18 has been updated in it's lifetime. Fact of the matter they are old and do not have the performance. Can remeber going to the mary feature in timor and having to fly ractracks to burn enough fuel to fly an approach - cause we had 3 pax on board.
Blackhawk does have struts that compress at about 11G, seats which collapse with a heavy landing, an actual seat for the loadmaster - my memory of a huey was seeing he loady knealing on the floor - okay for 60's and 70's but does cut it this century (unless you're in a MRH90).
As stated earlier - buy american, fit into their spares supply network. Stop buying products with promises on paper and buy what is tried, tested and current. That's why we do not have any helo's in the MEAO as we didn't buy american. Look at the recent defence programs - C-17, F/A-18E/F quickly up and running as opposed to KC30, tiger and MRH90. Don't even go awacs - who else is using that radar?
Sorry but huey won't be bought even though it may be updated, it's associated as a backward step, just like the new cobra. They look old and pollies want shiny shiny.
More red wine please
Frazzled
Today's MRH90 news! [still a heap of sh!#]
A TROUBLED $4 billion project to supply the army and navy with 46 multi-role helicopters has narrowly escaped the Federal Government's Defence project list of shame.
The European built MRH-90 chopper has been dogged by technical faults, including major engine problems, and delivery is 18 months behind schedule.
So far 13 machines have been accepted by Defence for testing and crew training.
The Defence Materiel Organisation conducted a so-called "gate review", or detailed investigation, of the project and recommended the chopper be kept off the "projects of concern list" - for the time being.
That list includes:
• Sustaining the Collins submarine.
• Project Vigilare command and control.
• Tactical unmanned aerial vehicles.
• Project Wedgetail airborne early warning and control aircraft.
• High frequency radio modernisation.
• Lightweight antisubmarine torpedo.
• Anzac anti-ship missile defence.
• Medium and heavy vehicle replacement.
• Multi-role tanker aircraft
However the high frequency radio upgrade and the Vigilare command and control system are about to be removed from the list.
The MRH-90 is built by Eurocopter and assembled at the Australian Aerospace plant in Brisbane. It is made from composite material, flies further and faster than other machines and is equipped with the latest technology.
The company and Defence have agreed to a wide ranging remediation plan before another "gate review" later this year that will determine whether or not it remains off the list of shame.
The MRH-90 has suffered serious engine problems related to uneven heating and cooling which, in turn, generates a bend in the compressor shaft.
Another concern has been insufficient protection from "foreign object damage", or damage caused when materials such as stones and sand are sucked into the engine.
Other problems include windscreen cracking, a faulty guidance system over the ocean, an inadequate machinegun mount and poor electronic warfare self-protection.
"This will be a good machine, but at present it is a long way from being a battlefield helicopter," a Defence source told The Courier-Mail.
The European built MRH-90 chopper has been dogged by technical faults, including major engine problems, and delivery is 18 months behind schedule.
So far 13 machines have been accepted by Defence for testing and crew training.
The Defence Materiel Organisation conducted a so-called "gate review", or detailed investigation, of the project and recommended the chopper be kept off the "projects of concern list" - for the time being.
That list includes:
• Sustaining the Collins submarine.
• Project Vigilare command and control.
• Tactical unmanned aerial vehicles.
• Project Wedgetail airborne early warning and control aircraft.
• High frequency radio modernisation.
• Lightweight antisubmarine torpedo.
• Anzac anti-ship missile defence.
• Medium and heavy vehicle replacement.
• Multi-role tanker aircraft
However the high frequency radio upgrade and the Vigilare command and control system are about to be removed from the list.
The MRH-90 is built by Eurocopter and assembled at the Australian Aerospace plant in Brisbane. It is made from composite material, flies further and faster than other machines and is equipped with the latest technology.
The company and Defence have agreed to a wide ranging remediation plan before another "gate review" later this year that will determine whether or not it remains off the list of shame.
The MRH-90 has suffered serious engine problems related to uneven heating and cooling which, in turn, generates a bend in the compressor shaft.
Another concern has been insufficient protection from "foreign object damage", or damage caused when materials such as stones and sand are sucked into the engine.
Other problems include windscreen cracking, a faulty guidance system over the ocean, an inadequate machinegun mount and poor electronic warfare self-protection.
"This will be a good machine, but at present it is a long way from being a battlefield helicopter," a Defence source told The Courier-Mail.
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Senate Additional Estimates 25 Feb 09
Major Gen. Fraser: In the MRH90 program we have accepted five aircraft, and the fifth of those was the first Australian manufactured aircraft—that was last year in December. Their flying rate needs to improve to meet the milestones. The first major milestone for that is Navy’s, which is a flight at sea mid next year. For Army the milestone is an operational deployment of four aircraft the year after or potentially having an aircraft deployable capability by mid-2011.
Major Gen. Fraser: In the MRH90 program we have accepted five aircraft, and the fifth of those was the first Australian manufactured aircraft—that was last year in December. Their flying rate needs to improve to meet the milestones. The first major milestone for that is Navy’s, which is a flight at sea mid next year. For Army the milestone is an operational deployment of four aircraft the year after or potentially having an aircraft deployable capability by mid-2011.