Why no helo transport? Are we condemning our diggers to an easy victimology?

[Andu]

Soldiers, believe it or not can navigate cross country on compass and terrain, avoiding obvious routes (and IEDs)

Hmmmm, why do I suspect that that comment will excite some possibly heated replies, particularly in regard to the terrain in Afghanistan limiting usable routes in and out of remote bases?

[Mythbuster20]

Air Power Paper

Have checked out that paper as suggested by Peagusus. Some interesting articles on that site by the Australian Army Aviation Association - they even agree that the Tiger and the MHR 90 are ill considered and the wrong choice:

Paper on Vietnam Air Power and the lack of RAAF Air Support to the Australian Task Force

Fourays - The Australian Army Aviation Association Inc


Tiger critique - written in 2005 and virtually predicts what is happening now
Fourays - The Australian Army Aviation Association Inc

[SASless]

Did anyone hang ( as by the neck...hang) for the "No Fly" policies?

How does one perform Medavac/Casavac missions without going into "un-secure" locations?

Is not the mission of all air assets, Army assets, to support troops in contact with the Enemy???????????

[Bushranger 71]

Hello SASless; re your post #198. My credentials first to support my contentions. Formerly flew fighters where formation flying is bread and butter stuff; FAC qualified, Vietnam stints in 1968, 1969, 1971 flying Hueys, appreciable C&C involvement for helo trooplifting, introduced RAAF Bushranger gunships to operational service.

Perhaps you forgot what a "staggered trail" formation looks like?

No; and aircraft formation can of course be adapted to suit the tactical need.

Those nice pretty Vee's (Vic's to some") were not used often...and then usually only in Vee's of three not five's.

Apart from some brief service with the US Army, we operated jointly with many Assault Helicopter Companies who usually fronted up with 10 slicks and 2 gunships. They almost always flew pretty tight vics of 5 between PZs and LZs; except perhaps when only smaller flights were needed.

Just how do you keep a Huey gunship out of sound range...and achieve timely response?...it was said a Huey could be heard from border to sea, DMZ to Ca Mau at any time of the day or night.

Nonsense on the noise bit. Unless you are strongly downwind and the Huey avoids tight 'wockering' turns, it cannot be heard if loitering at say 100 feet AGL between 5 and 10 clicks from a scene of action. At 90 knots, that equates to less than 3 minutes for timely response. Having spent time on the ground with the infanteers in jungle type terrain, you cannot hear an Iroquois approaching at low level until it is pretty close or determine from which direction, until it passes nearby.

Landing on an unprepped LZ with bad guys in position was a very bad choice...much worse than a fully prepped (Air, Arty, Gun Ship, Smoke Ship, and Lift Birds door guns)

Agree; but the big noise methodology masks signs of human activity and so risks blundering into defensive positions with higher casualties. The LZ preparation approach was so stereotyped it also allowed the opposition to easily figure out what was intended and react accordingly. Far better in my view for special forces (SAS) to covertly recce an LZ a bit remote from enemy locations, for the infanteers to employ their basic human activity detection skills after insertion and to have fighter-bombers or AC-130 and helo gunships loitering and/or artillery (if within range) laid on for prompt response if needed. Even in that scenario, all of the essential locations identification and clearance processes still take 2 or 3 minutes.

[Mythbuster20]

RAAF Support in Vietnam

I think the "heads that rolled" was the later decision to have the Australian Army operate the battle field helicopter. Despite what some people say, RAAF rw support to 1 ATF was never what it should have been. Their insistence on remaining at Vung Tau instead of basing forward with the Task Force for example, added time to their deployment (and their sortie count...2 aircraft to and from Nui Dat each day, 4 sorties per day, 1460 sorties per year)

Even with Dustoff, they were reluctant to remain at Nui Dat overnight, the 9 Sqn support would fly out around 1600hrs, and a US Army dustoff would position at Kanga Pad over night.

Generally US Army support was superior to 9 Sqn support in every aspect. Tales of them being unreliable are fiction, and their gunnies were more than willing to jump in and support Aussie troops.

As for 9 Sqn developing their own dedicated gunships, ask the question, "why did they take so long to start developing them, and why did they re-invent the wheel?"

From memory it wasn't until 1970, only a short time before we pulled out. Again the story of a "superior product" is self made fiction. US support was always superior.

All this contributed to the decision to have Army Aviation operate these assets.

[Bushranger 71]

In specific response to Shadow and 7X7, and in general support of the current "on the ground" posts, the dewy eyed RAAF notion that Air Power solves everything, so obvious in the subject comments, has been perfectly demolished in a very closely argued and researched paper"The Close Air Support Group", that I have read on the Australian Army Aviation's web site 'Fourays". Apparently written in 1993, apparently no one in the RAAF has come remotely close to refuting its conclusions. I have seen extracts on other sites around the world.

Pegasus, Mythbuster20, SASless; with respect, you are all succumbing to what Josef Goebbels figured out: 'If lies are told often enough, they will become the accepted truth'.

The author of the referenced paper was not an aviator but a Task Force Maintenance Area Platoon Commander at Nui Dat. The erroneous anti-RAAF bile in his paper (especially in Part 3) has been refuted by many over time; but the Australian Army Aviation Association point blank refuses to accept any countering views for publication on their website. Similarly, for another erroneous paper by Wing Commander Martin Sharp, RAF.

Consider this statement by the author of 'The Tactical Air Support Group': 'It could be said that apart from the Caribou Squadron, RAAF involvement in Vietnam was almost inconsequential to the conduct of Australian ground operations in a war that was essentially a ground conflict.'

9SQN flew 58,768 hours during 5.5 years of Vietnam involvement in support of 1ATF and allied forces - the highest effort for any flying unit in any theatre in the entire 90 year history of the RAAF. The squadron effected 4,357 casevacs/medevacs, expended 15,562,361 rounds of 7.62mm ammunition and 29,285 x 2.75" rockets. 2SQN also operated Canberra bombers out of Phan Rang including close air support of 1ATF ground forces. Was all of that inconsequential?

I will shortly provide some references rebutting such misinformation; but meanwhile, I suggest everybody temper their comments in that regard, otherwise moderators might conceivably choose to close an interesting thread if contributions become too unsavoury.

[Mythbuster20]

Paper by Wing Commander Martin Sharp RAF

I must thank Bushranger 71 for directing attention to this paper, hadn't seen it before. It makes very interesting reading.

Fourays - The Australian Army Aviation Association Inc

What is important in this discussion is that the facts are revealed. The problem becomes that the "system" is all too willing to make out that everything was OK and always was OK with Australian Army/RAAF operations in SVN.

The lesson must remain open so that the problem never happens again, ie a unit, 9Sqn, went to a war with peacetime SOPs.

The problem remained ongoing throughout the Australian involvement, resulting in the correct decision to have Army Aviation operate the battlefield helicopter.

Why else was that decision made?

[ozbiggles]

Well at least some of the pro army side here are admitting that they own the decisions for the MRH 90 and Tiger and the continued support of the Caribou!
But it was an interesting paper from 1992 wasn't it. I didn't see the bit about the Americans having about 200 times the number of assets the RAAF had however or the influence the 9 SQN personal would have had on the politics of how those assets were used.
Best that we just tar everyone with the same brush just to try and make a point however isn't it.

[Bushranger 71]

Hello Mythbuster20. You are way off track in your post #205.

Despite what some people say, RAAF rw support to 1 ATF was never what it should have been. Their insistence on remaining at Vung Tau instead of basing forward with the Task Force for example, added time to their deployment (and their sortie count...2 aircraft to and from Nui Dat each day, 4 sorties per day, 1460 sorties per year).

Basing of 9SQN at Vung Tau was for sound reasons, being co-located with the US Army supply system and enabling 24 hour maintenance activity as required. Nui Dat was only 25 kilometres or 10 minutes Huey flight time from Vung Tau. And VT received many more rocket attacks than Nui Dat because it was a worthwhile target.

I attended the 2002 Chief of Army History Conference on the Vietnam War and it was conceded at that symposium Army made 2 major planning mistakes; basing of the Task Force at Nui Dat in lieu of Vung Tau and establishment of the infamous minefield, which was an indirect cause of about half of own casualties incurred.

Even with Dustoff, they were reluctant to remain at Nui Dat overnight, the 9 Sqn support would fly out around 1600hrs, and a US Army dustoff would position at Kanga Pad over night.

9SQN aircrew resources were limited on initial deployment to Vietnam but after becoming established at Vung Tau, a night dustoff crew was always scheduled and later increased to 2 crews as the squadron re-equipped with Hotel model Iroquois and aircrew resources were built to full squadron strength. The US Army initially provided gunship and dustoff resources although 9SQN did the overwhelming bulk of casevacs/medevacs on the basis that the closest aircraft would do the job to get people to medical care ASAP. 9SQN unit history is replete with night casevacs/medevacs. After the Squadron had become established with 16 aircraft and fully manned, a night dustoff standby aircraft was provided at Nui Dat with back-up at Vung Tau, but a US Army dustoff aircraft also positioned during daylight hours which was ongoing support offered earlier by the US Army.

Generally US Army support was superior to 9 Sqn support in every aspect. Tales of them being unreliable are fiction, and their gunnies were more than willing to jump in and support Aussie troops.

A whole bunch of writings regarding the Vietnam War embrace misinformation, including some authored by so-called historians. The Bushranger gunship capability did not originate because US Army gunship support was inadequate - it was quite good in my view. The problem was availability as nearby gunship elements would often be tasked in areas 2 or 3 hours ferry time distant and vice versa. So, on occasions, gunship support might only be available from about 1000 to 1500 as many commanders preferred that their crews did not transit in darkness. That presented a perilous situation for support of SAS patrols in contact which was the main driver of 9SQN Hotel model gunship development.

As for 9 Sqn developing their own dedicated gunships, ask the question, "why did they take so long to start developing them, and why did they re-invent the wheel?"...From memory it wasn't until 1970, only a short time before we pulled out.

The Bravo model Huey was unsuitable for gunship operations which is why the Charlie model was introduced into US Army service and they began to be replaced in the late 1960s with the early model AH-1G Hueycobra. 9SQN began replacing Bravos with Hotel model Iroquois early in 1968 and I was appointed project officer on arrival early March for development of a unique Hotel model gunship not in service elsewhere. The project was supported by Army at HQ 1ATF and COMAFV level in Saigon. Development took 13 months and was not achievable quicker due to hardware and funding availability. Bushranger gunships entered operational service on 21 April 1969.

The Bushranger gunship version carried more ammunition than the early model Hueycobra, was arguably much better suited for the intimate close air support role and could be fully refuelled and re-armed in 10 minutes. Consider this anecdote from a comprehensive US Army study of Vietnam War operations:

'...While many (US Army) gunship crews liked the speed, agility and hard-to-hit slender lines of the Cobra, there was another faction that preferred the old Huey gunships since the door gunners not only provided additional eyes and ears but could lay down suppressive fire to the rear of the helicopter…The debate between the two factions went on through the war.’

Again the story of a "superior product" is self made fiction. US support was always superior.

Oh really! You should speak with the people who received Bushranger support and not rely on hearsay for your contributions in forums.

[Mythbuster20]

RAAF Support to 1 ATF

"Oh really! You should speak with the people who received Bushranger support and not rely on hearsay for your contributions in forums"

Bushranger 71

Suggest you speak with the former operations officer (KL) of 1 SQN, SAS 67-68 (during the hotest period TET1) about the SAS Sqns preferences for support.

Preference was US Army.

[MTOW]

Was the paper Mythbuster20 is referring to the one penned by the novelist Mister Ea**er?

[Peagasus]

http://www.pprune.org/military-aircrew/424827-why-no-helo-transport-we-condemning-our

Hmm - am I the only one who thinks Bushranger, Shadow, 7X7 and MTOW seem to be written by the same person - perhaps they all went to the same creative writing class.
On the identity of the CAS paper on the Australian Army website, the guy who wrote it was an Airborne unit commander, flew observer missions in Viet with Aussie Army Aviation, has an MBA and went to Command and Sraff College - doesen't sound like a know nothing to me.
I went back to the Australian Defence Force Jounrnal and the issue that the paper appeared in was an Air Power edition, with many articles by RAAF officers - are they just as much "novelists (MTOW's term) as the author. The Chairman of the Editorial Committee was a RAAF Wing Commander?
Come clean,"Shdow, Bushranger, MTOW and 7X7", are you rerally the multiple personalities of one writer?

[hanoijane]

In terms of his comments on the general tactical use of helicopters in Viet Nam, Bushranger is essentially correct. I also agree with his comments on the type of helicopters suitable for current and likely future operations involving your country.

Sometimes you can't see the wood for the trees. Or the suitability of tin helicopters with miniguns through the glare from the carbon composite wonder-beast loaded with sensors.

And before you ask, no, I am not Bushranger, nor even a friend of his.

[Brian Abraham]

Bushranger, it would be perhaps be helpful if you could post a copy of the Department of Air Organisation Directive No. 11/66, 6 May 1966 by way of providing background - should you have a copy.

The point of contention, it seems to me, is the Directives instruction for "operations to be limited to staging areas which were relatively secure, and free from expected enemy resistance".

Was this instruction ever rescinded, or otherwise amended in any fashion? If amended, what replaced it? And I don't mean superiors turning a blind eye to what lower ranks may have been doing to get the job done. None of the "More honored in the breach than the observance".

[ozbiggles]

So you are basing your opinions of an entire organisation on a 1966 political directive?

[Bushranger 71]

RAAF/Army Relations - History thread, 19July2010

Mythbuster20; you are still off track and see what I said previously. I got there during TET 1968 and 9SQN were then in the early throes of re-equipping with Hotel model Iroquois. The Squadron had no gunship capability at that time and the Bushrangers were not operationally introduced until April 1969.

To those interested; I suggest you review the title thread initiated by Brian Abraham re the paper: 'Command and Control of Battlefield Helicopters' by Wing Commander Martin Sharp, RAF posted on the Fourays website. Last post on Page 55 of Military Aircrew threads for the last year and lots of reading there; but see my posts #7, 12, 16, 20, 31, 46 regarding the validity of the paper. 'The Tactical Air Support Group' document on the Fourays website can be similarly challenged.

Hi BA; re your request in post #213. My copy of DAOD No. 11/66 was unfortunately lost in a domestic fire. The document was never amended or rescinded as I recall and remained in the Confidential Order Book to be read by all Officers. But it was in practice just ignored and that largely came about because we had a solid nucleus of veteran pilots from WW2, Korea, Confrontation, Malaysia who saw the directive as impractical if the guys on the ground were to be given adequate support. The junior pilots soon got the message as indicated by the levels of intimate support that evolved post-1966.

[Brian Abraham]

So you are basing your opinions of an entire organisation on a 1966 political directive?

Not at all. I only asked the question because the Vietnam era was raised by previous posters, and I have a lot of personal history in the era. I kicked off the RAAF/Army thread in the hope that some education on the history of the relationship between the two parties may be gained for those who are interested in history, and hopefully that those currently serving don't subject themselves to the same inter service rivalries that bedevil the deliverance of services to those in need - support for the grunt who has to hold the ground. Of course Oz is not the only country where this fight between services has gone on, the USAF/Army has had notable fights over jurisdiction and responsibilities. And we have current threads here re RAF/Army/RN.

[Mythbuster20]

The Battlefield helicopter decision

Perhaps, Bushranger 71 can tell us why the decision was made to remove the battlefield helicopter from the RAAF and place them under AAAVN command?

If, after all, 9 Sqn's support was as good as he suggests, then there would have been no reason for control to be removed and 9 Sqn disbanded?

I'm sure we'd all like to hear his opinions about what the background to this decision was?

Surely those who made the decision knew what they were doing?

Or did they?

[Bushranger 71]

Mythbuster20; you have been pointed in the direction of some enlightening reading, but like many of the bigoted fraternity, you are seemingly unwilling to shed hearsay and absorb some facts.

The basic reason the helo transfer decision eventuated was that lies were peddled by a former Army CDF and CGS, abetted by writings of Professor Paul Dibb who was the author of Defence White Paper 1987. Go read the account in post #12 of the referenced thread (19Jul10) by then Chief of Air Staff, Air Marshal Jake Newham.

That foolish politico-military decision has generated the helo battlefield support capabilities shortcomings evident today and cost the Australian taxpayer dearly.

[Doors Off]

Nothing like a bit of thread drift.

Brian did kick of the Army/RAAF thread which had some interesting reading. As for "Bigotry", it is the pot calling the kettle black. It is a rumour network, if you get a bit of sand in your knickers when somebody has a differing opinion then maybe, think twice before posting.

Yes, yes I know, here come the "Veteran" calls, though there is more than one conflict in the history of helicopter warfare and these "other" conflicts have their Veterans as well, whom are also very experienced Helicopter combat pilots. The non veterans, may not have had the unfortunate or fortunate experience of pure fear mixed with pure elation of combat, this does not mean that their words need to be dismissed. Most will certainly do all of us proud if the government decides to cash their cheque.

Is there a capability gap in troop lift? I guess the obvious answer to that question is yes, given the retirement of an out of life airframe and the slow introduction of another. I am quite sure that the first phase of NH90 purchase by Oz was "additional" troop lift, not a replacement for Blackhawk, I think that was phase 2 or something. Was the Uh1h seen as "Troop Lift" per se, within the Army or merely an LUH? So is there a gap? However, without doubt the lift being provided by civil contractors in the Solomon's is most certainly being done more cheaply than it would have been utilising the retired type. That really is the only theatre that the Iroquois would still be serving in. So, practically not much of a gap there.

S70's are still in service in Aus and none have departed the fleet into retirement as yet, so no gap there. I think that the overall "Deployability into a high threat environment ie: Afghanistan" troop lift really does not have a gap as yet, though on current timelines of S70 withdrawal and NH90 introduction there will be one in the future.

On getting back to the "Why no helo transport?" question, I guess that is a question for the CDF, Defence Minister and PM. Fact is though, there is "Helo transport" in Afghanistan in the guise of the 2 Chinooks. Is that enough, of course not, but there is some there. Could the S70's deploy? I guess they could, as there are other variants in theatre (upgraded uber stealth versions and classic Chevy Pickup types). Not sure of the EWSP fit/capability, maybe that could be stopping them? Or maybe just the Oz government does not see the benefit of sending 5 times the crews and airframes to provide the same "lift" capacity as two chinooks?

Do the soldiers in Afghanistan need more Helo Transport, I would suggest that the answer is definitely yes, not just Australians either. Without doubt road moves increase the exposure to IED's for the guys on the ground, but eventually they have to get out and seize the ground, which they do bloody well I guess by not having enough "Helo Transport" we are pretty much condemning them to an easy victimology. I am sure they would love their awesome Tigers above them as well, but there is whole separate thread on that topic.

Thanks to the guys for raising the "other" historical facts, albeit from a different and maybe not as air force friendly environment. I have read the links provided and done a bit Googling as well. Nice to hear the other side of the story, I am sure the truth is half way between the two, but without the two sides of the argument (RAAF v Army) it would just be a one sided story.

Doors Off