Why no helo transport? Are we condemning our diggers to an easy victimology?
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HanoiJane:
"If you guys had fought as hard in Viet Nam as you fight each other today you might have made more of an impression on your adversaries"
Good point well made mate.
Rest assured the current generation of RW combat aviators couldn't care less about this ideological pissing contest.
"If you guys had fought as hard in Viet Nam as you fight each other today you might have made more of an impression on your adversaries"
Good point well made mate.
Rest assured the current generation of RW combat aviators couldn't care less about this ideological pissing contest.
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anti 9 Sqn "bile"
Given all the comments about anti 9 Sqn bias, I went back to the Air Support paper on Australian Army website, prompted by ANDU's comment on F/Lt Riley. Without comment, here is what it says:
"This one battle (sic.Long Tan) was pivotal to the survival of I ATF and, at a crucial time in its progress, RAAF support was available only because of the conscious decision of one pilot to disobey orders and that of a senior RAAF officer to both encourage and turn a blind eye to that disobedience. If Air Board orders had been followed, the RAAF would never have flown in support of the Long Tan battle.
Both of the RAAF officers (sic. Raw & Riley) were aware of these orders, more so Raw, who was also the RAAF Commander, Vung Tau. D Company was facing a desperate lack of ammunition calling artillery fire almost on their position to break up enemy attacks and on the verge of being overwhelmed. Riley overheard all this from radio traffic. In spite of objections by one of his pilots on breaking Air Board directives that would risk aircraft and that they would be killed', Riley, on his initiative, offered to fly ammunition to the beleaguered infantry 'at all costs ... to support fellow Australians in difficulty', taking all responsibility as detachment commander. One other pilot, Lane, also volunteered to fly, alone if necessary. Raw immediately authorised Riley's mission, more closely aware of the dire situation of D Company and that the Iroquois was the only aircraft capable of the task. He declined to advise 9 Squadron at Vung Tau to both save time and to avoid creating a situation for Scott(sic. CO 9 Sqn) where he may 'not have been in a position to authorise it.' D Company received the ammunition resupply, delivered by Riley's two aircraft and their crews, in appalling visibility and rain, without gunship cover and into the teeth of intensive small arms fire, and the battle was saved. The delay in this ammunition arriving due to procrastination over the "legality" of the situation, however was considerable.(Ref 41) The analogy with Milne Bay is telling in all but one respect; Riley's airmen flew the sortie in support of D Company in spite of RAAF policy, not because of it.
To their everlasting credit, the integrity and courage of Riley, the devotion of his aircrew, the sense of duty and sagacity of Raw, all honoured the legacy of Milne Bay. All had recognised, in the furnace heat of combat, the insistent imperative of the land battle"
This is bile? It brings into question the reliability of, particularly, comments by Bushranger.
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Bushranger 71's misinformation
As we've seen B71 has a way of using selective amnesia and ignoring the facts...
He's accused reputable publishers and historians of lacking credibility, being biased or being stupid. He's also claimed that a former CDF and CGS were conspiritorial liars.
Everyone is nuts, ignorrant or stupid, according to B71 - except him who he puts forward as the ultimate authority. As someone has already pointed out, he should retire to Notre Dame cathedral and resume his bell ringing career.
For those who regard it as a mere squabble between old farts, remember one thing.
If the truth is concealed and as a result history is ignored, the mistakes of history will be repeated.
One day you too may have the misfortune to see comrades die in battle because of the stupidity and ignorance of ground operations by those in command who should know better, as has been pointed out in the two papers referred to.
The Tactical Air Support Group: Original Defence Journal paper
Fourays - The Australian Army Aviation Association Inc
Command and Control of Battlefield Helicopters: Wing Commander Martin Sharp
Fourays - The Australian Army Aviation Association Inc
You all be carefull out there now.
He's accused reputable publishers and historians of lacking credibility, being biased or being stupid. He's also claimed that a former CDF and CGS were conspiritorial liars.
Everyone is nuts, ignorrant or stupid, according to B71 - except him who he puts forward as the ultimate authority. As someone has already pointed out, he should retire to Notre Dame cathedral and resume his bell ringing career.
For those who regard it as a mere squabble between old farts, remember one thing.
If the truth is concealed and as a result history is ignored, the mistakes of history will be repeated.
One day you too may have the misfortune to see comrades die in battle because of the stupidity and ignorance of ground operations by those in command who should know better, as has been pointed out in the two papers referred to.
The Tactical Air Support Group: Original Defence Journal paper
Fourays - The Australian Army Aviation Association Inc
Command and Control of Battlefield Helicopters: Wing Commander Martin Sharp
Fourays - The Australian Army Aviation Association Inc
You all be carefull out there now.
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Defence Force Journal Editorial Committee credibility.
Sorry to belabour this, but Bushranger 71 claims that the Aussie Def Force Journal Editorial Committee "blew their credibility" by publishing the Air Support Paper. Does this mean that everything else in that edition was crap, too? Interesting, as all the other articles are by RAAF officers "peddling"(to use B71's term) the primacy and overarching importance of the RAAF to the defence of Australia.
There, I knew it - all BS, as irrefuteably determined by another RAAF officer, Bushranger 71.
Quad erat demonstradum.
There, I knew it - all BS, as irrefuteably determined by another RAAF officer, Bushranger 71.
Quad erat demonstradum.
Just because some new points of view, that provide balance,
are being presented with facts, does not mean that this thread should be closed.
Name calling has been going on for a while from both sides of the fence, if some can dish it out but can't take it
it doesn't not mean that the pissing contest should end.
It is entertaining and educational. Great stuff
The thread title is topical, pertinent and worthy of debate.
Keep it going
are being presented with facts, does not mean that this thread should be closed. Name calling has been going on for a while from both sides of the fence, if some can dish it out but can't take it
it doesn't not mean that the pissing contest should end. It is entertaining and educational. Great stuffThe thread title is topical, pertinent and worthy of debate.
Keep it going
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The awards and decorations allocated for the battle of Long Tan have been a contentious issue since 1966.
Oddly enough, given the ill feeling generated by the RAAF's initial refusal to fly the Long Tan resupply, there has never been any subsequent dispute regarding the DFC's that were earned that day.
Glorious stuff.
Oddly enough, given the ill feeling generated by the RAAF's initial refusal to fly the Long Tan resupply, there has never been any subsequent dispute regarding the DFC's that were earned that day.
Glorious stuff.
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Part 1. The wheel has Turned Full Circle
I wonder if any here realise the relevance of what has been “discussed”, to the original subject of the thread? That is, the lack of helo support to Australian troops in Afghanistan?
Maybe I can explain.
The Australian Defence Department has created a top heavy and somewhat paranoid PR machine, devoted to spin doctoring and politically sanitising all information coming out of Afghanistan and other operational areas of Australian involvement. Some of this censoring is justifiable on grounds of operational necessity, but unfortunately this mantle tends to be used to cover anything that might reflect adversely on the ADF’s political masters, and of course any blundering within the defence department – particularly your DMO.
Part of the “spinning” has involved furthering the ANZAC legend. A common phrase that has been popularized is that the Australian Digger can “punch above his weight”. While the Australian soldier is certainly well trained, this statement may or may not be accurate.
Now before you Aussies clench your bayonets between your teeth and swim pirate-like across the Pacific in pursuit of my hide, let me explain the dangers of perpetuating such a belief.
Your politicians for generations have continually under equipped your defence forces. The reason is simple, it costs big $$$ to do it properly. There have been a litany of bad decisions in equipment acquisitions (just look at the Collins Class submarine fiasco and the Seasprite) that have drained funds.
Meanwhile those who really have taken the brunt of the action – the Australian Army – has been continually short changed.
I read about how one battalion deploying to Iraq in 2006, purchased their own webbing and how the head of your DMO admitted they’d failed the troops in the subsequent investigation (he kept his job though)
Your politicians and senior officers who should know better have relied on this mantra of “They can punch above their weight” to avoid their responsibilities by adequately equipping the ADF at all levels.
Whether the mantra is correct or not, doing this is fraught with danger. It runs counter to many of the principles of war – assuming you’re superior is underestimating your enemy and leads to disaster.
Because this belief flows through to politicians, they have tended to remain ignorant of reality. After all it’s an extension of the great Australian “she’ll be right mate” ethos.
A classic example of this has been the current situation in Afghanistan. Because you have politicians and senior officers who unfortunately remain ignorant of the lessons of history, they accept the belief – after all who’s going to dispute such an accolade?
So when your Defence Minister visits as has recently happened, and is confronted by a vast array of US weaponry lined up in revue order and when told by some cigar chomping jarhead one-star that "these are all available to support your men” he floats away with a glowing feeling that the objections and warnings being sounded by your diggers are merely the usual rumblings that the grunts of all nations are renowned for.
What politicians do not fully understand is the difference between “in support” and “under command”. They believe that all the toys on show can be instantly be thrown into the conflict to help out our favourite ally if the time comes.
This of course is far from true.
To explain further, let’s review the Battle of Long Tan, since it’s been raised already.
This will be done in Part Two, currently awaiting moderation.
Maybe I can explain.
The Australian Defence Department has created a top heavy and somewhat paranoid PR machine, devoted to spin doctoring and politically sanitising all information coming out of Afghanistan and other operational areas of Australian involvement. Some of this censoring is justifiable on grounds of operational necessity, but unfortunately this mantle tends to be used to cover anything that might reflect adversely on the ADF’s political masters, and of course any blundering within the defence department – particularly your DMO.
Part of the “spinning” has involved furthering the ANZAC legend. A common phrase that has been popularized is that the Australian Digger can “punch above his weight”. While the Australian soldier is certainly well trained, this statement may or may not be accurate.
Now before you Aussies clench your bayonets between your teeth and swim pirate-like across the Pacific in pursuit of my hide, let me explain the dangers of perpetuating such a belief.
Your politicians for generations have continually under equipped your defence forces. The reason is simple, it costs big $$$ to do it properly. There have been a litany of bad decisions in equipment acquisitions (just look at the Collins Class submarine fiasco and the Seasprite) that have drained funds.
Meanwhile those who really have taken the brunt of the action – the Australian Army – has been continually short changed.
I read about how one battalion deploying to Iraq in 2006, purchased their own webbing and how the head of your DMO admitted they’d failed the troops in the subsequent investigation (he kept his job though)
Your politicians and senior officers who should know better have relied on this mantra of “They can punch above their weight” to avoid their responsibilities by adequately equipping the ADF at all levels.
Whether the mantra is correct or not, doing this is fraught with danger. It runs counter to many of the principles of war – assuming you’re superior is underestimating your enemy and leads to disaster.
Because this belief flows through to politicians, they have tended to remain ignorant of reality. After all it’s an extension of the great Australian “she’ll be right mate” ethos.
A classic example of this has been the current situation in Afghanistan. Because you have politicians and senior officers who unfortunately remain ignorant of the lessons of history, they accept the belief – after all who’s going to dispute such an accolade?
So when your Defence Minister visits as has recently happened, and is confronted by a vast array of US weaponry lined up in revue order and when told by some cigar chomping jarhead one-star that "these are all available to support your men” he floats away with a glowing feeling that the objections and warnings being sounded by your diggers are merely the usual rumblings that the grunts of all nations are renowned for.
What politicians do not fully understand is the difference between “in support” and “under command”. They believe that all the toys on show can be instantly be thrown into the conflict to help out our favourite ally if the time comes.
This of course is far from true.
To explain further, let’s review the Battle of Long Tan, since it’s been raised already.
This will be done in Part Two, currently awaiting moderation.
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Long Tan and beyond. Afghanistan.
Part Two:
In August 1966, Delta Company, 6RAR fought one of the most remarkable battles of the Vietnam war. In the USA it was played down, General Westmoreland didn’t like having his own methodology shown up for what it was. Even the United States most decorated veteran of that war Colonel Hackworth (who later lived in Australia for a time) had been pressing for the US Army to adopt more of the Australians tactics, something Westy was very much opposed to. He was duly silenced.
The outcome of the battle is well known, 100 Aussies were up against a force that’s now known to number close to 2000 enemy, dedicated to wiping out the newly lodged Australian Force at the Nui Dat location (which was the right location for them to interdict VC activity and protect the rice growing fileds in the area, not Vung Tau as some would have us believe.)
That they survived was not only due to the bravery of the men of Delta Company, but to a combination of factors, that may be titled “operational methodology”.
A decisive factor was artillery support. Accompanying the patrol was a very capable New Zealand FOO (recently passed away) As the company moved the FOO continually updated the company’s position via radio (the old reliable, but then new PRC 25 backpack) to the artillery command post.
Remember these were the days when navigation was an art form, no GPS then, merely counting paces on a compass line and using a map.
The artillery battery – 6 x 105mm howitzers - was manned, ammunition ready. One gun was continually being laid on the FOO’s reported location plus 200 yards, a selection of rounds near the gun ready to rock and roll (smoke and H.E depending on the FOO’s call)
The other five guns could be manned and laid within less than a minute when required. So when contact was made and the artillery was needed, it arrived on the ground, when and where required. The shooting that day was vital to the outcome of the battle. The gunfire was so intense at the battery location that the gunners were in danger of being overcome by the accumulation of cordite fumes.
Also decisive was the ammunition resupply by 9 Sqn. As luck would have it two slicks were on the ground at Nui Dat having delivered a moral boosting concert group. They were in effect available to directly support the commander if needed. The following brouhaha is well document, considerable delay in the resup was caused as the “legality” of flying the mission was “sorted”. But it was done, and the crews subsequently credited as Pegasus has described in a pervious post.
No one would ever deny that the crews deserved the awards made to them that day. (however one pilot was denied an award - no doubt due to a vengeful mindset somewhere. It was an error that I think has recently been rectified by "the system")
The Australian Army had always wanted helos in direct command, however RAAF policy at the time was based on an unrealistic philosophy that was started in New Guinea during the last year of WW2 (read the Bostock Schism)
Someone has posted that the army expects helos to be available immediately (“tied up like a cavalry horse outside the tent”) This reveals unfortunately a certain amount of ignorance by that writer of military operations on the ground. It might sound like a clever analogy by said writer, but using his own cavalry axiom as an example, the cavalry doesn't park their horses miles from where they are living.
What the army (including the US Army) wants is;
Assett availability with minimal delay.
One doesn’t get this by basing aircraft 20 minutes away from the main base along with another 10 minutes overfly to target. If possible (and it was possible in Vietnam) the army wanted them based forward at Nui Dat night and day. After all the army operated a squadron of 6 recon helos and 4 fixed wing at Nui Dat. Small aircraft sure, but they maintained a very high availability rate and managed to service them at night (seems the writer of that objection hasn’t heard about hangar doors and blackout curtains)
This night servicing objection was raised by the RAAF hierarchy as just one reason why they should remain at Vung Tau.
But one thing has always puzzled me, as B71 has pointed out, Vung Tau was a target for more rocket attacks that Nui Dat. Therefore one would assume they’d welcome the relative safety of the forward base at Nui Dat. According to B71 Nui Dat was an oasis of calm by comparison.
Clean air, sunshine, good view of the mountains and the bombing strikes upon it by F-4s, smiling natives surrounding the base with Ak-47s tucked down their black pajama pants. The occassional foray against the wire and the rumble of exploding land mines. The never ending thud of out going artillery at night. (One learned to sleep with it, and awoke suddenly if there was too long a period of silence...)
What more could one want? Certainly beats that holiday resort climate of Vung Tau and the very high risk of catching battle-clap in its 2000 or so brothels and bars. Penicilin injections in the ass could be a bitch.
However I’m digressing again.
What was learned (again) was that the ground forces need assets such as gunships, slicks, artillery in direct support and under command.
In Afghanistan they rely on having the US supply these assets and often they aren’t available in the timeframe required because they are in use elsewhere. Politicians of course, know zip about the reality of the ground war and having reviewed an arsenal of toys and whizz bangs and then being told by our jarhead GI Joe clone that all these will come a’ rushin’ to your aid, go back to Australia in ignorant bliss. They can run the war - a war they elected to become involved in - on a shoestring - and use the funding instead to support their favorite causes and handouts to pressure groups who vote.
Meanwhile the troops are gagged and the defence PR machine spins on. The wounded veterans are treated abissmally.
Bushranger 71 is correct in this respect. The situation isn’t helped by the blundering stupidity of Australian Army Aviation in selecting the Tiger and the MHR 90.
Just on interoperability alone these two helos should have been disqualified. Lt Colonel Glen Duus summarised it prophetically in 2005 so for those who’d like some real insight into what appears to be jobs for the boys and even corruption within, (and there has been) go take a look on the Fourays website. It's on the home page in the Chickenhawk chronicles.
The honchos who should know better have forgotten to study or have ignored the lessons of history. They've forgotten how valuable assetts under command and in direct support are. The result is your troops are denied these valuable supporting assetts in Afghanistan because some dumb ass politician surrounded by kowtowing service chiefs believes that the line up of US toys is at their beck and call. Your service chiefs aren't prepared to rock the boat and do the right thing - as someone wrote in the beginning of this thread the loss of 20 men over the total period of engagement is a cheaper trade-off than equipping them correctly. To a politician that's a neat way round it - all they need do is shed a few crocodile tears and utter meaningless sympathy to berieved families at military funerals.
History in some aspects in now repeating itself because some people figured they were too smart to bother about the lessons of history, after all, that stuff is forty years in the past.
The result, lack of equipment - including helos.
Thanks guys
www.fourays.org\history\history_50.htm
In August 1966, Delta Company, 6RAR fought one of the most remarkable battles of the Vietnam war. In the USA it was played down, General Westmoreland didn’t like having his own methodology shown up for what it was. Even the United States most decorated veteran of that war Colonel Hackworth (who later lived in Australia for a time) had been pressing for the US Army to adopt more of the Australians tactics, something Westy was very much opposed to. He was duly silenced.
The outcome of the battle is well known, 100 Aussies were up against a force that’s now known to number close to 2000 enemy, dedicated to wiping out the newly lodged Australian Force at the Nui Dat location (which was the right location for them to interdict VC activity and protect the rice growing fileds in the area, not Vung Tau as some would have us believe.)
That they survived was not only due to the bravery of the men of Delta Company, but to a combination of factors, that may be titled “operational methodology”.
A decisive factor was artillery support. Accompanying the patrol was a very capable New Zealand FOO (recently passed away) As the company moved the FOO continually updated the company’s position via radio (the old reliable, but then new PRC 25 backpack) to the artillery command post.
Remember these were the days when navigation was an art form, no GPS then, merely counting paces on a compass line and using a map.
The artillery battery – 6 x 105mm howitzers - was manned, ammunition ready. One gun was continually being laid on the FOO’s reported location plus 200 yards, a selection of rounds near the gun ready to rock and roll (smoke and H.E depending on the FOO’s call)
The other five guns could be manned and laid within less than a minute when required. So when contact was made and the artillery was needed, it arrived on the ground, when and where required. The shooting that day was vital to the outcome of the battle. The gunfire was so intense at the battery location that the gunners were in danger of being overcome by the accumulation of cordite fumes.
Also decisive was the ammunition resupply by 9 Sqn. As luck would have it two slicks were on the ground at Nui Dat having delivered a moral boosting concert group. They were in effect available to directly support the commander if needed. The following brouhaha is well document, considerable delay in the resup was caused as the “legality” of flying the mission was “sorted”. But it was done, and the crews subsequently credited as Pegasus has described in a pervious post.
No one would ever deny that the crews deserved the awards made to them that day. (however one pilot was denied an award - no doubt due to a vengeful mindset somewhere. It was an error that I think has recently been rectified by "the system")
The Australian Army had always wanted helos in direct command, however RAAF policy at the time was based on an unrealistic philosophy that was started in New Guinea during the last year of WW2 (read the Bostock Schism)
Someone has posted that the army expects helos to be available immediately (“tied up like a cavalry horse outside the tent”) This reveals unfortunately a certain amount of ignorance by that writer of military operations on the ground. It might sound like a clever analogy by said writer, but using his own cavalry axiom as an example, the cavalry doesn't park their horses miles from where they are living.
What the army (including the US Army) wants is;
Assett availability with minimal delay.
One doesn’t get this by basing aircraft 20 minutes away from the main base along with another 10 minutes overfly to target. If possible (and it was possible in Vietnam) the army wanted them based forward at Nui Dat night and day. After all the army operated a squadron of 6 recon helos and 4 fixed wing at Nui Dat. Small aircraft sure, but they maintained a very high availability rate and managed to service them at night (seems the writer of that objection hasn’t heard about hangar doors and blackout curtains)
This night servicing objection was raised by the RAAF hierarchy as just one reason why they should remain at Vung Tau.
But one thing has always puzzled me, as B71 has pointed out, Vung Tau was a target for more rocket attacks that Nui Dat. Therefore one would assume they’d welcome the relative safety of the forward base at Nui Dat. According to B71 Nui Dat was an oasis of calm by comparison.
Clean air, sunshine, good view of the mountains and the bombing strikes upon it by F-4s, smiling natives surrounding the base with Ak-47s tucked down their black pajama pants. The occassional foray against the wire and the rumble of exploding land mines. The never ending thud of out going artillery at night. (One learned to sleep with it, and awoke suddenly if there was too long a period of silence...)
What more could one want? Certainly beats that holiday resort climate of Vung Tau and the very high risk of catching battle-clap in its 2000 or so brothels and bars. Penicilin injections in the ass could be a bitch.
However I’m digressing again.
What was learned (again) was that the ground forces need assets such as gunships, slicks, artillery in direct support and under command.
In Afghanistan they rely on having the US supply these assets and often they aren’t available in the timeframe required because they are in use elsewhere. Politicians of course, know zip about the reality of the ground war and having reviewed an arsenal of toys and whizz bangs and then being told by our jarhead GI Joe clone that all these will come a’ rushin’ to your aid, go back to Australia in ignorant bliss. They can run the war - a war they elected to become involved in - on a shoestring - and use the funding instead to support their favorite causes and handouts to pressure groups who vote.
Meanwhile the troops are gagged and the defence PR machine spins on. The wounded veterans are treated abissmally.
Bushranger 71 is correct in this respect. The situation isn’t helped by the blundering stupidity of Australian Army Aviation in selecting the Tiger and the MHR 90.
Just on interoperability alone these two helos should have been disqualified. Lt Colonel Glen Duus summarised it prophetically in 2005 so for those who’d like some real insight into what appears to be jobs for the boys and even corruption within, (and there has been) go take a look on the Fourays website. It's on the home page in the Chickenhawk chronicles.
The honchos who should know better have forgotten to study or have ignored the lessons of history. They've forgotten how valuable assetts under command and in direct support are. The result is your troops are denied these valuable supporting assetts in Afghanistan because some dumb ass politician surrounded by kowtowing service chiefs believes that the line up of US toys is at their beck and call. Your service chiefs aren't prepared to rock the boat and do the right thing - as someone wrote in the beginning of this thread the loss of 20 men over the total period of engagement is a cheaper trade-off than equipping them correctly. To a politician that's a neat way round it - all they need do is shed a few crocodile tears and utter meaningless sympathy to berieved families at military funerals.
History in some aspects in now repeating itself because some people figured they were too smart to bother about the lessons of history, after all, that stuff is forty years in the past.
The result, lack of equipment - including helos.
Thanks guys
www.fourays.org\history\history_50.htm
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No argument there Shark, and unfortunately has been so when committing to all conflicts, and not just Oz.
Though don't agree with the
I think that's a quality you'll find across the board with military folks, whatever the service, whatever the country. Doing the best they can with inadequate gear.
Though don't agree with the
After all it’s an extension of the great Australian “she’ll be right mate” ethos.
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Shark
For our size, I think Australia does “punch above their weight”, not only the military in Afghan / Iraq but also i other areas of the world stage.
Part of aussies just getting on with the job with what they have at hand
plus being good at what they do. In particular the SF forces.
I also agree that since the pollies and senior staff are told by the us that the Aussie troops do a such good job, "politicians and senior officers who should know better have relied on this mantra of “They can punch above their weight” to avoid their responsibilities by adequately equipping the ADF at all levels."
If the DMO was a private or public company, it would have been shut down by now and it is disgusting that so many wrong decisions over so many years regarding equipment have been so wrong.
We, as in Australia / ADF / DMO, seem to create a unique set of requirements
for our equipment yet we do nothing that the US doesn't do and at a far less demanding activity level in exactly the same environment so I have yet to see why we always decide on "other" than off the shelf gear.
I think it may come down to the Aussie tight arse way of thinking we can save a few $$$ by doing it this way.
Just my HO.
For our size, I think Australia does “punch above their weight”, not only the military in Afghan / Iraq but also i other areas of the world stage.
Part of aussies just getting on with the job with what they have at hand
plus being good at what they do. In particular the SF forces.
I also agree that since the pollies and senior staff are told by the us that the Aussie troops do a such good job, "politicians and senior officers who should know better have relied on this mantra of “They can punch above their weight” to avoid their responsibilities by adequately equipping the ADF at all levels."
If the DMO was a private or public company, it would have been shut down by now and it is disgusting that so many wrong decisions over so many years regarding equipment have been so wrong.
We, as in Australia / ADF / DMO, seem to create a unique set of requirements
for our equipment yet we do nothing that the US doesn't do and at a far less demanding activity level in exactly the same environment so I have yet to see why we always decide on "other" than off the shelf gear.
I think it may come down to the Aussie tight arse way of thinking we can save a few $$$ by doing it this way.
Just my HO.
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Punching above our weight
I'll just explain this a little so I'm not taken out by an Aussie hit squad delivered by choppers to my compound!
I agree Australia does punch above their weight. The fear however, is that making it a PR spectacle creates false expectations, especially among those who should know better. Your politicians (and others) rely on service chiefs who roll over to have the tummies tickled, and don't put up solid arguments supporting the troops. Too many of them are "schmoozed" by this type of flattery - after all it would be a litle like complaining about Mom and apple pie.
Armed forces everywhere will always complain about lack of resources, but the Australian Defence Department (Inc DMO) have turned it into an artform. And yet the head blithely blunders on - why? I'm told he knows where the skeletons are buried. It's been widely reported amongst the military here, and we're waiting for a senate committee or whatever you have, to go after him and bring the critter to justice. But I doubt it will ever happen.
Meanwhile the troops go muzzled. (and persecuted - re the courtmartial of those diggers for the night action in Afghanistan. A disgrace that they have to face this)
About time some of your service chiefs grew some hair on their chests and spoke out publicly. But the higher up they get the more politically correct they become. Those not quite at the top won't speak out in support of troops complaints because they are hoping to be next to get the head guernsey and are too busy polishing their resumes. Besides they'd have to take the 5th to protect themselves.
But this is nothing new.
Happens everywhere.
I agree Australia does punch above their weight. The fear however, is that making it a PR spectacle creates false expectations, especially among those who should know better. Your politicians (and others) rely on service chiefs who roll over to have the tummies tickled, and don't put up solid arguments supporting the troops. Too many of them are "schmoozed" by this type of flattery - after all it would be a litle like complaining about Mom and apple pie.
Armed forces everywhere will always complain about lack of resources, but the Australian Defence Department (Inc DMO) have turned it into an artform. And yet the head blithely blunders on - why? I'm told he knows where the skeletons are buried. It's been widely reported amongst the military here, and we're waiting for a senate committee or whatever you have, to go after him and bring the critter to justice. But I doubt it will ever happen.
Meanwhile the troops go muzzled. (and persecuted - re the courtmartial of those diggers for the night action in Afghanistan. A disgrace that they have to face this)
About time some of your service chiefs grew some hair on their chests and spoke out publicly. But the higher up they get the more politically correct they become. Those not quite at the top won't speak out in support of troops complaints because they are hoping to be next to get the head guernsey and are too busy polishing their resumes. Besides they'd have to take the 5th to protect themselves.
But this is nothing new.
Happens everywhere.
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Shark Zero Six, you quite obviously have a bug planted in my living room!!!
Far from sending a hit team to silence you, there'd be many on this side of the Pacific who'd agree with your observations 101%.
For too long now, very, very few get past one star in Canberra unless they have proven themselves to be 100% trustworthy - i.e., guaranteed not to rock the boat. This has led to the sorry - (let's call it for what it is - scandalous) - state we have today, where apart from a nominal pair of Chinooks, our troops in Afghanistan must rely upon foreign rotary wing assets for any support at all. And that's just one example of many.
But everyone gets a nice little earner after retirement as the rep. for one of the multinational arms companies - and let's face it, that's the important thing.
Far from sending a hit team to silence you, there'd be many on this side of the Pacific who'd agree with your observations 101%.
For too long now, very, very few get past one star in Canberra unless they have proven themselves to be 100% trustworthy - i.e., guaranteed not to rock the boat. This has led to the sorry - (let's call it for what it is - scandalous) - state we have today, where apart from a nominal pair of Chinooks, our troops in Afghanistan must rely upon foreign rotary wing assets for any support at all. And that's just one example of many.
But everyone gets a nice little earner after retirement as the rep. for one of the multinational arms companies - and let's face it, that's the important thing.
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The way the system works...
Andu,
Great to see others in OZ are aware of what goes on. You'd be amazed (or probably wouldn't be...) at who have their snouts in the trough in the way you describe.
The result is submarines that can't go to sea and are being considered being asigned as fishing reefs to tourist areas. Imagine being the defence minister at the time and phoning around to submarine manufacturers -
"Hello Sweden? What sort of deal can you do for us on submarines? How much experience in submarine warfare have you had?"
The answer of course is none, but every submarine kit comes in a flatpack with a free Allen key. So Beazley decided to buy a Swedish-ish Design.
Compare this with the response to the phone call to Germany...
"Haff we had experience in submarine warfare? Gott in Himmel! Who do you think invented the wolf pack! I'll transfer you to our sales manager. His name is Doernitz..."
Then of course there's all the other clunkers that Defence is now acquiring, including the Tiger and MHR 90...
But I guess that's free enterprise for you.
Not sure how you solve this riddle.
Great to see others in OZ are aware of what goes on. You'd be amazed (or probably wouldn't be...) at who have their snouts in the trough in the way you describe.
The result is submarines that can't go to sea and are being considered being asigned as fishing reefs to tourist areas. Imagine being the defence minister at the time and phoning around to submarine manufacturers -
"Hello Sweden? What sort of deal can you do for us on submarines? How much experience in submarine warfare have you had?"
The answer of course is none, but every submarine kit comes in a flatpack with a free Allen key. So Beazley decided to buy a Swedish-ish Design.
Compare this with the response to the phone call to Germany...
"Haff we had experience in submarine warfare? Gott in Himmel! Who do you think invented the wolf pack! I'll transfer you to our sales manager. His name is Doernitz..."
Then of course there's all the other clunkers that Defence is now acquiring, including the Tiger and MHR 90...
But I guess that's free enterprise for you.
Not sure how you solve this riddle.
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The Tiger etc
I've followed this forum for a while, and until now have been reluctant to join as I was in the Australian Army. Just been discharged after serving my 5 years and deciding that reinlisting just wasn't worth it. So now I can talk freely.
What's been siad in here re politicians, aircraft and equipment procurement is true. The Australian Aviation corps is really screwed up today. They are great guys don't get me wrong, but let down by clowns at the top. We know of former "honchos" who have made decisions on equipment and now are in positions with those same companies as has been described in here.
The Tiger program is thouroughly screwed up. They have good men working hard to fix stupid problems caused by purchasing an unproven design, and the whole situation is a mess. Even the airframe is suspect as the corrosion proofing is not up to the standards required in the tropics - once they used to "tropicalise" aircraft, but this European designed bag of bolts, didn't have sufficient corrosion spec. Why because Europe is not the tropics. Some idiot forgot to think that one through when Australia purchased the aircraft.
The software is buggy to say the least. They are having problems keeping them flying. Enough said.
As for being gagged, the forces have almost become a Nazi state, defence PR is everywhere "spinning" every article that goes out. They have lawyers looking over shoulders. Check out what happens if anyone dare kill an enemy in Afghanistan! Every action has an investigation following it.
The MHR 90 is following the same path. Why the went for these aircraft remains a mystery, we won't be fighting in places where the European supply line is active, we'll be mainly associated with US logistics. The French will boycott spares at the drop of a hat. Chek their record.
But of course none of this will be made public. The Nazi PR machine will see to that.
What's been siad in here re politicians, aircraft and equipment procurement is true. The Australian Aviation corps is really screwed up today. They are great guys don't get me wrong, but let down by clowns at the top. We know of former "honchos" who have made decisions on equipment and now are in positions with those same companies as has been described in here.
The Tiger program is thouroughly screwed up. They have good men working hard to fix stupid problems caused by purchasing an unproven design, and the whole situation is a mess. Even the airframe is suspect as the corrosion proofing is not up to the standards required in the tropics - once they used to "tropicalise" aircraft, but this European designed bag of bolts, didn't have sufficient corrosion spec. Why because Europe is not the tropics. Some idiot forgot to think that one through when Australia purchased the aircraft.
The software is buggy to say the least. They are having problems keeping them flying. Enough said.
As for being gagged, the forces have almost become a Nazi state, defence PR is everywhere "spinning" every article that goes out. They have lawyers looking over shoulders. Check out what happens if anyone dare kill an enemy in Afghanistan! Every action has an investigation following it.
The MHR 90 is following the same path. Why the went for these aircraft remains a mystery, we won't be fighting in places where the European supply line is active, we'll be mainly associated with US logistics. The French will boycott spares at the drop of a hat. Chek their record.
But of course none of this will be made public. The Nazi PR machine will see to that.
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Lack of Helos
As Redback 20 indicates, the war in Afghanistan has become so politically correct with the Australian government, that they put their own soldiers on trial as some type of demonstration to the world how "responsible" they are. It's almost a form of self flagellation.
More will die, politicians will utter hollow words, then hop in their VIP jets and return to Canberra - the soldiers forgotton.
By the time they clear the MHR 90 and Tiger for IOC the Australian forces will be out of Afghanistan...
Maybe that was the idea in the first place?
More will die, politicians will utter hollow words, then hop in their VIP jets and return to Canberra - the soldiers forgotton.
By the time they clear the MHR 90 and Tiger for IOC the Australian forces will be out of Afghanistan...
Maybe that was the idea in the first place?
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"Not sure how you solve this riddle."
Stop dreaming up / creating "out of this world" specialist Australian requirements that just add complexity and cost to the items being purchased.
We don't have a large enough military and we don't go into combat enough by ourselves to warrant it.
Stop buying jobs using Defence contracts by having the equipment built here
at a higher cost than buying off the shelf OS. It's false economy IMHO.
Buy as much "off the shelf" "combat proven" gear as possible.
With a LEANING towards US manufactured / US Interoperability /
with guaranteed access to the world wide US supply chain of spare parts.
(That doesn't mean we automatically buy US but I think some positive weighting needs to be applied to US made, off the shelf, combat proven equipment).
And then spend the money that has been saved on flying hours of the aircraft (or in the case of subs, ocean time) so that the crews actually have a high level of skills ready for combat if and when needed (and actually let them go and don't be afraid of losing a few in the process).
I may be way off target but that's my HO.
.
Stop dreaming up / creating "out of this world" specialist Australian requirements that just add complexity and cost to the items being purchased.
We don't have a large enough military and we don't go into combat enough by ourselves to warrant it.
Stop buying jobs using Defence contracts by having the equipment built here
at a higher cost than buying off the shelf OS. It's false economy IMHO.
Buy as much "off the shelf" "combat proven" gear as possible.
With a LEANING towards US manufactured / US Interoperability /
with guaranteed access to the world wide US supply chain of spare parts.
(That doesn't mean we automatically buy US but I think some positive weighting needs to be applied to US made, off the shelf, combat proven equipment).
And then spend the money that has been saved on flying hours of the aircraft (or in the case of subs, ocean time) so that the crews actually have a high level of skills ready for combat if and when needed (and actually let them go and don't be afraid of losing a few in the process).
I may be way off target but that's my HO.
.
Last edited by 500N; 16th May 2011 at 07:26.
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Equipment Procurement
Methinks 500N has hit nail on head.
I know one person in DMO who tells that too often over 50% of the additional cost to many items that are "customised" is attributable to a requirement that adds maybe 5% additional capability. A generalisation perhaps but on the surface true.
Have a look on WikiPedia about the saga of the Collins class submarines...a very good account of the difficulties in that project. Check out how someone decided to configure the periscope's optics - against advice from more experienced operators. The $30 million cost overrun getting this sorted out was just petty cash. Also the prop seals came adrift and the boat takes on water - the cure after submerging - run the engine in reverse for a minute to reseat the seal. (otherwise the sub sinks ) Great when you're trying to bug out.
So what 500N says has a lot of merit. Get the equipment, put more $$$ into training, and maybe then consider mods if they can be justified after you've learned the item thoroughly.
I think Chuck Yeager would agree with him.
I know one person in DMO who tells that too often over 50% of the additional cost to many items that are "customised" is attributable to a requirement that adds maybe 5% additional capability. A generalisation perhaps but on the surface true.
Have a look on WikiPedia about the saga of the Collins class submarines...a very good account of the difficulties in that project. Check out how someone decided to configure the periscope's optics - against advice from more experienced operators. The $30 million cost overrun getting this sorted out was just petty cash. Also the prop seals came adrift and the boat takes on water - the cure after submerging - run the engine in reverse for a minute to reseat the seal. (otherwise the sub sinks ) Great when you're trying to bug out.
So what 500N says has a lot of merit. Get the equipment, put more $$$ into training, and maybe then consider mods if they can be justified after you've learned the item thoroughly.
I think Chuck Yeager would agree with him.
in WW2 we were removing the US gunsights and radios from P-40's and replacing them with UK stuff...
We said the Sherman tank was no good. Our US/UK Allies operated thousands successfully including in the Pacific..
nothing has changed..
We said the Sherman tank was no good. Our US/UK Allies operated thousands successfully including in the Pacific..
nothing has changed..
those Collins boats
Gday all, interesting thread and I certainly agree with many of the above comments...slight drift however since I keep reading about those "dud" Collins class subs here.
The whole Collins debacle is well documented and yes it has been a hugely expensive exercise plagued by many developmental problems. However, despite many of the well known issues of the past (and present - lack of crews etc) I am led to believe that the Collins boats have actually developed into extremely capable assets which are out there doing some very good (and interesting) work.
Sorry for the drift...continue
The whole Collins debacle is well documented and yes it has been a hugely expensive exercise plagued by many developmental problems. However, despite many of the well known issues of the past (and present - lack of crews etc) I am led to believe that the Collins boats have actually developed into extremely capable assets which are out there doing some very good (and interesting) work.
Sorry for the drift...continue