Why no helo transport? Are we condemning our diggers to an easy victimology?
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No-one should ever doubt the proud record of 9 Sqn in Vietnam, or the dedication of the crews. I certainly don't ever dispute the professionalism or motivation of any RAAF helo pilot. The various opinion pieces that have been written will always support one side or another. When someone writes a truly balanced piece, both sides will claim it vindicates their own point of view.
There is an issue that is consistently avoided by BR71 and his warrior brothers. While they all enjoyed a good and productive relationship with the units they supported at the tactical level, there was general level of dissatisfaction with the support provided by the RAAF from senior Army commanders from Vietnam onwards. It was this long-felt frustration that culminated in the decision to transfer command of all battlefield helicopters to Army, not a carefully concocted web of lies from one evil, politically motivated general.
Since then, there has been very little dissatisfaction with the levels of support provided by AAAvn to Army, because Army has always received all the support available.
I am certain that the posts to follow will assert that RAAF could have done better, and that RAAF would have avoided all of the issues which currently beset AAAvn, but the fact remains. If RAAF were operating the current inventory, Army would still be dissatisfied at some level because 'Army Support' is but one of the things that Air Forces do.
Calling it a foolish political decision, and asserting that RAAF would have magically avoided all the issues associated with our current fleet is a biased opinion. It infers that if RAAF were still operating our helos, then somehow CDG would have not selected the platforms they recommended to government, and that the RAAF would have magically kept the same number of aircraft they operated in Vietnam. In other words, it assumes that all of the strategic, political and technological changes of the last 24 years would have been cleverly avoided by the same people who have given us MRTT, King Airs, Wedgetail, HUG (10 years late), C-130J, and F-35/F-18E.
As I have said before, you can't have it both ways.
There is an issue that is consistently avoided by BR71 and his warrior brothers. While they all enjoyed a good and productive relationship with the units they supported at the tactical level, there was general level of dissatisfaction with the support provided by the RAAF from senior Army commanders from Vietnam onwards. It was this long-felt frustration that culminated in the decision to transfer command of all battlefield helicopters to Army, not a carefully concocted web of lies from one evil, politically motivated general.
Since then, there has been very little dissatisfaction with the levels of support provided by AAAvn to Army, because Army has always received all the support available.
I am certain that the posts to follow will assert that RAAF could have done better, and that RAAF would have avoided all of the issues which currently beset AAAvn, but the fact remains. If RAAF were operating the current inventory, Army would still be dissatisfied at some level because 'Army Support' is but one of the things that Air Forces do.
Calling it a foolish political decision, and asserting that RAAF would have magically avoided all the issues associated with our current fleet is a biased opinion. It infers that if RAAF were still operating our helos, then somehow CDG would have not selected the platforms they recommended to government, and that the RAAF would have magically kept the same number of aircraft they operated in Vietnam. In other words, it assumes that all of the strategic, political and technological changes of the last 24 years would have been cleverly avoided by the same people who have given us MRTT, King Airs, Wedgetail, HUG (10 years late), C-130J, and F-35/F-18E.
As I have said before, you can't have it both ways.
emergov: "It infers that if RAAF were still operating our helos, then somehow CDG would have not selected the platforms they recommended to government, and that the RAAF would have magically kept the same number of aircraft they operated in Vietnam."
Did CDG really recommend MRH90, or was it foisted upon Defence?
Frankly I was away from Defence from its Force Development era of the 90s (when ARH AIR 87 just kept bouncing around) until going back in there as a Resrvist in 2007 when MRH90 had been selected as the S-70A replacement. [So, nuthin' to do wiff me guv.]
I have talked before of the debacle of AIR 87, and we now have the 22 airframes I believe but still no IOC.
I believe the frogs have really taken us for a ride with MRH90, with about 13 airframes flying but..
... I won't give details.
How on earth have the European air forces (or armies) accepted this into service? Configuration management is evidently non-existent.
...and another thing, RAAF techos never treated them like trucks. It's not the diggers' fault, it is the mentality of everyone connected to AAAvn who is not aircrew.
Did CDG really recommend MRH90, or was it foisted upon Defence?
Frankly I was away from Defence from its Force Development era of the 90s (when ARH AIR 87 just kept bouncing around) until going back in there as a Resrvist in 2007 when MRH90 had been selected as the S-70A replacement. [So, nuthin' to do wiff me guv.]
I have talked before of the debacle of AIR 87, and we now have the 22 airframes I believe but still no IOC.
I believe the frogs have really taken us for a ride with MRH90, with about 13 airframes flying but..
... I won't give details. How on earth have the European air forces (or armies) accepted this into service? Configuration management is evidently non-existent.
...and another thing, RAAF techos never treated them like trucks. It's not the diggers' fault, it is the mentality of everyone connected to AAAvn who is not aircrew.
The Bushranger gunship capability did not originate because US Army gunship support was inadequate - it was quite good in my view. The problem was availability as nearby gunship elements would often be tasked in areas 2 or 3 hours ferry time distant and vice versa. So, on occasions, gunship support might only be available from about 1000 to 1500 as many commanders preferred that their crews did not transit in darkness. That presented a perilous situation for support of SAS patrols in contact which was the main driver of 9SQN Hotel model gunship development.
The H Model gunship the Ozzies had seemed more a situation of wanting to arm some of your own into "gunships" and as you only had H Models and no B-C-M or AH-1G models, very few aircraft to begin with, and the in-ability to form American style aviation units that incorporated both Lift and Gun style aircraft......along came your armed H Model.
I see your situation in much simpler terms....rather than admit a structural failure by rights of having the wrong force structure and composition...and correcting that problem....the fix was to arm a few H Models. The failure was at Senior levels of command. The folks doing the fighting and bleeding were very darn good Soldiers (and Sailors too).
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BBadanov
Tiger and MRH90 were both pretty much doctrinal post-Kinnaird capability decisions. MRH90 was considered along with Black Hawk, and Merlin. Government selected MRH90 for the additional troop lift project (AIR 9000 Ph 2), and then again for the Black Hawk and Sea King replacements (Ph 4 and 6). CDG identified the requirement, and then did the analysis required to inform the government decision for both aircraft.
I am not sure what you are saying about Army Avn maintenance. All Avn maintenance has always been conducted in accordance with RAAF tech pubs, and all Army tradesmen have been trained at the RAAF School of Tech Training since I can remember. There has never been any way that Army could maintain their aircraft differently to RAAF. It's the same tech system.
Tiger and MRH90 were both pretty much doctrinal post-Kinnaird capability decisions. MRH90 was considered along with Black Hawk, and Merlin. Government selected MRH90 for the additional troop lift project (AIR 9000 Ph 2), and then again for the Black Hawk and Sea King replacements (Ph 4 and 6). CDG identified the requirement, and then did the analysis required to inform the government decision for both aircraft.
I am not sure what you are saying about Army Avn maintenance. All Avn maintenance has always been conducted in accordance with RAAF tech pubs, and all Army tradesmen have been trained at the RAAF School of Tech Training since I can remember. There has never been any way that Army could maintain their aircraft differently to RAAF. It's the same tech system.
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there was general level of dissatisfaction with the support provided by the RAAF from senior Army commanders from Vietnam onwards.
Back to the quote: I agree that there was a general level of dissatisfaction among senior Army officers regarding RAAF helicopter (and, if we're being honest, fixed wing) support, but I don't think it was at the level of support offered, it was their (the Army officers') lack of direct control over the asset in the field.
Speak to any RAAF helicopter pilot who's ever done Army support and I guarantee that 9 out of 10 of them would be able to cite at least one instance where he, usually as a Flying Officer (1Lt equiv), quite possibly as a Pilot Officer (2Lt equiv) refused to carry out a patently ridiculous instruction from an Infantry or other non-aviation Major - which invaribly went down like the proverbial ton of bricks with the Major.
In refusing to comply with such instructions, those junior officers prevented aircraft being damaged and quite possibly, people being killed or injured.
That was what caused the high level of dissatisfaction, not the quality or amount of service on offer. They wanted junior officers who would understand the rank structure and who would obey - and that's why they wanted the helicopters operated by the Army and not the RAAF.
Secondly, many of the (some would call them) myths about the poor level of RAAF support in Vietnam stem from the early days when 9 Sqn was
(a) under equipped, (the B model simply couldn't do everything demanded of it in the high temperatures of Vietnam, and in the first few years, 9 Sqn didn't have enough of them), and
(b) the RAAF was sent to Vietnam under ridiculously limiting operating instructions that were totally unrealistic, a fact that was quickly recognised by the middle ranking and junior RAAF officers there, if not by those in Canberra. The first time that I know of that those orders were blatantly ignored was in August 1966, some five months after the squadron was deployed to Vung Tau, at the battle of Long Tan. (It was before my time; there may have been earlier instances.)
If there's an Army supporter who thinks Frank Riley or Cliff Dohle should have hung their and their crews' arses out further than they did in taking their helicopters in to do that (what turned out to be vital) ammunition resupply to D Coy's position in the appalling weather conditions they flew in that evening, I'd like to know how they think some Yank might have done it better.
I had a good friend while I was on choppers with the RAAF, the Army GLO attached to the squadron. He was of the same opinion that many Army people are, that the Yanks did it better than the RAAF. He cited an example of why he thought this was so. When his patrol needed a dustoff, the 9 Sqn aircraft said that the LZ the patrol had selected was unacceptable and told them they'd have to move to another one. The US Army dustoff did not refuse - he came in and used his main rotor to chop away the trees obstructing the LZ and quite literally cut himself a pad. Through good luck or good management (your choice which), he didn't crash his helicopter onto the waiting patrol below and he got the casualty out - and required two new main rotors, so badly did he damage his rotor.
From his point of view, as a grunt on the ground, my GLO friend couldn't see that there was anything wrong with what the American pilot did. Neither, I dare say, would some reading this. However, there lies the difference in operating cultures between the US Army and the RAAF - of the 1960s at least.
To be fair....the US Army had its own large share of dullards....some of which were not involved in "Aviation" and more than a few of the real duds were within Army Aviation. It does bear remembering....the Marines like their own close air support jets and pilots as compared to the Navy...or worse yet...the Air Force!
I once sat in on an all aviator safety meeting where a US Army Colonel....a rated aviator no less...suggested the cure for tail rotor strikes in Kiowa/Huey aircraft was to install rear view mirrors quite similar to those used by truckers. A senior Warrant Officer Pilot improved on that by suggesting to the Colonel we install two more mirrors on the tail stinger which would allow the Colonel to see the back of his own head in the process of clearing the tail.
The "unknowing" shall always ask for the unwise, unsafe, un-doable no matter what uniform or rank they wear!
The courage and devotion to duty shown by ALL involved in the fighting during the Long Tan battle is worthy of respect and admiration. That they had to confront such interference from Superiors and existing dictates of policy is what should be condemned.
When Brave Men are fighting and dying....the rule book does not apply! As a Soldier....one's only decision is to do whatever possible to come to the aid of those in the fight. That is what being a Soldier is all about...and should be about.
I once sat in on an all aviator safety meeting where a US Army Colonel....a rated aviator no less...suggested the cure for tail rotor strikes in Kiowa/Huey aircraft was to install rear view mirrors quite similar to those used by truckers. A senior Warrant Officer Pilot improved on that by suggesting to the Colonel we install two more mirrors on the tail stinger which would allow the Colonel to see the back of his own head in the process of clearing the tail.
The "unknowing" shall always ask for the unwise, unsafe, un-doable no matter what uniform or rank they wear!
The courage and devotion to duty shown by ALL involved in the fighting during the Long Tan battle is worthy of respect and admiration. That they had to confront such interference from Superiors and existing dictates of policy is what should be condemned.
When Brave Men are fighting and dying....the rule book does not apply! As a Soldier....one's only decision is to do whatever possible to come to the aid of those in the fight. That is what being a Soldier is all about...and should be about.
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The Battlefield helicopter decision
Let’s summarise Bushranger 71’s points. From posts in here and statements elsewhere he asserts:
1. The paper, The Tactical Air Support Group is ill conceived and riddled with inaccuracies.
The author isn’t qualified or have sufficient active service experience to write such a paper, as he was only a Lieutenant in a transport unit based at 1 ATF in 1967-68.
The fact that the author post Vietnam went on to attend staff college and in civilian life later gained an MBA from Macquarie University and held senior executive appointments in international corporations aren’t evidence or demonstrations of his capability to indulge in logical military thought processes.
The original publishers of the paper in 1993, The Australian Defence Force Journal was remiss in publishing this treatise. Bushranger 71 claims that the editorial committee was biased and didn’t have sufficient (or any) persons who’d seen active service. The head of the editorial committee who approved publication of the paper was then a RAAF Wing Commander.
2. The paper, Command and Control of Battlefield Helicopters - The Search for a Joint Approach by Wing Commander Martin Sharp (RAF) published in 1998 by the Air Power Studies Centre, Canberra, is similarly flawed.
3. The decision in 1996 to allocate command of the battlefield helicopter to Australian Army Aviation, was a conspiracy perpetrated by a lying Chief of the Defence Force and Chief of the General Staff;
“The basic reason the helo transfer decision eventuated was that lies were peddled by a former Army CDF and CGS…”
Thanks for clearing that one up Bushranger 71.
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SASless; re your post #223.
Some of the US Army gunship elements that supported 1ATF pre-April 1969 were based in the IV Corps area embracing the Mekong Delta. The problem was an inefficient tasking system which we were told aimed to give a balance of experience to US Army aircrew. On one occasion while I was doing a short exchange with 135th AHC based at Blackhorse near Nui Dat (Phuoc Tuy Province), we were tasked for operations around Tay Ninh up near the Cambodian border.
I did not say US Army gunships did not operate in the dark; on 2 night tasks where I led missions, they provided excellent support. But on one occasion where a LFT left us late in the day to transit home somewhere down the delta (callsigns escape me now), we were told both aircraft were found about 2 weeks later but no awareness of what happened to the crews.
The XM-16 weapon system as fitted to old Bravo models, and trialled by 9SQN, had 4 x traversible M60s beset with a lot of reliability problems. It was being replaced by the XM-23 system fitted to Charlie models incorporating 2 x traversible miniguns and that model aircraft also had an enhanced rotor system. US Army units naturally had precedence for hardware and spares support in their own supply system, so we had to barter XM-23 components for experimental adaptation of that system to Hotel models. After we had proven the Bushranger concept, the Australian government then authorised the princely sum of $94,000 for acquisition of 4 sets of hardware. The US Army gave us some crap gear which we ultimately replaced with newer stuff through conniving their supply system and also having high level representations made in Saigon. As we began receiving Hotel models early in 1968, the Bravo models were progressively returned to Australia and were utilised mainly for helicopter aircrew training and for search and rescue detachments at multiple Air Force bases.
You infer in your later post #223 that the successful development of the Hotel model Bushranger gunship was inappropriate and the Air Force should have perhaps re-organised along US Army lines. I am sure you would have trouble convincing many contributors here that would have been beneficial considering the achievements of 9SQN thoughout the whole campaign. What has always irritated the senior echelons of the Australian Army was that they wanted supporting elements under command (sort of like helicopters tied up outside tents like horses) whereas operational control was adequate and conformed with the joint doctrine existing at the time.
On a separate tack, the 9SQN effort in the Battle of Long Tan was laudable, but that was an early days microcosym of involvement in other significant actions. Hovering ammunition resupplies and coincident casevacs during enemy engagements were also not uncommon throughout the remainder of the campaign. Recorded history does not get those aspects adequately in perspective.
Where were these gunships based that they could only operate from 1000-1500? Gunships did not operate in the dark? What of this thing about B Model gunships being no good?
I did not say US Army gunships did not operate in the dark; on 2 night tasks where I led missions, they provided excellent support. But on one occasion where a LFT left us late in the day to transit home somewhere down the delta (callsigns escape me now), we were told both aircraft were found about 2 weeks later but no awareness of what happened to the crews.
The XM-16 weapon system as fitted to old Bravo models, and trialled by 9SQN, had 4 x traversible M60s beset with a lot of reliability problems. It was being replaced by the XM-23 system fitted to Charlie models incorporating 2 x traversible miniguns and that model aircraft also had an enhanced rotor system. US Army units naturally had precedence for hardware and spares support in their own supply system, so we had to barter XM-23 components for experimental adaptation of that system to Hotel models. After we had proven the Bushranger concept, the Australian government then authorised the princely sum of $94,000 for acquisition of 4 sets of hardware. The US Army gave us some crap gear which we ultimately replaced with newer stuff through conniving their supply system and also having high level representations made in Saigon. As we began receiving Hotel models early in 1968, the Bravo models were progressively returned to Australia and were utilised mainly for helicopter aircrew training and for search and rescue detachments at multiple Air Force bases.
You infer in your later post #223 that the successful development of the Hotel model Bushranger gunship was inappropriate and the Air Force should have perhaps re-organised along US Army lines. I am sure you would have trouble convincing many contributors here that would have been beneficial considering the achievements of 9SQN thoughout the whole campaign. What has always irritated the senior echelons of the Australian Army was that they wanted supporting elements under command (sort of like helicopters tied up outside tents like horses) whereas operational control was adequate and conformed with the joint doctrine existing at the time.
On a separate tack, the 9SQN effort in the Battle of Long Tan was laudable, but that was an early days microcosym of involvement in other significant actions. Hovering ammunition resupplies and coincident casevacs during enemy engagements were also not uncommon throughout the remainder of the campaign. Recorded history does not get those aspects adequately in perspective.
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US gunnie limited hours between 1000-1500
Seems B71 is being very selective in his examples.
Many times additional gun teams were allocated by the US Army, to supplement the daily LFT they based at Nui Dat. (mainly from Bein Hoa) These "opportunity" LFT's did sometimes come from "far away", but they were a "bonus" addition that we were grateful for.
They weren't the regular or main taskers that B71 likes to infer they were.
Many times additional gun teams were allocated by the US Army, to supplement the daily LFT they based at Nui Dat. (mainly from Bein Hoa) These "opportunity" LFT's did sometimes come from "far away", but they were a "bonus" addition that we were grateful for.
They weren't the regular or main taskers that B71 likes to infer they were.
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Hmmm Mythbuster20; maybe you have just revealed yourself as the author of 'The Tactical Air Support Group' as featured on the AAAvn website (www.fourays.org).
I am not aware who the RAAF Wing Commander was who headed the Editorial Committee of the Australian Defence Force Journal, but that group blew their credibility by allowing publication of a paper that embraced this ridiculous assertion considering recorded history of the Vietnam War:
'It could be said that apart from the Caribou Squadron, RAAF involvement in Vietnam was almost inconsequential to the conduct of Australian ground operations in a war that was essentially a ground conflict.'
See my guidance in post #216 regarding a critique of the another paper on the AAAvn website: 'Command and Control of Battlefield Helicopters' by Wing Commander Martin Sharp, RAF. Interestingly, I have previously sought to respond to both papers, but the Fourays Executive have point blank refused opportunity (and for others). I also offered to allow them to publish 'The Bushranger Story' which they would not allow without editing.
The misinformation regarding the RAAF helo force since inception in 1962/63 has been voluminous. Its structure was developed largely along joint planning lines with 3 utility squadrons and 1 MLH squadron created and facilities developed where preferred by Army. While all of that was happening, the most significant portion of Air Force helo activity was Army support training for a proliferation of units/sub-units all around the nation, which has seemingly much diminished since transfer of battlefield helos to Army Aviation in 1989. The ambitions of the Generals wanting helicopters under command dismantled a structure that had greatly benefited Army.
The capabilities gaps that have emerged from the flawed ADF helicopter fleet rationalisation plan (spawned within Army Aviation) would likely not have materialised had the helo transfer decision not eventuated. The Army has crapped in its own nest.
I am not aware who the RAAF Wing Commander was who headed the Editorial Committee of the Australian Defence Force Journal, but that group blew their credibility by allowing publication of a paper that embraced this ridiculous assertion considering recorded history of the Vietnam War:
'It could be said that apart from the Caribou Squadron, RAAF involvement in Vietnam was almost inconsequential to the conduct of Australian ground operations in a war that was essentially a ground conflict.'
See my guidance in post #216 regarding a critique of the another paper on the AAAvn website: 'Command and Control of Battlefield Helicopters' by Wing Commander Martin Sharp, RAF. Interestingly, I have previously sought to respond to both papers, but the Fourays Executive have point blank refused opportunity (and for others). I also offered to allow them to publish 'The Bushranger Story' which they would not allow without editing.
The misinformation regarding the RAAF helo force since inception in 1962/63 has been voluminous. Its structure was developed largely along joint planning lines with 3 utility squadrons and 1 MLH squadron created and facilities developed where preferred by Army. While all of that was happening, the most significant portion of Air Force helo activity was Army support training for a proliferation of units/sub-units all around the nation, which has seemingly much diminished since transfer of battlefield helos to Army Aviation in 1989. The ambitions of the Generals wanting helicopters under command dismantled a structure that had greatly benefited Army.
The capabilities gaps that have emerged from the flawed ADF helicopter fleet rationalisation plan (spawned within Army Aviation) would likely not have materialised had the helo transfer decision not eventuated. The Army has crapped in its own nest.
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If you review some previous posts Mythbuster20, you will see that the gunship capability was developed within 9SQN (with support of 1ATF) due to non-availability of US Army gunships at times from wherever based, not their adequacy. On a few occasions, they did not turn up for whatever reasons.
As an interim measure, a twin door gun installation that had been developed for Bravo models was also adapted for fitment to 2 Hotel models to provide more firepower for SAS work and this system was subsequently further modified for Bushranger doorguns.
As an interim measure, a twin door gun installation that had been developed for Bravo models was also adapted for fitment to 2 Hotel models to provide more firepower for SAS work and this system was subsequently further modified for Bushranger doorguns.
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Misinformation by Bushranger 71
According to my sources, the editorial staff of the Fourays website, have not refused to allow any counter point of view to the Air Support paper to be published on their website.
They had a standing offer; Produce a well reasoned argument/paper and it will be published. No such paper was ever submitted to the Fourays website editorial staff.
As for the Bushranger story, I'm told it was never submitted to them for publication, BUT for a REVIEW. You were riding on the expectations and offer of publishing a logical counter argument to the Air Support Paper, but instead pushing your own publication, which had very little to do with the subject.
It was requested in doc format or PDF, however you (B71) refused to send it stating that it could be "plaugerised". The content had little to do with the Air Support Group paper, and as indicated was a commercial offering being sold by the author ($25)
Now if they were being asked to publish it on their website, the author would have sent it in an extractable format as requested. But, as I'm sure you will recall, only a disk version with a "locked" PDF was offered, which according to the author was "plaugerise" proof. It was never sent because the DISK was not wanted - a doc or unlocked PDF was.
As it turns out the story is some 44 pages long with almost 200 photos. Even if you had offered it for publishing on the web, it would have needed editing down in size and in a format that could be extracted to HTML And as you were then stating (in 2004?) you were sending a disk, from which you stated the PDF could not be extracted which would have prevented it from being put to the web as a PDF download.
The editor of any journal has the right to specify the conditions and format required for any article they publish, however you decided otherwise and demanded (very abusively) that it be accepted for review.
So again, selective amnesia and misinformation.
They had a standing offer; Produce a well reasoned argument/paper and it will be published. No such paper was ever submitted to the Fourays website editorial staff.
As for the Bushranger story, I'm told it was never submitted to them for publication, BUT for a REVIEW. You were riding on the expectations and offer of publishing a logical counter argument to the Air Support Paper, but instead pushing your own publication, which had very little to do with the subject.
It was requested in doc format or PDF, however you (B71) refused to send it stating that it could be "plaugerised". The content had little to do with the Air Support Group paper, and as indicated was a commercial offering being sold by the author ($25)
Now if they were being asked to publish it on their website, the author would have sent it in an extractable format as requested. But, as I'm sure you will recall, only a disk version with a "locked" PDF was offered, which according to the author was "plaugerise" proof. It was never sent because the DISK was not wanted - a doc or unlocked PDF was.
As it turns out the story is some 44 pages long with almost 200 photos. Even if you had offered it for publishing on the web, it would have needed editing down in size and in a format that could be extracted to HTML And as you were then stating (in 2004?) you were sending a disk, from which you stated the PDF could not be extracted which would have prevented it from being put to the web as a PDF download.
The editor of any journal has the right to specify the conditions and format required for any article they publish, however you decided otherwise and demanded (very abusively) that it be accepted for review.
So again, selective amnesia and misinformation.
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No 35 Sqn: Wallaby Zero Four
I have to agree that "Wallaby Airlines" as we affectionately knew them, did a great job in SVN.
I can always remember one day while on VR somewhere in the province, hearing one them calling up "Luscombe, this is Lorrea Desmond in Wallaby Zero Four..."
You could set your watch on them rain or shine (no hail)
I can still hear the clatter of those radial engines...
Well done guys.
I can always remember one day while on VR somewhere in the province, hearing one them calling up "Luscombe, this is Lorrea Desmond in Wallaby Zero Four..."
You could set your watch on them rain or shine (no hail)
I can still hear the clatter of those radial engines...
Well done guys.
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Vietnam Operations
Interesting posts. I've been a spectator for a long while and resisted making any comments.
My first comment may well be my last, however I'd suggest that Bushranger 71 should go back to Notre Dame Cathedral and resume his career as the resident bell ringer.
My first comment may well be my last, however I'd suggest that Bushranger 71 should go back to Notre Dame Cathedral and resume his career as the resident bell ringer.
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'The Bushranger Story'
Okay Mythbuster20; you have now clearly identified yourself.
Fourays Executives were assailed by multiple former RAAF types in 2004 re 'The Tactical Air Support Group' paper appearing in Feature Articles on their website, but cannot recall any offer that a well-reasoned argument/paper in response would be automatically published. So, will try again and see if they will now publish critiques on your paper and that by Wing Commander Martin Sharp, RAF.
The Bushranger Story is published in pdf format on CD embracing 188 images including an Image Library (of 100) with another non-saleable version excluding only that library. The story being available commercially has nought to do with it being offered to Fourays for publication among Feature Articles on their website. Like any pdf document, it is adequately reviewable via Adobe Reader yet Fourays would not accept it for review in other than word format(?). I will not allow editing of either version as they are both identified by ISBNs.
It might be interesting to see where debate goes if greater awareness is created of the 2 subject papers, so enough dialogue from me this topic.
Fourays Executives were assailed by multiple former RAAF types in 2004 re 'The Tactical Air Support Group' paper appearing in Feature Articles on their website, but cannot recall any offer that a well-reasoned argument/paper in response would be automatically published. So, will try again and see if they will now publish critiques on your paper and that by Wing Commander Martin Sharp, RAF.
The Bushranger Story is published in pdf format on CD embracing 188 images including an Image Library (of 100) with another non-saleable version excluding only that library. The story being available commercially has nought to do with it being offered to Fourays for publication among Feature Articles on their website. Like any pdf document, it is adequately reviewable via Adobe Reader yet Fourays would not accept it for review in other than word format(?). I will not allow editing of either version as they are both identified by ISBNs.
It might be interesting to see where debate goes if greater awareness is created of the 2 subject papers, so enough dialogue from me this topic.
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Air Power Paper
No, B71, you have not made a correct ID.
But I do know him and other members of their Association.
However if you have the rebutal - seeing you stated it had been offered but rejected - you should be able to resubmit it to their website within a few hours.
To assist you, go to that website and click on contacts, they have form submits there and I'm sure they will be only to happy to receive a well reasoned argument/paper. I'd also suggest it includes references and bibliography etc to the same standard as the paper published in 1993.
Also be a good idea to resubmit the counter argument to the 'Command and Control of Battlefield Helicopters' by Wing Commander Martin Sharp, RAF published 1998 that you've indicated you had done some time ago. Same high standard applies.
One point - the offer is/was for a logically constructed argument, (quoting that millions of 7.62 round were expended does NOT constitute a logical argument) and the words automatically published were not used. These are your words used in your post - not theirs. Their editors reserve the right to not publish if they find your paper unsuitable.
Looking forward to seeing these well reasoned and well written treatises on the web. Should only take a few hours to check them over seeing that you state that they have already been done but were rejected first time round. I'm sure you made copies.
But I do know him and other members of their Association.
However if you have the rebutal - seeing you stated it had been offered but rejected - you should be able to resubmit it to their website within a few hours.
To assist you, go to that website and click on contacts, they have form submits there and I'm sure they will be only to happy to receive a well reasoned argument/paper. I'd also suggest it includes references and bibliography etc to the same standard as the paper published in 1993.
Also be a good idea to resubmit the counter argument to the 'Command and Control of Battlefield Helicopters' by Wing Commander Martin Sharp, RAF published 1998 that you've indicated you had done some time ago. Same high standard applies.
One point - the offer is/was for a logically constructed argument, (quoting that millions of 7.62 round were expended does NOT constitute a logical argument) and the words automatically published were not used. These are your words used in your post - not theirs. Their editors reserve the right to not publish if they find your paper unsuitable.
Looking forward to seeing these well reasoned and well written treatises on the web. Should only take a few hours to check them over seeing that you state that they have already been done but were rejected first time round. I'm sure you made copies.
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Anti 9 Sqn bile
Went back to the Aust Army Avn site to look at the Air Support Paper to check what "bile" had been published about 9 Sqn RAAF, prompted by ANDU's comment about F/Lt Riley. Without further comment, this is what the author said:
"This one battle(sic. Long Tan) was pivotal to the survival of I ATF and, at a crucial time in its progress, RAAF support was available only because of the conscious decision of one pilot to disobey orders and that of a senior RAAF officer to both encourage and turn a blind eye to that disobedience. If Air Board orders had been followed, the RAAF would never have flown in support of the Long Tan battle.
"This one battle(sic. Long Tan) was pivotal to the survival of I ATF and, at a crucial time in its progress, RAAF support was available only because of the conscious decision of one pilot to disobey orders and that of a senior RAAF officer to both encourage and turn a blind eye to that disobedience. If Air Board orders had been followed, the RAAF would never have flown in support of the Long Tan battle.
.....the RAAF officers were aware of these orders, more so Raw, who was also the RAAF Commander, Vung Tau. D Company was facing a desperate lack of ammunition calling artillery fire almost on their position to break up enemy attacks and on the verge of being overwhelmed. Riley overheard all this from radio traffic. In spite of objections by one of his pilots on breaking Air Board directives that would risk aircraft and that they would be killed', Riley, on his initiative, offered to fly ammunition to the beleaguered infantry 'at all costs ... to support fellow Australians in difficulty', taking all responsibility as detachment commander. One other pilot, Lane, also volunteered to fly, alone if necessary. Raw immediately authorised Riley's mission, more closely aware of the dire situation of D Company and that the Iroquois was the only aircraft capable of the task. He declined to advise 9 Squadron at Vung Tau to both save time and to avoid creating a situation for Scott(9 Sqn CO) where he may 'not have been in a position to authorise it.' D Company received the ammunition resupply, delivered by Riley's two aircraft and their crews, in appalling visibility and rain, without gunship cover and into the teeth of intensive small arms fire, and the battle was saved. The delay in this ammunition arriving due to procrastination over the "legality" of the situation, however was considerable.( Ref 41) The analogy with Milne Bay is telling in all but one respect; Riley's airmen flew the sortie in support of D Company in spite of RAAF policy, not because of it.
To their everlasting credit, the integrity and courage of Riley, the devotion of his aircrew, the sense of duty and sagacity of Raw, all honoured the legacy of Milne Bay. All had recognised, in the furnace heat of combat, the insistent imperative of the land battle."
This is bile?
To their everlasting credit, the integrity and courage of Riley, the devotion of his aircrew, the sense of duty and sagacity of Raw, all honoured the legacy of Milne Bay. All had recognised, in the furnace heat of combat, the insistent imperative of the land battle."
This is bile?
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the 9SQN effort in the Battle of Long Tan was laudable
I have great sympathy for Group Captain Raw, who on the one hand was being asked to task his crews for a mission that was fraught with danger, and the instructions from their airships that the aircraft were not to be exposed to hostile action. He suggested that approval may have to be sought from Canberra. The Army commander reportedly fumed "I'm about to lose a company. What the hell's a few more choppers and a few more pilots!". The request for support then went to the Americans. Had Raw approved the task and it had ended badly it is highly likely that it would have been career ending. It is not clear to me if Raw did in the end give his imprimatur.
Whether Raw did or not seems to be immaterial, as one of the RAAF pilots, Flight Lieutenant Frank Riley, insisted he would go on his own if necessary. Flight Lieutenant Bruce Lane was of the same opinion, though copilot Flight Lieutenant Bob Grandin was less keen, and felt it was a suicide mission. Bob is reported to have said "It was insanity. I felt petrified. I tried to talk Riley out of it. Frank said shut up, stop giving me the ****s".
What is laudable is the calibre of the crews who look the bit between their teeth and did the job. What is not laudable is the position in which Raw found himself.
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Long Tan and the Air Support Paper
Brian Abraham is correct in what he says about Raw and those aircrew.
What B71 has ignored from the day that paper was first published is the fact that the author gave credit to the crews who flew the support mission at Long Tan, despite flawed SOPs.
"To their everlasting credit, the integrity and courage of Riley, the devotion of his aircrew, the sense of duty and sagacity of Raw, all honoured the legacy of Milne Bay. All had recognised, in the furnace heat of combat, the insistent imperative of the land battle."
What B71 has ignored from the day that paper was first published is the fact that the author gave credit to the crews who flew the support mission at Long Tan, despite flawed SOPs.
"To their everlasting credit, the integrity and courage of Riley, the devotion of his aircrew, the sense of duty and sagacity of Raw, all honoured the legacy of Milne Bay. All had recognised, in the furnace heat of combat, the insistent imperative of the land battle."