Perhaps my final input to this interesting thread.
There are design aspects of the UH-1 that fall far short of the UH-60 re survivability and crash worthiness. I guess there is a trade off between holding to the new standards and accepting the risks that occur when one uses less well designed equipment.
Much of the manufacture-generated hype re battlefield survivability and crash-worthiness emerged during the UTTAS competition and of course added appreciably to the cost of the competing airframes. Military types cannot expect to be cocooned against harm in war-fighting and defence planners ought really be focused more on cost-effectiveness in hardware acquisition. The high unit cost of some helo types and their operating costs have been more or less shrugged off by the Australian DoD, including the Service Chiefs, but there will have to be more accountability in this regard as defence expenditure is tightened - the money tree is going to be pruned. Rigorous cost-benefit analysis of all hardware projects would highlight the wisdom of enhancing proven gear in service with adequate capabilities.
The current fighting in Afghanistan is not all that unlike the situation when the ol' Huey was in its prime. The major threat now days is not all different than when the Huey was doing its thing...RPG's, Small Arms, 7.62/.51 Caliber automatic weapons. The threat of Manpads exists but does not seem to be very prevalant now.
Agree SASless and the coal face of combat will foreseeably always embrace close quarters engagement with pretty basic weaponry. Operating techniques are of course adapted according to the threat although MANPADS have hitherto not dominated any battlefield to the degree predicted. Stand-off weaponry like Hellfire is great stuff but very expensive and hardly justifiable for use in knocking over a few insurgents. The basic need still applies of eye-balling the opposition within gun range and being able to deliver accurate helo fire support very close to friendlies during ammunition resupplies and casualty hoisting in particular.
In finality, an attempt to crystallize the theme question: 'Why no helo transport?...'. Unquestionably, flawed defence planning in not maintaining continual adequate military preparedness through progressive optimisation of in-service assets. Shedding of capabilities and/or running down availability of various types before proposed replacements (Tiger, MRH90) have adequate operational capability is really inexcusable. Australian military leaders have been complicit in helo capability gaps emerging by endorsing the very flawed ADF helicopter fleet rationalisation plan, whereas their obligation is to ensure that adequate military preparedness is continually maintained. Exercise of command authority also requires accountability.