Why no helo transport? Are we condemning our diggers to an easy victimology?
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Senate Additional Estimates 4 Jun 09
Major Gen. Fraser: For the MRH90 we have accepted five aircraft at this point and we are in the process of accepting the sixth aircraft. The flying rate for the first year was not up to the level that was desirable and the company has taken initiatives to improve that. We have seen those results in the last few weeks with an increased rate of effort. At this point we are on schedule to achieve the Navy initial operational capability mid next year of the first flight at sea, but we are about six months behind in the Army training at this point to achieve four aircraft, deployable capability, for mid-2011.
Major Gen. Fraser: For the MRH90 we have accepted five aircraft at this point and we are in the process of accepting the sixth aircraft. The flying rate for the first year was not up to the level that was desirable and the company has taken initiatives to improve that. We have seen those results in the last few weeks with an increased rate of effort. At this point we are on schedule to achieve the Navy initial operational capability mid next year of the first flight at sea, but we are about six months behind in the Army training at this point to achieve four aircraft, deployable capability, for mid-2011.
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Senate Additional Estimates 23 Feb 11
CHAIR: As to the diagnostic review that Minister Smith ordered on the MRHs—correct me if I am wrong, but we have received about a dozen or 15 up there in Brisbane?
Mr Warren King (Deputy CEO DMO): Thirteen.
CHAIR: We have received 13. Minister Smith has now ordered a diagnostic review.
Mr King: That is correct.
CHAIR: We have 60-odd to receive yet. That is a very serious step that he has instituted?
Mr King: Of course.
CHAIR: Having had 13 in service for some time now.
Mr King: Yes, of course. Far be it for me to second-guess a minister, but of course it is a very necessary step. Each one of these projects are key for Australia’s defence capacity and it is always going to be a serious issue when a project is late or when the capability is not being delivered as we anticipated. I think what this allows Defence to do and then feed back to the minister obviously in a very detailed analytical way is what is the state of the project, what is the likely impact on the national capability and what are the right ways to approach that problem?
CHAIR: Have any of those 13 helicopters been signed off into full operational service?
Mr King: No, they have not.
CHAIR: Are they all a long way from being ready for that?
Mr King: I have just had the first meeting in the gate review, so I am reluctant to be definitive on that, but I can say that they are not at the final delivery baseline.
CHAIR: If they were at the final delivery baseline and the minister had ordered a diagnostic review, we would have a whole heap of problems, would we not?
Mr King: There are clearly challenges on the project and that is why the minister has directed that this diagnostic be undertaken. My obligation is to assemble all of that information in a very objective and analytical way. We will speak to the company to take their view of the position. We do not look at just the technical aspects; we look at the business relationships and the support from the parent company. Once we have looked at the project status, if you like, the capability manager puts the overlay and, in this case, it is both Chief of Army and Chief of Navy, for their take on the conclusions that are drawn on any capability and schedule impacts and how that affects them in meeting their obligations.
CHAIR: As to the diagnostic review that Minister Smith ordered on the MRHs—correct me if I am wrong, but we have received about a dozen or 15 up there in Brisbane?
Mr Warren King (Deputy CEO DMO): Thirteen.
CHAIR: We have received 13. Minister Smith has now ordered a diagnostic review.
Mr King: That is correct.
CHAIR: We have 60-odd to receive yet. That is a very serious step that he has instituted?
Mr King: Of course.
CHAIR: Having had 13 in service for some time now.
Mr King: Yes, of course. Far be it for me to second-guess a minister, but of course it is a very necessary step. Each one of these projects are key for Australia’s defence capacity and it is always going to be a serious issue when a project is late or when the capability is not being delivered as we anticipated. I think what this allows Defence to do and then feed back to the minister obviously in a very detailed analytical way is what is the state of the project, what is the likely impact on the national capability and what are the right ways to approach that problem?
CHAIR: Have any of those 13 helicopters been signed off into full operational service?
Mr King: No, they have not.
CHAIR: Are they all a long way from being ready for that?
Mr King: I have just had the first meeting in the gate review, so I am reluctant to be definitive on that, but I can say that they are not at the final delivery baseline.
CHAIR: If they were at the final delivery baseline and the minister had ordered a diagnostic review, we would have a whole heap of problems, would we not?
Mr King: There are clearly challenges on the project and that is why the minister has directed that this diagnostic be undertaken. My obligation is to assemble all of that information in a very objective and analytical way. We will speak to the company to take their view of the position. We do not look at just the technical aspects; we look at the business relationships and the support from the parent company. Once we have looked at the project status, if you like, the capability manager puts the overlay and, in this case, it is both Chief of Army and Chief of Navy, for their take on the conclusions that are drawn on any capability and schedule impacts and how that affects them in meeting their obligations.
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Hi Frazzled; you have enticed me to re-engage re your post #178.
You are singing my song re progressive optimisation of in-service assets and it seems that Lockheed Martin/Sikorsky consider ADF Blackhawk and Seahawk assets as low time airframes by world standards. Can you please enlighten re height AMSL of the 'Mary' feature in East Timor and whether the requirement was for Blackhawk to hover IGE or OGE?
Methinks you are referring to the UH-1B/C cabin floor plan whereas the workhorse UH-1D/H fuselage has rear crew stations (with seating) that do not intrude into main cabin space and are also adaptable for deflatable auxiliary fuel bags (quad tanks) for range extension.
It seems some lessons of previous war-fighting have been shed in aircraft design regarding helo gun stations and Sikorsky and Boeing erred in my view in not modelling UTTAS competitors on the UH-1H cabin floor plan, which has been continued by Bell in the slightly stretched UH-1Y. As outlined in several threads, a utility helo has to be suited to involving directly in enemy engagements to best support the guys on the ground, which sometimes means hovering over a fire-fight for extended periods. The broadest possible fields of view and fire are highly desirable to enable defensive suppression virtually directly forward, behind and near vertically below a hovering aircraft. This requirement is achieved well with the outboard XM-23 Sub-system door-gun arrangement for the UH-1H, which was enhanced by 9SQN RAAF to incorporate a 600 round rotating ammunition bin that largely eliminated gun stoppages due to ammunition chute flexing. The spacious Huey door-gun stations allow gunners pretty unrestricted movement to operate their weapons and to more or less hang out of the aircraft as required. Inboard gun stations as for Blackhawk and larger helo types do not have comparable fields of view and fire with lessened mobility for gunners. These considerations are of course a bit academic now considering ADF helo fleet rationalisation planning.
Apparently, inboard door-gun stations for the medium lift MRH90 will significantly impede cabin space and movement, apart from whatever other deficiencies there may be with the gun mount system.
Why are our blackhawks not there - because defence in it's infinite wisdon have spent next to nothing upgrading it - still with the same engines and avioincs we bought it with. Think how many times the F/a-18 has been updated in it's lifetime. Fact of the matter they are old and do not have the performance. Can remeber going to the mary feature in timor and having to fly ractracks to burn enough fuel to fly an approach - cause we had 3 pax on board.
Blackhawk does have struts that compress at about 11G, seats which collapse with a heavy landing, an actual seat for the loadmaster - my memory of a huey was seeing he loady knealing on the floor - okay for 60's and 70's but does cut it this century (unless you're in a MRH90).
It seems some lessons of previous war-fighting have been shed in aircraft design regarding helo gun stations and Sikorsky and Boeing erred in my view in not modelling UTTAS competitors on the UH-1H cabin floor plan, which has been continued by Bell in the slightly stretched UH-1Y. As outlined in several threads, a utility helo has to be suited to involving directly in enemy engagements to best support the guys on the ground, which sometimes means hovering over a fire-fight for extended periods. The broadest possible fields of view and fire are highly desirable to enable defensive suppression virtually directly forward, behind and near vertically below a hovering aircraft. This requirement is achieved well with the outboard XM-23 Sub-system door-gun arrangement for the UH-1H, which was enhanced by 9SQN RAAF to incorporate a 600 round rotating ammunition bin that largely eliminated gun stoppages due to ammunition chute flexing. The spacious Huey door-gun stations allow gunners pretty unrestricted movement to operate their weapons and to more or less hang out of the aircraft as required. Inboard gun stations as for Blackhawk and larger helo types do not have comparable fields of view and fire with lessened mobility for gunners. These considerations are of course a bit academic now considering ADF helo fleet rationalisation planning.
Apparently, inboard door-gun stations for the medium lift MRH90 will significantly impede cabin space and movement, apart from whatever other deficiencies there may be with the gun mount system.
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 30th Apr 2011 at 20:22.
UH-60's can be well armed....if one cares to do so.
The only thing that holds folks back is thinking inside the box...ignoring what strangers are doing....and by being flat assed stupid!
Sikorsky will gladly sell you off the shelf kit....proven kit....and in use by the US Army today....and up grade your "old" Blackhawks into something that roots and toots!
The only thing that holds folks back is thinking inside the box...ignoring what strangers are doing....and by being flat assed stupid!
Sikorsky will gladly sell you off the shelf kit....proven kit....and in use by the US Army today....and up grade your "old" Blackhawks into something that roots and toots!
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the outboard XM-23 Sub-system door-gun arrangement
Ask any person in Southeast Asia of a certain age what really scared them back in the day and 'that screaming gun' will be at the very very top of their list. Strange, therefore, that a similar arrangement hasn't been an integral part of the design of every troop carrying helicopter since then.
As an aside, did you ever conduct a formal study into the direction from which the significant hits were fired on downed Hueys, relative to the helicopters position when hit? If so, what did you discover?
Ask any person in Southeast Asia of a certain age what really scared them back in the day and 'that screaming gun' will be at the very very top of their list. Strange, therefore, that a similar arrangement hasn't been an integral part of the design of every troop carrying helicopter since then.
As an aside, did you ever conduct a formal study into the direction from which the significant hits were fired on downed Hueys, relative to the helicopters position when hit? If so, what did you discover?
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Hi hanoijane and trusting that you are not that femme!
The ability to see and especially hear ground-fire from a Huey usually enabled pretty swift response; more eyes and ears of a 4 man crew being very beneficial, be it a slick or gunship. This anecdote from a comprehensive US Army analysis of Vietnam War operations:
'...While many (US Army) gunship crews liked the speed, agility and hard-to-hit slender lines of the Cobra, there was another faction that preferred the old Huey gunships since the door gunners not only provided additional eyes and ears but could lay down suppressive fire to the rear of the helicopter…The debate between the two factions went on through the war.’
271 Hueycobras were lost during that campaign and maybe about half resulted from enemy action. As with other AAH, a crew of only 2 cocooned in an air-conditioned tandem cockpit have lessened visual and aural surveillance capacity than the doors open gunship versions. AAH may of course have other sensors, some of which can also be fitted to Blackhawk, Huey II, UH-1Y Venom.
To my knowledge, the Royal Australian Air Force never studied ground-fire origins relative to Iroquois airframe orientation; but I am aware of where most battle damage was incurred on airframes and am confident that these generalisations would be pretty correct. For hovering aircraft, most hits were sustained in the hemisphere from the engine forward and from below. During forward flight, hits mostly originated from abeam. The ability of Huey door gunners to suppress virtually directly behind the aircraft probably deterred the opposition from engaging aircraft when they were exiting a scene of action or target. The image illustrates this aspect:
The ability to see and especially hear ground-fire from a Huey usually enabled pretty swift response; more eyes and ears of a 4 man crew being very beneficial, be it a slick or gunship. This anecdote from a comprehensive US Army analysis of Vietnam War operations:
'...While many (US Army) gunship crews liked the speed, agility and hard-to-hit slender lines of the Cobra, there was another faction that preferred the old Huey gunships since the door gunners not only provided additional eyes and ears but could lay down suppressive fire to the rear of the helicopter…The debate between the two factions went on through the war.’
271 Hueycobras were lost during that campaign and maybe about half resulted from enemy action. As with other AAH, a crew of only 2 cocooned in an air-conditioned tandem cockpit have lessened visual and aural surveillance capacity than the doors open gunship versions. AAH may of course have other sensors, some of which can also be fitted to Blackhawk, Huey II, UH-1Y Venom.
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 1st May 2011 at 07:47.
spent some time yesterday with an old service colleague. 40 years rotary and still instructing. Tells me that the Tiger ARH helmet system that is common to the MRH90 has now been ditched in MRH90 and does not work in Tiger. No night ops/pilot headaches because of design etc//// DMO answer to pilot headaches is that they should not get headaches!!!! He also told me that Army failed to keep the mod status up on the D model Chinooks inspite of their statements otherwise.....
He was the last Huey QFI in Army by the way...
He was the last Huey QFI in Army by the way...
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Thanks bushranger. Interesting reply.
I was taught the preferred location for AA was about 300m from the estimated LZ, positioned so you'd be directly behind inbound helicopters. Gunners were taught to aim low and the helicopter would descend into their fire. Focus was very much on hitting a full troopship. Even if you didn't bring it down, casualties in a crowded cabin were almost guaranteed.
AA in that position was pretty suicidal though. They may not have been exposed to fire from their target, but they certainly were from the accompanying gunships. It was, however, considered the optimum effective position to secure a knockdown. From what I heard it worked rather well.
In closing, I spoke with an army colleague today and asked him how he'd deal with a minigun equipped Huey-successor. His answer? "I'd trade one gun or missile crew for one helicopter, just like my father did 40 years ago." It seems harsh, but the economics of this approach are sound and appear to be well understood by your current adversaries.
I was taught the preferred location for AA was about 300m from the estimated LZ, positioned so you'd be directly behind inbound helicopters. Gunners were taught to aim low and the helicopter would descend into their fire. Focus was very much on hitting a full troopship. Even if you didn't bring it down, casualties in a crowded cabin were almost guaranteed.
AA in that position was pretty suicidal though. They may not have been exposed to fire from their target, but they certainly were from the accompanying gunships. It was, however, considered the optimum effective position to secure a knockdown. From what I heard it worked rather well.
In closing, I spoke with an army colleague today and asked him how he'd deal with a minigun equipped Huey-successor. His answer? "I'd trade one gun or missile crew for one helicopter, just like my father did 40 years ago." It seems harsh, but the economics of this approach are sound and appear to be well understood by your current adversaries.
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Iroquois ground-fire hit statistics were US Army 1 in 1,147 and RAAF 1 in 9,512 sorties and shoot down statistics were US Army 1 in 13,461 and RAAF 1 in 79,270 sorties (more prudent operating practices)
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Bushranger,
Mary feature about 9,500ft AMSL from memory, approach flown was to a IGE hover I think. Below 5000ft performance no probs - used to laugh at Kiwi's with the Hueys as they had to offload either fuel or pax to get to some places where as the blackhawk took full fuel and load until it got high.
Having said that I can't remember being very limited in the C model chook when a boggie at 12Sqn - guess that's why the there are so many chooks in theatre. Shame the army hasn't kept them up to the currnet mod. Though RAAF guitly of doing the same with some of it's airframes - unless of course it's a fast jet.
Don't suppose we can do a "seasprite" and scap the tiger/mrh90 and just get mike blackhawks and D model apaches?? You know - off the shelf like teh C-17
Frazzled
Mary feature about 9,500ft AMSL from memory, approach flown was to a IGE hover I think. Below 5000ft performance no probs - used to laugh at Kiwi's with the Hueys as they had to offload either fuel or pax to get to some places where as the blackhawk took full fuel and load until it got high.
Having said that I can't remember being very limited in the C model chook when a boggie at 12Sqn - guess that's why the there are so many chooks in theatre. Shame the army hasn't kept them up to the currnet mod. Though RAAF guitly of doing the same with some of it's airframes - unless of course it's a fast jet.
Don't suppose we can do a "seasprite" and scap the tiger/mrh90 and just get mike blackhawks and D model apaches?? You know - off the shelf like teh C-17
Frazzled
OBL raid was done with four Blackhawks and a couple of MH-47G's. 
*I guess the Aussie MRH90's would have had to wait around another ten years to get to any level of comparable readiness.
Pox on those who bought this piece of flying dirt....
*I guess the Aussie MRH90's would have had to wait around another ten years to get to any level of comparable readiness.
Pox on those who bought this piece of flying dirt....
Last edited by TBM-Legend; 3rd May 2011 at 00:05.
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Apologies for delayed responses but at another Air Force related funeral yesterday in Canberra.
Hello again hanoijane. Just great to get opposing force perspectives in military forums. Apologies if I seemed a bit blunt in my preceding response, but I feel sure you will understand how many of us feel concerning the actions of Jane Fonda.
Your comments regarding anti-aircraft teachings of the Vietnam War era are most interesting and have triggered my memory. I now recall at least 2 instances where we were investigating some ground happenings (large explosions or whatever) and could see movement although were not being fired upon. However, as we departed the scenes of action, we were engaged by 12.7mm from our rear hemisphere detected by the crewmembers down the back who saw the big tracer balls heading our way. There is a long-standing military axiom: 'Never underestimate your enemy' and my view is that happened to significant extents during that conflict.
A possible counter of course to utility helicopters being engaged from their rear was, weather and situation permitting, climb to about 4,000 feet AGL (above 12.7mm range) and respond with 7.62mm doorguns, which can be quite lethal against personnel without overhead protection as evidenced by the success of AC-47 'Spooky' gunships during that campaign.
Hi BA; re your post # 192. The US Army doctrine of heli-borne combat assault emerged pretty early in the Vietnam War and seemed to derive from a belief in some quarters that instead of walking into combat, troops could leap from helicopters and immediately begin engaging the enemy. There are numerous accounts of instances where troops were inserted by helos directly on to enemy held objectives with consequent aircraft losses and casualties. Some of those happenings were recounted to several of us from 9SQN who flew short exchange stints with you guys at the 135th AHC.
The US Army Aviation commitment to the Vietnam War expanded quickly and enormously and in such circumstances, there had to be operating guidelines for relatively low experienced aircrew. But in my view, US Army procedures for so-called combat assault became too stereotyped allowing the opposition to predict how an operation might be conducted, as intimated by hanoijane in post # 190. Landing zone suppression by gunships for example became almost religious, but was often counter-productive in setting fire to vegetation with the stench of explosives masking signs of human activity. The better ground commanders endeavoured to select landing zones a reasonable distance from enemy occupied objectives, preferring slow and orderly forward movement with gunships loitering fully armed out of hearing range for quick response if necessary.
US Army formation flying procedures were unsound in our view being extremely tiring and potentially dangerous as evidenced by several catastrophic instances of clashing rotors. 9SQN RAAF simply adapted fighter aircraft battle formation procedures to helicopter operations enabling greater tactical flexibility, more relaxed flying, better visual situational awareness and much more effective door-gun cross-cover. The following image compares the different practices and the finger-four tactical formation depicted could be expanded to whatever aircraft separation was appropriate for weather conditions to facilitate broader dispersal and diverse ground tracking to reduce ground-fire risk. In that respect, the Air Force did apply lessons of war-fighting from previous conflicts.
Frazzled; thank you for the feedback re Blackhawk performance in East Timor. Huey II can operate IGE at about 12,000 feet AMSL at ISA +20C, fully armed with a crew of 4, full fuel and at MOGW with roughly a 2,000 pound payload of troops, however equipped. Am still trying to ascertain comparable performance for the UH-60M.
Digressing somewhat to make people aware of a brilliant work that is essential reading for those concerned about what is unfolding in defence realms around the world. See this link to 'The Pentagon Labrynth': http://www.cdi.org/pdfs/TPL_FullText_2.9.11.pdf
Hello again hanoijane. Just great to get opposing force perspectives in military forums. Apologies if I seemed a bit blunt in my preceding response, but I feel sure you will understand how many of us feel concerning the actions of Jane Fonda.
Your comments regarding anti-aircraft teachings of the Vietnam War era are most interesting and have triggered my memory. I now recall at least 2 instances where we were investigating some ground happenings (large explosions or whatever) and could see movement although were not being fired upon. However, as we departed the scenes of action, we were engaged by 12.7mm from our rear hemisphere detected by the crewmembers down the back who saw the big tracer balls heading our way. There is a long-standing military axiom: 'Never underestimate your enemy' and my view is that happened to significant extents during that conflict.
A possible counter of course to utility helicopters being engaged from their rear was, weather and situation permitting, climb to about 4,000 feet AGL (above 12.7mm range) and respond with 7.62mm doorguns, which can be quite lethal against personnel without overhead protection as evidenced by the success of AC-47 'Spooky' gunships during that campaign.
Hi BA; re your post # 192. The US Army doctrine of heli-borne combat assault emerged pretty early in the Vietnam War and seemed to derive from a belief in some quarters that instead of walking into combat, troops could leap from helicopters and immediately begin engaging the enemy. There are numerous accounts of instances where troops were inserted by helos directly on to enemy held objectives with consequent aircraft losses and casualties. Some of those happenings were recounted to several of us from 9SQN who flew short exchange stints with you guys at the 135th AHC.
The US Army Aviation commitment to the Vietnam War expanded quickly and enormously and in such circumstances, there had to be operating guidelines for relatively low experienced aircrew. But in my view, US Army procedures for so-called combat assault became too stereotyped allowing the opposition to predict how an operation might be conducted, as intimated by hanoijane in post # 190. Landing zone suppression by gunships for example became almost religious, but was often counter-productive in setting fire to vegetation with the stench of explosives masking signs of human activity. The better ground commanders endeavoured to select landing zones a reasonable distance from enemy occupied objectives, preferring slow and orderly forward movement with gunships loitering fully armed out of hearing range for quick response if necessary.
US Army formation flying procedures were unsound in our view being extremely tiring and potentially dangerous as evidenced by several catastrophic instances of clashing rotors. 9SQN RAAF simply adapted fighter aircraft battle formation procedures to helicopter operations enabling greater tactical flexibility, more relaxed flying, better visual situational awareness and much more effective door-gun cross-cover. The following image compares the different practices and the finger-four tactical formation depicted could be expanded to whatever aircraft separation was appropriate for weather conditions to facilitate broader dispersal and diverse ground tracking to reduce ground-fire risk. In that respect, the Air Force did apply lessons of war-fighting from previous conflicts.
Frazzled; thank you for the feedback re Blackhawk performance in East Timor. Huey II can operate IGE at about 12,000 feet AMSL at ISA +20C, fully armed with a crew of 4, full fuel and at MOGW with roughly a 2,000 pound payload of troops, however equipped. Am still trying to ascertain comparable performance for the UH-60M.
Digressing somewhat to make people aware of a brilliant work that is essential reading for those concerned about what is unfolding in defence realms around the world. See this link to 'The Pentagon Labrynth': http://www.cdi.org/pdfs/TPL_FullText_2.9.11.pdf
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 4th May 2011 at 06:24.
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According to an article in the latest Fourays journal, the stated withdrawal of the Blackhawk is 2012-14.
Does this seem likely?
The UH-1H was shedded in 2007 with a platform still not operational leaving a huge capability gap, so I'm wondering if it will be the same story with the Blackhawk, withdrawn with no real replacement yet ready for operational and/or frontline service?
I'm currently post Flight Screening and have Army first preference and personally would much rather be flying proven hardware (Blackhawk/Iroquois) than something all new and shiny without any real proven capability!!! May not get the chance!!!
Just my two cents
Chris
Does this seem likely?
The UH-1H was shedded in 2007 with a platform still not operational leaving a huge capability gap, so I'm wondering if it will be the same story with the Blackhawk, withdrawn with no real replacement yet ready for operational and/or frontline service?
I'm currently post Flight Screening and have Army first preference and personally would much rather be flying proven hardware (Blackhawk/Iroquois) than something all new and shiny without any real proven capability!!! May not get the chance!!!
Just my two cents
Chris
Bushranger,
Perhaps you forgot what a "staggered trail" formation looks like?
Those nice pretty Vee's (Vic's to some" were not used often...and then usually only in Vee's of three not five's.
Just how do you keep a Huey gunship out of sound range...and achieve timely response?
With approximatley 7,000 helicopters in South Vietnam at the peak of the War...it was said a Huey could be heard from border to sea, DMZ to Ca Mau at any time of the day or night.
Landing on an unprepped LZ with bad guys in position was a very bad choice....much worse than a fully prepped (Air, Arty, Gun Ship, Smoke Ship, and Lift Birds door guns) even if brush fires and the stench of cordite permeated the area. Least ways the Gomers were ducking and weaving while all the boom-bang was falling around their heads.
Perhaps you forgot what a "staggered trail" formation looks like?
Those nice pretty Vee's (Vic's to some" were not used often...and then usually only in Vee's of three not five's.
Just how do you keep a Huey gunship out of sound range...and achieve timely response?
With approximatley 7,000 helicopters in South Vietnam at the peak of the War...it was said a Huey could be heard from border to sea, DMZ to Ca Mau at any time of the day or night.
Landing on an unprepped LZ with bad guys in position was a very bad choice....much worse than a fully prepped (Air, Arty, Gun Ship, Smoke Ship, and Lift Birds door guns) even if brush fires and the stench of cordite permeated the area. Least ways the Gomers were ducking and weaving while all the boom-bang was falling around their heads.
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With approximatley 7,000 helicopters in South Vietnam at the peak of the War...it was said a Huey could be heard from border to sea, DMZ to Ca Mau at any time of the day or night.
or...
With approximately 3,305 Hueys destroyed in South Viet Nam during the War... it was said that Huey wreckage could be seen from border to sea, DMZ to Ca Mau at any time of day or night.
They were clearly doing something else other than just 'duckig and weaving'. Damn those pesky Gomers
or...
With approximately 3,305 Hueys destroyed in South Viet Nam during the War... it was said that Huey wreckage could be seen from border to sea, DMZ to Ca Mau at any time of day or night.
They were clearly doing something else other than just 'duckig and weaving'. Damn those pesky Gomers
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Air Power does not get you to Heaven
In specific response to Shadow and 7X7, and in general support of the current "on the ground" posts, the dewy eyed RAAF notion that Air Power solves everything, so obvious in the subject comments, has been perfectly demolished in a very closely argued and researched paper"The Close Air Support Group", that I have read on the Australian Army Aviation's web site 'Fourays". Apparently written in 1993, apparently no one in the RAAF has come remotely close to refuting its conclusions. I have seen extracts on other sites around the world.
Shadow has absolutely no concept of Patrolling Operations. A R/W full of squaddies is very vunerable to, if not scarce Stingers. the ubiquitous RPG 7, almost as common as AK 47s. Then you get 10 plus KIA at one swoop. Shadow is plainly only experienced in SAS type covert reconnaisance insertions and extractions, not Air Mobile Company type mainstream operations with conventional forces, as is the case in Afghanistan. R?W is very useful, but not in the "bull in the China shop" manner proposed.
Soldiers, believe it or not can navigate cross country on compass and terrain, avoiding obvious routes (and IEDs) without the need of a Navigational Suite on the Flight Deck.
There is a now Unclassified Australian Army Doctrine Manual" Infantry Tactics, Volume IV" ( I got mine at a stall in Notting Hill a few years ago). I sugget Shadow reads it. Its pricinples are not out of date and he may just get out of a 40 year old mental rut in the process.
Shadow has absolutely no concept of Patrolling Operations. A R/W full of squaddies is very vunerable to, if not scarce Stingers. the ubiquitous RPG 7, almost as common as AK 47s. Then you get 10 plus KIA at one swoop. Shadow is plainly only experienced in SAS type covert reconnaisance insertions and extractions, not Air Mobile Company type mainstream operations with conventional forces, as is the case in Afghanistan. R?W is very useful, but not in the "bull in the China shop" manner proposed.
Soldiers, believe it or not can navigate cross country on compass and terrain, avoiding obvious routes (and IEDs) without the need of a Navigational Suite on the Flight Deck.
There is a now Unclassified Australian Army Doctrine Manual" Infantry Tactics, Volume IV" ( I got mine at a stall in Notting Hill a few years ago). I sugget Shadow reads it. Its pricinples are not out of date and he may just get out of a 40 year old mental rut in the process.