there was general level of dissatisfaction with the support provided by the RAAF from senior Army commanders from Vietnam onwards.
You certainly got that right! I'm going to try to turn the level of bile down in what I say here, because I'm distressed at what seems to me to be the high level of anger emanating from some on the Army side.
Back to the quote: I agree that there was a general level of dissatisfaction among senior Army officers regarding RAAF helicopter (and, if we're being honest, fixed wing) support, but I don't think it was at the level of support offered, it was their (the Army officers') lack of direct control over the asset in the field.
Speak to any RAAF helicopter pilot who's ever done Army support and I guarantee that 9 out of 10 of them would be able to cite at least one instance where he, usually as a Flying Officer (1Lt equiv), quite possibly as a Pilot Officer (2Lt equiv) refused to carry out a patently ridiculous instruction from an Infantry or other non-aviation Major - which invaribly went down like the proverbial ton of bricks with the Major.
In refusing to comply with such instructions, those junior officers prevented aircraft being damaged and quite possibly, people being killed or injured.
That was what caused the high level of dissatisfaction, not the quality or amount of service on offer. They wanted junior officers who would understand the rank structure and who would obey - and
that's why they wanted the helicopters operated by the Army and not the RAAF.
Secondly, many of the (some would call them) myths about the poor level of RAAF support in Vietnam stem from the early days when 9 Sqn was
(a) under equipped, (the B model simply couldn't do everything demanded of it in the high temperatures of Vietnam, and in the first few years, 9 Sqn didn't have enough of them), and
(b) the RAAF was sent to Vietnam under ridiculously limiting operating instructions that were totally unrealistic, a fact that was quickly recognised by the middle ranking and junior RAAF officers there, if not by those in Canberra. The first time that I know of that those orders were blatantly ignored was in August 1966, some five months after the squadron was deployed to Vung Tau, at the battle of Long Tan. (It was before my time; there may have been earlier instances.)
If there's an Army supporter who thinks Frank Riley or Cliff Dohle should have hung their and their crews' arses out further than they did in taking their helicopters in to do that (what turned out to be vital) ammunition resupply to D Coy's position in the appalling weather conditions they flew in that evening, I'd like to know how they think some Yank might have done it better.
I had a good friend while I was on choppers with the RAAF, the Army GLO attached to the squadron. He was of the same opinion that many Army people are, that the Yanks did it better than the RAAF. He cited an example of why he thought this was so. When his patrol needed a dustoff, the 9 Sqn aircraft said that the LZ the patrol had selected was unacceptable and told them they'd have to move to another one. The US Army dustoff did not refuse - he came in and used his main rotor to chop away the trees obstructing the LZ and quite literally cut himself a pad. Through good luck or good management (your choice which), he didn't crash his helicopter onto the waiting patrol below and he got the casualty out - and required two new main rotors, so badly did he damage his rotor.
From his point of view, as a grunt on the ground, my GLO friend couldn't see that there was anything wrong with what the American pilot did. Neither, I dare say, would some reading this. However, there lies the difference in operating cultures between the US Army and the RAAF - of the 1960s at least.