"The point of Military Flight Safety is to preserve both aircrew and aircraft from avoidable accidents so that they remain available for unavoidable war. Nobly expending either in unnecessary and avoidable accidents is wasteful and helps no-one, other than our potential enemies. This isn't about wrapping up the little darlings in fluffy cotton wool, but of giving them aircraft that can be seen by others (unless at war), recognised by allies (when at war), able to withstand an AK47 round entering a fuel tank without exploding, able to conduct airborne refuelling without exploding, able to keep flying without a computer arbitrarily winding up the power, winding down the power, or cutting the power altogether, etc, etc."
And what happens because the mission doesn't take off, and we can't complete the mission, because all the aircraft have been grounded? Why do the MAA get to make that operational decision?
If we are made aware of the risk, then we get to make that decision, not an "independent MAA", which by definition will be civilian run. Moreover, what happens if mitigating that risk results in the entire fleet having been grounded, because we can't afford to embody that mitigation?
I appreciate that you are trying to reduce the mitigatable (made-up word!) risks, but in doing so you reduce operational capability. Simply look at the loss in MPA capability we've accepted simply due to the death of 14 personnel. Whilst I appreciate this may be an emotive topic for many on this board, MR2 and MRA4 provided a significant capability, yet the cost (both financial and presentational) of fixing the flaws was deemed to be too high. I have significant fears that the majority of our aircraft types will have "risks" associated with them, and as the MAA increases it's influence, we will be unable to remove all those risks at an affordable cost.
As I've said, perfect remains the enemy of good enough, and whilst "risk" must be made transparent, it's not up to the MAA to stop us from flying.