Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
A really irritating PPRuNer
Thread Starter
Join Date: Jun 2000
Location: Just popping my head back up above the parapet
Posts: 903
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
FJJP,
You raised a very good point. I asked that very point back in 2003. Herewith, my question followed by the reply from the MoD.
Q: Air Chif Marshal Day was the Director of Air Force Plans and Programs MoD between 1991 and 1994. Was his Department involved in any way with the procurement and/or introduction into service of the Chinook HC2?
A: You also ask for further information about the procurement and/or introduction into service of the Chinook HC2 and I have sought advice from the Chinook Project Team. They have confirmed that between 1991 and 1994 the Directorate of Air Force Plans and Programmes had no involvement in the procurement and introduction of the Chinook Mk2 into service.
Q: Air Chief Marshal Wratten was the Director of Operational Requirements (RAF) MoD between 1984 and 1986. As above, was his Department involved in any way with the procurement and/or introduction into service of the Chinook HC2?
A: Similarly, in the period 1984 to 1986 the Directorate of Operational Requirements had nothing to do with the proposed mid-life update of the Chinook HC1.
On a different note, I was very disappointed to see that the official RAF website carries a copy of the article written by Mr Wratten back in in 2000 ( Galls me to put the link, but here it is (scroll down) ), in which he justifies his decision to blame the pilots. There is nothing on the site to balance the article. How sad that the RAF does not take an imparital approach, despite many people trying to clear the names of two of their own. I wonder why the article merits bandwidth on the site in the first place? Perhaps the opinion of senior officers really is above all else!
Don't forget, the campaign is a cross party issue. If you have a prospective Parliamentary candidate call at your door, amongst other things, be sure to bring this injustice to their attention and ask their opinion.
More, as and when.
My best, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
You raised a very good point. I asked that very point back in 2003. Herewith, my question followed by the reply from the MoD.
Q: Air Chif Marshal Day was the Director of Air Force Plans and Programs MoD between 1991 and 1994. Was his Department involved in any way with the procurement and/or introduction into service of the Chinook HC2?
A: You also ask for further information about the procurement and/or introduction into service of the Chinook HC2 and I have sought advice from the Chinook Project Team. They have confirmed that between 1991 and 1994 the Directorate of Air Force Plans and Programmes had no involvement in the procurement and introduction of the Chinook Mk2 into service.
Q: Air Chief Marshal Wratten was the Director of Operational Requirements (RAF) MoD between 1984 and 1986. As above, was his Department involved in any way with the procurement and/or introduction into service of the Chinook HC2?
A: Similarly, in the period 1984 to 1986 the Directorate of Operational Requirements had nothing to do with the proposed mid-life update of the Chinook HC1.
On a different note, I was very disappointed to see that the official RAF website carries a copy of the article written by Mr Wratten back in in 2000 ( Galls me to put the link, but here it is (scroll down) ), in which he justifies his decision to blame the pilots. There is nothing on the site to balance the article. How sad that the RAF does not take an imparital approach, despite many people trying to clear the names of two of their own. I wonder why the article merits bandwidth on the site in the first place? Perhaps the opinion of senior officers really is above all else!
Don't forget, the campaign is a cross party issue. If you have a prospective Parliamentary candidate call at your door, amongst other things, be sure to bring this injustice to their attention and ask their opinion.
More, as and when.
My best, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
Join Date: Mar 2005
Location: Falmouth
Posts: 1,651
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
He then amplified his opening remarks by saying that as the pilots approached the deteriorating weather near the Mull, they had 2 choices. If they intended and were able to maintain flight under Visual Flight Rules, they should have slowed down, turned away or turned back. If they planned to continue their flight under Instrument Flight Rules, they should have climbed to above Safety Altitude well before they approached the Mull. If they were forced to transition to Instrument Flight Rules because they inadvertently entered cloud when close to the Mull, they should have made a rapid climb to at least Safety Altitude at maximum power and best climbing speed, while also turning away from the Mull.
The aircraft's avionics showed that the Chinook neither turned away nor turned back. When it was less than one nautical mile from what was to be the point of impact, a waypoint change was made. This selection on the navigation equipment caused it then to display heading and distance to the next en route fix. Specifically, the pilots changed waypoint to one 87 nautical miles beyond the Lighthouse that was their next planned turning point. They did this when extremely close to the Lighthouse where the Lighthouse Keeper, who was on the spot, gave evidence that visibility was 400 to 500 metres, and in places below 20 metres.
Activity in the cockpit of this nature provided pivotal evidence of conscious, intentional pilot input. It proved that the pilots were in control of their aircraft at that moment, a fact undisputed by even our most vociferous critics. It also showed that, rather than ensure they were at Safety Altitude well before landfall, they had flown into the bad weather at low level and at speed, in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre where the Board of Inguiry itself had concluded that the prevailing conditions 'would have required flight in accordance with Instrument Flight Rules'.
At waypoint change they were some 15 seconds from the fogbound Lighthouse and perilously close to steeply rising ground that was also shrouded in cloud. In reaching this position they had violated the rules governing flight under both Visual and Instrument Meteorological Conditions. In consequence they were in grave danger, solely through failing to exercise the skill and judgement of which they were capable and as they were trained to do. This is the definition of neglioence as it applies to militaxy aviation.
About twenty seconds after making the waypoint change and 5 seconds beyond the Lighthouse, they crashed. They hit the ground at a height of 810 feet. This was some 600 feet below the top of the Mull and 2000 feet below Safety Altitude for this sector of the planned route. Their speed at impact was calculated by the Air Accident Investigation Branch to be 150 knots.
If this is all true - as is to be expected then surely the pilots were guilty of gross negligence. They were IMC and 2000 ' BELOW the safety altitude. They violated the rules (significantly).
so, why were they not negligent then? whats wrong with Sir William Wrattens statement? Is it correct?
The aircraft's avionics showed that the Chinook neither turned away nor turned back. When it was less than one nautical mile from what was to be the point of impact, a waypoint change was made. This selection on the navigation equipment caused it then to display heading and distance to the next en route fix. Specifically, the pilots changed waypoint to one 87 nautical miles beyond the Lighthouse that was their next planned turning point. They did this when extremely close to the Lighthouse where the Lighthouse Keeper, who was on the spot, gave evidence that visibility was 400 to 500 metres, and in places below 20 metres.
Activity in the cockpit of this nature provided pivotal evidence of conscious, intentional pilot input. It proved that the pilots were in control of their aircraft at that moment, a fact undisputed by even our most vociferous critics. It also showed that, rather than ensure they were at Safety Altitude well before landfall, they had flown into the bad weather at low level and at speed, in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre where the Board of Inguiry itself had concluded that the prevailing conditions 'would have required flight in accordance with Instrument Flight Rules'.
At waypoint change they were some 15 seconds from the fogbound Lighthouse and perilously close to steeply rising ground that was also shrouded in cloud. In reaching this position they had violated the rules governing flight under both Visual and Instrument Meteorological Conditions. In consequence they were in grave danger, solely through failing to exercise the skill and judgement of which they were capable and as they were trained to do. This is the definition of neglioence as it applies to militaxy aviation.
About twenty seconds after making the waypoint change and 5 seconds beyond the Lighthouse, they crashed. They hit the ground at a height of 810 feet. This was some 600 feet below the top of the Mull and 2000 feet below Safety Altitude for this sector of the planned route. Their speed at impact was calculated by the Air Accident Investigation Branch to be 150 knots.
If this is all true - as is to be expected then surely the pilots were guilty of gross negligence. They were IMC and 2000 ' BELOW the safety altitude. They violated the rules (significantly).
so, why were they not negligent then? whats wrong with Sir William Wrattens statement? Is it correct?
Join Date: Aug 2000
Location: UK
Posts: 1,777
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
vecvechookattack
You really must read the whole thread from the beginning to begin to understand why those of us with extensive military flying experience have joined the campaign in disagreeing with the BoI verdict.
The whole case has been argued in great detail, will completely answer your questions and explain why the Air Marshalls' conclusions were a travesty of justice.
FJJP
You really must read the whole thread from the beginning to begin to understand why those of us with extensive military flying experience have joined the campaign in disagreeing with the BoI verdict.
The whole case has been argued in great detail, will completely answer your questions and explain why the Air Marshalls' conclusions were a travesty of justice.
FJJP
Join Date: Jan 2004
Location: Hampshire
Posts: 112
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
FJJP,
Please let us have the facts as a matter of urgency!!! What was wrong with the aircraft? How have they fixed them. People are still flying them, do they need to be grounded?
connected with the intro of the [defective] ac...
If the aircraft were defective what has been done to fix them? Are they still flying around defective?
those of us with extensive military flying experience
Join Date: Mar 2005
Location: Falmouth
Posts: 1,651
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
But is wasn't a travesty of justice. They were guilty of gross negligence in so much as they flew the aircraft (which was perfectly servicable) into the ground.
Now as someone with over 5000 rotary wing flying hours in various aircraft types including Wessex, Seaking Lynx Merlin etc etc, I very clearly remember lesson 1. If you can's see the ground then you MUST climb to above your safety altitude.
as the pilots approached the deteriorating weather near the Mull, they had 2 choices. If they intended and were able to maintain flight under Visual Flight Rules, they should have slowed down, turned away or turned back. If they planned to continue their flight under Instrument Flight Rules, they should have climbed to above Safety Altitude well before they approached the Mull. If they were forced to transition to Instrument Flight Rules because they inadvertently entered cloud when close to the Mull, they should have made a rapid climb to at least Safety Altitude at maximum power and best climbing speed, while also turning away from the Mull.
Now as someone with over 5000 rotary wing flying hours in various aircraft types including Wessex, Seaking Lynx Merlin etc etc, I very clearly remember lesson 1. If you can's see the ground then you MUST climb to above your safety altitude.
as the pilots approached the deteriorating weather near the Mull, they had 2 choices. If they intended and were able to maintain flight under Visual Flight Rules, they should have slowed down, turned away or turned back. If they planned to continue their flight under Instrument Flight Rules, they should have climbed to above Safety Altitude well before they approached the Mull. If they were forced to transition to Instrument Flight Rules because they inadvertently entered cloud when close to the Mull, they should have made a rapid climb to at least Safety Altitude at maximum power and best climbing speed, while also turning away from the Mull.
Without becoming embroiled into the negligence debate, does anyone, with knowledge of the avionics on this aircraft, know whether the waypoint change described:
"The aircraft's avionics showed that the Chinook neither turned away nor turned back. When it was less than one nautical mile from what was to be the point of impact, a waypoint change was made. This selection on the navigation equipment caused it then to display heading and distance to the next en route fix"
was a manually entered change or simply the next waypoint in the route? Most of the various RNAVs and FMS' that I've used will change to the next waypoint in a route, before it is reached, in order to intercept the next track using a rate one turn (unless OVERFLY is used.) Come to that, would the aircraft have been hand flown or coupled to the autopilot?
"The aircraft's avionics showed that the Chinook neither turned away nor turned back. When it was less than one nautical mile from what was to be the point of impact, a waypoint change was made. This selection on the navigation equipment caused it then to display heading and distance to the next en route fix"
was a manually entered change or simply the next waypoint in the route? Most of the various RNAVs and FMS' that I've used will change to the next waypoint in a route, before it is reached, in order to intercept the next track using a rate one turn (unless OVERFLY is used.) Come to that, would the aircraft have been hand flown or coupled to the autopilot?
Join Date: Jun 2001
Posts: 85
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
From Select Committee on Chinook ZD 576:
"The aircraft was fitted with a Racal Avionics "SuperTANS" Tactical Area Navigation System providing navigation information from two independent sources. The system enables a number of way points to be fed into it before a flight. When flying from the point of departure to the first way point the screen[20] shows bearing, distance and "time to go" from the aircraft's current position to the way point. When the pilot alters the system from the first way point to the second, the distance and bearing of the former are replaced on the screen by those of the latter and so on as way points are progressively changed. Racal confirmed that the system was performing perfectly at the time of loss of power and extracted from its memory the information that way point B had been selected when way point A was 0.81 nautical miles distant, bearing 018°. The distance from the way point change to the point of impact was 0.95 nautical miles. The system gave no information as to height or time at the way point change but had recorded that at approximately 15-18 seconds before power down the aircraft was at a height of 468 feet ± 50 feet (Board report para 49). The manufacturers have told us that "18 seconds is likely to be a better estimate".[21] The TANS had also recorded that the height above sea level at impact was 665 ft[22], whereas in fact it was 810 ft. The investigating board noted this discrepancy (para 49); they considered it probably due to "the mechanics of the crash and the developing fireball", but we know of no evidence to support this. The TANS is not intended to act as a Flight Recorder or what is colloquially known as a Black Box, and the information referred to above was achieved by a somewhat complicated and ingenious method of extraction employed by Racal."
"The aircraft was fitted with a Racal Avionics "SuperTANS" Tactical Area Navigation System providing navigation information from two independent sources. The system enables a number of way points to be fed into it before a flight. When flying from the point of departure to the first way point the screen[20] shows bearing, distance and "time to go" from the aircraft's current position to the way point. When the pilot alters the system from the first way point to the second, the distance and bearing of the former are replaced on the screen by those of the latter and so on as way points are progressively changed. Racal confirmed that the system was performing perfectly at the time of loss of power and extracted from its memory the information that way point B had been selected when way point A was 0.81 nautical miles distant, bearing 018°. The distance from the way point change to the point of impact was 0.95 nautical miles. The system gave no information as to height or time at the way point change but had recorded that at approximately 15-18 seconds before power down the aircraft was at a height of 468 feet ± 50 feet (Board report para 49). The manufacturers have told us that "18 seconds is likely to be a better estimate".[21] The TANS had also recorded that the height above sea level at impact was 665 ft[22], whereas in fact it was 810 ft. The investigating board noted this discrepancy (para 49); they considered it probably due to "the mechanics of the crash and the developing fireball", but we know of no evidence to support this. The TANS is not intended to act as a Flight Recorder or what is colloquially known as a Black Box, and the information referred to above was achieved by a somewhat complicated and ingenious method of extraction employed by Racal."
Join Date: Dec 2004
Location: SE490618
Age: 64
Posts: 182
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
"Racal confirmed that the system was performing perfectly at the time of loss of power and extracted from its memory the information that way point B had been selected when way point A was 0.81 nautical miles distant, bearing 018°." which suggests to me that they knew where they were. Which has to lead you down the negligence route.
Join Date: Aug 2000
Location: Liverpool based Geordie, so calm down, calm down kidda!!
Age: 60
Posts: 2,051
Likes: 0
Received 17 Likes
on
6 Posts
The RNS 252 operated in route mode can AUTOMATICALLY change to the next waypoint just before you reach it and you are given a steer that does not take you over the waypoint. This is the equivalent of a 'commercial turn' taught in IF schools. The pilot can manually change the waypoint. I don't know what happened in this case, enough to say that it could have been automatic. Can anyone confirm this??
vecvechookattack, you are partly correct, if they deliberately flew that ac into the ground they would be G/Negligent. The Mk2 had no IF clearance at the time. I'm not sure if you have read the whole thread, if not, please do. It explains the lack of clearances and the known FADEC problems causing massive engine problems. Please tell us how YOU are certain that nothing else was happening in the seconds before impact?? We are NOT saying they were not negligent, god only knows that they might have been. We are saying that without absolute certainty and proof, there is only one conclusion.
"Racal confirmed that the system was performing perfectly at the time of loss of power". Everyone says that after an incident............
vecvechookattack, you are partly correct, if they deliberately flew that ac into the ground they would be G/Negligent. The Mk2 had no IF clearance at the time. I'm not sure if you have read the whole thread, if not, please do. It explains the lack of clearances and the known FADEC problems causing massive engine problems. Please tell us how YOU are certain that nothing else was happening in the seconds before impact?? We are NOT saying they were not negligent, god only knows that they might have been. We are saying that without absolute certainty and proof, there is only one conclusion.
"Racal confirmed that the system was performing perfectly at the time of loss of power". Everyone says that after an incident............
Join Date: Aug 2000
Location: UK
Posts: 1,777
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
vecvechookattack, you stated
That's the whole point of this campaign - were they in control of the aircraft? Or had some malfunction robbed them of the ability to climb/turn/whatever. BTW, bow to your rotary experience; your profile gives little away.
Twinact, very droll. I put defective in brackets - maybe it should have been ?defective. Why did the Boscombe test crews stop flying it? Perhaps you could throw some light on the argument - I would guess you have a better knowledge base than I concerning twin rotors... Give me your address and I'll pop in for a beer next time I'm in Odiham.
they flew the aircraft (which was perfectly servicable) into the ground
Twinact, very droll. I put defective in brackets - maybe it should have been ?defective. Why did the Boscombe test crews stop flying it? Perhaps you could throw some light on the argument - I would guess you have a better knowledge base than I concerning twin rotors... Give me your address and I'll pop in for a beer next time I'm in Odiham.
"Racal confirmed that the system was performing perfectly at the time of loss of power". Everyone says that after an incident............
Correct. Especially companies who define serviceability as working on their bench, not integrated into a complex avionic system within a complex aircraft, that in electrical terms resembles RF soup. Perfectly serviceable kit can give wrong readings because of external influences. e.g. poor bonding.
Sorry, been there and watched them squirm when "serviceable" kit failed miserably as soon as it was installed. (And then laugh and walk away as they realised the contract didn't include a demonstration of installed performance, as all avionics contracts should - but few are). Funnily enough, the worst example I ever saw was R****. The quote, as read, is meaningless.
Correct. Especially companies who define serviceability as working on their bench, not integrated into a complex avionic system within a complex aircraft, that in electrical terms resembles RF soup. Perfectly serviceable kit can give wrong readings because of external influences. e.g. poor bonding.
Sorry, been there and watched them squirm when "serviceable" kit failed miserably as soon as it was installed. (And then laugh and walk away as they realised the contract didn't include a demonstration of installed performance, as all avionics contracts should - but few are). Funnily enough, the worst example I ever saw was R****. The quote, as read, is meaningless.
A really irritating PPRuNer
Thread Starter
Join Date: Jun 2000
Location: Just popping my head back up above the parapet
Posts: 903
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
vecvechookattack,
there is no record of the time the waypoint change was made so I don't see how the 15 seconds from the lighthouse is significant. You make the assumption that it was flying in a straight line. What was the heading of the Chinook at waypoint change?
I have a full copy of the Racal report, but have passed it to someone with better avionics knowledge than I, so can't answer with absolute confidence at the moment. However, much of the information was disclosed to the House of Lords Select Committee, so a search through their transcripts will be useful.
Rafloo,
Racal confirmed that their system was working correctly. They also stated that it was never intended to be used as an accident data recorder. This (to me) implies that the information should not be relied upon for such a purpose.
I say again, that the purpose of the campaign is not to say that the pilots were not negligent, we are simply saying that there is insufficient evidence to support the verdict of negligence against the rules in place at that time.
Regards, as always
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
Edited to add the word 'not' to the last paragraph
there is no record of the time the waypoint change was made so I don't see how the 15 seconds from the lighthouse is significant. You make the assumption that it was flying in a straight line. What was the heading of the Chinook at waypoint change?
I have a full copy of the Racal report, but have passed it to someone with better avionics knowledge than I, so can't answer with absolute confidence at the moment. However, much of the information was disclosed to the House of Lords Select Committee, so a search through their transcripts will be useful.
Rafloo,
Racal confirmed that their system was working correctly. They also stated that it was never intended to be used as an accident data recorder. This (to me) implies that the information should not be relied upon for such a purpose.
I say again, that the purpose of the campaign is not to say that the pilots were not negligent, we are simply saying that there is insufficient evidence to support the verdict of negligence against the rules in place at that time.
Regards, as always
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
Edited to add the word 'not' to the last paragraph
Last edited by Brian Dixon; 13th Apr 2005 at 19:41.
Rafloo
"but whose fault is that...the company....or the fools who bought it ???"
The latter. They’re not all fools; often they’re ordered to do it by the elite few who are.
However, my point is that all Racal can opine is that the kit was serviceable when tested on their bench. Fair enough. The logical follow-on question - did it meet the installed performance specification when fitted to the aircraft? – is seldom asked because too many people think one follows the other automatically. In part, because the two issues are, in procurement terms, often managed separately. That is, one IPT will often buy the black box with a Certificate of Design and Performance, and put it on the shelf, job done. A quite separate IPT (the platform one) will then have to contract installation and, importantly, negotiate the installed performance; given that every a/c DA understands that its performance will be different when integrated into other systems and the airframe, and very often different between a/c of the same type. For example, anything with an antenna falls into this category because the antenna and feeder are part of the aircraft, not aircraft equipment, and selected by the a/c DA. In this case, unless Racal carried out the system installation design, design incorporation, embodiment etc, then they have little to do with issues of performance. This is unlikely (although I will stand corrected) because of Boeing’s policy at the time of not acting as a sub to anyone.
To an a/c DA, the Certificate from the vendor is only the starting point and a small part of the audit trail with leads to a demonstration of installed performance. Apart from obvious safety issues, it is in many ways meaningless when discussing practical performance. To take the point a step further, if you change the system in any way and try to contract a demo of installed performance, the first thing the company will ask for is the baseline i.e. the certified results of the previous demo. Too often this is unavailable, typically because somewhere in the loop there is a Service Engineered Mod which affects performance. SEMs are regarded as cheap alternatives to the full monty, and full performance trials are rare. This is manna to contractors, because the inevitable outcome is a contract which says “test and declare”. On numerous occasions I’ve inherited a/c where the performance trials report said “we tested it, this is the performance, it’s nothing like what you want or need, more money please if you want to improve it”. Everyone at any DA understands this, and know they stand a very good chance of swinging such a clause past most MoD PMs.
I am not inferring any or all of this happened in this case, merely pointing out an obvious (to me) area of reasonable doubt.
"but whose fault is that...the company....or the fools who bought it ???"
The latter. They’re not all fools; often they’re ordered to do it by the elite few who are.
However, my point is that all Racal can opine is that the kit was serviceable when tested on their bench. Fair enough. The logical follow-on question - did it meet the installed performance specification when fitted to the aircraft? – is seldom asked because too many people think one follows the other automatically. In part, because the two issues are, in procurement terms, often managed separately. That is, one IPT will often buy the black box with a Certificate of Design and Performance, and put it on the shelf, job done. A quite separate IPT (the platform one) will then have to contract installation and, importantly, negotiate the installed performance; given that every a/c DA understands that its performance will be different when integrated into other systems and the airframe, and very often different between a/c of the same type. For example, anything with an antenna falls into this category because the antenna and feeder are part of the aircraft, not aircraft equipment, and selected by the a/c DA. In this case, unless Racal carried out the system installation design, design incorporation, embodiment etc, then they have little to do with issues of performance. This is unlikely (although I will stand corrected) because of Boeing’s policy at the time of not acting as a sub to anyone.
To an a/c DA, the Certificate from the vendor is only the starting point and a small part of the audit trail with leads to a demonstration of installed performance. Apart from obvious safety issues, it is in many ways meaningless when discussing practical performance. To take the point a step further, if you change the system in any way and try to contract a demo of installed performance, the first thing the company will ask for is the baseline i.e. the certified results of the previous demo. Too often this is unavailable, typically because somewhere in the loop there is a Service Engineered Mod which affects performance. SEMs are regarded as cheap alternatives to the full monty, and full performance trials are rare. This is manna to contractors, because the inevitable outcome is a contract which says “test and declare”. On numerous occasions I’ve inherited a/c where the performance trials report said “we tested it, this is the performance, it’s nothing like what you want or need, more money please if you want to improve it”. Everyone at any DA understands this, and know they stand a very good chance of swinging such a clause past most MoD PMs.
I am not inferring any or all of this happened in this case, merely pointing out an obvious (to me) area of reasonable doubt.
Join Date: Mar 2005
Location: On the outside looking in
Posts: 542
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
AP3207
One thing that surprised me in all of this (although I'm not intimate with the details, haven't read all this thread and am not a Chinook man) was the changes that went around post crash.
I can't remember the exact words, as I haven't needed to look at the issue for a while, but having been on the BOI for a crash a couple of years later, IIRC negligence was only something that could be ascertained where those 'accused' could defend their corner. Given that if this change was brought about because of this incident, it baffles me that nobody has said 'ok, we've changed the rules because of this, if we treated these guys the way we now have the rules they wouldn't be found negligent'.
Whether or not what they did was believed to be negligent then becomes irrelevant.
sw
I can't remember the exact words, as I haven't needed to look at the issue for a while, but having been on the BOI for a crash a couple of years later, IIRC negligence was only something that could be ascertained where those 'accused' could defend their corner. Given that if this change was brought about because of this incident, it baffles me that nobody has said 'ok, we've changed the rules because of this, if we treated these guys the way we now have the rules they wouldn't be found negligent'.
Whether or not what they did was believed to be negligent then becomes irrelevant.
sw
A really irritating PPRuNer
Thread Starter
Join Date: Jun 2000
Location: Just popping my head back up above the parapet
Posts: 903
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Safeware,
that very point was raised quite some time ago by James Arbuthnot MP. It was completely ignored by the MoD.
Regards,
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
that very point was raised quite some time ago by James Arbuthnot MP. It was completely ignored by the MoD.
Regards,
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
Join Date: Mar 2005
Location: Falmouth
Posts: 1,651
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
But surely the MOD are allowed to change the rules and changnig the rules doesn't mean anything...it doesn't mean that the rules were wrong previously....otherwise...like a gross negligent charge...you will need to PROVE that the rules were wrong before the change...
A really irritating PPRuNer
Thread Starter
Join Date: Jun 2000
Location: Just popping my head back up above the parapet
Posts: 903
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I don't think anyone can PROVE the rules were wrong prior to the change, just as the MoD can't PROVE that the pilots were guilty of gross negligence with absolutely no doubt whatsoever.
The current standard of opinion and best guess simply isn't good enough.
My best, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
The current standard of opinion and best guess simply isn't good enough.
My best, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
Join Date: Mar 2005
Location: Falmouth
Posts: 1,651
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Exactly. The pilots of ZD576 were probably guilty of nothing more than displaying both poor navigation skills and poor airmanship.
But they were not Grossly negligent
But they were not Grossly negligent
Last edited by vecvechookattack; 14th Apr 2005 at 17:09.
Join Date: Mar 2005
Location: Falmouth
Posts: 1,651
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Very true....lets hope that justice will prevail.
Although, I'm not sure we can lay any blame on Mr Hoon. He is just acting on advice from his lieutenants. He isn't an expert on the Chinook, military flying or BOI's. He will just act as advised and he is being advised incorrectly. But thats not his fault....and it won't be the fault of Fatty Arbuckle should he get voted in (God forbid).
Although, I'm not sure we can lay any blame on Mr Hoon. He is just acting on advice from his lieutenants. He isn't an expert on the Chinook, military flying or BOI's. He will just act as advised and he is being advised incorrectly. But thats not his fault....and it won't be the fault of Fatty Arbuckle should he get voted in (God forbid).