He then amplified his opening remarks by saying that as the pilots approached the deteriorating weather near the Mull, they had 2 choices. If they intended and were able to maintain flight under Visual Flight Rules, they should have slowed down, turned away or turned back. If they planned to continue their flight under Instrument Flight Rules, they should have climbed to above Safety Altitude well before they approached the Mull. If they were forced to transition to Instrument Flight Rules because they inadvertently entered cloud when close to the Mull, they should have made a rapid climb to at least Safety Altitude at maximum power and best climbing speed, while also turning away from the Mull.
The aircraft's avionics showed that the Chinook neither turned away nor turned back. When it was less than one nautical mile from what was to be the point of impact, a waypoint change was made. This selection on the navigation equipment caused it then to display heading and distance to the next en route fix. Specifically, the pilots changed waypoint to one 87 nautical miles beyond the Lighthouse that was their next planned turning point. They did this when extremely close to the Lighthouse where the Lighthouse Keeper, who was on the spot, gave evidence that visibility was 400 to 500 metres, and in places below 20 metres.
Activity in the cockpit of this nature provided pivotal evidence of conscious, intentional pilot input. It proved that the pilots were in control of their aircraft at that moment, a fact undisputed by even our most vociferous critics. It also showed that, rather than ensure they were at Safety Altitude well before landfall, they had flown into the bad weather at low level and at speed, in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre where the Board of Inguiry itself had concluded that the prevailing conditions 'would have required flight in accordance with Instrument Flight Rules'.
At waypoint change they were some 15 seconds from the fogbound Lighthouse and perilously close to steeply rising ground that was also shrouded in cloud. In reaching this position they had violated the rules governing flight under both Visual and Instrument Meteorological Conditions. In consequence they were in grave danger, solely through failing to exercise the skill and judgement of which they were capable and as they were trained to do. This is the definition of neglioence as it applies to militaxy aviation.
About twenty seconds after making the waypoint change and 5 seconds beyond the Lighthouse, they crashed. They hit the ground at a height of 810 feet. This was some 600 feet below the top of the Mull and 2000 feet below Safety Altitude for this sector of the planned route. Their speed at impact was calculated by the Air Accident Investigation Branch to be 150 knots.
If this is all true - as is to be expected then surely the pilots were guilty of gross negligence. They were IMC and 2000 ' BELOW the safety altitude. They violated the rules (significantly).
so, why were they not negligent then? whats wrong with Sir William Wrattens statement? Is it correct?