Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
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buoy15
Your point <<… whether SCATC or SCATCMiil were holding secondary contact and/or VHF comms, immediately prior to the incident. irrespective of any settings or selections found on the D band transponder by the BOI.>>
is significant – one would have thought that this would have been made clear very early on in the inquiries and I believe that this is one area that interested parties should ask to be clarified.
From transcripts of the inquiries we know that ZD576 made a call to ATC but this call was either unanswered (some find this unusual, others say it can be expected) or possibly recordings after this point have not been made public. One would have thought that independent, expert analysis of the complete period of interest should be done – for example of the usefulness of this, at the very least the timing of even the momentary activation of a Tx button could have been revealing. It would be reassuring to have a statement from an independent expert that the VHF recording was complete over the period of interest (ie. no sign of editing).
Regarding secondary radar, there is one reliable source who claims (and reported in a newspaper at the time) that radar recordings showed the path of the aircraft right up to impact – unfortunately, to date he has not confirmed that this was from a secondary radar, nor what the observed squawk code was had this been the case. One would have thought that the squawk code set initially should have been stated (there was much talk of how it could have gotten to what it was from a general setting at the inquiries but the actual starting point was not stated) and, as I believe that it may have relevance, interested parties should formally ask what it was (under the Freedom of Information Act or whatever).
Your point <<… whether SCATC or SCATCMiil were holding secondary contact and/or VHF comms, immediately prior to the incident. irrespective of any settings or selections found on the D band transponder by the BOI.>>
is significant – one would have thought that this would have been made clear very early on in the inquiries and I believe that this is one area that interested parties should ask to be clarified.
From transcripts of the inquiries we know that ZD576 made a call to ATC but this call was either unanswered (some find this unusual, others say it can be expected) or possibly recordings after this point have not been made public. One would have thought that independent, expert analysis of the complete period of interest should be done – for example of the usefulness of this, at the very least the timing of even the momentary activation of a Tx button could have been revealing. It would be reassuring to have a statement from an independent expert that the VHF recording was complete over the period of interest (ie. no sign of editing).
Regarding secondary radar, there is one reliable source who claims (and reported in a newspaper at the time) that radar recordings showed the path of the aircraft right up to impact – unfortunately, to date he has not confirmed that this was from a secondary radar, nor what the observed squawk code was had this been the case. One would have thought that the squawk code set initially should have been stated (there was much talk of how it could have gotten to what it was from a general setting at the inquiries but the actual starting point was not stated) and, as I believe that it may have relevance, interested parties should formally ask what it was (under the Freedom of Information Act or whatever).
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Walter Kennedy
None of us has worried about the IFF/SSR code that was set as it can have had no bearing on the accident. As has already been stated earlier in this thread, the 'Squawk' can only have been used for conspicuity and not in connection with the 'homing' activities that you have described (at great length), as ZD576 was not fitted with the type of device that you described.
As for the radar tape, my understanding is that the earlier statement confirmed only that the aircraft headed off in the expected direction and certainly did not show the radar contact up till impact. If you think about it, this would not have been possible as at some point the aircraft radar return would have been masked by returns from the high ground beyond it. Furthermore, the crash site is just under 50 nm from Aldergrove, which would be well beyond the radar horizon anyway.
None of us has worried about the IFF/SSR code that was set as it can have had no bearing on the accident. As has already been stated earlier in this thread, the 'Squawk' can only have been used for conspicuity and not in connection with the 'homing' activities that you have described (at great length), as ZD576 was not fitted with the type of device that you described.
As for the radar tape, my understanding is that the earlier statement confirmed only that the aircraft headed off in the expected direction and certainly did not show the radar contact up till impact. If you think about it, this would not have been possible as at some point the aircraft radar return would have been masked by returns from the high ground beyond it. Furthermore, the crash site is just under 50 nm from Aldergrove, which would be well beyond the radar horizon anyway.
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meadowbank
So what is the problem in getting the squawk code confirmed – for completion, lets say?
What is this spin on “homing activities”? – the equipment I refer to gives range and approximate bearing to a portable beacon – useful for local navigation, extraction of personnel, etc... The RAF adopted it for Chinooks only a year later – they must have tried it out beforehand – it would have been easy to borrow a set as it was designed as a self contained unit for easy exchange between 47Ds, Mk2s, etc.. Of course this does not mean that ZD576 would have had one, but it sure looks like they were using it – sufficiently so for the possibility to be explored, I think. I seem to recall some alarm being expressed at one of the inquiries when this flight was described as a “training flight” – had it been tasked to evaluate this system, then it would have been appropriate to squawk a particular code describing/reminding AT Controllers that it may have done something different or whatever and so the code could have relevance to what it was doing.
As for the radar recordings – why are we speculating at this stage? Why doesn’t one of you with connections or status as an interested party find out for sure? My understanding is that the recordings had returns beyond waypoint change but I cannot as yet get this clarified. At any rate, the simple point is that the squawk code should be able to be confirmed from what recordings there were. Why not find out?!!!
So what is the problem in getting the squawk code confirmed – for completion, lets say?
What is this spin on “homing activities”? – the equipment I refer to gives range and approximate bearing to a portable beacon – useful for local navigation, extraction of personnel, etc... The RAF adopted it for Chinooks only a year later – they must have tried it out beforehand – it would have been easy to borrow a set as it was designed as a self contained unit for easy exchange between 47Ds, Mk2s, etc.. Of course this does not mean that ZD576 would have had one, but it sure looks like they were using it – sufficiently so for the possibility to be explored, I think. I seem to recall some alarm being expressed at one of the inquiries when this flight was described as a “training flight” – had it been tasked to evaluate this system, then it would have been appropriate to squawk a particular code describing/reminding AT Controllers that it may have done something different or whatever and so the code could have relevance to what it was doing.
As for the radar recordings – why are we speculating at this stage? Why doesn’t one of you with connections or status as an interested party find out for sure? My understanding is that the recordings had returns beyond waypoint change but I cannot as yet get this clarified. At any rate, the simple point is that the squawk code should be able to be confirmed from what recordings there were. Why not find out?!!!
A really irritating PPRuNer
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No reply as yet. They must be getting very close to the 20 working day deadline though!
I'll advise you all as and when I get any response from the MoD.
Then we'll send the next batch of requests in!!!
My best to you all, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
I'll advise you all as and when I get any response from the MoD.
Then we'll send the next batch of requests in!!!
My best to you all, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
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Walter Kennedy - you just don't get it, do you? The subject of your post is totally irrelevant to the investigation. I'm beginning to think that the following link might apply to you:
http://members.aol.com/intwg/trolls.htm
You seem determined to grasp at any straw to keep your name in lights on this forum, despite the relevance...
http://members.aol.com/intwg/trolls.htm
You seem determined to grasp at any straw to keep your name in lights on this forum, despite the relevance...
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FJJP
Hear, hear!
Walter
1. You acknowledge that the Chinook fleet had no such kit at the time, then suggest that ZD576 might have had this kit fitted!
2. "it sure looks like they were using it" - oh right!
3. If there was radar contact on ZD576 beyond the waypoint change, it certainly wasn't from Aldergrove (radar horizon).
Hear, hear!
Walter
1. You acknowledge that the Chinook fleet had no such kit at the time, then suggest that ZD576 might have had this kit fitted!
2. "it sure looks like they were using it" - oh right!
3. If there was radar contact on ZD576 beyond the waypoint change, it certainly wasn't from Aldergrove (radar horizon).
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FJJP
<<The subject of your post is totally irrelevant to the investigation.>>&
<<You seem determined to grasp at any straw to keep your name in lights on this forum, despite the relevance...>>
I only came to this forum to get support after years of trying to get this aspect investigated as a possibility through other channels.
At the least debate here has (to many readers, I expect) clarified many conditions on this flight which had been left vague or unnecessarily confusing, such as:
The intended path up the coast;
The intended proximity of the turn to the Mull;
The actual (very common) local weather on the Mull;
The flight rules applicable to a helicopter in that situation;
The difference between the TANS in the Mk1 and Mk2 and bringing to this thread a reminder of this crews noted misgivings on the accuracy of the TANS in the latter;
Bringing to the attention of readers of this thread the Boeing document that helps one to work through the available data to get a reconstruction of the last leg of this flight WHICH IS NOT THE SIMULATION;
The existence of portable personnel locator systems (which have a DME mode) that could be used as a reference for local navigation – to use such, the aircraft only needed a hand held unit plugged into a radio headset socket to get accurate range (Mk1 or Mk2) or to get accurate range and approximate bearing (Mk2) the palletized, self contained unit that included the requisite antennas – the latter system adapted in some RAF Chinooks only a year later but at the time widespread in the US forces and in service in several other NATO countries;
Reminding readers of the presence of US personnel at the crash site having the requisite equipment and training to have been able to (intentionally or otherwise) cause an incorrect reading in an aircraft using such a beacon in the area;
The importance of the team on board and their standpoint vis a vis the government on the NI anti-terrorist strategy;
The timing of the crash with regard to political events (sabotage had been dismissed very early on by the authorities).
All of which I suggest are very relevant to anyone interested in analyzing as fully as possible what happened in this tragic case.
meadowbank
<<1. You acknowledge that the Chinook fleet had no such kit at the time, then suggest that ZD576 might have had this kit fitted! >>
I think that I have explained how little is involved in having it “fitted”. Why not rubbish this suggestion by getting a definitive answer (from the authorities) on whether this system was tried out before multiple units were purchased – and (better) if so when – and (best) if ZD576 had ever been tasked to evaluate it?
<<2. "it sure looks like they were using it" - oh right!>>
I half expected someone to jump on my brief statement – I think you are aware that I have explained (yes, “at some length”) previously why I think so. Well, here we go again:
They were not breaking the rules as a helicopter in intending to turn as close in as (the actual geographical position of) waypoint A – although there was a low cloud base, it was clear in all directions apart from straight ahead where the Mull was visible but, with its surface detail obscured by the local mist, it would have been difficult to accurately judge their distance off – these conditions could be predicted well in advance – they are very, very common there;
Although they would not have trusted the SuperTANS to any useful degree of accuracy in this situation after the sea crossing it is important to understand that the SuperTANS had already told them they were close to waypoint A and that the actual waypoint A was very close to the Mull;
It would have been prudent in those very, very common local conditions to have turned when the SuperTANS indicated BUT they did not – they ignored the proximity indicated by the SuperTANS position – they must have been under control at that time as they bothered to change to the next waypoint – they not only carried on but made a small steer to the right (into danger) – they would not have done so unless they were using a reference that they trusted to be accurate – an experienced crew like this should not have been referring to a visual feature that was not clearly recognized and familiar (had they been using a clear and familiar visual reference then presumably they would have began their turn at waypoint A as planned – as it happened in this case, the SuperTANS was found to have been accurate and so turning on a visual cue should coincidentally have happened at waypoint A according to the SuperTANS, while they still apparently had control);
Bearing in mind that ZD576 did not have radar, this leaves the only other possibility, a system that is a trusted favorite of helicopter pilots, DME;
A portable DME placed further inland than expected fully explains that corrective steer to the right and their closure with the Mull;
there would have been a range at which, according to their plan, the turn would be started which on completion should have left them close to but clear of the mist (in those common conditions, the mist would have been expected to start no closer than the shoreline);
the trouble is, a nice instrument readout can bias one’s interpretation of what one can see (remember, if you’re disorientated look at the instruments!), if the reading was wrong its influence would have fatally delayed the crews perception of their proximity to the fuzzy gray landmass – they seemed to have control at the end with what appears a perfectly reasonable evasive maneuver started when several factors would have alerted them to their crossing of the shoreline.
<<3. If there was radar contact on ZD576 beyond the waypoint change, it certainly wasn't from Aldergrove (radar horizon).>>
I still have not got further detail from the source – a respected journalist in a reputable publication gave this impression from his talks with a military AT Controller (as I recall) – the original article was not challenged at the time. Why not find out what records are available? Why do you keep rubbishing suggestions that are put forward to be explored?
FJJP
Re “Trolls” – very good! Do you have a description for hirelings who, for personal gain or ingratiation with superiors or perhaps just to preserve their comfort zone, drown out potentially embarrassing discussions with bleating befitting the sheep in Orwell’s “Animal Farm”?
<<The subject of your post is totally irrelevant to the investigation.>>&
<<You seem determined to grasp at any straw to keep your name in lights on this forum, despite the relevance...>>
I only came to this forum to get support after years of trying to get this aspect investigated as a possibility through other channels.
At the least debate here has (to many readers, I expect) clarified many conditions on this flight which had been left vague or unnecessarily confusing, such as:
The intended path up the coast;
The intended proximity of the turn to the Mull;
The actual (very common) local weather on the Mull;
The flight rules applicable to a helicopter in that situation;
The difference between the TANS in the Mk1 and Mk2 and bringing to this thread a reminder of this crews noted misgivings on the accuracy of the TANS in the latter;
Bringing to the attention of readers of this thread the Boeing document that helps one to work through the available data to get a reconstruction of the last leg of this flight WHICH IS NOT THE SIMULATION;
The existence of portable personnel locator systems (which have a DME mode) that could be used as a reference for local navigation – to use such, the aircraft only needed a hand held unit plugged into a radio headset socket to get accurate range (Mk1 or Mk2) or to get accurate range and approximate bearing (Mk2) the palletized, self contained unit that included the requisite antennas – the latter system adapted in some RAF Chinooks only a year later but at the time widespread in the US forces and in service in several other NATO countries;
Reminding readers of the presence of US personnel at the crash site having the requisite equipment and training to have been able to (intentionally or otherwise) cause an incorrect reading in an aircraft using such a beacon in the area;
The importance of the team on board and their standpoint vis a vis the government on the NI anti-terrorist strategy;
The timing of the crash with regard to political events (sabotage had been dismissed very early on by the authorities).
All of which I suggest are very relevant to anyone interested in analyzing as fully as possible what happened in this tragic case.
meadowbank
<<1. You acknowledge that the Chinook fleet had no such kit at the time, then suggest that ZD576 might have had this kit fitted! >>
I think that I have explained how little is involved in having it “fitted”. Why not rubbish this suggestion by getting a definitive answer (from the authorities) on whether this system was tried out before multiple units were purchased – and (better) if so when – and (best) if ZD576 had ever been tasked to evaluate it?
<<2. "it sure looks like they were using it" - oh right!>>
I half expected someone to jump on my brief statement – I think you are aware that I have explained (yes, “at some length”) previously why I think so. Well, here we go again:
They were not breaking the rules as a helicopter in intending to turn as close in as (the actual geographical position of) waypoint A – although there was a low cloud base, it was clear in all directions apart from straight ahead where the Mull was visible but, with its surface detail obscured by the local mist, it would have been difficult to accurately judge their distance off – these conditions could be predicted well in advance – they are very, very common there;
Although they would not have trusted the SuperTANS to any useful degree of accuracy in this situation after the sea crossing it is important to understand that the SuperTANS had already told them they were close to waypoint A and that the actual waypoint A was very close to the Mull;
It would have been prudent in those very, very common local conditions to have turned when the SuperTANS indicated BUT they did not – they ignored the proximity indicated by the SuperTANS position – they must have been under control at that time as they bothered to change to the next waypoint – they not only carried on but made a small steer to the right (into danger) – they would not have done so unless they were using a reference that they trusted to be accurate – an experienced crew like this should not have been referring to a visual feature that was not clearly recognized and familiar (had they been using a clear and familiar visual reference then presumably they would have began their turn at waypoint A as planned – as it happened in this case, the SuperTANS was found to have been accurate and so turning on a visual cue should coincidentally have happened at waypoint A according to the SuperTANS, while they still apparently had control);
Bearing in mind that ZD576 did not have radar, this leaves the only other possibility, a system that is a trusted favorite of helicopter pilots, DME;
A portable DME placed further inland than expected fully explains that corrective steer to the right and their closure with the Mull;
there would have been a range at which, according to their plan, the turn would be started which on completion should have left them close to but clear of the mist (in those common conditions, the mist would have been expected to start no closer than the shoreline);
the trouble is, a nice instrument readout can bias one’s interpretation of what one can see (remember, if you’re disorientated look at the instruments!), if the reading was wrong its influence would have fatally delayed the crews perception of their proximity to the fuzzy gray landmass – they seemed to have control at the end with what appears a perfectly reasonable evasive maneuver started when several factors would have alerted them to their crossing of the shoreline.
<<3. If there was radar contact on ZD576 beyond the waypoint change, it certainly wasn't from Aldergrove (radar horizon).>>
I still have not got further detail from the source – a respected journalist in a reputable publication gave this impression from his talks with a military AT Controller (as I recall) – the original article was not challenged at the time. Why not find out what records are available? Why do you keep rubbishing suggestions that are put forward to be explored?
FJJP
Re “Trolls” – very good! Do you have a description for hirelings who, for personal gain or ingratiation with superiors or perhaps just to preserve their comfort zone, drown out potentially embarrassing discussions with bleating befitting the sheep in Orwell’s “Animal Farm”?
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Apologies to all (inc FJJP) if I perpetuate this aspect, but I am now a little confused, 'Walter'
If this is so, what would be the significance of the 'peculiar' code set on the aircraft SSR box to which you refer? Have I misunderstood your line of reasoning?
the aircraft only needed a hand held unit plugged into a radio headset socket to get accurate range (Mk1 or Mk2) or to get accurate range and approximate bearing (Mk2) the palletized, self contained unit that included the requisite antennas
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Walter
I'm highlighting (above) what you have suggested. Perhaps there is someone in Ppruneland who can give a date when this equipment was fitted if, indeed, it ever was. If you are still curious you could write/email to the contact details on the following link:
http://www.qinetiq.com/home/contact.html
As far as I am concerned, I have sufficient information to convince me that ZD576 was not fitted with the kit you have described.
The logical reason for not turning when the SuperTANS indicated is that they were in visual contact with the ground and flying VFR. I agree that it is reasonable to assume that the aircraft was under full control at the moment of the waypoint change, but thereafter (even nanoseconds thereafter) no-one, not even an Air Marshal with far more experience than the President of the Board of Inquiry, can be certain. Based on the fact that the aircraft impacted the ground to the right of the planned track, a number of people have assumed that a small correction was made to the right. However, this is a false assumption; at least 3 different technical problems may have taken control (or choice of manoeuvre) away from the pilots:
1. Control restriction.
2. UFCM.
3. Engine runaway.
If the pilots had had control and freedom of choice, it would be incredible if they had chosen a small turn to the right following a waypoint change that indicated a turn of 7 degrees (or so) to the left, which was both away from the probable weather and from the known high ground. For clarity, I refer to choice because in the event of engine runaway, the immediate action to be taken was to absorb the additional power by pulling up (almost certainly into cloud).
Of course they should have - that's what flying under VFR is all about. If I remember correctly, you've never flown a helicopter so what qualifies you to make the statement that I have just quoted from you?
No it doesn't! A DME (it stands for Distance Measuring Equipment, by the way) only measures distance. How would the crew know to turn left or right based on a distance? Imagine an arc of a circle 5 miles from a DME beacon; the kit tells you that you are 5 miles from the beacon, but how do you know where on the arc you are? Answer: You don't.
I wasn't there, but I can confidently state that no crew would have planned a turn, based on a range, to keep them clear of anything, least of all clear of mist, the position of which they can not have known before departing Aldergrove.
Not a reasonable assumption. I suggest that it is likely that what has been assumed to have been a last-moment evasive manoeuvre, carried out because the ground was suddenly spotted, is more likely to have been something else: any of the 3 possible causes of control-loss mentioned above could have resulted in the aircraft turning and/or climbing. As the pilots regained some semblance of control they are likely to have found themselves with a nose-low aircraft attitude from which they will have attempted to recover. Unfortunately, they had insufficent control and/or insufficient height available to complete that recovery. The position of the rudder pedals certainly adds to the likelihood of this - if the impact conditions were the result of a simple last-moment pull to avoid the ground, having flown in the manner assumed by the Air Marshals, why would 77% left pedal have been applied? Of course, the AAIB stated that this pedal postion could have been the result of impact, but we'll never know, will we? I put it to you that this pedal application is eerily similar to that found to have been necessary to regain control of the US Army Chinook (with the well-documented UFCM) from a similar fate to ZD576.
You're the one with the information that none of the rest of us appears to have. Produce it or forget it.
Finally, why does a non-pilot apparently living in Western Australia have an interest in this?
Why not rubbish this suggestion by getting a definitive answer (from the authorities) on whether this system was tried out before multiple units were purchased – and (better) if so when – and (best) if ZD576 had ever been tasked to evaluate it?
http://www.qinetiq.com/home/contact.html
As far as I am concerned, I have sufficient information to convince me that ZD576 was not fitted with the kit you have described.
It would have been prudent in those very, very common local conditions to have turned when the SuperTANS indicated BUT they did not – they ignored the proximity indicated by the SuperTANS position – they must have been under control at that time as they bothered to change to the next waypoint – they not only carried on but made a small steer to the right
1. Control restriction.
2. UFCM.
3. Engine runaway.
If the pilots had had control and freedom of choice, it would be incredible if they had chosen a small turn to the right following a waypoint change that indicated a turn of 7 degrees (or so) to the left, which was both away from the probable weather and from the known high ground. For clarity, I refer to choice because in the event of engine runaway, the immediate action to be taken was to absorb the additional power by pulling up (almost certainly into cloud).
an experienced crew like this should not have been referring to a visual feature
A portable DME placed further inland than expected fully explains that corrective steer to the right and their closure with the Mull
there would have been a range at which, according to their plan, the turn would be started which on completion should have left them close to but clear of the mist
they seemed to have control at the end with what appears a perfectly reasonable evasive maneuver
Why do you keep rubbishing suggestions that are put forward to be explored?
Finally, why does a non-pilot apparently living in Western Australia have an interest in this?
Last edited by meadowbank; 10th Feb 2005 at 08:20.
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BOAC
The squawk code relates to the aircrafts’ activity irrespective of the onboard equipment. I am suggesting that the SSR code found set in the wreck could have been as it was earlier in the flight (not disturbed by impact or a hasty attempt to set an emergency code by the crew) and that this may be an invaluable piece of evidence as to what they were doing – briefly, I believe that they may have been evaluating a portable DME transponder placed near the Mull lighthouse pad. My reasoning regarding the squawk code follows:
As I understand it, codes are assigned that put an aircraft in a particular category or describe its activity as an easy reminder to the controller watching the screen.
For example, if an aircraft was engaged in a search and rescue operation were to change speed and course suddenly, the controller would not be instantly alarmed if the code on his/her screen described that activity. Similarly, and perhaps relevant to this case, an aircraft tasked to evaluate the usefulness of a local navaid may slow down or repeat an approach to the navaid and so an appropriate SSR code would have been allocated so that the controller would not be instantly alarmed if and when a deviation from the established track occurred.
The problem in the UK was that in the old system (pre mode S) there was a chronic shortage of such descriptive codes to cover all the activities. I have it from someone in authority that it was the custom to use a code from the Uks domestic allocation to cover less common activities that did not warrant a permanent specific code (because of the limited number available) – presumably they would be chosen only where there was no danger of confusion. 7760 on the UK list is something like “Domestic to Channel Islands” – not likely to be confused with a special allocation in the NW of Scotland, one would have thought. It is also right adjacent to the set of codes relating to SSR monitors (ground based transponder equipment) – indeed, in some European countries and in some flight simulation training systems (who try to get the detail as close to the real world as possible) 7760 specifically means “Ground Transponders, Tests/Trials”. So what a logical choice for an AT Controller to assign to an aircraft evaluating a local navaid, especially a ground transponder which is what a portable DME is?
Of course, it would have been nice if the actual SSR code evident on the radar earlier in the flight had been clearly stated as a starting point but for whatever reason, despite the topic being discussed at the inquiries, this was not done. Instead there was conjecture into how it ended up at 7760 without the starting point being given. Two suggestions were made: either the setting was disturbed by impact with a soft object (there being no marks) or that one of the crew was trying to set the code to one indicating distress. The latter action is not usual practice in a sudden emergency; the idea of the middle two wheels only being disturbed (one by one place, the other by two assuming a starting point of 7000) by being hit with a soft object sets a challenge – anyone familiar with the equipment may like to take a bean bag with them and try to replicate this! And it just happens to end up on a setting which could be telling us that they were trying out a system which I suspected could have caused the crash long before I became aware of the relevance of such SSR codes!
The squawk code relates to the aircrafts’ activity irrespective of the onboard equipment. I am suggesting that the SSR code found set in the wreck could have been as it was earlier in the flight (not disturbed by impact or a hasty attempt to set an emergency code by the crew) and that this may be an invaluable piece of evidence as to what they were doing – briefly, I believe that they may have been evaluating a portable DME transponder placed near the Mull lighthouse pad. My reasoning regarding the squawk code follows:
As I understand it, codes are assigned that put an aircraft in a particular category or describe its activity as an easy reminder to the controller watching the screen.
For example, if an aircraft was engaged in a search and rescue operation were to change speed and course suddenly, the controller would not be instantly alarmed if the code on his/her screen described that activity. Similarly, and perhaps relevant to this case, an aircraft tasked to evaluate the usefulness of a local navaid may slow down or repeat an approach to the navaid and so an appropriate SSR code would have been allocated so that the controller would not be instantly alarmed if and when a deviation from the established track occurred.
The problem in the UK was that in the old system (pre mode S) there was a chronic shortage of such descriptive codes to cover all the activities. I have it from someone in authority that it was the custom to use a code from the Uks domestic allocation to cover less common activities that did not warrant a permanent specific code (because of the limited number available) – presumably they would be chosen only where there was no danger of confusion. 7760 on the UK list is something like “Domestic to Channel Islands” – not likely to be confused with a special allocation in the NW of Scotland, one would have thought. It is also right adjacent to the set of codes relating to SSR monitors (ground based transponder equipment) – indeed, in some European countries and in some flight simulation training systems (who try to get the detail as close to the real world as possible) 7760 specifically means “Ground Transponders, Tests/Trials”. So what a logical choice for an AT Controller to assign to an aircraft evaluating a local navaid, especially a ground transponder which is what a portable DME is?
Of course, it would have been nice if the actual SSR code evident on the radar earlier in the flight had been clearly stated as a starting point but for whatever reason, despite the topic being discussed at the inquiries, this was not done. Instead there was conjecture into how it ended up at 7760 without the starting point being given. Two suggestions were made: either the setting was disturbed by impact with a soft object (there being no marks) or that one of the crew was trying to set the code to one indicating distress. The latter action is not usual practice in a sudden emergency; the idea of the middle two wheels only being disturbed (one by one place, the other by two assuming a starting point of 7000) by being hit with a soft object sets a challenge – anyone familiar with the equipment may like to take a bean bag with them and try to replicate this! And it just happens to end up on a setting which could be telling us that they were trying out a system which I suspected could have caused the crash long before I became aware of the relevance of such SSR codes!
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You wrote <<As far as I am concerned, I have sufficient information to convince me that ZD576 was not fitted with the kit you have described.>> and << You're the one with the information that none of the rest of us appears to have. Produce it or forget it.>> I can’t think that I am holding much back apart from specific identities of sources – rather have been pushing for people to come forward to add to our knowledge/refute statements/confirm etc – what is the information you have that ZD576 did not have the kit? (I know it was not found in the wreckage and that should have been the end of this line of thought, but then the site was compromised by US personnel who said that they were looking for their equipment when challenged.)
You quoted the section << It would have been prudent … to have turned when the SuperTANS indicated BUT they did not … they not only carried on but made a small steer to the right …>>
and replied:
<<The logical reason for not turning when the SuperTANS indicated is that they were in visual contact with the ground and flying VFR.>>I think I made the point that, in this case, the SuperTANS was found to have been accurate and that waypoint A according to the SuperTANS was at the actual geographic position of waypoint A and that this was already so close in that, had they clear visual contact with a feature on the landmass, it was time to turn anyway. At this point, at which I believe that they had control, they would not carried on visually with the mist on the landmass as it was - only another, trusted system would have led them closer. The condition of mist forming right on the landmass is very, very common there – they would have been in the clear but needed to judge a turning point commensurate with their speed – something telling them they still had, say, half a mile to go before the shoreline (and the start of the ground hugging mist) could have biased their visual judgment had it been giving an incorrect reading. They would not have been breaking the rules for helicopter flight in those conditions if they could have turned as little as half a mile away from that mist – it was the judgment of that distance to go which I believe was the problem.
You wrote <<If the pilots had had control and freedom of choice, it would be incredible if they had chosen a small turn to the right following a waypoint change that indicated a turn of 7 degrees (or so) to the left, which was both away from the probable weather and from the known high ground.>>
I think I have made this point myself in the past with the qualification that if they were in trouble, they would have done anything possible other than to carry on as they were and, unless they had most unusual and complete control problems, they had consciously made that steer to the right and carried on.
And you wrote: <<For clarity, I refer to choice because in the event of engine runaway, the immediate action to be taken was to absorb the additional power by pulling up (almost certainly into cloud).>>
OK they only had a couple of hundred feet of clear air straight up but was a steep turn out of the question in that situation (engine runaway)? (At least it would have been instinctively away from danger.) I believe the rudder pedal positions (see later) showed their attempt to slow down suddenly by a sharp yaw just before impact.
You quote me thus: << an experienced crew like this should not have been referring to a visual feature >> and said:
<<Of course they should have - that's what flying under VFR is all about.>>
The full relevant text from which you extracted the quote was “an experienced crew like this should not have been referring to a visual feature THAT WAS NOT CLEARLY RECOGNISED AND FAMILIAR” which was in the context of had they had a good visual reference, they would have seen how close they were and presumably they would have began their turn at (the geographical position of) waypoint A as planned.
You compound quoting out of context with a puzzling derogatory comment:
<<If I remember correctly, you've never flown a helicopter so what qualifies you to make the statement that I have just quoted from you?>>
Sadly true (apart from a little wrestling with a R22 which doesn’t count) but have been a passenger a bit, significantly sometimes while hugging the shoreline at very low level in the NW of Scotland in those very common conditions with the mist forming immediately on the rising ground. This rather compliments heaps of sea time in that area and a lot of hill walking – I know first hand how deceptive range can be when mist obscures ground detail – and how common and predictable those conditions are in that area.
You quoted me:<< A portable DME placed further inland than expected fully explains that corrective steer to the right and their closure with the Mull>> and commented:
<<No it doesn't! A DME (it stands for Distance Measuring Equipment, by the way) only measures distance. How would the crew know to turn left or right based on a distance? Imagine an arc of a circle 5 miles from a DME beacon; the kit tells you that you are 5 miles from the beacon, but how do you know where on the arc you are? Answer: You don't.>>
Either you have not followed the relevant posts or you are trying to confuse recent or less deeply interested readers of this thread. I have explained in great detail the respective equipments with which the aircraft can interrogate the communication sets (eg PRC112 types) which have a DME mode; very briefly, the ARS-6 system was procured for fitting to RAF Chinooks to support NATO in Bosnia just about a year after the ZD576 crash; it was palletized for movement between aircraft.
It gives accurate range (it is a UHF DME in one mode) and approximate bearing (not as a VOR but just as a radio direction finder):
I quote directly from CUBIC Defense Applications product information:
<<PLS (Personnel Locator System) consists of two essential components: the airborne AN/ARS-6(V) guidance system, which is mounted inside the rescue helicopter, and a handheld radio/transponder carried by the survivors.>>
And
<<A matched pair of UHF blade antennas, utilized in conjunction with the ASU and two phase-matched coaxial cables provide the ± 4 degree steering accuracy of the PLS.>>
These antennas are integral with the palletized equipment – you could easily remove the complete equipment from a 47-D (HC2) and no one would know it had been fitted.
These types are not just used as combat search and rescue systems – US Navy SEALS use them for marking targets, drop zones, etc and I recall reading references to their use as navigation aids marking isolated hazards near temporary landing areas (forward airfields, etc).
At the time of the crash, such equipment was widespread in the US and present in several other NATO countries.
You quoted an incomplete comment of mine (again) which in full was:
<<there would have been a range at which, according to their plan, the turn would be started which on completion should have left them close to but clear of the mist (in those common conditions, the mist would have been expected to start no closer than the shoreline)>>
The importance of the bit you cut off was that the starting point of the mist was known in geographical terms. You commented:
<<I wasn't there, but I can confidently state that no crew would have planned a turn, based on a range, to keep them clear of anything, least of all clear of mist, the position of which they can not have known before departing Aldergrove.>>
Firstly, I wonder what DMEs are ever used for – even in VFR in clear conditions, are you not (subconsciously even) judging your range to make a turn before something? On their route (which I believe, having talked to locals, was a regular practice) they were not intending to just avoid the Mull, they were intending to approach it closely (directly towards it) and then “handrail” up the coast –if not range, what criteria would they have used to judge that turn?
Secondly, those conditions were very, very common where the mist formed right on the shoreline as the air started to rise – and very predictable earlier in the day by a competent met man. This crew being very experienced could have planned for it themselves (so common was it) and would have recognized the conditions on their way over (clear over the sea and the shoreline visible – yeah, yeah but with no clear detail higher up needed at their closing speed).
This has been one of the most disturbing aspects of this tragic event – how even the most basic factor in the crash – the local weather on the Mull – has not only not been clarified to the general public but great effort seems to have been made to keep it unclear.
You quote:<< they seemed to have control at the end with what appears a perfectly reasonable evasive maneuver >> and comment:
<<Not a reasonable assumption… they had insufficent control and/or insufficient height available to complete that recovery. The position of the rudder pedals certainly adds to the likelihood of this - if the impact conditions were the result of a simple last-moment pull to avoid the ground, having flown in the manner assumed by the Air Marshals, why would 77% left pedal have been applied>>
This was the subject of interesting discussion at the inquiries: as I recall (I am short of time now to dig out the exact quotes and occasions) it was suggested by someone at the inquiries (or possibly someone on this thread some time ago) that such full rudder application was inappropriate for a helicopter doing an evasive manouvre in this situation – I could be mistaken, but I think it was Sqn Ldr Robert Burke who was perplexed at this stating that (something like) it was an entirely correct thing to do in a tandem rotor helicopter like a Chinook (present the large broadside to slow down, presumably).
You ask:
<<Finally, why does a non-pilot apparently living in Western Australia have an interest in this?>>
I would have thought anyone with a concern that something had been missed in the official inquiries would be obliged to speak up in so serious a case – it was such a serious a blow to the British people as to be on a par with the arrow in Harold’s eye back in 1066 – a large chunk of them have lost their champions in that very real terrorist war in NI.
But since you asked:
I am, after all, still a British citizen and lived most of my life there, with most of my career as a professional engineer being in defence systems.
My military experience is fragmented, flirtatious and of short duration but led me to respect the guys who are more dedicated than I was (Rhodesian Army, British Territorial) – and the nearest I came to being a military pilot was as far as basic flying training in the Rhodesian Air Force. It was the shafting of that decent little country by our wonderfully internationalist politicians that gave me empathy with the people of Northern Ireland and a healthy cynicism towards our governments.
My interest in navigation and guidance systems (theory from 10 years as a Member of the Royal Institute of Navigation, practical mainly through much coastal navigation and tasks while an engineer with the CAA) has given me, I humbly suggest, a viewpoint on this case that is perhaps relevant.
In summary, I started out just trying to bring to people’s attention how easy it was to tamper with a particular type of navaid that I had thought, in that location and conditions, would have been an obvious choice for the pilots to have relied on – just in case more qualified and authoritative people missed the possibility in time to gather any evidence as such evidence would have been ethereal.
Nothing could have prepared me for the obfuscation in the inquiries and the omission of basic parameters pertinent to the flight, the misrepresentation of the met conditions, the false arguments on the simplistic VFR/IMC topic, the focus on the control problems whilst the obvious navigation aspect was studiously ignored (not even the intended route was clarified), the hostility to and effort to quash suggestions that could (and should) more easily have been followed up and brought to closure properly. But most of all, the naivety that dismisses sabotage – and therefore any method that required malice by any party in a position to enact it.
You wrote <<As far as I am concerned, I have sufficient information to convince me that ZD576 was not fitted with the kit you have described.>> and << You're the one with the information that none of the rest of us appears to have. Produce it or forget it.>> I can’t think that I am holding much back apart from specific identities of sources – rather have been pushing for people to come forward to add to our knowledge/refute statements/confirm etc – what is the information you have that ZD576 did not have the kit? (I know it was not found in the wreckage and that should have been the end of this line of thought, but then the site was compromised by US personnel who said that they were looking for their equipment when challenged.)
You quoted the section << It would have been prudent … to have turned when the SuperTANS indicated BUT they did not … they not only carried on but made a small steer to the right …>>
and replied:
<<The logical reason for not turning when the SuperTANS indicated is that they were in visual contact with the ground and flying VFR.>>I think I made the point that, in this case, the SuperTANS was found to have been accurate and that waypoint A according to the SuperTANS was at the actual geographic position of waypoint A and that this was already so close in that, had they clear visual contact with a feature on the landmass, it was time to turn anyway. At this point, at which I believe that they had control, they would not carried on visually with the mist on the landmass as it was - only another, trusted system would have led them closer. The condition of mist forming right on the landmass is very, very common there – they would have been in the clear but needed to judge a turning point commensurate with their speed – something telling them they still had, say, half a mile to go before the shoreline (and the start of the ground hugging mist) could have biased their visual judgment had it been giving an incorrect reading. They would not have been breaking the rules for helicopter flight in those conditions if they could have turned as little as half a mile away from that mist – it was the judgment of that distance to go which I believe was the problem.
You wrote <<If the pilots had had control and freedom of choice, it would be incredible if they had chosen a small turn to the right following a waypoint change that indicated a turn of 7 degrees (or so) to the left, which was both away from the probable weather and from the known high ground.>>
I think I have made this point myself in the past with the qualification that if they were in trouble, they would have done anything possible other than to carry on as they were and, unless they had most unusual and complete control problems, they had consciously made that steer to the right and carried on.
And you wrote: <<For clarity, I refer to choice because in the event of engine runaway, the immediate action to be taken was to absorb the additional power by pulling up (almost certainly into cloud).>>
OK they only had a couple of hundred feet of clear air straight up but was a steep turn out of the question in that situation (engine runaway)? (At least it would have been instinctively away from danger.) I believe the rudder pedal positions (see later) showed their attempt to slow down suddenly by a sharp yaw just before impact.
You quote me thus: << an experienced crew like this should not have been referring to a visual feature >> and said:
<<Of course they should have - that's what flying under VFR is all about.>>
The full relevant text from which you extracted the quote was “an experienced crew like this should not have been referring to a visual feature THAT WAS NOT CLEARLY RECOGNISED AND FAMILIAR” which was in the context of had they had a good visual reference, they would have seen how close they were and presumably they would have began their turn at (the geographical position of) waypoint A as planned.
You compound quoting out of context with a puzzling derogatory comment:
<<If I remember correctly, you've never flown a helicopter so what qualifies you to make the statement that I have just quoted from you?>>
Sadly true (apart from a little wrestling with a R22 which doesn’t count) but have been a passenger a bit, significantly sometimes while hugging the shoreline at very low level in the NW of Scotland in those very common conditions with the mist forming immediately on the rising ground. This rather compliments heaps of sea time in that area and a lot of hill walking – I know first hand how deceptive range can be when mist obscures ground detail – and how common and predictable those conditions are in that area.
You quoted me:<< A portable DME placed further inland than expected fully explains that corrective steer to the right and their closure with the Mull>> and commented:
<<No it doesn't! A DME (it stands for Distance Measuring Equipment, by the way) only measures distance. How would the crew know to turn left or right based on a distance? Imagine an arc of a circle 5 miles from a DME beacon; the kit tells you that you are 5 miles from the beacon, but how do you know where on the arc you are? Answer: You don't.>>
Either you have not followed the relevant posts or you are trying to confuse recent or less deeply interested readers of this thread. I have explained in great detail the respective equipments with which the aircraft can interrogate the communication sets (eg PRC112 types) which have a DME mode; very briefly, the ARS-6 system was procured for fitting to RAF Chinooks to support NATO in Bosnia just about a year after the ZD576 crash; it was palletized for movement between aircraft.
It gives accurate range (it is a UHF DME in one mode) and approximate bearing (not as a VOR but just as a radio direction finder):
I quote directly from CUBIC Defense Applications product information:
<<PLS (Personnel Locator System) consists of two essential components: the airborne AN/ARS-6(V) guidance system, which is mounted inside the rescue helicopter, and a handheld radio/transponder carried by the survivors.>>
And
<<A matched pair of UHF blade antennas, utilized in conjunction with the ASU and two phase-matched coaxial cables provide the ± 4 degree steering accuracy of the PLS.>>
These antennas are integral with the palletized equipment – you could easily remove the complete equipment from a 47-D (HC2) and no one would know it had been fitted.
These types are not just used as combat search and rescue systems – US Navy SEALS use them for marking targets, drop zones, etc and I recall reading references to their use as navigation aids marking isolated hazards near temporary landing areas (forward airfields, etc).
At the time of the crash, such equipment was widespread in the US and present in several other NATO countries.
You quoted an incomplete comment of mine (again) which in full was:
<<there would have been a range at which, according to their plan, the turn would be started which on completion should have left them close to but clear of the mist (in those common conditions, the mist would have been expected to start no closer than the shoreline)>>
The importance of the bit you cut off was that the starting point of the mist was known in geographical terms. You commented:
<<I wasn't there, but I can confidently state that no crew would have planned a turn, based on a range, to keep them clear of anything, least of all clear of mist, the position of which they can not have known before departing Aldergrove.>>
Firstly, I wonder what DMEs are ever used for – even in VFR in clear conditions, are you not (subconsciously even) judging your range to make a turn before something? On their route (which I believe, having talked to locals, was a regular practice) they were not intending to just avoid the Mull, they were intending to approach it closely (directly towards it) and then “handrail” up the coast –if not range, what criteria would they have used to judge that turn?
Secondly, those conditions were very, very common where the mist formed right on the shoreline as the air started to rise – and very predictable earlier in the day by a competent met man. This crew being very experienced could have planned for it themselves (so common was it) and would have recognized the conditions on their way over (clear over the sea and the shoreline visible – yeah, yeah but with no clear detail higher up needed at their closing speed).
This has been one of the most disturbing aspects of this tragic event – how even the most basic factor in the crash – the local weather on the Mull – has not only not been clarified to the general public but great effort seems to have been made to keep it unclear.
You quote:<< they seemed to have control at the end with what appears a perfectly reasonable evasive maneuver >> and comment:
<<Not a reasonable assumption… they had insufficent control and/or insufficient height available to complete that recovery. The position of the rudder pedals certainly adds to the likelihood of this - if the impact conditions were the result of a simple last-moment pull to avoid the ground, having flown in the manner assumed by the Air Marshals, why would 77% left pedal have been applied>>
This was the subject of interesting discussion at the inquiries: as I recall (I am short of time now to dig out the exact quotes and occasions) it was suggested by someone at the inquiries (or possibly someone on this thread some time ago) that such full rudder application was inappropriate for a helicopter doing an evasive manouvre in this situation – I could be mistaken, but I think it was Sqn Ldr Robert Burke who was perplexed at this stating that (something like) it was an entirely correct thing to do in a tandem rotor helicopter like a Chinook (present the large broadside to slow down, presumably).
You ask:
<<Finally, why does a non-pilot apparently living in Western Australia have an interest in this?>>
I would have thought anyone with a concern that something had been missed in the official inquiries would be obliged to speak up in so serious a case – it was such a serious a blow to the British people as to be on a par with the arrow in Harold’s eye back in 1066 – a large chunk of them have lost their champions in that very real terrorist war in NI.
But since you asked:
I am, after all, still a British citizen and lived most of my life there, with most of my career as a professional engineer being in defence systems.
My military experience is fragmented, flirtatious and of short duration but led me to respect the guys who are more dedicated than I was (Rhodesian Army, British Territorial) – and the nearest I came to being a military pilot was as far as basic flying training in the Rhodesian Air Force. It was the shafting of that decent little country by our wonderfully internationalist politicians that gave me empathy with the people of Northern Ireland and a healthy cynicism towards our governments.
My interest in navigation and guidance systems (theory from 10 years as a Member of the Royal Institute of Navigation, practical mainly through much coastal navigation and tasks while an engineer with the CAA) has given me, I humbly suggest, a viewpoint on this case that is perhaps relevant.
In summary, I started out just trying to bring to people’s attention how easy it was to tamper with a particular type of navaid that I had thought, in that location and conditions, would have been an obvious choice for the pilots to have relied on – just in case more qualified and authoritative people missed the possibility in time to gather any evidence as such evidence would have been ethereal.
Nothing could have prepared me for the obfuscation in the inquiries and the omission of basic parameters pertinent to the flight, the misrepresentation of the met conditions, the false arguments on the simplistic VFR/IMC topic, the focus on the control problems whilst the obvious navigation aspect was studiously ignored (not even the intended route was clarified), the hostility to and effort to quash suggestions that could (and should) more easily have been followed up and brought to closure properly. But most of all, the naivety that dismisses sabotage – and therefore any method that required malice by any party in a position to enact it.
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I wish I could wave a magic wand and tell you why Rick and Jon didn't make that turn but sadly no one does. I do have some thoughts though and it concerns the waypoint and the weather. Both Jon and Rick were VERY experienced. Indeed Rick had over 3000 hrs most of them in Chinook. Jon, likewise was also experienced.
So, they had to plan a sortie from Belfast to Inverness. The weather is iffy and they know that the icing clearance on the Mk2 is also iffy. So, (like I would) they plan to go over the sea as best they could and their first WP is the Mull. Off they go and they are soon spotted flying at between 200-400 feet. They are watching S.Tans count down the range and bearing to the Mull and are eagerly looking out of the window to see if they can see the WP. S. Tans then says they are at the WP and they then make the WP change on Tans. That suggests they knew where they were. Yet seconds later they hit a 800 foot hill. ?
To me - an experienced aviator - that suggests that something went seriously wrong during the final 20-30 seconds. Im not going to speculate as to what part of the aircraft malfunctioned but would just like to say that unless there is absolute proof then the charge of negligence should be removed.
So, they had to plan a sortie from Belfast to Inverness. The weather is iffy and they know that the icing clearance on the Mk2 is also iffy. So, (like I would) they plan to go over the sea as best they could and their first WP is the Mull. Off they go and they are soon spotted flying at between 200-400 feet. They are watching S.Tans count down the range and bearing to the Mull and are eagerly looking out of the window to see if they can see the WP. S. Tans then says they are at the WP and they then make the WP change on Tans. That suggests they knew where they were. Yet seconds later they hit a 800 foot hill. ?
To me - an experienced aviator - that suggests that something went seriously wrong during the final 20-30 seconds. Im not going to speculate as to what part of the aircraft malfunctioned but would just like to say that unless there is absolute proof then the charge of negligence should be removed.
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OK, Walter, I had misunderstood your posts, as you referred to 'DME transponders' etc and my simple mind assumed you were suggesting the code was related to the 'special equipment'.
Would it not be more likely that a 'special' code (7760?) would have been allocated because of the 'special' nature of the load and thus status of the flight?
So, yes, there MAY have been a 'special' DME unit on the Mull, yes, the heli MAY have been 'using it' and yes, there MAY have been some ill-intended interference with it. It is all very believable, if horrific.
At the end of all this, however, we have yet more 'evidence' that there is NO 'evidence' of negligence. Unless anyone has firm 'evidence' of such negligence, PLEASE can we concentrate on getting the verdict overturned on the simple premise of the existing lack of 'evidence', as hyd3 and many, many others say? We will not be able to prove your theory for many years, even if it is true, so it merely detracts from the effort.
Would it not be more likely that a 'special' code (7760?) would have been allocated because of the 'special' nature of the load and thus status of the flight?
So, yes, there MAY have been a 'special' DME unit on the Mull, yes, the heli MAY have been 'using it' and yes, there MAY have been some ill-intended interference with it. It is all very believable, if horrific.
At the end of all this, however, we have yet more 'evidence' that there is NO 'evidence' of negligence. Unless anyone has firm 'evidence' of such negligence, PLEASE can we concentrate on getting the verdict overturned on the simple premise of the existing lack of 'evidence', as hyd3 and many, many others say? We will not be able to prove your theory for many years, even if it is true, so it merely detracts from the effort.
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BOAC
The simple point is that an interested party could formally ask under FOI what the code was earlier in the flight.
If it was 7760 then at the very least the inquiries would have been shown to have been flawed as it had been described as "meaningless" and had got to be that setting by an object hitting the equipment or the crew were attempting to change the setting.
The next question would then be what was the meaning of 7760 - a clear and definitive answer being required.
I do not see that this is unreasonable - surely such an omission in the inquiries would only strengthen the argument that the verdicts of negligence were wrongly arrived at?
Looking ahead, if they had been given an extra task on their flight that in any way complicated or compromised normal practice on that route, then at the very least the case for blaming the crew is again weakened.
And of course if there was the slightest possibility of any equipment they may have been using in any way being set incorrectly, moved, or otherwise made to malfunction in any way (inadvertently or deliberately) then again the case for blaming the crew would again be weakened. Thus, I think that interested parties should follow up this navigation aspect as soon as possible – it may achieve their goal of clearing the pilots’ names quicker than any other way – and it is do-able.
The simple point is that an interested party could formally ask under FOI what the code was earlier in the flight.
If it was 7760 then at the very least the inquiries would have been shown to have been flawed as it had been described as "meaningless" and had got to be that setting by an object hitting the equipment or the crew were attempting to change the setting.
The next question would then be what was the meaning of 7760 - a clear and definitive answer being required.
I do not see that this is unreasonable - surely such an omission in the inquiries would only strengthen the argument that the verdicts of negligence were wrongly arrived at?
Looking ahead, if they had been given an extra task on their flight that in any way complicated or compromised normal practice on that route, then at the very least the case for blaming the crew is again weakened.
And of course if there was the slightest possibility of any equipment they may have been using in any way being set incorrectly, moved, or otherwise made to malfunction in any way (inadvertently or deliberately) then again the case for blaming the crew would again be weakened. Thus, I think that interested parties should follow up this navigation aspect as soon as possible – it may achieve their goal of clearing the pilots’ names quicker than any other way – and it is do-able.
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walter
You miss BOAC's message to you. So, again. Whilst your hypothesis may be sound, it is unlikely to be proven for many years, if ever, and in the meantime will be dismissed by the likes of Hoon as a conspiracy theory; and, as such, will only strengthen MoD resolve to further dismiss the campaign. In other words, and whilst acknowledging your good intention, your continued and overly-long contributions have now become a significant detraction. Having made your points well, and in repeated detail, you would now better serve the cause of many by resting your own individual case.
You miss BOAC's message to you. So, again. Whilst your hypothesis may be sound, it is unlikely to be proven for many years, if ever, and in the meantime will be dismissed by the likes of Hoon as a conspiracy theory; and, as such, will only strengthen MoD resolve to further dismiss the campaign. In other words, and whilst acknowledging your good intention, your continued and overly-long contributions have now become a significant detraction. Having made your points well, and in repeated detail, you would now better serve the cause of many by resting your own individual case.
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Walter, I ask you very seriously, what is your real interest in pursuit of the information you seek? Let the thing rest, because everything that you are saying is circumstantial. Please let Brian continue his quest in peace.
To bring the tone a little lower......."F**K OFF, WALTER!!"
No disrespect meant to this thread by the use of bad language.
To bring the tone a little lower......."F**K OFF, WALTER!!"
No disrespect meant to this thread by the use of bad language.
A really irritating PPRuNer
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Hi everyone,
Just a quick update to keep you updated as to what is going on.
I had a reply to my request for documents under the Freedom of Information Act and received most of what I requested. Some were withheld, but I aim to appeal.
Amongst other things, I requested BoI reports from a different accident to the Chinook, and the MoD kindly supplied all that I required. Without going into too much detail at the moment, I have to say that I am amazed at the contrasting attitude of the reports and aim to write back to the MoD to express my concerns and also ask that they explain how decisions are made and conclusions reached.
I would be grateful if people didn’t speculate which additional BoI was requested as it was a fatal accident, and I am very conscious that there are families involved who may well have ‘moved on’ and therefore do not need this issue brought to the fore again.
I must also say that I am in no way looking at the accident – just the way in which certain individuals reached, and reported, their findings.
As I say, I intend to write back to the MoD to ask for clarification of the decision making procedure, to ask further questions and to request more information under the FoIA. As always, I’ll keep everyone updated as to my progress.
In the meantime, there’s a sniff of a General Election in the air, so if you have any MPs or prospective candidates suddenly appearing at your door with the ‘I take it I can rely on your vote’ smile
, you may like to ask their views on this injustice.
My best, as always.
Brian
“Justice has no expiry date” – John Cook
Just a quick update to keep you updated as to what is going on.
I had a reply to my request for documents under the Freedom of Information Act and received most of what I requested. Some were withheld, but I aim to appeal.
Amongst other things, I requested BoI reports from a different accident to the Chinook, and the MoD kindly supplied all that I required. Without going into too much detail at the moment, I have to say that I am amazed at the contrasting attitude of the reports and aim to write back to the MoD to express my concerns and also ask that they explain how decisions are made and conclusions reached.
I would be grateful if people didn’t speculate which additional BoI was requested as it was a fatal accident, and I am very conscious that there are families involved who may well have ‘moved on’ and therefore do not need this issue brought to the fore again.
I must also say that I am in no way looking at the accident – just the way in which certain individuals reached, and reported, their findings.
As I say, I intend to write back to the MoD to ask for clarification of the decision making procedure, to ask further questions and to request more information under the FoIA. As always, I’ll keep everyone updated as to my progress.
In the meantime, there’s a sniff of a General Election in the air, so if you have any MPs or prospective candidates suddenly appearing at your door with the ‘I take it I can rely on your vote’ smile
, you may like to ask their views on this injustice.My best, as always.
Brian
“Justice has no expiry date” – John Cook