Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
John,
You say that you've read the account of the US Army UFCM episode. I trust you realise the implications - no warning, no input from the crew, the only reason they lived to tell the tale was because of the altitude at which they were flying when the incident started. Fills you with confidence in the aircraft, eh?
I read this from your post at the top of page 93:
...and I'd love to know where the definitive proof that the aircraft was under control before or at the time of the crash might be. If such proof there were, it might go some way to explaining the incident - but by itself would not eliminate the other possible causes to the standards of proof required for the negligence finding. Without absolute proof that the aircraft was under control, then it would be clear to someone of your, or even Invertron's, apparent education that the standard of evidence required to justify the negligence verdict had not been met.
Mikehegland,
I've never authorised a sortie based on an aftercast of the weather - have you?
You say that you've read the account of the US Army UFCM episode. I trust you realise the implications - no warning, no input from the crew, the only reason they lived to tell the tale was because of the altitude at which they were flying when the incident started. Fills you with confidence in the aircraft, eh?
I read this from your post at the top of page 93:
But the unpleasant fact is that all the evidence we have points to the conclusion of negligence - high speed, low level, in cloud, aircraft under control and so on
Mikehegland,
I've never authorised a sortie based on an aftercast of the weather - have you?
Mikehegland,
Assuming that this is directed to me, my point is that the weather you based this comment upon:
...is that which was reported by a SAR aircraft on scene some time AFTER the incident. Your comments about authorisation imply that it was information known BEFOREthe flight, because that's generally when authorisation takes place - before the flight.
If you don't anything sensible to say then keep it to yourself (sic)
200' cb and 1/4 nm viz !!!!!!
ALARM - I wouldnt have authorised that and I would be extremely disappointed in any of my Officers if they had authorised that.
ALARM - I wouldnt have authorised that and I would be extremely disappointed in any of my Officers if they had authorised that.
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Chinook
Mikehedland
d'accord!
Thud & Blunder
AAIB Investigation/ Racal Report; ' ........struck a rocky outcrop at around 150 kts and climbing at approx 20 degs. It was erect, banked slightly left and pitched at around 30 degs nose-up, probably with cockpit control demands of substantial aft and left cyclic stick, left yaw and full thrust present'.........
Yet it was not under control?
Regards JP
d'accord!
Thud & Blunder
AAIB Investigation/ Racal Report; ' ........struck a rocky outcrop at around 150 kts and climbing at approx 20 degs. It was erect, banked slightly left and pitched at around 30 degs nose-up, probably with cockpit control demands of substantial aft and left cyclic stick, left yaw and full thrust present'.........
Yet it was not under control?
Regards JP
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nn
So the weather was blue blue until just after the accident when it suddenly got bad... behave. Stop trying to defend them. This forum is about removing the negligence charge.... it isn't and will never exonerate them from making poor decisions.
We can argue about the weather and their flight path/plan until we are blue in the face. The facts are that the weather (at the brief) was atrocious. They should not have been groping around low level with a truck load of passengers in the back. They made poor decisions. Their CRM, airmanship and captaincy was poor. They flew their aircraft into the ground killing themselves and all of their passengers.
HOWEVER, they were not negligent......why were they not negligent? Well to prove negligence you would have to prove everything I have just written and you can't and so therefore they are not negligent.
We can argue about the weather and their flight path/plan until we are blue in the face. The facts are that the weather (at the brief) was atrocious. They should not have been groping around low level with a truck load of passengers in the back. They made poor decisions. Their CRM, airmanship and captaincy was poor. They flew their aircraft into the ground killing themselves and all of their passengers.
HOWEVER, they were not negligent......why were they not negligent? Well to prove negligence you would have to prove everything I have just written and you can't and so therefore they are not negligent.
John,
So if the aircraft had been suffering a UFCM similar to the US Army incident, what do you suppose would have been different about the control positions? I note the word "probably" in your quote - hardly the standard of PROOF required for the finding of gross negligence, eh?
As an aside, there is a mention of left yaw demand - not something a Chinook operator is going to voluntarily apply at high forward speed, I'd venture. The bending forces on the fuselage (fwd rotor rolling one way, aft rolling the other) would be immense. Hardly indicative of an aircraft fully under control, though not conclusive by itself. But then this is all conjecture, after all - none of it reaching that same old standard of PROOF these campaigners so annoyingly keep coming back to.
Mikehegland (just seen your post)
Methinks you're allowing malice into your thinking - my post was pointing out the errors in using actual reports of weather from after the event to criticise the decision-making process of the deceased before the event.
However, I have no problems with the factual content of your conclusion about the BoI finding in your last paragraph.
So if the aircraft had been suffering a UFCM similar to the US Army incident, what do you suppose would have been different about the control positions? I note the word "probably" in your quote - hardly the standard of PROOF required for the finding of gross negligence, eh?
As an aside, there is a mention of left yaw demand - not something a Chinook operator is going to voluntarily apply at high forward speed, I'd venture. The bending forces on the fuselage (fwd rotor rolling one way, aft rolling the other) would be immense. Hardly indicative of an aircraft fully under control, though not conclusive by itself. But then this is all conjecture, after all - none of it reaching that same old standard of PROOF these campaigners so annoyingly keep coming back to.
Mikehegland (just seen your post)
So the weather was blue blue until just after the accident when it suddenly got bad... behave
However, I have no problems with the factual content of your conclusion about the BoI finding in your last paragraph.
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Mikehegland,
your final comment of:
is, in my humble opinion, the whole point of the campaign.
There were no witnesses to the accident nor, tragically, any survivors. There was nothing conclusive in the aftermath that credibly supports a negligence verdict.
We have had heated discussions over many years about who's witness should have more influence than the other (on the Mull or in a yacht), yet fail to agree on that, presumably because we were not there at the time and have only an opinion to back ourselves up. We have also trawled through the wreckage trying to find factual evidence to indicate which side of the argument is correct, and failed there too.
The campaign is happy to say that, unlikely as we believe it to be, both Rick and Jon may have been negligent but, when applying the rules in place at the time (absolutely no doubt whatsoever), find that this RAF legal requirement has not been met.
To have absolutely no doubt whatsoever, one must present hard facts. Negligence is a causational factor. Wreckage is the result of that factor. Where is the factual evidence supporting the causational factor? At this time, none has been presented.
If only they had ADR and CVR - but we've discussed that a thousand time too!
Your quote sums up perfectly the reasons behind the campaign.
My best, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
your final comment of:
HOWEVER, they were not negligent......why were they not negligent? Well to prove negligence you would have to prove everything I have just written and you can't and so therefore they are not negligent.
There were no witnesses to the accident nor, tragically, any survivors. There was nothing conclusive in the aftermath that credibly supports a negligence verdict.
We have had heated discussions over many years about who's witness should have more influence than the other (on the Mull or in a yacht), yet fail to agree on that, presumably because we were not there at the time and have only an opinion to back ourselves up. We have also trawled through the wreckage trying to find factual evidence to indicate which side of the argument is correct, and failed there too.
The campaign is happy to say that, unlikely as we believe it to be, both Rick and Jon may have been negligent but, when applying the rules in place at the time (absolutely no doubt whatsoever), find that this RAF legal requirement has not been met.
To have absolutely no doubt whatsoever, one must present hard facts. Negligence is a causational factor. Wreckage is the result of that factor. Where is the factual evidence supporting the causational factor? At this time, none has been presented.
If only they had ADR and CVR - but we've discussed that a thousand time too!
Your quote sums up perfectly the reasons behind the campaign.
My best, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
Last edited by Brian Dixon; 4th Dec 2004 at 20:57.
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Chinook
Thud&Blunder, please stop quibbling! It was the considered view of a real expert.
Mikehedland, An interesting contribution, but I think it might be helpful if you looked up the military definitions of 'poor judgement', aircrew error', 'negligence' and even 'recklessness'.
Oh dear; we have been here before as well!!!
JP
Mikehedland, An interesting contribution, but I think it might be helpful if you looked up the military definitions of 'poor judgement', aircrew error', 'negligence' and even 'recklessness'.
Oh dear; we have been here before as well!!!
JP
JP,
Stop quibbling? When I point out that a "considered view" is certainly not the standard of proof required? I think not, no matter how inconvenient you may find it. By the way, I missed the bit where the expert then came to the conclusion that his findings proved the aircraft was under control (as opposed to just stating where he found the controls to be). I'd be grateful if you'd post that too.
Not quite so "d'accord" now with the contributor whose user name you consistently mis-spell. Perhaps if you'd furnish us with your "military" definitions of those words here (we can use our dictionaries to find the English versions) then we might be able to see your point better. Or perhaps not. Feel free to quibble.
Stop quibbling? When I point out that a "considered view" is certainly not the standard of proof required? I think not, no matter how inconvenient you may find it. By the way, I missed the bit where the expert then came to the conclusion that his findings proved the aircraft was under control (as opposed to just stating where he found the controls to be). I'd be grateful if you'd post that too.
Not quite so "d'accord" now with the contributor whose user name you consistently mis-spell. Perhaps if you'd furnish us with your "military" definitions of those words here (we can use our dictionaries to find the English versions) then we might be able to see your point better. Or perhaps not. Feel free to quibble.
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Chinook
I don't need to furnish you with the definitions of those words and there is no difference between the military definition and the civilian counterparts. All of this of course is my opinion and in my opinion they were foolhardy to launch. They displayed poor airmanship by continuing. The Captain of the aircraft displayed appalling leadership in continuing and in my opinion he should have turned back.
That is my opinion. It might not be yours but its mine.
However, we are not here to discuss their lack of leadership skills or their poor airmanship. That is not being debated. We are here debating (and demanding) that the charge of negligence be removed. It should be removed because unless anyone can prove without any doubt what so ever that they were negligence then there were not.
That is my opinion. It might not be yours but its mine.
However, we are not here to discuss their lack of leadership skills or their poor airmanship. That is not being debated. We are here debating (and demanding) that the charge of negligence be removed. It should be removed because unless anyone can prove without any doubt what so ever that they were negligence then there were not.
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Thud_and_Blunder
<<As an aside, there is a mention of left yaw demand - not something a Chinook operator is going to voluntarily apply at high forward speed, I'd venture. The bending forces on the fuselage (fwd rotor rolling one way, aft rolling the other) would be immense. Hardly indicative of an aircraft fully under control…>>
I think from memory it was Sqn Ldr Robert Burke who addressed this at one of the inquiries saying something like that for a tandem rotor aircraft like a Chinook it was entirely sensible to brake rapidly with such a maneuver in those circumstances – I believe that the final maneuver was consistent with their realization that they had got too close and thus suggests that the aircraft was under control at this last moment. Bearing in mind just how close in waypoint A was and that it can be assumed that they were under control at the point where they changed waypoint on the SuperTANS the window of opportunity for a control malfunction to occur and clear itself would have been very short.
The weather.
What is not being appreciated here is that there is a very common local weather condition in those parts due to the prevailing wind rising on the steep landmass and what has been said by the various witnesses strongly suggests that this common condition was the case that day – it should not be unreasonable to use this common condition as a baseline for analysis of the available data:
The mist starts right on the shoreline, not a variable distance out to sea;
They would have been able to see the Mull from the NI coast (a witness on the NI shore at the time of the crash could);
However, while its geographical position would have been fixed, it would have appeared as a gray blob with no ground detail consistently visible (the SAR helicopter confirms these conditions on the Mull):
Further, from the direction of their approach, the lateral extent would have been limited and so there were no other adjacent topographical features to give parallax – and, with the top of the Mull merging with the solid cloud base and their level being lower than the top, no perspective of closing with the main mass would have been available;
Assuming that they intended turning close in (and waypoint A was actually quite close), once they had finished with the SuperTANS (changed waypoint but continued) had they been relying upon visual judgment they would probably have only had the shoreline itself – having done a good deal of close in navigation (boat) in such conditions (including the NW Scottish coast) I humbly suggest that with their weight they would/should not have continued in at their speed if relying on their view alone;
Once they had made the turn and were running up the shoreline as opposed to closing rapidly with it, there would not have been a problem with purely visual judgment – the problem was judging the distance off for starting the turn – all the available data is compatible with the simple misjudgment of this turn;
Back to the important point that the mist started at the shoreline, had this crew trusted the SuperTANS to give the geographical position of waypoint A accurately (and they most certainly did not) they could have used the SuperTANS position for the start of their turn and, regardless of their visual judgment of the proximity to the landmass, would have turned clear of the mist and within the rules for helicopter VFR.
The point is, without radar, did they rely on their visual judgment alone or was there something else to which they could refer?
For those who have not viewed the slides provided at the inquiry (available on the web) nor plotted positions on their own chart, let me make it clear that waypoint A was very close in; even changing the waypoint (on the SuperTANS) a bit before still puts them close in at a point that they had control (or, one would assume, they would not have been bothering to make the route change); their own misgivings about the accuracy of the SuperTANS should have made them wary of the possibility of it putting them closer to the Mull than planned and so their estimation should have erred on the safe side; the conditions on the Mull, by all accounts, were unsuitable for visual judgment of range for a closer approach at their high speed; for them not to have turned at waypoint change (remember, when they had control), already so close in, they must have had a reference which they trusted.
<<As an aside, there is a mention of left yaw demand - not something a Chinook operator is going to voluntarily apply at high forward speed, I'd venture. The bending forces on the fuselage (fwd rotor rolling one way, aft rolling the other) would be immense. Hardly indicative of an aircraft fully under control…>>
I think from memory it was Sqn Ldr Robert Burke who addressed this at one of the inquiries saying something like that for a tandem rotor aircraft like a Chinook it was entirely sensible to brake rapidly with such a maneuver in those circumstances – I believe that the final maneuver was consistent with their realization that they had got too close and thus suggests that the aircraft was under control at this last moment. Bearing in mind just how close in waypoint A was and that it can be assumed that they were under control at the point where they changed waypoint on the SuperTANS the window of opportunity for a control malfunction to occur and clear itself would have been very short.
The weather.
What is not being appreciated here is that there is a very common local weather condition in those parts due to the prevailing wind rising on the steep landmass and what has been said by the various witnesses strongly suggests that this common condition was the case that day – it should not be unreasonable to use this common condition as a baseline for analysis of the available data:
The mist starts right on the shoreline, not a variable distance out to sea;
They would have been able to see the Mull from the NI coast (a witness on the NI shore at the time of the crash could);
However, while its geographical position would have been fixed, it would have appeared as a gray blob with no ground detail consistently visible (the SAR helicopter confirms these conditions on the Mull):
Further, from the direction of their approach, the lateral extent would have been limited and so there were no other adjacent topographical features to give parallax – and, with the top of the Mull merging with the solid cloud base and their level being lower than the top, no perspective of closing with the main mass would have been available;
Assuming that they intended turning close in (and waypoint A was actually quite close), once they had finished with the SuperTANS (changed waypoint but continued) had they been relying upon visual judgment they would probably have only had the shoreline itself – having done a good deal of close in navigation (boat) in such conditions (including the NW Scottish coast) I humbly suggest that with their weight they would/should not have continued in at their speed if relying on their view alone;
Once they had made the turn and were running up the shoreline as opposed to closing rapidly with it, there would not have been a problem with purely visual judgment – the problem was judging the distance off for starting the turn – all the available data is compatible with the simple misjudgment of this turn;
Back to the important point that the mist started at the shoreline, had this crew trusted the SuperTANS to give the geographical position of waypoint A accurately (and they most certainly did not) they could have used the SuperTANS position for the start of their turn and, regardless of their visual judgment of the proximity to the landmass, would have turned clear of the mist and within the rules for helicopter VFR.
The point is, without radar, did they rely on their visual judgment alone or was there something else to which they could refer?
For those who have not viewed the slides provided at the inquiry (available on the web) nor plotted positions on their own chart, let me make it clear that waypoint A was very close in; even changing the waypoint (on the SuperTANS) a bit before still puts them close in at a point that they had control (or, one would assume, they would not have been bothering to make the route change); their own misgivings about the accuracy of the SuperTANS should have made them wary of the possibility of it putting them closer to the Mull than planned and so their estimation should have erred on the safe side; the conditions on the Mull, by all accounts, were unsuitable for visual judgment of range for a closer approach at their high speed; for them not to have turned at waypoint change (remember, when they had control), already so close in, they must have had a reference which they trusted.
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mikehegland
Your (very recent) appearance on Pprune, and intense interest, and profuse contributions to this thread are intriguing. I also find your profile slightly odd (so odd, I think I may even remember you!) How are you enjoying flying the 747-400 with AA?
Your very firmly held, and strident, 'opinions' are recognised by many contributors to this thread as exactly that: Opinions!
We here are far more impressed by people who limit themselves to the 'known FACTUAL evidence'. We find it prevents us being drawn into the 'JP circles'.
Sadly for you, little of your statement of opinions can be taken as accurate representations of 'known' fact. It is certainly NOT supported by the quality of evidence required for a finding of 'absolutely no doubt whatsoever'
So I repeat for you the question I have twice asked of JP. He has felt unable to respond, so we assume HE agrees with the premise, and accepts the limitations of his own position on these matters.
So Mike:
"Let me suggest to you that the general BROKEN cloudbase in the IMMEDIATE vicinity of the high ground of the Mull was approximately 300' ASL, and the visibility below this level was of the order of 5km.
Let me suggest to you that witnesses on that high ground reported they were IN cloud
Let me suggest to you that a yachtsman approximately 2 miles from the accident site was in bright sunshine, and he "SAW" this Chinook flying in those SAME bright conditions.
Finally let me suggest that, in the very final stages of their approach to the Mull, at 200-400' ASL, Flt Lts Tapper and Cook, were operating ZD576 in VMC, and in strict accordance with the rules for VFR.
And further, that they should have been perfectly able to continue in that manner.
What have I suggested that is INCOMPATIBLE with the FACTUAL evidence?"
Mike, "it's over to you."
JP
The \'considered\' view of the SAME \'real expert\' regarding the pre impact serviceability of ZD576 was FAR more certain!
Have you forgotten?
He stated the pre-impact serviceability of ZD576 could not be positively determined. Not a single use of the word \'probable\' in sight.
Your (very recent) appearance on Pprune, and intense interest, and profuse contributions to this thread are intriguing. I also find your profile slightly odd (so odd, I think I may even remember you!) How are you enjoying flying the 747-400 with AA?
Your very firmly held, and strident, 'opinions' are recognised by many contributors to this thread as exactly that: Opinions!
We here are far more impressed by people who limit themselves to the 'known FACTUAL evidence'. We find it prevents us being drawn into the 'JP circles'.
Sadly for you, little of your statement of opinions can be taken as accurate representations of 'known' fact. It is certainly NOT supported by the quality of evidence required for a finding of 'absolutely no doubt whatsoever'
So I repeat for you the question I have twice asked of JP. He has felt unable to respond, so we assume HE agrees with the premise, and accepts the limitations of his own position on these matters.
So Mike:
"Let me suggest to you that the general BROKEN cloudbase in the IMMEDIATE vicinity of the high ground of the Mull was approximately 300' ASL, and the visibility below this level was of the order of 5km.
Let me suggest to you that witnesses on that high ground reported they were IN cloud
Let me suggest to you that a yachtsman approximately 2 miles from the accident site was in bright sunshine, and he "SAW" this Chinook flying in those SAME bright conditions.
Finally let me suggest that, in the very final stages of their approach to the Mull, at 200-400' ASL, Flt Lts Tapper and Cook, were operating ZD576 in VMC, and in strict accordance with the rules for VFR.
And further, that they should have been perfectly able to continue in that manner.
What have I suggested that is INCOMPATIBLE with the FACTUAL evidence?"
Mike, "it's over to you."
JP
The \'considered\' view of the SAME \'real expert\' regarding the pre impact serviceability of ZD576 was FAR more certain!
Have you forgotten?
He stated the pre-impact serviceability of ZD576 could not be positively determined. Not a single use of the word \'probable\' in sight.
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chinook
Yeah right. Well if you want to continue and think that then Krak on. But there is no doubt (and it is a FACT) that the weather was pants... We have weather records going back years and on this day the weather was pants...and if they were flying in good vis with a decent cloudbase and they were VFR then why did they conduct a C.F.I.T ? Unless of course they were negligent...? Now, there's a theory
and youre right. You do know me
you know me quite well
and youre right. You do know me
you know me quite well
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"Let me suggest to you that the general BROKEN cloudbase in the IMMEDIATE vicinity of the high ground of the Mull was approximately 300' ASL, and the visibility below this level was of the order of 5km."
Since when was that 'pants'?
Since when was that 'pants'?
Just a numbered other
that the weather was pants.
It was the kind of weather (accepted by the BoI as quite suitable to make a VFR transit) which was and is the bread and butter of military helicopter life.
They were under some pressure to make this trip, as the pax required to get to Inverness. That there was no back up plan was an act of folly, or possibly of gross negligence.
You say:
All of this of course is my opinion and in my opinion they were foolhardy to launch.
The Captain of the aircraft displayed appalling leadership in continuing and in my opinion he should have turned back.
You are, of course, entitled to your opinions about the crash. I have my own. They are based on supposition, speculation, experience, and 'nouse'. They are of no relevance to the attribution of blame for the accident, as they contain no hard factual evidence.
Your views are as valid as those of anyone else, including Bill Wratten. Difference is, that yours and mine can be ignored. Wratten was in a position to call his views fact and to unleash this travesty of justice on the defenseless dead.
At least we almost agree on one thing:
It should be removed because unless anyone can prove without any doubt what so ever that they were negligent, then there were not.
Just as an aside, was /is there an` Actual` for Machrihanish ever submitted? Covering the afternoon period?
Where is the `foghorn` site in relation to the Lighthouse?
Were there any ships` log reports of the wx, from those fishing in the vicinity, or in transit?
T-R, did you get my PM?
Syc
Where is the `foghorn` site in relation to the Lighthouse?
Were there any ships` log reports of the wx, from those fishing in the vicinity, or in transit?
T-R, did you get my PM?
Syc
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The root cause of this accident is that the crew while operating in poor weather and close to high ground flew the aircraft into the ground.
Flt Lt TAPPER and his crew were undoubtedly competent to carry out the mission. In carrying out that mission Flt Lt TAPPER, as captain of an aircraft in peacetime, had an overriding duty to ensure the safety of the aircraft, its crew and the passengers. While there may, arguably, be some mitigating circumstances, I am regrettably drawn to the conclusion that he failed in that duty.
Weather - "was a contributory factor"
There were deteriorating weather conditions
all the evidence points towards them having ignored one of the basic tenants of airmanship, which is never to attempt to fly visually below safety altitude unless the weather conditions are unambiguously suitable for operating under Visual Flight Rules
Remember - we are not trying to find the casue of this accident, we already know that. We are not trying to remove the blame of this accident from John or Rick. Rick was flying and John was the Captain therefore they are to blame. We are trying to remove the unwarranted word NEGLIGENCE. Please lets stick to the purpose of this thread.
Flt Lt TAPPER and his crew were undoubtedly competent to carry out the mission. In carrying out that mission Flt Lt TAPPER, as captain of an aircraft in peacetime, had an overriding duty to ensure the safety of the aircraft, its crew and the passengers. While there may, arguably, be some mitigating circumstances, I am regrettably drawn to the conclusion that he failed in that duty.
Weather - "was a contributory factor"
There were deteriorating weather conditions
all the evidence points towards them having ignored one of the basic tenants of airmanship, which is never to attempt to fly visually below safety altitude unless the weather conditions are unambiguously suitable for operating under Visual Flight Rules
Remember - we are not trying to find the casue of this accident, we already know that. We are not trying to remove the blame of this accident from John or Rick. Rick was flying and John was the Captain therefore they are to blame. We are trying to remove the unwarranted word NEGLIGENCE. Please lets stick to the purpose of this thread.
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NO. What caused the accident was the aircraft hitting the ground. That is the ONLY proven fact.
The following MAY have been factors leading to the CAUSE of the accident:
Weather.
Aircraft systems serviceability.
Sabotage.
Unlawful interference with the flight.
Poor airmanship by the crew.
Discussing opinions on any or all of the above is a complete waste of bandwidth, because none of the above can be proven to have actually occurred.
So can we just stop there and not speculate further - it is not adding to the quest to have the negligence verdict overturned.
FJJP
The following MAY have been factors leading to the CAUSE of the accident:
Weather.
Aircraft systems serviceability.
Sabotage.
Unlawful interference with the flight.
Poor airmanship by the crew.
Discussing opinions on any or all of the above is a complete waste of bandwidth, because none of the above can be proven to have actually occurred.
So can we just stop there and not speculate further - it is not adding to the quest to have the negligence verdict overturned.
FJJP