Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
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I have received a letter from my MP, Paul Burstow, MP for Sutton and Cheam, who has responded to the e-mails I have sent to him. He writes.
It is good to know that he is active in the quest to absolve John and Rick from all blame.
As you will know the House of Lords appointed a special Select Committee to re-examine the evidence surrounding the Chinook helicopter crash. The Committee came to the view that the verdict of the Board of Enquiry was flawed and that the finding of negligence against the pilots should be quashed.
My colleague, Menzies Campbell MP, Liberal Democrat Shadow Foreign Secretary continues to press the Government to reopen the enquiry and quash the negligence findings.
An injustice has been done and Ministers seem unwilling to even in the face of overwhelming evidence to act. I have sent copies of your e-mails to the Rt. Hon. Geoffrey Hoon MP, Secretary of State for Defence, asking him to look into the points that you have raised and to let me have his comments. I will write to you again when I receive a response.
Once again thank you for e-mailing me about this very important matter.
Signed, Paul Burstow.
My colleague, Menzies Campbell MP, Liberal Democrat Shadow Foreign Secretary continues to press the Government to reopen the enquiry and quash the negligence findings.
An injustice has been done and Ministers seem unwilling to even in the face of overwhelming evidence to act. I have sent copies of your e-mails to the Rt. Hon. Geoffrey Hoon MP, Secretary of State for Defence, asking him to look into the points that you have raised and to let me have his comments. I will write to you again when I receive a response.
Once again thank you for e-mailing me about this very important matter.
Signed, Paul Burstow.
It is good to know that he is active in the quest to absolve John and Rick from all blame.
A really irritating PPRuNer
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Damn!!
I'm not at work that day.
Thanks TL.
Regards
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
I'm not at work that day.
Thanks TL.
Regards
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
A really irritating PPRuNer
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Hi folks,
thought you would all like to know that Lord Chalfont had a meeting with Mr Hoon yesterday (24 Oct 02).
By all accounts the meeting was a little 'frosty' and even less hospitable towards the end of the meeting. Mr Hoon said that he believed it was time for the matter to rest. He appeared to not look forward to the debate planned in the Lords for the 5th November.
Lord Chalfont reminded Mr Hoon that he had no intention of giving up and Mr Hoon made some sort of comment about two playing at that game (whatever that meant
). Can there be a Govenment whip at a Lords debate?? I don't know.
I'm delighted to report that Lord Chalfont is very much for continuing. I've also taken the liberty of e-mailing Mr Hoon to advise him that I have no intention of giving up either. You may like to do the same. Simply scroll down to find his name.
E-Mail Mr Hoon
To the families, Lord Chalfont and all involved in the campaign, I assure you of my continued support.
To the Government and MoD - accept defeat with dignity and restore the reputations of two of your finest.
My regards, as always
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
thought you would all like to know that Lord Chalfont had a meeting with Mr Hoon yesterday (24 Oct 02).
By all accounts the meeting was a little 'frosty' and even less hospitable towards the end of the meeting. Mr Hoon said that he believed it was time for the matter to rest. He appeared to not look forward to the debate planned in the Lords for the 5th November.
Lord Chalfont reminded Mr Hoon that he had no intention of giving up and Mr Hoon made some sort of comment about two playing at that game (whatever that meant
). Can there be a Govenment whip at a Lords debate?? I don't know.I'm delighted to report that Lord Chalfont is very much for continuing. I've also taken the liberty of e-mailing Mr Hoon to advise him that I have no intention of giving up either. You may like to do the same. Simply scroll down to find his name.
E-Mail Mr Hoon
To the families, Lord Chalfont and all involved in the campaign, I assure you of my continued support.
To the Government and MoD - accept defeat with dignity and restore the reputations of two of your finest.
My regards, as always
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
Just a numbered other
Good on Lord Chalfont. Hoon should not forget what 'Chalfonts' are in cockney rhyming slang! The irritation will continue!
I'll be emailing Mr Hoon to remind him how many of us out here are still awaiting justice. As you said, Brian, one day he'll have to take his fingers out of his ears........and we'll still be standing next to him yelling!
I'll be emailing Mr Hoon to remind him how many of us out here are still awaiting justice. As you said, Brian, one day he'll have to take his fingers out of his ears........and we'll still be standing next to him yelling!
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E-mail to Geoff Hoon
Sir,
The picture of you, and two Air Marshals, standing Canute-like, holding back the tide of Justice would appear to be the only humorous topic in this whole sorry saga.
Hopefully it will eventually become apparent to you, that you and your supporters are the ones out of step.
Yours faithfully,
HectorusRex
The picture of you, and two Air Marshals, standing Canute-like, holding back the tide of Justice would appear to be the only humorous topic in this whole sorry saga.
Hopefully it will eventually become apparent to you, that you and your supporters are the ones out of step.
Yours faithfully,
HectorusRex
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CHINOOK
JP is back in the circuit, and would like to pick up from Tandemrotor's message of 30 Sept. No, I am not k52, and unfortunately I do not seem able to find what it was he said.
In your message you say you would like to discuss some of my 'facts'; OK, lets hear from you. Regards. John.
In your message you say you would like to discuss some of my 'facts'; OK, lets hear from you. Regards. John.
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John Purdey
Reading through the thread I’ve just come upon you writing:
“All the many theories sound fine, but only one of them fits all the known facts.”
Now that’s fine by me but please explain how that makes the finding of gross negligence beyond doubt.
Sniping is for girls.
Reading through the thread I’ve just come upon you writing:
“All the many theories sound fine, but only one of them fits all the known facts.”
Now that’s fine by me but please explain how that makes the finding of gross negligence beyond doubt.
Sniping is for girls.
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Many thanks M134. The answer is that the known facts show that at around waypoint change, the crew had four choices: slow down and think about it; climb to safety altitude (though I note an earlier comment that the icing layer was against them); turn port along the coasdt; or fly straight ahead. They chose the latter and selected a cruise climb. That rate of climb would have cleared the high ground at the lighthoue, BUT they were over 500 yards to sbd of the intended track, and the cruise climb did not clear that much higher terrain. It is precisely to accomodate any possible positional errors of that kind that we have a regime of safety altitudes. The negligence lay in the fact that the crew pressed on in IMC when all the rules of good airmanship were against them doing so. I devoutly wish that those were not the facts, but they are. Regards John.
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Welcome back to the debate John Purdey. To some extent we are covering old ground here, but for the benefit of the debate I am happy to go over it again.
> The answer is that the known facts show that at around waypoint
> change, the crew had four choices: slow down and think about it; climb
> to safety altitude (though I note an earlier comment that the icing
> layer was against them); turn port along the coasdt; or fly straight
> ahead.
I am pleased to see you have accepted the icing point, however I feel you mis-state the options. In reality I believe the options were:
1. Continue with the planned flight, which involved a small turn to the left and a climb to clear terrain 2. Make a larger turn left and continue up the western coast, at low level if necessary 3. Abort the mission and return to Aldergrove
There were other options, such as continuing up the eastern coast of the Mull, or climbing into IMC, but none which are likely to have been considered by the crew for reasons already covered. Continuing straight on was not a realistic option as it fitted neither the flight plan nor the alternatives. By continuing straight on they would have been going considerably off course and towards known terrain.
> or fly straight ahead. They chose the latter
Actually they turned slightly right, which does not fit any of the profiles above (either yours or mine).
> and selected a cruise climb.
The aircraft may have *achieved* a cruise climb, but we do not know what was selected.
> That rate of climb would have cleared the high ground at the
> lighthoue,
Indeed, but not by an acceptable margin in IMC
> BUT they were over 500 yards to sbd of the intended track, and the
> cruise climb did not clear that much higher terrain.
> It is precisely to accomodate any possible positional errors of that
> kind that we have a regime of safety altitudes.
Indeed. Unfortunately the Chinook HC2 was unable to climb to safety altitude due icing, which is just one of the reasons that the aircraft was unsuitable for this mission. If there is any negligence attributable, it is to the people to decreed that a Chinook HC2 should be used for this mission.
> The negligence lay in the fact that the crew pressed on in IMC when
> all the rules of good airmanship were against them doing so.
There is no evidence that they "pressed on" voluntarily
There is no evidence that they were in IMC
There is evidence that they were not in IMC
There is evidence which questions the serviceability of the aircraft at the time of the accident There is evidence of intermittent untraceable problems with many aspects of the Chinook HC2 at the time
I look forward to your thoughts on these points.
> The answer is that the known facts show that at around waypoint
> change, the crew had four choices: slow down and think about it; climb
> to safety altitude (though I note an earlier comment that the icing
> layer was against them); turn port along the coasdt; or fly straight
> ahead.
I am pleased to see you have accepted the icing point, however I feel you mis-state the options. In reality I believe the options were:
1. Continue with the planned flight, which involved a small turn to the left and a climb to clear terrain 2. Make a larger turn left and continue up the western coast, at low level if necessary 3. Abort the mission and return to Aldergrove
There were other options, such as continuing up the eastern coast of the Mull, or climbing into IMC, but none which are likely to have been considered by the crew for reasons already covered. Continuing straight on was not a realistic option as it fitted neither the flight plan nor the alternatives. By continuing straight on they would have been going considerably off course and towards known terrain.
> or fly straight ahead. They chose the latter
Actually they turned slightly right, which does not fit any of the profiles above (either yours or mine).
> and selected a cruise climb.
The aircraft may have *achieved* a cruise climb, but we do not know what was selected.
> That rate of climb would have cleared the high ground at the
> lighthoue,
Indeed, but not by an acceptable margin in IMC
> BUT they were over 500 yards to sbd of the intended track, and the
> cruise climb did not clear that much higher terrain.
> It is precisely to accomodate any possible positional errors of that
> kind that we have a regime of safety altitudes.
Indeed. Unfortunately the Chinook HC2 was unable to climb to safety altitude due icing, which is just one of the reasons that the aircraft was unsuitable for this mission. If there is any negligence attributable, it is to the people to decreed that a Chinook HC2 should be used for this mission.
> The negligence lay in the fact that the crew pressed on in IMC when
> all the rules of good airmanship were against them doing so.
There is no evidence that they "pressed on" voluntarily
There is no evidence that they were in IMC
There is evidence that they were not in IMC
There is evidence which questions the serviceability of the aircraft at the time of the accident There is evidence of intermittent untraceable problems with many aspects of the Chinook HC2 at the time
I look forward to your thoughts on these points.
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CHINOOK
Brian Dixon, It really saddens me beyond measure to have to keep repeating the unfortunate facts of this tragedy as I see them, and as a very experienced military aviator I wish someone could find another explanation of what happened.
Meanwhile, and in reply to your posting I humbly offer the following. First, I had not seen any evidence that the crew turned right. Have you? Second, you say that the aircraft 'achieved' a cruise climb. But since everyone as far as I know accepts that the aircraft was under control at waypoint change, who or what was it that 'achieved' cruise climb? Third, you say 'not by an acceptable limit' in IMC; but they were already in IMC (25 yards vis at the lighthouse, which was only 500 yards or so to the left of where the aircraft impacted. Since IMC rules in that situation specify at least 1000 yards vis, how can we say they were not IMC? Fourth, now come-on; if the aircraft was not fit for the mission, we all know that the crew could have declined to take it.
Yours with real regret in challenging so many other experts in all this, John.
Meanwhile, and in reply to your posting I humbly offer the following. First, I had not seen any evidence that the crew turned right. Have you? Second, you say that the aircraft 'achieved' a cruise climb. But since everyone as far as I know accepts that the aircraft was under control at waypoint change, who or what was it that 'achieved' cruise climb? Third, you say 'not by an acceptable limit' in IMC; but they were already in IMC (25 yards vis at the lighthouse, which was only 500 yards or so to the left of where the aircraft impacted. Since IMC rules in that situation specify at least 1000 yards vis, how can we say they were not IMC? Fourth, now come-on; if the aircraft was not fit for the mission, we all know that the crew could have declined to take it.
Yours with real regret in challenging so many other experts in all this, John.
JP,
Wellcome back. I hope that you will deal with the question of doubt raised by M134 because it is this requirement to have "no doubt whatsoever" which is fundamental.
With my scientific hat on, "no doubt" means that it is scientifically proven and this is, as others have pointed out, a very high standard of certainty indeed and probably very unlikely ever to be achieved without reliable eye witnesses and an FDR. I would be interested to understand if you can claim that degree of certainty.
Your theory certainly fits the known facts, of which there are two:
1. Change of way point
2. Point of impact
Scientifically speaking the weakness in your position is rather like someone drawing a graph with only two points. Without some previously proven rule to determine the shape of the graph, it could go anywhere e.g. straight line, sine wave, etc. Your "rule" is based on your extensive experience as a pilot and, to me, it is very plausible. However, it can never be with "no doubt whatsoever" to the extent apparently required by the regulations. This is the issue we are all on about and which the HoL determined. Let us hope that the debate next week helps justice to prevail.
Wellcome back. I hope that you will deal with the question of doubt raised by M134 because it is this requirement to have "no doubt whatsoever" which is fundamental.
With my scientific hat on, "no doubt" means that it is scientifically proven and this is, as others have pointed out, a very high standard of certainty indeed and probably very unlikely ever to be achieved without reliable eye witnesses and an FDR. I would be interested to understand if you can claim that degree of certainty.
Your theory certainly fits the known facts, of which there are two:
1. Change of way point
2. Point of impact
Scientifically speaking the weakness in your position is rather like someone drawing a graph with only two points. Without some previously proven rule to determine the shape of the graph, it could go anywhere e.g. straight line, sine wave, etc. Your "rule" is based on your extensive experience as a pilot and, to me, it is very plausible. However, it can never be with "no doubt whatsoever" to the extent apparently required by the regulations. This is the issue we are all on about and which the HoL determined. Let us hope that the debate next week helps justice to prevail.
Last edited by pulse1; 31st Oct 2002 at 16:32.
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CHINOOK
Chocks Wayhay, Very sorry, I meant you rather than Brian Dixon. It must be this very good Rioja I'm supping here!!. Regards John
Pulse !. Yes, here we are again, but your posting seems to have been incomplete. Can you retransmit? John
Pulse 1. Somewhat puzzled at your suggestion that there are only two facts in all this. What about 1. Heading (the aircraft flew staight into terrain on its intended heading), 2. Track error (500 plus yards from intended track), 3. airspeed (around 145 kts), 4. aircraft under control (nose suddenly raised a few seconds before impact)and 4. IMC over the hills (lighthouse keeper). Why do we find it so difficult to accept aircrew error in this case, as we have had to do in so many others?
As Eisenhower said at the end of his pre-D-Day briefing, 'I don't like it, but thre we are' Regards John
Pulse !. Yes, here we are again, but your posting seems to have been incomplete. Can you retransmit? John
Pulse 1. Somewhat puzzled at your suggestion that there are only two facts in all this. What about 1. Heading (the aircraft flew staight into terrain on its intended heading), 2. Track error (500 plus yards from intended track), 3. airspeed (around 145 kts), 4. aircraft under control (nose suddenly raised a few seconds before impact)and 4. IMC over the hills (lighthouse keeper). Why do we find it so difficult to accept aircrew error in this case, as we have had to do in so many others?
As Eisenhower said at the end of his pre-D-Day briefing, 'I don't like it, but thre we are' Regards John
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John Purdey.
The words "facts" and "how I see them", can never be completely factual...You are stating an opinion. You have a zero understanding of "safety altitude". A competent crew flew a (possibly) serviceable aircraft into the ground? If the Service had not cheapskated and provided CVR and ADR we could make an educated decision. So I, Brian Dixon, the majority pprune, S/L Burke, the Fatal Accident Inquiry, The Commons Pac, the House of Lords Committee all read the facts differently to you. edited
The use of any form of swearing and/or rudeness, as in your case, is completely uneccessary. This thread is above 'lost argument' verbalism's. Everyone is entitled to, and will receive, the opportunity to place their opinions, good bad or indifferent, on this topic without bad manners.
The words "facts" and "how I see them", can never be completely factual...You are stating an opinion. You have a zero understanding of "safety altitude". A competent crew flew a (possibly) serviceable aircraft into the ground? If the Service had not cheapskated and provided CVR and ADR we could make an educated decision. So I, Brian Dixon, the majority pprune, S/L Burke, the Fatal Accident Inquiry, The Commons Pac, the House of Lords Committee all read the facts differently to you. edited
The use of any form of swearing and/or rudeness, as in your case, is completely uneccessary. This thread is above 'lost argument' verbalism's. Everyone is entitled to, and will receive, the opportunity to place their opinions, good bad or indifferent, on this topic without bad manners.
Just a numbered other
JP
Welcome back to the debate.
As others have asked, what is so hard to understand about the term 'absolutely no doubt whatsoever'?
Their Airships and Mr Hoon (and you) agree that it is an impossibly tight and difficult concept to achieve. Ask yourself why.
It is precisely because dead men, who by definition cannot defend themselves, must be given the benefit of any doubt. Make no mistake, the finding of gross negligence is a damning slur, which has to be extremely difficult to arrive at.
I will say again that not one of we campaigners has said that negligence is impossible in this case (I note that you used the term 'error' an your last post - I hope you can see the difference).
We simply demand that the rules in force at the time of the accident are adhered to to the letter, and that if there is no absolute proof that the pilots acted negligently, then the finding is unsafe, and must be reversed.
Negligence is something that must be proven 'beyond any doubt whatsoever', and not used as a convenient conclusion when no other cause is evident.
Welcome back to the debate.
As others have asked, what is so hard to understand about the term 'absolutely no doubt whatsoever'?
Their Airships and Mr Hoon (and you) agree that it is an impossibly tight and difficult concept to achieve. Ask yourself why.
It is precisely because dead men, who by definition cannot defend themselves, must be given the benefit of any doubt. Make no mistake, the finding of gross negligence is a damning slur, which has to be extremely difficult to arrive at.
I will say again that not one of we campaigners has said that negligence is impossible in this case (I note that you used the term 'error' an your last post - I hope you can see the difference).
We simply demand that the rules in force at the time of the accident are adhered to to the letter, and that if there is no absolute proof that the pilots acted negligently, then the finding is unsafe, and must be reversed.
Negligence is something that must be proven 'beyond any doubt whatsoever', and not used as a convenient conclusion when no other cause is evident.
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Firstly, I'm not Brian (but I'll take it as a compliment!)
Positional data from the Racal SuperTANS, referenced in the AAIB report, indicated that a small overall course change of a few degrees occurred between the waypoint and impact point. There is not enough data to indicate whether the aircraft went from one point to the other in a straight line or was weaving however. What is certainly true is that the aircraft did not make the left turn required to stay on track, or a harder left turn to continue low level up the coast.
This then raises the question as to whether they carried on deliberately, accidentally (because of distraction perhaps) or involuntarily. We can assume that they were aware of the approaching terrain as they entered a climb at some point. This then surely discounts the likelihood of the crew deliberately carrying on, leaving their intended flightpath. It is similarly unlikely (but possible) that both crew members were distracted by something inside the aircraft, such as an engine malfunction indication. In such cases however, procedures existed for dealing with such occurrences where one pilot is heads-in, and there is nothing to indicate that an experienced crew like this would have departed from these procedures. Again, the climb suggests that at least one crew member was aware of the terrain. This only leaves the possibility that they carried on involuntarily.
The assumption (a reasonable one in my opinion also) that the aircraft was capable of maintaining level flight up to the waypoint does not give any proof that it was capable of climbing. We also do not know that a "cruise climb" occurred, all we have is an estimate of height at the waypoint, and the knowledge of the height at which the aircraft crashed. SuperTANS gave no rate of climb data, so we have no actual facts on how the aircraft got from one height to the other.
Fog in the area can be very localised, and there is no evidence that the conditions at the lighthouse extended that far out. You say "how can we say they were not IMC?" - indeed, however by the same token - how can we say they were not? That it cannot be proven that there were visual does not mean that they were not. That it cannot be proved that the aircraft was malfunctioning doesn't prove that it was not.
There was anecdotal evidence that the crew had requested an alternative aircraft (a Mk1) the previous evening, but this request was refused. I think this is in the House of Lords report, but I can't find the reference just now.
This may seem like pedantic wordplay, but it is necessary to be pedantic to ensure that assumptions and estimates do not become accepted as facts. I can't explain the accident using only the absolute known facts, and neither anyone else. Where we differ is in the reliance on assumptions to convict dead men - the majority of us find that unacceptable.
Positional data from the Racal SuperTANS, referenced in the AAIB report, indicated that a small overall course change of a few degrees occurred between the waypoint and impact point. There is not enough data to indicate whether the aircraft went from one point to the other in a straight line or was weaving however. What is certainly true is that the aircraft did not make the left turn required to stay on track, or a harder left turn to continue low level up the coast.
This then raises the question as to whether they carried on deliberately, accidentally (because of distraction perhaps) or involuntarily. We can assume that they were aware of the approaching terrain as they entered a climb at some point. This then surely discounts the likelihood of the crew deliberately carrying on, leaving their intended flightpath. It is similarly unlikely (but possible) that both crew members were distracted by something inside the aircraft, such as an engine malfunction indication. In such cases however, procedures existed for dealing with such occurrences where one pilot is heads-in, and there is nothing to indicate that an experienced crew like this would have departed from these procedures. Again, the climb suggests that at least one crew member was aware of the terrain. This only leaves the possibility that they carried on involuntarily.
The assumption (a reasonable one in my opinion also) that the aircraft was capable of maintaining level flight up to the waypoint does not give any proof that it was capable of climbing. We also do not know that a "cruise climb" occurred, all we have is an estimate of height at the waypoint, and the knowledge of the height at which the aircraft crashed. SuperTANS gave no rate of climb data, so we have no actual facts on how the aircraft got from one height to the other.
Fog in the area can be very localised, and there is no evidence that the conditions at the lighthouse extended that far out. You say "how can we say they were not IMC?" - indeed, however by the same token - how can we say they were not? That it cannot be proven that there were visual does not mean that they were not. That it cannot be proved that the aircraft was malfunctioning doesn't prove that it was not.
There was anecdotal evidence that the crew had requested an alternative aircraft (a Mk1) the previous evening, but this request was refused. I think this is in the House of Lords report, but I can't find the reference just now.
This may seem like pedantic wordplay, but it is necessary to be pedantic to ensure that assumptions and estimates do not become accepted as facts. I can't explain the accident using only the absolute known facts, and neither anyone else. Where we differ is in the reliance on assumptions to convict dead men - the majority of us find that unacceptable.
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Hi Mr Purdey,
thanks for your comments. May I apologise for being absent for your first contributions.
I have to say that you are one of the very few people on the other side of the debate who presents your argument in a well reasoned way (K52 being another).
That said, yours is simply just one interpretetion of all the available evidence - just as mine is. Would you agree? Just because we choose to interpret the evidence differently does not lessen the credibility of each choice.
Please correct me if I'm wrong, but no-one has said that your interpretation is wrong. Just as I have never said that my interpretation is the only correct one. If you agree nothing more than the possisbility that either one is the correct version, you have an element of doubt. Therefore the verdict is unlawful.
Whilst I accept that I have the easy part of the campaign - I only have to introduce an element of doubt (no matter how small), the Air Marshals, MoD and all who support their interpretation have to prove with absolutely no doubt whatsoever that there is no other possible explanation.
The burden of proof in place at the time of the accident was there to protect aircrew from this very situation. If the level is now deemed almost impossible to achieve, then I really have to say, with all respect, too bad.
Just because the law makes the life of the Air Marshals and the MoD difficult does not give them the right to simply ignore it.
This whole issue is not about whose interpretation is right and whose is wrong. Its about the burden of proof - nothing else. Well, that's the way I see it anyway.
What should also concern you is the way in which the MoD appears to consider itself above Parliament and the law of the land.
Kind regards
Brian
Chocks - We both know what I'm like so I would take offence if I were you!!
Thanks, as always, to everyone for their support
Regards
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
thanks for your comments. May I apologise for being absent for your first contributions.
I have to say that you are one of the very few people on the other side of the debate who presents your argument in a well reasoned way (K52 being another).
That said, yours is simply just one interpretetion of all the available evidence - just as mine is. Would you agree? Just because we choose to interpret the evidence differently does not lessen the credibility of each choice.
Please correct me if I'm wrong, but no-one has said that your interpretation is wrong. Just as I have never said that my interpretation is the only correct one. If you agree nothing more than the possisbility that either one is the correct version, you have an element of doubt. Therefore the verdict is unlawful.
Whilst I accept that I have the easy part of the campaign - I only have to introduce an element of doubt (no matter how small), the Air Marshals, MoD and all who support their interpretation have to prove with absolutely no doubt whatsoever that there is no other possible explanation.
The burden of proof in place at the time of the accident was there to protect aircrew from this very situation. If the level is now deemed almost impossible to achieve, then I really have to say, with all respect, too bad.
Just because the law makes the life of the Air Marshals and the MoD difficult does not give them the right to simply ignore it.
This whole issue is not about whose interpretation is right and whose is wrong. Its about the burden of proof - nothing else. Well, that's the way I see it anyway.
What should also concern you is the way in which the MoD appears to consider itself above Parliament and the law of the land.
Kind regards
Brian
Chocks - We both know what I'm like so I would take offence if I were you!!
Thanks, as always, to everyone for their support
Regards
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
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As one who dips in only occasionally to this forum, may I say that I agree with John Purdey's views. And, in my own experience, so do most other aircrew when the topic has been discussed outside the portals of Pprune.
Hoverstop
A little anecdote for you:
Some time ago I was a Loan Service pilot on single Hueys in a very pleasant desert land. One particular day my task was a simple one - Air Experience Flying for a bunch of recruits at the Artillery training school. My brief from their instructors may sound familiar - a couple of Stage 1 lifts to get the youngsters used to the idea of working with a helicopter, then a "tactical" insert at the standard operating altitude (we had 50 feet and below, everything above that belonged to the Hunters/Jags). Lots of wingo-wango, big grins from all in the back - everyone happy.
Next morning that same a/c went up to a high jebel site (6300 ft amsl) for a USL task. As the (very experienced, non-RAF) pilot brought the a/c to a hover over the first load, the tail rotor control linkage broke presenting him with the equivalent of 150+% max left boot. He chopped the throttle and EOL'd next to the load - no damage to self, heli or hookers. BZ to him; a/c duly repaired and returned to service.
However, it set me thinking. What if that linkage had failed 1 hour 20 mins previously, when I'd been down at 50 feet with 30 deg bank and 14 youngsters down the back? How hard would the investigators have looked for evidence of pre-crash mechanical failure? Or would it all have been put down to over-exuberance from someone with a documented history as a training risk? I suspect I know what most crewroom BoIs would have concluded, especially as there was no CVR, HUMS or ADR to help clarify things.
I learned 2 main lessons from this incident:
****ty things happen at the worst of times - there's always a way to achieve the task with the minimum of unnecessary risk exposure.
What might seem the obvious cause of a mishap may not always be the actual cause.
Move on 11 years to 1994, and the tragic deaths of John, Rick, Graham, Kev and their passengers. You say that the crewroom discussions you've participated in suggest that the pilots f***ed up. I say they might have done. However, I also say - as do many learned, articulate contributors to this website, to the various legal processes and latterly to the House of Lords debates - that whatever evidence exists does not satisfy the exacting conditions of proof demanded by the rules that existed in the Royal Air Force at the time of the crash. Not only do I carry this conviction based upon the weight of evidence presented, but I also feel it deeply based on my own personal experience as described above. The Air Marshals' analysis of the outcome may sound exhaustive/convincing to people who wish to believe what they say, but anyone with an open mind may find the conclusions reached by the Sherriff, the House of Lords and others to be more compelling.
Welcome to the wonderful world of PPRuNe posting, and to the debate. Please don't subscribe to the tabloid-trial "no smoke without fire" school of second-guessing when it comes to this question; the reputations of 2 erstwhile brother-officers deserve much more than that. Apply the same standard of proof as was required when the investigation was first carried out, and see if you can still honestly agree with Day and Wratten afterwards. You're not looking for the most likely cause (and having worked with and known the crew reasonably well, I suspect we might even disagree on that...), but absolute proof of negligence.
Written in the wee small hours of a hectic night shift, so there are bound to be grammatical/speeling errors. I'll let the ISS-qual types pick over those...
A little anecdote for you:
Some time ago I was a Loan Service pilot on single Hueys in a very pleasant desert land. One particular day my task was a simple one - Air Experience Flying for a bunch of recruits at the Artillery training school. My brief from their instructors may sound familiar - a couple of Stage 1 lifts to get the youngsters used to the idea of working with a helicopter, then a "tactical" insert at the standard operating altitude (we had 50 feet and below, everything above that belonged to the Hunters/Jags). Lots of wingo-wango, big grins from all in the back - everyone happy.
Next morning that same a/c went up to a high jebel site (6300 ft amsl) for a USL task. As the (very experienced, non-RAF) pilot brought the a/c to a hover over the first load, the tail rotor control linkage broke presenting him with the equivalent of 150+% max left boot. He chopped the throttle and EOL'd next to the load - no damage to self, heli or hookers. BZ to him; a/c duly repaired and returned to service.
However, it set me thinking. What if that linkage had failed 1 hour 20 mins previously, when I'd been down at 50 feet with 30 deg bank and 14 youngsters down the back? How hard would the investigators have looked for evidence of pre-crash mechanical failure? Or would it all have been put down to over-exuberance from someone with a documented history as a training risk? I suspect I know what most crewroom BoIs would have concluded, especially as there was no CVR, HUMS or ADR to help clarify things.
I learned 2 main lessons from this incident:
****ty things happen at the worst of times - there's always a way to achieve the task with the minimum of unnecessary risk exposure.
What might seem the obvious cause of a mishap may not always be the actual cause.
Move on 11 years to 1994, and the tragic deaths of John, Rick, Graham, Kev and their passengers. You say that the crewroom discussions you've participated in suggest that the pilots f***ed up. I say they might have done. However, I also say - as do many learned, articulate contributors to this website, to the various legal processes and latterly to the House of Lords debates - that whatever evidence exists does not satisfy the exacting conditions of proof demanded by the rules that existed in the Royal Air Force at the time of the crash. Not only do I carry this conviction based upon the weight of evidence presented, but I also feel it deeply based on my own personal experience as described above. The Air Marshals' analysis of the outcome may sound exhaustive/convincing to people who wish to believe what they say, but anyone with an open mind may find the conclusions reached by the Sherriff, the House of Lords and others to be more compelling.
Welcome to the wonderful world of PPRuNe posting, and to the debate. Please don't subscribe to the tabloid-trial "no smoke without fire" school of second-guessing when it comes to this question; the reputations of 2 erstwhile brother-officers deserve much more than that. Apply the same standard of proof as was required when the investigation was first carried out, and see if you can still honestly agree with Day and Wratten afterwards. You're not looking for the most likely cause (and having worked with and known the crew reasonably well, I suspect we might even disagree on that...), but absolute proof of negligence.
Written in the wee small hours of a hectic night shift, so there are bound to be grammatical/speeling errors. I'll let the ISS-qual types pick over those...
Avoid imitations
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Thud,
Very well said, even after your bedtime!
We can all think back like yourself and from our own personal experiences, relate to the accident situation in a very different way from the Air Marshals, as did the RAF's own BOI. The story of the flight is a one that the true authors sadly did not get to finish. From what is, or more relevantly, isn't known, there are any number of ways to write the final chapter in the abscence of the word of those who should have been allowed to complete it, namely the crew.
MOD have perhaps chosen to finish the story in a way that suited (and still does suit) their political aims of the time. It appears that at least in the short term, the constitution of this country allows this to continue. Even if a satisfactory conclusion is not reached in the short term, in years to come I think it is likely there will be more evidence to support a very different conclusion.
We should ask whose careers would have been at risk if at least some of the blame HAD been laid on the desks of those responsible for the management debacle of the introduction of the Chinook Mark 2 into service - without the required Controller of Aircraft's Release to Service. Also, we should ask who insisted that the fated flight went ahead despite the crew's (and everyone else's) reluctance to fly the aircraft.
Very well said, even after your bedtime!
We can all think back like yourself and from our own personal experiences, relate to the accident situation in a very different way from the Air Marshals, as did the RAF's own BOI. The story of the flight is a one that the true authors sadly did not get to finish. From what is, or more relevantly, isn't known, there are any number of ways to write the final chapter in the abscence of the word of those who should have been allowed to complete it, namely the crew.
MOD have perhaps chosen to finish the story in a way that suited (and still does suit) their political aims of the time. It appears that at least in the short term, the constitution of this country allows this to continue. Even if a satisfactory conclusion is not reached in the short term, in years to come I think it is likely there will be more evidence to support a very different conclusion.
We should ask whose careers would have been at risk if at least some of the blame HAD been laid on the desks of those responsible for the management debacle of the introduction of the Chinook Mark 2 into service - without the required Controller of Aircraft's Release to Service. Also, we should ask who insisted that the fated flight went ahead despite the crew's (and everyone else's) reluctance to fly the aircraft.