Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
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Archie. I agree of course that Rick and John sadly do not have the opportunity to appeal, and that is why we should try to get to the truth about this - without any unwarrented emotion and without theories that do not hold water. I am sure we all wish that there was some other explanation of the disaster that would be more favourable to them ,bu I for one am still anxiously awaiting it.
As to their Lordships ability to interpret the law, it most certainly is in question. Tell me, do you really subscribe to their definition of negligence whuch I quoted in my posting of 25 Sept? I suggestbthat the definition given there is not one of negligence, nor one even of recklessness, but one of suicide.
Yerri. Many thanks, and yes, I have studied that too, but it did not cover all the known facts.
Pulse 1. Will you please say which elements of my (very sad) version you cannot accept? For example:
1. The a/c was at very low level (yachsman's evidence)
2. It was flying at a speed of about 145 knots (Aldergrove radar plot, plus time of impact).
3.It was in a cruise climb (profile from LL to impact)
4. The visibility on the hills was strictly IMC (20 meters the lighthouse keeper tells us).
5. The a/c was about 500 yards starboard of its intended track (distnce between intended waypoint, and impact point).
6. The a/c was under control at waypoint change, and it was under control a few seconds before impact (the nose was sharply raised 30 degs or so just before the crash).
7. THe ht of the ground on actual track was above 800 ft, while on the intended track it was around 300 feet.
Tragic though all this is, does it not add up to a coherent picture?
Please anybody tell me exactly where I am wrong. I would be very relieved. Best wishes. John Purdey
Arkroyal, I do understand your emotion, but please see my earlier posting and in particular say whether you think their Lordships' definition of negligence is one that you accept. Regars.. John.
Arkroyal, sorry, but my brief reply seems to have somehow been attached to an ealier post of mine, which I am sure you will be able to find. John.
As to their Lordships ability to interpret the law, it most certainly is in question. Tell me, do you really subscribe to their definition of negligence whuch I quoted in my posting of 25 Sept? I suggestbthat the definition given there is not one of negligence, nor one even of recklessness, but one of suicide.
Yerri. Many thanks, and yes, I have studied that too, but it did not cover all the known facts.
Pulse 1. Will you please say which elements of my (very sad) version you cannot accept? For example:
1. The a/c was at very low level (yachsman's evidence)
2. It was flying at a speed of about 145 knots (Aldergrove radar plot, plus time of impact).
3.It was in a cruise climb (profile from LL to impact)
4. The visibility on the hills was strictly IMC (20 meters the lighthouse keeper tells us).
5. The a/c was about 500 yards starboard of its intended track (distnce between intended waypoint, and impact point).
6. The a/c was under control at waypoint change, and it was under control a few seconds before impact (the nose was sharply raised 30 degs or so just before the crash).
7. THe ht of the ground on actual track was above 800 ft, while on the intended track it was around 300 feet.
Tragic though all this is, does it not add up to a coherent picture?
Please anybody tell me exactly where I am wrong. I would be very relieved. Best wishes. John Purdey
Arkroyal, I do understand your emotion, but please see my earlier posting and in particular say whether you think their Lordships' definition of negligence is one that you accept. Regars.. John.
Arkroyal, sorry, but my brief reply seems to have somehow been attached to an ealier post of mine, which I am sure you will be able to find. John.
Mr Purdey,
Earlier in this thread I said that there are only two men on this planet who "know" (i.e. with absolutely no doubt whatsoever) what happened in the final minutes/seconds of that fateful flight. I was wrong; there are three!
It beggars belief that someone who asks what other theories could fit the facts cannot get his head round what this whole campaign is all about. As soon as you move away from incontravertable facts into theory/think/could/might/likely/most probable/simulation etc, etc. etc... the "absolutely no doubt whatsoever" criterion clearly cannot be met.
The most senior legal brains in Britain have acknowledged this, thousands of aviation people (whatever their qualifications) hold the same opinion. Why is it that Day and Wratten - and now Mr Purdey can be convinced that they are in step and the rest of the parade is not?
Unwarrantable arrogance is the phrase that comes to mind!
Earlier in this thread I said that there are only two men on this planet who "know" (i.e. with absolutely no doubt whatsoever) what happened in the final minutes/seconds of that fateful flight. I was wrong; there are three!
It beggars belief that someone who asks what other theories could fit the facts cannot get his head round what this whole campaign is all about. As soon as you move away from incontravertable facts into theory/think/could/might/likely/most probable/simulation etc, etc. etc... the "absolutely no doubt whatsoever" criterion clearly cannot be met.
The most senior legal brains in Britain have acknowledged this, thousands of aviation people (whatever their qualifications) hold the same opinion. Why is it that Day and Wratten - and now Mr Purdey can be convinced that they are in step and the rest of the parade is not?
Unwarrantable arrogance is the phrase that comes to mind!
John,
Forgive me, but I'm not quite certain that I can agree with your point about their Lordships' qualifications and their definition (I am assuming that your query refers to your reference to para 147).
I think that their Lordships recognised the apparent incongruity that you highlight. If you'll forgive my quoting:
"13. Board of Inquiry procedure is governed by rules[2] made under section 135 of the Air Force Act 1955 and by The Queen's Regulations for the RAF, chapter 17. The RAF Manual of Flight Safety AP 3207 published by the Inspectorate of Flight Safety and in force at the time of the accident provided in paragraph 9 of Annex G to Chapter 8 that "only in cases in which there is absolutely no doubt whatsoever should deceased air crew be found negligent".
14. Paragraph 9 demanded a particularly high standard of proof, higher than is required of the prosecution in a criminal case in the United Kingdom ("beyond reasonable doubt"), and much higher than is required in civil litigation ("on the balance of probabilities"). It was no doubt set so high because deceased aircrew are no longer available to offer their own account of events. We consider that it requires all other plausible explanations for the crash to have been positively excluded. If any such explanations remain possibilities, the standard of proof has not been met. Furthermore, the fact that there is no evidence that an event giving rise to an explanation occurred will not amount to proof positive that it did not if such event could have occurred without leaving evidence of its occurrence or if evidence that it occurred could have been destroyed...
...26. Later, questioned by Menzies Campbell QC MP about the "absolutely no doubt whatsoever" standard of proof, Dr Reid acknowledged that it was "a very high burden of proof". He declined to be drawn into philosophical debate as to whether absolute certainty is ever achievable, offering instead the following test: "have we ruled out the possibility, on the basis of the evidence in front of us, that there was another possibility here?" (Q 917)."
In a nutshell, their Lordships noted that the standard of proof required was very high, and, indeed, with their reference in para 26, arguably almost impossible to achieve. That this is ridiculous, silly, or whatever, is neither here nor there - it is the standard of proof demanded, and (viz paras 13 and 14) a standard that could not be obtained in this case. Dr Reid's question: "have we ruled out the possibility, on the basis of the evidence in front of us, that there was another possibility here?" undermines the MoD's argument - the enquiry clearly demonstrated, from the evidence of Sq Ldr Burke and Witness A that there was another possibility, and thus the burden of proof was not achieved, even when modified by the MoD from the position noted by their Lordships.
Also, the legal experience of the members of the committee should be noted. Lord Jauncey was a Law Lord; Lord Brennan is a QC; ditto Lord Hooson (although I udnerstand that he has not practised law fully for some time) and Lord Bowness is/was a member of the legal profession. I'd respectfully submit that they can, between them, ascertain the burden of proof.
So I'm afraid that I must disagree - although the burden of proof required may have been impossibly high, this was not the fault of their Lordships - all they did, I'd suggest, is to examine the evidence and apply it to the burden of proof. They found that the evidence did not meet the standards (noting some of the problems along the way) and concluded that the verdict was not sustainable on legal grounds. Since I am not a lawyer, then I shall defer to their hihgly qualified viewpoint. Regards, Archie
Forgive me, but I'm not quite certain that I can agree with your point about their Lordships' qualifications and their definition (I am assuming that your query refers to your reference to para 147).
I think that their Lordships recognised the apparent incongruity that you highlight. If you'll forgive my quoting:
"13. Board of Inquiry procedure is governed by rules[2] made under section 135 of the Air Force Act 1955 and by The Queen's Regulations for the RAF, chapter 17. The RAF Manual of Flight Safety AP 3207 published by the Inspectorate of Flight Safety and in force at the time of the accident provided in paragraph 9 of Annex G to Chapter 8 that "only in cases in which there is absolutely no doubt whatsoever should deceased air crew be found negligent".
14. Paragraph 9 demanded a particularly high standard of proof, higher than is required of the prosecution in a criminal case in the United Kingdom ("beyond reasonable doubt"), and much higher than is required in civil litigation ("on the balance of probabilities"). It was no doubt set so high because deceased aircrew are no longer available to offer their own account of events. We consider that it requires all other plausible explanations for the crash to have been positively excluded. If any such explanations remain possibilities, the standard of proof has not been met. Furthermore, the fact that there is no evidence that an event giving rise to an explanation occurred will not amount to proof positive that it did not if such event could have occurred without leaving evidence of its occurrence or if evidence that it occurred could have been destroyed...
...26. Later, questioned by Menzies Campbell QC MP about the "absolutely no doubt whatsoever" standard of proof, Dr Reid acknowledged that it was "a very high burden of proof". He declined to be drawn into philosophical debate as to whether absolute certainty is ever achievable, offering instead the following test: "have we ruled out the possibility, on the basis of the evidence in front of us, that there was another possibility here?" (Q 917)."
In a nutshell, their Lordships noted that the standard of proof required was very high, and, indeed, with their reference in para 26, arguably almost impossible to achieve. That this is ridiculous, silly, or whatever, is neither here nor there - it is the standard of proof demanded, and (viz paras 13 and 14) a standard that could not be obtained in this case. Dr Reid's question: "have we ruled out the possibility, on the basis of the evidence in front of us, that there was another possibility here?" undermines the MoD's argument - the enquiry clearly demonstrated, from the evidence of Sq Ldr Burke and Witness A that there was another possibility, and thus the burden of proof was not achieved, even when modified by the MoD from the position noted by their Lordships.
Also, the legal experience of the members of the committee should be noted. Lord Jauncey was a Law Lord; Lord Brennan is a QC; ditto Lord Hooson (although I udnerstand that he has not practised law fully for some time) and Lord Bowness is/was a member of the legal profession. I'd respectfully submit that they can, between them, ascertain the burden of proof.
So I'm afraid that I must disagree - although the burden of proof required may have been impossibly high, this was not the fault of their Lordships - all they did, I'd suggest, is to examine the evidence and apply it to the burden of proof. They found that the evidence did not meet the standards (noting some of the problems along the way) and concluded that the verdict was not sustainable on legal grounds. Since I am not a lawyer, then I shall defer to their hihgly qualified viewpoint. Regards, Archie
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have to agree with archimedes on this one.
mr purdey, welcome to the thread.
you have adequately detailed your flying experience, but could you provide details of experience / qualifications which enables you to authoratively state that the Law Lords present in the Committee did not adequately interpret and therefore understand the law?
some may agree with 1.3VStall in that those comments were exceptionally arrogant considering the wealth of experience present in that fair and impartial committee. if you are actually Lord Justice Woolf or Lord Justice Gibson / Potter et al using a pseudonym then i apologise unreservedly and would suggest that you send their Lordships a copy of your reasoning. if, however, you are not, then i would suggest deference to what is incontravertible experience.
regards
mr purdey, welcome to the thread.
you have adequately detailed your flying experience, but could you provide details of experience / qualifications which enables you to authoratively state that the Law Lords present in the Committee did not adequately interpret and therefore understand the law?
some may agree with 1.3VStall in that those comments were exceptionally arrogant considering the wealth of experience present in that fair and impartial committee. if you are actually Lord Justice Woolf or Lord Justice Gibson / Potter et al using a pseudonym then i apologise unreservedly and would suggest that you send their Lordships a copy of your reasoning. if, however, you are not, then i would suggest deference to what is incontravertible experience.
regards
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Mr Purdey,
In your last post, you make the assertion:
"The a/c was under control at waypoint change, and it was under control a few seconds before impact (the nose was sharply raised 30 degs or so just before the crash)."
The fact that the aircraft pitched up does not prove that it was under control. There are many pieces of evidence to point spontaneous losses of control on the type, including those experienced by Sqn Ldr Burke and the US Army. The AAIB could not dismiss the possibility that such loss of control had occurred, yet you seem positive that there was no loss of control. Why?
You also say:
"The visibility on the hills was strictly IMC (20 meters the lighthouse keeper tells us). "
There is sufficient evidence that these conditions were very localised to the Mull itself. When Mr Holbrook saw the aircraft (2 miles from the Mull) it was well clear of cloud at 2-400ft.
As the Chinook approached the Mull it would have been obvious to them that it would be impossible to continue on their intended track. The most obvious, safe and legal course of action would have been to turn left and proceed up the west coast of the Mull. In fact the aircraft turned right - can you explain this?
While we all accept that your theory has some validity, there are insufficient facts to prove it. There are sufficient other credible theories (based on evidence of other incidents) that have equal validity to make a finding of negligence unsustainable. If you are aware of the incidents experienced by Sqn Ldr Burke, the US Army and other, can you explain how you are so sure that a similar incident did not occur on the Mull of Kintyre that evening?
Do you agree that no evidence of something means only that there is no evidence of it - it does not prove that it did not happen?
As always I look forward to reading your response
In your last post, you make the assertion:
"The a/c was under control at waypoint change, and it was under control a few seconds before impact (the nose was sharply raised 30 degs or so just before the crash)."
The fact that the aircraft pitched up does not prove that it was under control. There are many pieces of evidence to point spontaneous losses of control on the type, including those experienced by Sqn Ldr Burke and the US Army. The AAIB could not dismiss the possibility that such loss of control had occurred, yet you seem positive that there was no loss of control. Why?
You also say:
"The visibility on the hills was strictly IMC (20 meters the lighthouse keeper tells us). "
There is sufficient evidence that these conditions were very localised to the Mull itself. When Mr Holbrook saw the aircraft (2 miles from the Mull) it was well clear of cloud at 2-400ft.
As the Chinook approached the Mull it would have been obvious to them that it would be impossible to continue on their intended track. The most obvious, safe and legal course of action would have been to turn left and proceed up the west coast of the Mull. In fact the aircraft turned right - can you explain this?
While we all accept that your theory has some validity, there are insufficient facts to prove it. There are sufficient other credible theories (based on evidence of other incidents) that have equal validity to make a finding of negligence unsustainable. If you are aware of the incidents experienced by Sqn Ldr Burke, the US Army and other, can you explain how you are so sure that a similar incident did not occur on the Mull of Kintyre that evening?
Do you agree that no evidence of something means only that there is no evidence of it - it does not prove that it did not happen?
As always I look forward to reading your response
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Real danger of repeating myself here, but briefly - 1.3VStall, insults are no argument, and in any case we are not talking about only three people who share the same opinion but also three CASs and ten ministers across two diferent administrations. Archie - many thanks for the quotes and courteous contribution. Will you please say which other plausible explanations have NOT been excluded? Uncle Peter - Please say whether you can agree with the Law Lords' definition of negligence (see my earlier posts). Chocks Wahay - Burke and witness A dealt with possible technical failures, but the essential point is that the aircraft must have been under control at waypoint change (no-one has ever disagreed with that), and because of the conditions ahead the crew should by then have been at or climbing to their Safety Altitude. It was their failure to do so that led to the findings of gross disobedience. Possible technical failure later - of which there is absolutely no evidence - is irrelevant. Hope this helps clear at least some of the misunderstandings. Regards. John Purdey.
Sorry, for disobedience of course I should have said negligence - trying to do three things at once here! John.
Sorry, for disobedience of course I should have said negligence - trying to do three things at once here! John.
John,
I am beginning to get a feeling of deja vu here (many regulars will no doubt remember a similar behaviour from K52). You're tending to argue very well, I would say, but you are ignoring the answers to your questions which do not fit your argument.
For example, you keep referring to your opinion that they should have climbed to MSA when it has been shown many times that this was not a legal option under the prevailing conditions.
Turn around, yes. Climb, no.
Could you deal with this issue please.
I am beginning to get a feeling of deja vu here (many regulars will no doubt remember a similar behaviour from K52). You're tending to argue very well, I would say, but you are ignoring the answers to your questions which do not fit your argument.
For example, you keep referring to your opinion that they should have climbed to MSA when it has been shown many times that this was not a legal option under the prevailing conditions.
Turn around, yes. Climb, no.
Could you deal with this issue please.
Just a numbered other
JP
I display no 'emotion' at all. my bold type is used merely to reinforce my points, all of which have been put by myself and others before. It is cold logic.
The climb to safety altitude was a non starter due to the temperature.
The definition of negligence is accepted, as is the requirement to prove such negligence beyond any doubt whatsoever.
Support helicopters almost invariably fly at very low level, and the most likely way to have planned this sortie is to have become visual with the Mull, change waypoint, and then follow the west coast northwards.
Now, no-one will ever know why this didn't happen. The lack of positive evidence of what did happen, does not allow one to 'theorise', 'assume' or 'believe' that the pilots simply forgot all their training and flew into the high ground. You must prove it positively 'beyond any doubt whatsoever'.
I display no 'emotion' at all. my bold type is used merely to reinforce my points, all of which have been put by myself and others before. It is cold logic.
The climb to safety altitude was a non starter due to the temperature.
The definition of negligence is accepted, as is the requirement to prove such negligence beyond any doubt whatsoever.
Support helicopters almost invariably fly at very low level, and the most likely way to have planned this sortie is to have become visual with the Mull, change waypoint, and then follow the west coast northwards.
Now, no-one will ever know why this didn't happen. The lack of positive evidence of what did happen, does not allow one to 'theorise', 'assume' or 'believe' that the pilots simply forgot all their training and flew into the high ground. You must prove it positively 'beyond any doubt whatsoever'.
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Pulse 1, you are quite right; I meant to say 'climbed to Safety Altitude or turned away'. Ark Royal, same reply, and apologies; but surely you accept that the crew still had control of the aircraft at waypoint change, and there is no alternative but to accept the fact that they flew straight on? Why they flew on I have tried to explain with reference to the difference in terrain height between where they were and where they thought they were.
Meanwhile, I shall unfortunately now be out of touch for quite a while, and I shall have to break off these exchanges. They have been very interesting, and I thank each of you for them. Please remember what I said at the start: it is not up to me to try to change anyone's mind on this, I am merely giving you my thoughts - which I hope you might have found interesting too. With all good wishes, John Purdey
Meanwhile, I shall unfortunately now be out of touch for quite a while, and I shall have to break off these exchanges. They have been very interesting, and I thank each of you for them. Please remember what I said at the start: it is not up to me to try to change anyone's mind on this, I am merely giving you my thoughts - which I hope you might have found interesting too. With all good wishes, John Purdey
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Just one point on the theory that the aircraft must have been under control at the Mull waypoint because the TANS was selected to the next leg. This might not have been manually selected at all.
The TANS has an auto-waypoint change facility to allow a "smart" turn onto the next track without actually over-flying a waypoint. As far as I remember, this is the default setting for the system, in common with many other similar Nav systems.
As far as I remember, there is no evidence to suggest that the default settings were changed to require a manual key push.
This point has apparently been "overlooked" by those using that hypothesis.
The TANS has an auto-waypoint change facility to allow a "smart" turn onto the next track without actually over-flying a waypoint. As far as I remember, this is the default setting for the system, in common with many other similar Nav systems.
As far as I remember, there is no evidence to suggest that the default settings were changed to require a manual key push.
This point has apparently been "overlooked" by those using that hypothesis.
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ShyTorque - interesting point, I'm surprised it hasn't come up. How close to the waypoint do you have to be before it will select the next one? How do you switch between manual & auto - software selection or a physical switch?
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As it's now a few years since I left the service, I don't have access to technical manuals so I can't quote any figures, but perhaps someone else can help out.
However, attempting to put figures on the initiation point or radius of the turn isn't really my point. What I am pointing out is that the TANS system may have automatically changed itself to the next waypoint, rather than a manual selection being made. Relying on a suppositon that everything in the aircraft was normal because the next waypoint selection was made could quite possibly be false.
(I'm sure that if my memory is incorrect over the next few paragraphs, someone with current knowledge of the MK2 Chinook will correct me, please do so).
As I recall, the TANS can be used in two modes. In the first mode, "Route Steer" the computer takes into account the groundspeed of the aircraft and caculates the turn onto the next leg from that. The pilot's steer bar indication in this mode works as a course deviation bar so gives a "centred" indication when the aircraft is on the direct line drawn between the two relevant waypoints. In this mode the next leg is automatically selected when the aircraft approaches a waypoint.
The other mode is "Tactical Steer" mode. Here the steer bar centres when the aircraft is pointing at the next waypoint. This allows the aircraft to be off the direct line between the two waypoints but still fly to the next waypoint, rather like using a VOR or ADF needle to overfly a beacon. In this mode the next waypoint is not automatically selected by the computer and has to be selected manually.
During my time on the OCU, there was an ongoing argument about which was the better mode to use for SH at low level.
The Chinook fleet generally used the former method, i.e. Route Steer mode which gave automatic changeovers to the next leg. This was taught on the Chinook OCU at that time and quite possibly remains so to this day.
Conversely, the Puma fleet preferred the Tactical Steer mode with manual changeovers to the next leg as waypoints were reached.
In my opinion, because Rick was not previously Puma qualified it is highly likely that he would be using the normal Route Steer mode. Therefore the next waypoint (which of course, they never reached) was perhaps automatically selected by the computer and not by a crew member.
One final point to avoid confusion. The aircraft would still have to be flown manually, the autopilot was not coupled to the TANS.
However, attempting to put figures on the initiation point or radius of the turn isn't really my point. What I am pointing out is that the TANS system may have automatically changed itself to the next waypoint, rather than a manual selection being made. Relying on a suppositon that everything in the aircraft was normal because the next waypoint selection was made could quite possibly be false.
(I'm sure that if my memory is incorrect over the next few paragraphs, someone with current knowledge of the MK2 Chinook will correct me, please do so).
As I recall, the TANS can be used in two modes. In the first mode, "Route Steer" the computer takes into account the groundspeed of the aircraft and caculates the turn onto the next leg from that. The pilot's steer bar indication in this mode works as a course deviation bar so gives a "centred" indication when the aircraft is on the direct line drawn between the two relevant waypoints. In this mode the next leg is automatically selected when the aircraft approaches a waypoint.
The other mode is "Tactical Steer" mode. Here the steer bar centres when the aircraft is pointing at the next waypoint. This allows the aircraft to be off the direct line between the two waypoints but still fly to the next waypoint, rather like using a VOR or ADF needle to overfly a beacon. In this mode the next waypoint is not automatically selected by the computer and has to be selected manually.
During my time on the OCU, there was an ongoing argument about which was the better mode to use for SH at low level.
The Chinook fleet generally used the former method, i.e. Route Steer mode which gave automatic changeovers to the next leg. This was taught on the Chinook OCU at that time and quite possibly remains so to this day.
Conversely, the Puma fleet preferred the Tactical Steer mode with manual changeovers to the next leg as waypoints were reached.
In my opinion, because Rick was not previously Puma qualified it is highly likely that he would be using the normal Route Steer mode. Therefore the next waypoint (which of course, they never reached) was perhaps automatically selected by the computer and not by a crew member.
One final point to avoid confusion. The aircraft would still have to be flown manually, the autopilot was not coupled to the TANS.
Just a numbered other
I raised this point some time ago, and although I'll have to delve into my archives, I think there was some proof that they were in the 'Tactical' steering mode, and that the waypoint change was manual.
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At the time of TANS powerdown, the page displayed was the īTac steerīpage. ie, no auto change over.
No evidence exists as to the mode selected at waypoint change.
Did John Purdey say he was also K52?
Shame he has gone (as most seem to!) there are points for discussion in his "facts"!
Mmmm, where have I heard that word before?
No evidence exists as to the mode selected at waypoint change.
Did John Purdey say he was also K52?
Shame he has gone (as most seem to!) there are points for discussion in his "facts"!
Mmmm, where have I heard that word before?
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Thanks for pointing out about the Tac steer mode. Was this in the original BOI findings? It's a long time since I saw the report.
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Just found this site, registered and logged in; top quality site by the way. I'm a pongo but have a vested interest in this thread, won't go into the details. Suffice it to say, I'm appalled that the Air Marshalls can overturn a board of enquiry of subject matter experts and find that the pilots were negligent. For what it's worth, i do not believe they were negligent and my deepest sympathy goes out to the families of the guys. I really hope that justive prevails and all the fine campaigning from you guys pays off and they are exonerated. I read a criticism somewhere in the thread about 'the cream of the British Military intelligence' all in one aircraft together; having served in NI for several years in the G2 environment, sometimes there is no other way. PS I have written to my MP, James Gray, and am waiting a response.
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Hi everyone,
my sincere apologies for lack of posts of late. Personal circumstances overtook me for a while. I managed to be able to read the thread but not have the time to contribute.
Hopefully, I can resume all campaign duties again!
Welcome to ADUX. Please have a look at the campaign web site (if you haven't already) Campaign Web Site
Thanks to everyone for keeping the campaign going. Not long before someone will have to answer to the House!
Regards, as always
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
my sincere apologies for lack of posts of late. Personal circumstances overtook me for a while. I managed to be able to read the thread but not have the time to contribute.
Hopefully, I can resume all campaign duties again!
Welcome to ADUX. Please have a look at the campaign web site (if you haven't already) Campaign Web Site
Thanks to everyone for keeping the campaign going. Not long before someone will have to answer to the House!
Regards, as always
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
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Brian
Thanks for your welcome comments. I hadn't viewed the website but did have a look, but unfortunately i couldn't register my name on the petition; it wasn't playing, I will keep trying. Please keep up the good work, God willing, justice will prevail and we will see a resolution to this disraceful injustuce.
Regards
ADUX
Thanks for your welcome comments. I hadn't viewed the website but did have a look, but unfortunately i couldn't register my name on the petition; it wasn't playing, I will keep trying. Please keep up the good work, God willing, justice will prevail and we will see a resolution to this disraceful injustuce.
Regards
ADUX
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ADUX - The petition signing form seems to be working ok at the moment. If you have no joy you can email your name to [email protected] and it will be added.
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Bumped into Mark Oaten, MP for Winchester yesterday, and thanked him for signing the EDM.
He mentioned his meeting with Brian D, and said that he had been impressed by Brian's obvious grip on the issues involved here.
He mentioned his meeting with Brian D, and said that he had been impressed by Brian's obvious grip on the issues involved here.