Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
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Flipster
FISHING BOATS
Some years ago when I was there, I asked about the trawlers: a senior police officer who is also a local told me that the majority of them were Irish and (even then) it would have been difficult to identify who had been there and I add that the described conditions would have been so common that the fisherman would not have noticed anything odd about the weather so it would be highly unlikely that any of them would be able to contribute anything more than the yachtsman.
I would like to restate that, in those conditions which to me are so common there at that time of year, at that time of day, I do not believe they were in IMC until the last seconds when they would have entered the ground hugging mist or had pulled up enough (they had started to do so according to Boeing's analysis) when aware of the ground (the upslope mist is typically erratic and patchy with the odd "suckers' gap") to enter the orographic cloud - they would have been flying into a vertical wedge of grey - their whole problem was not being able to judge distance from that mist covered ground while from some other reference thinking they had further to go.
FISHING BOATS
Some years ago when I was there, I asked about the trawlers: a senior police officer who is also a local told me that the majority of them were Irish and (even then) it would have been difficult to identify who had been there and I add that the described conditions would have been so common that the fisherman would not have noticed anything odd about the weather so it would be highly unlikely that any of them would be able to contribute anything more than the yachtsman.
I would like to restate that, in those conditions which to me are so common there at that time of year, at that time of day, I do not believe they were in IMC until the last seconds when they would have entered the ground hugging mist or had pulled up enough (they had started to do so according to Boeing's analysis) when aware of the ground (the upslope mist is typically erratic and patchy with the odd "suckers' gap") to enter the orographic cloud - they would have been flying into a vertical wedge of grey - their whole problem was not being able to judge distance from that mist covered ground while from some other reference thinking they had further to go.
Last edited by walter kennedy; 17th Jun 2009 at 23:13. Reason: addition
BOAC #4528
I think this slight confusion over GPS and SuperTANS (RNS252) may be explained by the limitations in the CA Release (and hence Release to Service, as the latter simply subsumes the former);
Section O – Navigation Installations
2.2 TNL 8000 GPS – GPS has not yet been declared operational (at IOC) by the US Department of Defense and accuracy is therefore not guaranteed to any level.
2.3 (a) RNS252 GPS (Ext) Position – In addition to paragraph 2.2 above, the GPS is highly susceptible to jamming of which the only crew indication is loss of GPS. ….. The “Err” figure displayed, which has conventionally been taken as a measure of GPS performance, is meaningless and so no indication of the accuracy of the GPS is available to the user.
Now, in the context of various statements that the aircraft was “serviceable”, I ask – How do you know, and how were the pilots to know? How was it demonstrated? And, is there any wonder why the pilots didn’t trust the system?
I also ask a very simple question, which the regulations mandate as part of the process of considering the aircraft for (a) CA Release and (b) Release to Service – Given the above, and considering the fact that the FADEC software was still in the development phase at the time of the crash (as it hadn’t been validated or verified to the laid down standards), do you think this was a mature design and fit for purpose?
It matters not a jot that with hindsight the “system” turned out to be reasonably accurate – evidence shows that this was something of a hit and miss affair with other aircraft experiencing errors of up to 2nm over a similar route. What is vitally important here is the lack of confidence the crew had in the system - the human factors element of airworthiness. This has simply not been addressed by the BoI or ROs. This lack of confidence led one pilot to ask for a Mk1. Rather conveniently, this line if investigation was not pursued.
The above are direct quotes from the Master Airworthiness Reference. No wonder the ROs didn’t want the BoI to go anywhere near Airworthiness. Gross Negligence? I know who committed it and it wasn’t the pilots.
I think this slight confusion over GPS and SuperTANS (RNS252) may be explained by the limitations in the CA Release (and hence Release to Service, as the latter simply subsumes the former);
Section O – Navigation Installations
2.2 TNL 8000 GPS – GPS has not yet been declared operational (at IOC) by the US Department of Defense and accuracy is therefore not guaranteed to any level.
2.3 (a) RNS252 GPS (Ext) Position – In addition to paragraph 2.2 above, the GPS is highly susceptible to jamming of which the only crew indication is loss of GPS. ….. The “Err” figure displayed, which has conventionally been taken as a measure of GPS performance, is meaningless and so no indication of the accuracy of the GPS is available to the user.
Now, in the context of various statements that the aircraft was “serviceable”, I ask – How do you know, and how were the pilots to know? How was it demonstrated? And, is there any wonder why the pilots didn’t trust the system?
I also ask a very simple question, which the regulations mandate as part of the process of considering the aircraft for (a) CA Release and (b) Release to Service – Given the above, and considering the fact that the FADEC software was still in the development phase at the time of the crash (as it hadn’t been validated or verified to the laid down standards), do you think this was a mature design and fit for purpose?
It matters not a jot that with hindsight the “system” turned out to be reasonably accurate – evidence shows that this was something of a hit and miss affair with other aircraft experiencing errors of up to 2nm over a similar route. What is vitally important here is the lack of confidence the crew had in the system - the human factors element of airworthiness. This has simply not been addressed by the BoI or ROs. This lack of confidence led one pilot to ask for a Mk1. Rather conveniently, this line if investigation was not pursued.
The above are direct quotes from the Master Airworthiness Reference. No wonder the ROs didn’t want the BoI to go anywhere near Airworthiness. Gross Negligence? I know who committed it and it wasn’t the pilots.
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Walter,
Thank you for your prompt response.
I think we agree that WPt D is a precise location at Inverness. Whether it was obtained from an LZ chart, OS map, or consultation with ATC Inverness we will probably never know.
To try and explain what might have happened I have again tried to put myself in the position of the crew on that day.
Having decided on a precise LZ / Tgt, I would now shop around for an IP / TAP.
The corner of Fort George looks good.
I would draw a line from my IP to my target on the OS and measure the bearing and distance as accurately as possible. I would enter C as a bearing and distance from D. So would never have measured the Lat and Long. A precise IP to Target run defined none the less.
I would approach my IP with Track B to C selected, Bearing and Distance or A/A as required by the Captain. Once the TAP had been positively identified I would switch to Track C to D A/A to define precise run in to the LZ.
This technique was used at Lyneham, Farnboro and Boscombe by most Pilots and Navs. If it is not appropriate to Chinook operations, I am sure someone will tell me.
I accept the fact that the LZ I mentioned was unsuitable for Chinooks and there may well be others around. But if Google earth is correct Wpt A is still a pile of rocks. I would still expect to see a TAP to LZ run planned and as the lighthouse turning point Wpt A, is within acceptable plotting limits.
We are now probably boring everyone else to death. We are both working on unprovable theories. I you wish to continue this line please PM me.
Thank you for your prompt response.
I think we agree that WPt D is a precise location at Inverness. Whether it was obtained from an LZ chart, OS map, or consultation with ATC Inverness we will probably never know.
To try and explain what might have happened I have again tried to put myself in the position of the crew on that day.
Having decided on a precise LZ / Tgt, I would now shop around for an IP / TAP.
The corner of Fort George looks good.
I would draw a line from my IP to my target on the OS and measure the bearing and distance as accurately as possible. I would enter C as a bearing and distance from D. So would never have measured the Lat and Long. A precise IP to Target run defined none the less.
I would approach my IP with Track B to C selected, Bearing and Distance or A/A as required by the Captain. Once the TAP had been positively identified I would switch to Track C to D A/A to define precise run in to the LZ.
This technique was used at Lyneham, Farnboro and Boscombe by most Pilots and Navs. If it is not appropriate to Chinook operations, I am sure someone will tell me.
I accept the fact that the LZ I mentioned was unsuitable for Chinooks and there may well be others around. But if Google earth is correct Wpt A is still a pile of rocks. I would still expect to see a TAP to LZ run planned and as the lighthouse turning point Wpt A, is within acceptable plotting limits.
We are now probably boring everyone else to death. We are both working on unprovable theories. I you wish to continue this line please PM me.
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Thank you WK for the link to the charts., and tucumseh for the post and PMs.
I think, in summary, I am now even more convinced that there is sufficient reasonable doubt about what happened, based on the total illogicality of changing Waypoints NOT knowing where you were (or, for WK, not being at your 'destination'). Waypoints are sequenced when they are no longer required.
No-one has put forward a reasoned explanation for continuing on course, and since therefore there is 'sufficient doubt' as to why this happened, I will continue to support the campaign to the best of my ability.
As stated many times, I don't think many of us rule OUT the possibility of careless flying - due to the lack of available evidence - but I can see absolutely NO proof that it took place. Also, in my opinion, based on many years of low level flying, that the weather conditions were adequate for the task/route to be attempted and that the crew were competent and able to complete the task.
I understand the planner to have been an RN pilot. Was he ever interviewed by the board?
So, no more LDZ range 'deception' discussion for me, no more 'it was dangerous to be flying that day', no more worrying about 'prac nav'. As others have said, 'negligence' took place at other levels, and that is pretty clear. On with the effort! Bring on Cameron?
I think, in summary, I am now even more convinced that there is sufficient reasonable doubt about what happened, based on the total illogicality of changing Waypoints NOT knowing where you were (or, for WK, not being at your 'destination'). Waypoints are sequenced when they are no longer required.
No-one has put forward a reasoned explanation for continuing on course, and since therefore there is 'sufficient doubt' as to why this happened, I will continue to support the campaign to the best of my ability.
As stated many times, I don't think many of us rule OUT the possibility of careless flying - due to the lack of available evidence - but I can see absolutely NO proof that it took place. Also, in my opinion, based on many years of low level flying, that the weather conditions were adequate for the task/route to be attempted and that the crew were competent and able to complete the task.
I understand the planner to have been an RN pilot. Was he ever interviewed by the board?
So, no more LDZ range 'deception' discussion for me, no more 'it was dangerous to be flying that day', no more worrying about 'prac nav'. As others have said, 'negligence' took place at other levels, and that is pretty clear. On with the effort! Bring on Cameron?
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Chinook
BOAC. As to your question "Did you abort many of those 'sorties' of yours when you saw a cloud..........................?
If it was ahead of me, and I had the merest suspicion that it contained a hard centre, like for example the Mull of Kyntire, I most certainly would have aborted the low level aspect!
JP
If it was ahead of me, and I had the merest suspicion that it contained a hard centre, like for example the Mull of Kyntire, I most certainly would have aborted the low level aspect!
JP
Last edited by John Purdey; 18th Jun 2009 at 09:02. Reason: spelling
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... and then what, climb to an altitude (let's call it an "immediate MSA") and continue on task well below your en-route MSA because the aircraft wasn't cleared for icing? One would hope not. The only option after an abort would have been to 180 and go home. I'm not saying this should have overridden their decision making but it certainly would have been a consideration. Imagine a possible conversation.
They hit a hill, as have many pilots. I'll ask it again - can anyone explain why this particular accident warranted a Gross Negligence when many others with more compelling evidence didn't? I have yet to hear an explanation on that one.
As an aside, I shared a CH47 with Rick some years earlier as we crawled up the side of an arbitrary hill in the Falklands. We had dropped a signals team on top to do some maintenance on the rebro and whilst we were away on other tasks the cloud lowered covering the hill. Sometime later we returned and the sqn boss decided to hover taxy up the side of the hill into the cloud in order to pick up the rebro team. In no uncertain terms, Rick told the Boss that he was barking mad and that he had every intention of making his own way on to the Tristar home. He convinced the Boss that he should either land on waiting for the signallers to walk down the mountain or just leave them behind with their 2 days of rations. That is the way SH worked.
They hit a hill, as have many pilots. I'll ask it again - can anyone explain why this particular accident warranted a Gross Negligence when many others with more compelling evidence didn't? I have yet to hear an explanation on that one.
As an aside, I shared a CH47 with Rick some years earlier as we crawled up the side of an arbitrary hill in the Falklands. We had dropped a signals team on top to do some maintenance on the rebro and whilst we were away on other tasks the cloud lowered covering the hill. Sometime later we returned and the sqn boss decided to hover taxy up the side of the hill into the cloud in order to pick up the rebro team. In no uncertain terms, Rick told the Boss that he was barking mad and that he had every intention of making his own way on to the Tristar home. He convinced the Boss that he should either land on waiting for the signallers to walk down the mountain or just leave them behind with their 2 days of rations. That is the way SH worked.
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BOAC
Your Post 4881
"I understand the planner to have been an RN Pilot. Was he ever interviewed by the Board?"
That clearly indicates to me, and I expect to others, that you have not actually read the BOI, nor these threads which stretch back some eight years.
Do you not think it would be sensible to rectify that omission before leaping in and pontificating on possible factors bearing on the tragedy? With nearly a decade of discussion to digest you may just find the answers you seek.
Enter the Archives and select "Chinook - Hit Back Here".
Your Post 4881
"I understand the planner to have been an RN Pilot. Was he ever interviewed by the Board?"
That clearly indicates to me, and I expect to others, that you have not actually read the BOI, nor these threads which stretch back some eight years.
Do you not think it would be sensible to rectify that omission before leaping in and pontificating on possible factors bearing on the tragedy? With nearly a decade of discussion to digest you may just find the answers you seek.
Enter the Archives and select "Chinook - Hit Back Here".
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Caz,
Yet again another ignorant question.
I have often planned for other people, and they have planned for me. It is common practice on Squadrons.
I have looked at the plan and don't see a great deal wrong with it. Although I do not have access the then LFC's and handbooks.
Why was it so wrong for the crew to accept the planning of an RN Officer?
Perhaps at the next BOI we can invite him yo attend with S/L Burke
Yet again another ignorant question.
I have often planned for other people, and they have planned for me. It is common practice on Squadrons.
I have looked at the plan and don't see a great deal wrong with it. Although I do not have access the then LFC's and handbooks.
Why was it so wrong for the crew to accept the planning of an RN Officer?
Perhaps at the next BOI we can invite him yo attend with S/L Burke
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Originally Posted by JP
If it was ahead of me, and I had the merest suspicion that it contained a hard centre, like for example the Mull of Kyntire, I most certainly would have aborted the low level aspect!
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BOAC
Quite well I should say! He is still here annoying you!
How did your "very many sorties in piston, medium multi-jet and in LL fast jet a/c near and over those sinister hills" go?
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dalek
Nothing was wrong with the crew accepting the planning of an RN Officer ---
AS LONG AS THEY ASCERTAINED EXACTLY WHAT WAS PLANNED.
Did the crew, as well as the investigating Board, ASSUME that the turning point was the Lighthouse; whereas the co-ordinates entered in the SuperTans were for the Helicopter Landing Site? If, as suggested, the planning was done by Lt K; it would have been perfectly reasonable for that Officer to choose the HLS as a planned turning point as it was used by Detatchment Crews and it would have been an opportunity to view the site before being tasked into that site.
The old Flight Safety adage:
DON'T ASSUME -CHECK
Nothing was wrong with the crew accepting the planning of an RN Officer ---
AS LONG AS THEY ASCERTAINED EXACTLY WHAT WAS PLANNED.
Did the crew, as well as the investigating Board, ASSUME that the turning point was the Lighthouse; whereas the co-ordinates entered in the SuperTans were for the Helicopter Landing Site? If, as suggested, the planning was done by Lt K; it would have been perfectly reasonable for that Officer to choose the HLS as a planned turning point as it was used by Detatchment Crews and it would have been an opportunity to view the site before being tasked into that site.
The old Flight Safety adage:
DON'T ASSUME -CHECK
Avoid imitations
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Cazatou, by asking that last question, albeit a loaded one, you highlight more doubts about what happened on and before the flight.
No-one knows the answer to many questions and certainly in no accident where there are no survivors, no-one can ever know what the crew were thinking. We don't even know what was said, due to the lack of a CVR.
It seems you have moved away from your previous alleged "no breakfast" issue, only to try and find yet another knife.
--------------------------------------------------
It appears that certain posters have undeclared but compelling personal reasons to try to uphold the unfair verdict, especially in view of the amount of time spent here doing so.
Cause unknown is the only fair verdict.
No-one knows the answer to many questions and certainly in no accident where there are no survivors, no-one can ever know what the crew were thinking. We don't even know what was said, due to the lack of a CVR.
It seems you have moved away from your previous alleged "no breakfast" issue, only to try and find yet another knife.
--------------------------------------------------
It appears that certain posters have undeclared but compelling personal reasons to try to uphold the unfair verdict, especially in view of the amount of time spent here doing so.
Cause unknown is the only fair verdict.
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Originally Posted by bast0n
Quite well I should say! He is still here annoying you
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Dalek
<<I think we agree that WPt D is a precise location at Inverness. >>
If you look at Inverness airport on an OS map, the runways all cross in the middle of the aerodrome; a quick note of its coords would be on grid line 52 and half way between 77 & 78, thus NH775 520 which translates to N57:32' 25” W 4:02' 55” in lat&long which is waypoint D.
If you want a quick reference point, it is obvious but why would you want to land a Chinook just there? So not a precise location, I'm afraid.
<<Wpt A is still a pile of rocks>> You say this despite the charts, photos, and descriptions of the site that I have posted? You genuinely cannot see the significance? Perhaps those serving or who have served are reluctant to comment but the locals know it was used as an LZ.
<<I think we agree that WPt D is a precise location at Inverness. >>
If you look at Inverness airport on an OS map, the runways all cross in the middle of the aerodrome; a quick note of its coords would be on grid line 52 and half way between 77 & 78, thus NH775 520 which translates to N57:32' 25” W 4:02' 55” in lat&long which is waypoint D.
If you want a quick reference point, it is obvious but why would you want to land a Chinook just there? So not a precise location, I'm afraid.
<<Wpt A is still a pile of rocks>> You say this despite the charts, photos, and descriptions of the site that I have posted? You genuinely cannot see the significance? Perhaps those serving or who have served are reluctant to comment but the locals know it was used as an LZ.
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Cazatou re your post #4889
You have hit the nail on the head – a most basic aspect of the planning that should have been established by the board as a starting point.
I would like to add to <<.... it would have been perfectly reasonable for that Officer to choose the HLS as a planned turning point as it was used by Detatchment Crews and it would have been an opportunity to view the site before being tasked into that site. >> that the flight was described as a training flight in one of the inquiries (it is the case that training is spliced in to any such flight whenever possible/acceptable to reduce the a/c hours of dedicated training flights, is it not?). And it was an ideal site to trial the CPLS, in my view.
You have hit the nail on the head – a most basic aspect of the planning that should have been established by the board as a starting point.
I would like to add to <<.... it would have been perfectly reasonable for that Officer to choose the HLS as a planned turning point as it was used by Detatchment Crews and it would have been an opportunity to view the site before being tasked into that site. >> that the flight was described as a training flight in one of the inquiries (it is the case that training is spliced in to any such flight whenever possible/acceptable to reduce the a/c hours of dedicated training flights, is it not?). And it was an ideal site to trial the CPLS, in my view.
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BOAC
Do try to remain objective. What a really silly thing to write. You are not Winston. If you see a cloud covered hill sensible
do not fly on regardless.
- I'd amend that to 'amazing' me. IF you 'abort' every time you see a cloud covered hill.............................................. .........Thank the Lord our 'chaps' were made of better stuff
'chaps'
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Do try to remain objective. What a really silly thing to write. You are not Winston. If you see a cloud covered hill sensible
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Haven't said this for some time but as they say "here goes - again."
Doubt, any doubt, is a doubt if it cannot be proved to be otherwise.
THAT - is exactly what happened in this case. Day and Rotten were guilty of making the issue something that was cut and dried when it wasn't. In my book they were both negligent and showed dereliction of duty in not following the requirement, at that time in Queen's regs, that there must be "no doubt whatsoever" that the pilots were negligent.
They did not do that! The HoL committee hearing, which I attended, agreed with that and thus the pilots SHOULD have been exonerated forthwith.
A gross mis-carriage of justice was SEEN to be done following that hearing and it was, therefore, the duty of the MoD to reverse the decision of the AM's immediately.
So why are we still fighting?
BEagle has a letter from David Cameron, which states that if and when they return to power he, DC, WILL reverse it. Can't wait.
Doubt, any doubt, is a doubt if it cannot be proved to be otherwise.
THAT - is exactly what happened in this case. Day and Rotten were guilty of making the issue something that was cut and dried when it wasn't. In my book they were both negligent and showed dereliction of duty in not following the requirement, at that time in Queen's regs, that there must be "no doubt whatsoever" that the pilots were negligent.
They did not do that! The HoL committee hearing, which I attended, agreed with that and thus the pilots SHOULD have been exonerated forthwith.
A gross mis-carriage of justice was SEEN to be done following that hearing and it was, therefore, the duty of the MoD to reverse the decision of the AM's immediately.
So why are we still fighting?
BEagle has a letter from David Cameron, which states that if and when they return to power he, DC, WILL reverse it. Can't wait.