Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)

[BOAC]

Originally Posted by PPP

Day and Rotten were guilty of making the issue something that was cut and dried when it wasn't

- you are, as usual quite correct PPP, and I am now minded to wait as you say since it is again going nowhere. For the charge of G N to stick, the 2 of them would need to 'establish' that the crew were IMC at waypoint change. Although unprovable, and I mantain unlikely in view of the selected Waypoint change, this has now become 'folklore' as described in the HoL enquiry. I cannot believe the 2 of them (D and W) would not have understood how the route would normally have been flown in those typical weather conditions, and cannot believe they are of the JP school of 'there's a cloud on that hill, I'd better abort'.

There are, thus, in my mind and as many have said, other forces at work. The flight of the aircraft at high speed towards the high ground and not around the coast remains unexplained. Sufficient doubt. My thanks to all who responded helpfully.

[tucumseh]

dalek

Nothing was wrong with the crew accepting the planning of an RN Officer ---

AS LONG AS THEY ASCERTAINED EXACTLY WHAT WAS PLANNED.

Did the crew, as well as the investigating Board, ASSUME that the turning point was the Lighthouse; whereas the co-ordinates entered in the SuperTans were for the Helicopter Landing Site? If, as suggested, the planning was done by Lt K; it would have been perfectly reasonable for that Officer to choose the HLS as a planned turning point as it was used by Detatchment Crews and it would have been an opportunity to view the site before being tasked into that site.

The old Flight Safety adage:

DON'T ASSUME –CHECK

Caz

The inference in this, and many other posts, is that an officer other than the deceased planned the flight alone, and that the deceased did not check.

From the BoI;

(Lt K) - "Flt Lt xxxxx and myself then put basic details on a Low Flying Chart of route, distance and endurance. At this stage we were joined by Flt Lt Tapper". ..."I then left him with the map and details".


That is, the flight planning was a joint effort, accepted by the BoI when they asked Q2 of the witness – “During your flight planning with Flt Lt Tapper did you discuss his bad weather options and the possibility of transitting under IFR?”


In reply – “Yes we did. …… We all came to the conclusion that it would be unwise to attempt an IFR transit and that a VFR flight would be the only option, with the fuel available and the lack of diversionary options”.


Q3. – “Would Flt Lt Tapper have been able to exceed Chinook Mk2 icing limitations if operationally required?”

A – "No. He sought advice from 7 Sqn on breaking CA Release for operational and emergency reasons. …….He had been told that under no circumstances could the CA Release be broken and if the aircraft was involved in an accident……the captain would be held personally liable……”


I note they continually refer to “CA Release”, not the Release to Service, which is the Master Airworthiness Reference. It makes one wonder if they’d read the latter and appreciated the very serious questions it raised about MoD’s failure to implement the airworthiness regulations. The cynic in me also notes the MoD’s subsequent lies about the Release to Service, conveniently omitting to mention the raft of Service Deviations issued AFTER the current (March 1994) amendment. That is, there was a disconnect between the CAR and RTS.

I also note that the questions & answers to the following witness (#20) were based on the premise that IFR was permitted on this flight, completely ignoring witness 19 (Lt K). These, and other contradictions, are not resolved, allowing the ROs to cherry pick to suit their agenda. Especially his A6, which completely contradicts the Nav Limitations (see previous posts).

[cazatou]

tucumseh

You make my point; the basic planning had been done by someone else. A full check of what had been done would have revealed exactly where the planned turning point was, and its proximity to the high ground.

[John Purdey]

Chinook

bastOn. You beat me to it!
PPRune Pop Very interesting about the letter to BEagle from D Cameron. May we please see the full text of what he said? - BEagle?
Regards. JP

[BOAC]

Oh dear! Careful now JP! You'll have cazatou accusing you of not doing enough research. May I refer you to post #3792?

[tucumseh]

tucumseh

You make my point; the basic planning had been done by someone else. A full check of what had been done would have revealed exactly where the planned turning point was, and its proximity to the high ground.

Sorry Caz, but I, and perhaps many other readers, think you have been inferring neither of the deceased were present at the planning; that Lt K did it by himself.

The BoI clearly accepted it was a joint effort. At worst, Lt Tapper joined them just after they started otherwise, surely, the BoI would not have phrased their next question the way they did. Based on the equally clear acceptance of his utter professionalism and competence, and lacking any evidence to the contrary, I think it must be accepted that he spent a short time “catching up” on what little he missed (if indeed he missed anything).

If there is a lack of precision, depth and breadth to the BoI’s questions, and a failure to reconcile contradictory statements and evidence (and there is, in both cases), then that merely adds to the doubt as to what happened.


All designed, I’m afraid, to divert attention away from what frightens MoD most. The truth. The aircraft shouldn’t have been in service, and that simple fact sucks in 2 Stars and above; where they don’t let investigations go. Even if one really stretched their interpretation of the regs and accepted it could, just, be in-service, you quickly get to the question – Why allocate a Mk2 to this task when safety critical components were in development, and the crews were still in what the regs call “familiarisation and training”?. That is, the Risk Register MUST have been lop-sided with all the red flags hanging from it.

[John Purdey]

Chinook

BOAC. Having read Caz's posts over these many months, I think you will find that both he and I (and, by the way, I have no idea who he is), are not too bad at research. As to your own researches, you should read Cameron's letter more carefully. What he said, we are told, in the letter was:
"As I mentioned in my previous letter to you, I do believe that the reputations of the two pilots deserve to be reinstated, as the Lords Select Committee recommended, and in the absence of any overwhelming argument presented to me as Prime Minister that is what I would do".

Yours sincerely,
David Cameron

Time has moved on, and it would be surprising if, when reminded of this half-promise, DC did not refer to the year-long re-examination of the case that was, as a result of the Mull Group dossier, conducted by MOD. He might well then say that this was indeed 'an overwhelming argument' that supported the eventual findings. And since that study was carried out under a Labour administration, it might be difficult for the (likely) opposion to dispute it.
With all good wishes, JP

[BOAC]

JP -

As to your own researches, you should read Cameron's letter more carefully.

- do not confuse my 'researches' with my 'helping the needy'. You asked for sight of the "full text of" the letter, not an analysis of it, nor did I ask for yet another obfuscation. I think I'd better pull up here - things are getting a bit cloudy.

PS Ever do Staff College?

[PPRuNe Pop]

JP, if you search you will find it on this forum. A few well chosen words like David Cameron will do it!

However, BOAC has saved you the trouble.

PPP

[John Purdey]

Chinook

BOAC. Your last post not understood, and just by the way i was once a DS at Staff College, that is to say when I was not clocking up 4000 plus hours 1st pilot - about two thirds at LL. Anything else? Regards JP

[Seldomfitforpurpose]

BOAC,

If you go back a while in here you will find that JP has himself done the "inadvertant IMC" thing, on more than one occasion I seem to recall him admitting to.When I asked him if he felt himself to be grossly negligent when he did it he simply declined to answer.

He also admits that no one alive actually knows what was seen from the flight deck windows at any time prior to impact, but he does go on to offer two distinct alternatives. If you ask him which it actually is he avoids answering as to do so throws some doubt, of which according to him there is none.

He also has a canny knack of avoiding any direct questions, witness any mention of the aircraft possibly being unservicable prior to impact being met with derision. There is not a shred of conclusive evidence to say the aircraft was serviceable or not but for the verdict to stick it HAS to have been serviceable.

The reason I am on Caz's ignore list and I suspect shortly to be on JP's is that rather that get tied up in the minutiae of the debate I poke the simplest of holes in their version of events, read their posts and offer your alternative and because their is no "smoking gun" they are both totally stumped.

[PPRuNe Pop]

JP, sounds slightly snide!

Did you know that BOAC did two tours with the Reds? Many hours on.................best leave it. He get so embarrassed and IF there is a smoking gun it'll be after he fires it at moi.

[pulse1]

Sorry Caz, but I, and perhaps many other readers, think you have been inferring neither of the deceased were present at the planning; that Lt K did it by himself.

Well here is one reader who agrees with that. I would go further and say that caz's response means that he and his arguments are thoroughly discredited.

[walter kennedy]

Cows
<<Walt, that grid (N57:32' 25” W 4:02' 55” - Waypoint D) makes imminent sense to me - it is, as close as makes no difference, the threshold of RW30.>>
Only 100 mts short BUT 230 mts off track - compared with the quick look grid for the centre of the aerodrome (as in the waypoint at Fort George).
If you are agreeing with Dalek that waypoint D was "precise", that they had chosen those coords such that the 25sec and 55 sec were meaningful, then why wouldn't they have lined up more exactly with that runway?
I have to disagree - I think common sense has it that the waypoints at Fort George and Inverness aerodrome together point to the use of convenient grid lines for approximate positions.
If you can say that waypoint D could have been the threshold for runway 30 at Inverness (100m short and 230m off track) then how about waypoint A being a virtual inner marker for the LZ on the Mull, actually right on the 035 track that is the best line on that site and just 60m short (rounded to easy lat & long for memorising?)?

[bast0n]

SFFP

He also admits that no one alive actually knows what was seen from the flight deck windows at any time prior to impact, but he does go on to offer two distinct alternatives. If you ask him which it actually is he avoids answering as to do so throws some doubt, of which according to him there is none.

Yup - once again, scenery or cloud. Scenery, avoid it - cloud, do something. Whichever it was, and yes, we do not know, flying into a cloud filled with rock was probably not the best course of action available on the day. I will not bore you with the sensible alternatives again as you do not seem to assimilate them. Perhaps the view from down the back is not as clear as from those of us who sat up the front.

[Cows getting bigger]

Walt, I apologise, my map reading was awry, as was yours. If you are talking about the intersection of all three runways, that is at N57 32' 32" W004 2' 54", something rather different to your quoted N57:32' 25” W 4:02' 55”. Interestingly, your presumed waypoint is also 230m from the intersection. So, please remind me, what was programmed into the TANS?

[TheAerosCo]

bast0n/JP

You assume two possibilities. There were more. There is no definitive evidence of track or heading during the flight (except at impact). At the point of decision to change waypoint (if indeed such a change was made manually), it is possible (but by no means a fact) that the aircraft was not heading toward the Mull at all, but instead up the coast neither toward ground nor toward cloud. If so, why would it have then turned and hit the ground? I don't know. But, then again, if you subscribe to the direct track theory, why did it make the "slight right turn" at or after waypoint change?
There appears to be an acceptance among many on the thread that the Boeing analysis, in particular, of track and heading (and speed) during the flight is definitive. But it really is not nearly as clear cut as that, as I have outlined in previous posts. The analysis really amounts to no more than a best (?) guess.

[Airborne Aircrew]

Perhaps the view from down the back is not as clear as from those of us who sat up the front.

... and sometimes my dear "two-winged master" it's all a whole lot clearer by virtue of the fact that as often as not the pilot's head is somewhat closer to his arrse than his crewman's is.

Your statement is as overly simplistic as your argument that there were only two, actionable, scenarios. There are significant questions about the airworthiness of the Mk. 2. The Mk. 1 wasn't exactly the most airworthy of aircraft IMNSHO... There's the possibility of illusion - which it has been determined can't be ruled out... etc. etc...

But you have it all down pat... Good on you.

[cazatou]

Pulse 1

Umm. Just remind me will you - what was the location of the waypoint on the Mull entered into the SuperTans? Not what you think it was or intended to be - what was it precisely as recorded by the BOI as a result of AAIB post crash investigation and analysis?

Secondly, where in QR's or MAFL does it state that Orders and Instructions laid down in GASO's and STCASI's are optional at the whim of Detatchment Commanders?

Thirdly, which versions of events are correct; the versions given on oath to the BOI or the versions given on these threads by persons using pseudonyms?

Fourthly, which is correct: the finding of the BOI that "Detatchment Crews preferred to operate on a day on/day off basis" - or the statements on these threads that Flt Lts Tapper and Cook took on the task at the last moment at the behest of the other crew in view of the poor weather?

[bast0n]

Airborne aircrew

... and sometimes my dear "two-winged master" it's all a whole lot clearer by virtue of the fact that as often as not the pilot's head is somewhat closer to his arrse than his crewman's is.

Eh? and rather too many apostrophes!

There's the possibility of illusion

and delusion appears rather a lot in these posts. Try to stay polite and focused - you do your argument no service by crude badinage.