Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)

[BOAC]

A few questions still awiting an answer from WK - I wonder if there is any hope?

What is 'prac nav'? Your post #4818 ", I wonder if you have done much prac nav " I may have, if I knew what it was.

What do we really think of the HoL enquiry? - quote Lord Burnham (9:40 PM) "The pilots were navigating by the relatively primitive TANS—tactical air navigation system—which did not at that time have a GPS input." Really does not a lot of credit to his 'learned' comments if it is rubbish.

Is it known who the 'planning officer' was and has he/she been interviewed?

Which of the 2 formats you have quoted was the exact format of the TANS WPT A?

[John Purdey]

Chinook

Pulse1. You are ignoring the fact that the negligence took place before they crosed, or even neared, the coast.
My suggestion as to why they pressed on is, as I have always said, pure speculation, ie. they mistook the fog station for the lighthouse, which was around 500 meters off their intended track , and the hill behind was thus around 300 ft higher than they expected.
But that theory is irrevelant; they should not have been near that coast at low level in those met conditions. What is arrogant about that?

[BOAC]

Originally Posted by JP

But that theory is irrevelant; they should not have been near that coast at low level in those met conditions.

- that, John, is totally wrong! I don't know if you have any experience of flying around the Western Isles etc, but your statement rules out ANY low-level VFR operations there - just about ever! There is absolutely NO DANGER in being 'near' that coast with on-shore upslope stratus on a visual flight. The danger is in entering cloud or fog and carrying on towards high ground, which is what makes the whole 'findings' so illogical.

The planned route was highly practical, particularly in a helo, and nipping up this sound or that sea loch or the Great Glen is commonplace - 'bread and butter', as I have said before. It may well have been that on that day one could have flown PARALLEL to the Mull coast a few hundred yards off - in complete safety.

[Chugalug2]

JP:

Pulse1. You are ignoring the fact that the negligence took place before they crosed, or even neared, the coast.

Far be it for me to answer on behalf of Pulse for he will make a far better fist of it than I but perhaps he, like me, would totally endorse your sentiments rather than ignoring them, JP. The negligence, or rather Gross Negligence, indeed took place long before that and far away from there. It was committed by issuing an RTS, limited or otherwise, to this then unairworthy type and compounded by a totally inadequate BoI that to all intents and purposes ignored that negligence, to the extent of not even calling obvious witnesses to it. Talk about stuffing fingers in our ears and chanting La, La, La!

[John Purdey]

Chinook.

BOAC. Wrong! I have completed very many sorties in piston, medium multi-jet and in LL fast jet a/c near and over those sinister hills.

Do you really wish to swap 'old soldier' memories with me, or shall we stick to the facts and to my suppositions, (which are no more than that of course), but which offer a reasonable explanation of why the crew GOT IT WRONG. Not that it matters, because, as has been said here often enough before, they should not have been anywhere near those hills at low level in those met conditions. THAT was the negligence.

Do we really have to continue repeating these obvious points, or do you have something new and relevant to offer?

Regards. JP

[pulse1]

JP,

Chugalug2 is, of course, quite correct.

And my accusation of arrogance was related purely to your dismissal of several other possible explanations which have appeared on this thread, most of which are worthy of discussion by those who are objectively trying to get to the truth. But of course, I expect you already know that. You are probably being deliberately political (after recent events, that is not a complement, by the way).

Again, you refer to "those met conditions" but, when pressed, you cannot tell us what those conditions were except for quoting the witnesses at the lighthouse itself and, because of the poor visibility where they were, they could have no idea what the conditions were over the sea. The best witness to the actual weather before waypoint change was given by Mr Holbrook. The only response I can remember from you and caz , and forgive me if I am wrong, is to point out the inconsistencies between his testimony at the BoI and the HoL, as if this totally negates his evidence. That is total nonsense and, again, shows the lack of objectivity in your arguments.

Over the last weeks we have seen more and more information from the likes of tucumseh which, added to that in the public domain already, shows that this helicopter was not airworthy. Your only argument to that is to question us about any corrective action carried out since. Again, you seem to be implying that because we cannot answer that, it means that the problems did not exist. If the audit chain was such a mess, it might be that the only people who could tell you might be those who actually did the work.

So, once again, do tell us what those met conditions were, as seen from the cockpit. If you cannot answer, then BOAC is quite correct. "your statement rules out ANY low-level VFR operations there - just about ever!"

Edited just to say that I am not arguing that your theory is wrong, just that any objective person would admit to some doubt.

[flipster]

Pulse - you may want to read my post from this morning!
flip

[Cows getting bigger]

Can someone enlighten me (I'm sure it is here somewhere but cannot recollect where) as to the weather forecast at the time the crew launched from Aldergrove?

[pulse1]

Thanks flipster. I had read it but reading it again, I think that it reinforces my argument about the need for objectivity. One supposes that the cross examination at the BoI and FAI would have been very subjective, just as in a court case. The HoL enquiry was free to be entirely objective and, I believe, succeeded in this very well. This explains the more detailed and, probably, more accurate picture he gives.

[John Purdey]

Chinook

Chugalug2. I am not qualified to comment on the RTS aspects of this sorry story; you may well be right.

But the fact is that a fully competent crew accepted the a/c as servicecable, and then flew it into an IMC hillside.

If there was, or was not, something amiss at higher levels of command, then that is another subject altogether. How do you connect the two?
Regards. JP

[BOAC]

JP - difficult to keep up with you guys as you change your facts and statements. I fully agree with your latest 'go' "because, as has been said here often enough before, they should not have been anywhere near those hills at low level in those met conditions." - what I differ from you about is your previous 'go' "they should not have been near that coast at low level in those met conditions."

I'm more than willing to "stick to the facts and to my suppositions," if we could determine what they are.

Which is it? Did you abort many of those 'sorties' of yours when you saw a cloud..........................?

[Fitter2]

But the fact is that a fully competent crew accepted the a/c as servicecable, and then flew it into an IMC hillside.

JP goes on my ignore list. Shouting louder proves only the weakness in the argument. Stating 'they flew it into an IMC hillside' contains at least 3 assumptions, open to question, all of which negate the 'beyond all possible doubt' requirement.

[pulse1]

JP - difficult to keep up with you guys as you change your facts and statements.

JP an illustration of this is your introduction of the word "serviceable" (again). The aircraft was deemed as "unairworthy". Is there anyway a flight crew would have known that? And please don't pretend that you don't know the difference again.

[BOAC]

Not to mention "fully competent" and "grossly negligent" in the same breath.

[Chugalug2]

JP:

But the fact is that a fully competent crew accepted the a/c as servicecable, and then flew it into an IMC hillside.

It seems that Pulse and I continue to be in violent agreement concerning your posts, JP. Not very difficult! As he says our contention is that the aircraft was unairworthy. I have no idea if it was serviceable, but have no reason to believe it was not. Similarly the Iraq Hercules and the Afghanistan Nimrod both were accepted as serviceable, and no doubt they were. They both crashed because of lack of airworthiness or fitness for purpose. These three accidents account for no less than 53 lives needlessly lost. I do not find attempts to confuse airworthiness and serviceability by an experienced ex military pilot as amusing in those tragic circumstances.

[Fitter2]

For instance, the crew that signed out an F700 I presented them with for a Lightning accepted it as serviceable (and airworthy). When a pressure regulator failed, and the relief valve jammed, the radome blew off and 2 Avons got a nasty attack of indigestion. Fortunately in that case Martin-Baker provided an alternative let-down procedure. And there were enough bits left to ascertain the cause.

In this case probably the actual cause will never be known.

Pilot error is one (of many) possibilities. It is unfortunately the one seized on by a pair of senior officers to obscure serious failings in their empires, and one which the crew are unable to offer any defence.

[dalek]

John Purdey,
You seem to suggest that all aircraft that start sorties "serviceable" finish them in the same state. Not on my planet.
You say you have flown this area in Piston, ME and FJ. So have I, and many others on this thread.
Many too have done it in HELO's. I have not. Have you?
Try listening to them for a change.

[walter kennedy]

Dalek
<<There is a marked LZ close by at N5518.39 W00548.05 ...>> This is the small hardstanding, marked helipad that you can clearly see in the pix I have posted and on the anotated chart – as I have recently described again, it is far too small for a Chinook (not just my view, locals' too) and with nearby obstructions.
I had posted some time ago about the waypoints in response to a handwritten note I had seen on a report commenting that the other waypoints were apparently more precise (because of extra digits) while the one of interest had rounded coords. I refer you again to that post (#3934, page 197) rather than go over it again other than to say that the nav computer inputs were in lat & long for these waypoints and it could have been the case that the other approximate waypoints were originally picked from an OS map and the (unecessary) decimal places came about from a conversion from map grid to lat & long either external to the nav comp or perhaps input as grid and converted internally by that nav comp (those who have used TANS or STANS can confirm).
FOR EXAMPLE Waypoint C in the sea off Fort George, was entered into the STANS as:
N 57.35.02 W 004.04.45 - seems very accurate? But this position on an OS map is the exact intersection of two grid lines – it is at GB grid NH 760 570.
Just what you'd do for an approximate waypoint to assist in route navigation.
Get the picture? I'll leave it to you to check the others.


Conversely, there was a handy grid line intersection just a safe distance off the light house but they put in a lat & long which, while rounded for memorising, was on shore right next to hazardous ground – not at all a good idea for a route waypoint – but just right for that LZ. I persist with the LZ theory because so much points to them intending a landing or close pass over it – it used to be frequently used before this crash (according to aforementioned locals) yet not a mention in any of the inquiries of such a site only a few hundred yards from the crash – there must be someone on this forum who, has or knows someone who has, landed there – some squaddies stationed in NI told me they had been dropped off for exercise there – are you collectively trying to deny its past use?
<<I do hope that this entry does not compound my ignorance?>> Yep but I appreciate your getting to grips with it – I hope it makes this aspect clearer for other readers too – worthwhile discussion, I hope.
Regards
Walter

[BOAC]

Still many questions (the difficult ones) unanswered lately from the trio. One has to hope that JP for one never had any responsibility for operational flying, or our gallant Air Force would have been grounded with clouds on the hills, as it would be too dangerous to commit aviation then.

I will repeat the good Lady's words from the House about the 'findings':

"The people who have told it have frequently said that it is the only realistic or credible explanation. That is the power of the good story teller, who proceeds on the assumption that they know how it must have been and then we all believe it."

Luckily there are those of us who do not fit that seductive mould.

[walter kennedy]

BOAC
Regarding what nav computer was fitted: you really need to do the background work, acquaint yourself with the reports produced in response to the crash by, say, AAIB and the suppliers of the equipment – I am not going to spoon feed you any more after your comment “A few questions still awiting an answer from WK - I wonder if there is any hope?”.
The Doppler side of the system gets screwed up over water and the overall performance of the STANS at the time warranted a warning by Flt Lt Tapper, an acknowledged nav systems expert, to his colleagues – he would not have relied upon its accuracy, especially after a sea crossing, such, I suggest, that if some other navaid, for example a TACAN (not that I am saying a TACAN was involved her, just for comparison) was conflicting with the STANS data, he would without doubt have preferred that other navaid to the STANS and not have been over concerned with a discrepency of ½ mile or so.
<<but the overwhelming LACK of evidence of both the equipment and the planning to use such that day persuades me that it is a dead end.>> The “overwhelming lack” is easily achieved by the authorities simply denying it being fitted - as for planning, well, that is a foggy area for this flight, nothing normal about it, no one seems to have their flight plan nor been with the captain at a proper outbrief, the most basic aspects of planning for this flight are still being debated. The “evidence” for the use of such equipment is that the only way I can see such a crew approaching the ground in the way that they did in those conditions is if they had reference to some equipment that they believed intrinsically accurate – a DME system of some kind would be the only candidate I can think of, and the CPLS/PRC112 system is effectively a portable UHF DME – the hand held ground equipment needed to be in the right location, though, otherwise you'd have a case of Cornish wrecking of old.
RE “prac nav” - an obvious inference I would have thought – as opposed to say VOR route flying, have done any, say, drops over an op area? - done any orienteering in bad weather? Had to work in undeveloped countries with different map grids, etc. sort of thing – you know, having to work out where you are going as opposed to flying preplanned routes?
Waypoint A in the STANS was in the format of decimal minutes as opposed to seconds thus:
N55.18.50 means 55deg north, 18decimal5 minutes which is equivalent to 55deg 18 minutes and 30 seconds. You can check out quickly by looking at the annotated charts (post#3094, page 155, 10Jan08) – the MOD one, although hard to make out, has waypoint A on it and you can see that it is where I put it on my version (you can zoom in using the “view” tab) – it's obviously not, say, the helipad at the light house, the light house itself, etc...