Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)

[cazatou]

dalek

Since 1941 there have been 20 recorded military air accidents in the vicinity of the Mull; the first being an Armstrong Whitworth Whitley of 502 Sqn in 1941. These have resulted in more than 120 fatalities.

A very experienced Maritime Captain and Instructor, Sqn Ldr D Kinch, who lost a Brother in Law in the Neptune crash on the Mull on 10th October 1956, wrote the following letter to the Daily Telegraph on 13 December 2000:-

" In light winds and high relative humidity, layers of fog and low cloud form adjacent to the Mull to obscure the high ground completely. There are occasions when a relatively calm sea and a grey sky of similar hue merge, so that in otherwise good visibility a pilot flying in accordance with Visual Flight Rules may be unaware that he is about to enter a fog/cloud bank."

The Chinook pilots had an advantage over the other unfortunates who crashed on the Mull; they could have slowed to walking pace until clear of the fog.

They did not do that.

[flipster]

walt has a valid point and, what's more, he could well be right - it is liklely that the ac was not 'at high speed' but was at the planned cruise speed of 135KIAS (I believe that the definintion for helos in the UKMLFSHB was IAS.)

Secondly, Chug is correct also - the weather on land AT the Mull was pants but offshore, it was most probably VFR.

Thirdly, the concept of a climb to the SAlt for just 'around the Mull' (Approx 2400') and then levelling off before either carrying on and diverting is flawed logic - if the intent was to avoid the icing level at above approx 2500ft. The crew wouldn't have known how high the cloud-tops were and couldn't assume they'd get VMC on top; they would have had to assume continuous IMC (been there done that!)

This is because the crew would have had to climb much higher than 2400' - to either approx 6000' if carrying on Corran (Min Safe quadrantal FL of 70 in ISA conditions) or approx 4000' (min safe quadrantal of 5000' (TL was 5000' - so maybe even higher) if diverting to GLA/PIK. Either way, staying at 2500'ish was not a sensible option unless they took a long sea route- even then they would have been right on the edge of the predicted icing level - not good airmanship. Furthermore, the strength of the crew's continuation bias would have been high considering the importance of their passengers.

Ultimately, an IMC climb was an option that was greatly compromised by the limitations of the RTS and the crew knew this - they had been forced into a corner by the organisational decisions and failings.

[Arkroyal]

Cazatou,

I continue to wonder at your absolute belief in the bits you want to believe in, whilst rubbishing those you don't, and the apparent infallibility of senior officers in your eyes.

You quote from the BOI:

Para 16e
"The weather was suitable for the flight but would have required flight in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre

As meadowbank points out the word 'vicinity' is vague. Holbrooke could see both the helicopter and the lighthouse, so they were in VMC and most likely in sight of the lighthouse.

Para 32c
" In the forecast conditions, the icing clearance would have allowed an IMC pull-up from low level flight to Safety Altitude over the Mull of Kintyre."

Probably correct, but as flipster points out, something the crew would not have considered, when a left turn along the coast would have been a far better option. Why they didn't turn, we simply don't know.

Para 45b
"The Rad Alt setting procedures used by the crew were a contributory factor in the accident."

I can't remember the settings, but if flying VFR in VMC quite irrelevant.

Para 51
"The Board assessed that the possibility of the crew visually acquiring the lighthouse was remote, given the fact that it was in fog at the time.

Totally at variance with Holbrooke's evidence. It is also very unlikely that they would have changed waypoints until seeing the first.

Furthermore, any visual contact with the Mull or Lighthouse in the prevailing weather conditions should have prompted a reduction in height and speed well below those at impact."

A crew flying a serviceable aircraft might enjoy such a luxury. We have no idea why Cooke and Tapper did not.

The Chinook pilots had an advantage over the other unfortunates who crashed on the Mull; they could have slowed to walking pace until clear of the fog.

They did not do that.

And You do not know why they did not with no doubt whatsoever. Do You?

[Seldomfitforpurpose]

Originally Posted by cazatou

dalek

Since 1941 there have been 20 recorded military air accidents in the vicinity of the Mull; the first being an Armstrong Whitworth Whitley of 502 Sqn in 1941. These have resulted in more than 120 fatalities.

A very experienced Maritime Captain and Instructor, Sqn Ldr D Kinch, who lost a Brother in Law in the Neptune crash on the Mull on 10th October 1956, wrote the following letter to the Daily Telegraph on 13 December 2000:-

" In light winds and high relative humidity, layers of fog and low cloud form adjacent to the Mull to obscure the high ground completely. There are occasions when a relatively calm sea and a grey sky of similar hue merge, so that in otherwise good visibility a pilot flying in accordance with Visual Flight Rules may be unaware that he is about to enter a fog/cloud bank."

The Chinook pilots had an advantage over the other unfortunates who crashed on the Mull; they could have slowed to walking pace until clear of the fog.

They did not do that.

Caz,

A serious question Sir, can you give us an idea as to how many of the subsequent BOI's of those 20 recorded accidents arrived at the same conclusion as Messer's Wratten and Day?

[dalek]

Cazatou.
1. Did Not. Gross Negligence.
2. Could Not. Technical Malfunction.
3. Should have but didn,t. Due to??????
Turbulence, bird or aircraft avoidance, icing, visual illusion, wasps in cockpit, emergency, (either real or percieved), sudden illness etc etc, in other words distracted by something serious or minor.
Negligence with mitigating circumstances or error of judgement. It would depend on knowing all the circumstances, which we don't.

I always though the MOD cased failed the required level of proof before I had heard the name Sqn Ldr Burke.
It has been pointed out by a previous entry that the majority of his evidence was based on fact and not expert opinion.
Do you:
1. Contend all his evidence, both fact and opinion, was wrong?
2. Accept that his evidence to the Scottish Inquiry and the HOL were major factors in their rejection of the MOD position?

[pulse1]

All these questions for cazatou.

I wonder if it would help if we built up a list of questions which he has ignored. Each person who has a question ignored could then add to the list to update it.

[cazatou]

dalek, pulse et al

As few answer the questions that I have posed there is little incentive to answer the fallacious barbs and innuendo that flow from your posts.

You answer a very basic question that has been studiously ignored from the very start of the original thread until now.

If, as described on this thread, Flt Lts Tapper and Cook took over the task that evening from Lt K RN and Flt Lt T because of the actual and forecast weather around the Mull; how was it that the BOI felt able to state quite categorically (based on the evidence it had received on oath from Detatchment Personnel) that Detatchment Crews preferred to operate on a day on/day off basis?

I was not present that evening; but many on this thread have claimed that they were. So, which "evidence" is correct?

[dalek]

Cazatou,
I wasn't present that evening so I don't know.
It is many years since I have read the BOI. I cannot remember any serious concerns on crew composition, so why does it matter who the two pilots were?
Answer my final two questions please.

[Seldomfitforpurpose]

Caz,

Not expecting a response to post #4633 because of the nature of the question but if you do get a moment to put together a response I would appreciate it.

[pulse1]

Caz,

I know that questions to you are getting quite frenetic but I really would be grateful if you could justify your accusation of "fallacious barb"?

Were you referring to everyone or just dalek and myself? Please use an example if you care to.

[davaar lad]

Caz

much as it hurts me to say, "you do have a point" when you say that they should have slowed down etc etc and amongst all the comments I have to agree that we don't know; but say the crew were misled by the visual cues into thinking that they had greater visibility than they actually had, previous incidents and accidents testify to the deceptive nature of the local weather. How is that different to someone who flies into a mountain in broad daylight and good vis when that can be put down to "unexplained" "error of judgement" etc etc. ?

rgds
DL

[cazatou]

dalek

In answer to your query:


CREW DUTY LIMITATIONS

[Brian Dixon]

From the BoI:

Crew Duty Time Considerations
The Chinook task for 2 Jun 94 was planned by HQNI to require 9 hours and 30 minutes total flying time, comprising 6 hours and 30 minutes for the in-Province task, and 3 hours for the sortie to Inverness and back. Flt Lt TAPPER considered that the in-Province tasking would take less time than HQNI had allocated and, to maintain crew rostering, decided that his crew would complete the entire day's programme.

Prior to his first take-off on 2 Jun, Flt Lt TAPPER obtained the 230 Sqn Duty Flt Cdr's permission to extend his normal NI limit of 7 hours flying per crew duty period to 8 hours. A further extension to 10 hours, the normal SH Force maximum, would have been unusual for NI operations, and would have required the personal authority of SRAFONI.

When the Board reviewed the in-theatre task details, it found that the time which could be saved was in the order of 60 minutes. However, this would still have been insufficient to allow all of the days tasking to have been completed within 8 hours. In the event, the morning's tasking took 5 hours 40 minutes. On the flight authorisation sheet, Flt Lt TAPPER anticipated that the approximate duration of the flight to Inverness and return to Aldergrove would be 4 hours. He did not obtain SRAFONI's authority to exceed his 8 hour limit. This would have meant that on arrival at Inverness, Flt Lt TAPPER would correctly have either required SRAFONI's authority to return to RAF Aldergrove, or HQNI clearance to remain outside NI overnight.

The evidence relevant to Flt Lt TAPPER's intentions on arrival at Inverness is contradictory.

Flt Lt TAPPER had briefed the 230 Sqn Duty Flight Commander during the morning of 2 Jun that if he reached his crew duty limits he intended staying at Inverness. However, no accommodation bookings were made, and all the flight planning preparations, including weather information, low flying bookings and the authorisation sheets indicated a return flight to Aldergrove. Furthermore, Flt Lt TAPPER did not take the F700 with him and, although the crewmen had taken overnight kit, they were expecting to return to Aldergrove that evening.

After considering the balance of information, the Board considered it most likely that at the time of the accident, Flt Lt TAPPER was planning to return to Aldergrove that evening. The Board concluded that at the time of the accident crew duty time limitations had not been exceeded and that fatigue was unlikely to have played a part in the accident. The Board also concluded that, if Flt Lt TAPPER was planning to return to Aldergrove that evening, he may have felt pressure to complete the sortie as quickly as possible, and that this may have been a contributory factor in the accident.

So, in a nutshell - Flt Lt Tapper was aware of crew duty limitations. There is factual evidence stating that if the limitations were exceeded, then the crew would overnight in Inverness. The Board considered it "most likely" a return to Aldergrove was planned, which is not absolutely no doubt whatsoever. The Board also stated that at the time of the accident, crew duty limitations had not been exceeded.

So, there is proof that Flt Lt Tapper was aware of the duty limitations and that remedial action would be taken if those limitations were exceeded. To suggest that they were going to run over, or that they were tired is pure speculation designed to support an assumed, unsupported theory.

Next!

My best, as always.
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[cazatou]

pulse 1

Perhaps you misunderstood my post 4592; operating at not above 100ft whilst carrying VIP Pax was due to known potential threats.

There was no requirement for that Chinook flight to be carried out on that route at low level. The BoI determined that the Chinook could have overflown the Mull at Minimum Safe Flight Level within the Icing Limitations in force at that time. I know the qualifications and experience of those who made that determination: I have no knowledge of your qualifications or experience.

You have not addressed the matter of Crew Composition for the known tasks of the Detatchment that day. Which is correct: the version given to the BOI or the version aired on PPrune? The 2 versions are not compatible; please share with us your views.

You are basing your viewpoint on the various statements made on this thread by unknown persons, who may or may not have any knowledge of aviation. Or were you actually there that day? Nothing you have said leads one to that conclusion - but if you were, then you can answer the queries above!!

[walter kennedy]

One would have thought that the planning for this flight would have been established clearly - obviously every aspect would have been worthy of checking. Surely someone left on the ground would have been party to the decision making process and so questions like those being put by Cazatou should be able to be answered with confidence.
But as with other fundamentals of this flight, there is doubt.
Forget your personal sniping for a moment and try and answer Cazatou's fundamentally important question regarding who was supposed to fly the sortie, and why, etc. - it is stuff we all need to know.
Now to throw something else into this planning business – many years ago on this thread someone claimed that it was planned to use a Chinook several weeks earlier – I wonder if that person would kindly come forward with what he knows?


Cazatou
As I have pointed out before, according to what I heard at the FAI the crew would have been within their duty hours that day on the outward part – as the duty hours limitation was just for flights in the operational area, they would have got around their limitation by doing a touch and go anywhere on the Mull, the subsequent “take off” and leg to Inverness being outside the op area they would have saved that amount of time from their limitation leaving enough for the return flight later.
By the way, you say there was no requirement to do this flight low level but, with a general cloud base of about 1500ft and pleasant scenery at LL, wouldn't it have been the obvious way? Didn't some RAF witness say at one of the inquiries that this was a training flight as were most of such flights?


Arkroyal
<<Quote:
Para 45b
"The Rad Alt setting procedures used by the crew were a contributory factor in the accident."
I can't remember the settings, but if flying VFR in VMC quite irrelevant. >>
The point was that neither warning setting was of any use to them if, as they did, they for whatever reason crossed the shoreline as the upper setting was too high and the lower setting (69ft?) would not have given them sufficient warning. The above statement (para 45b) was relevant in the case that the crew had been distracted by something in the cockpit as the alarm may have helped – not that I subscibe to the distraction theory at all but it is why you have RADALT alarms and so they should have been set appropriately. As I have pointed out many times, the minimal setting was appropriate for an imminent landing in marginal conditions, the uselessly high other setting would have been just to prevent confusion by getting it out of the way effectively – and don't forget that the HP's baro alt subscale setting was right for a QFE at the elevation of the LZ that they crashed so close to.

[Brian Dixon]

Caz,
Whilst we are on about contradictory statements, could you please tell me which is correct:

BoI Para 39. Spatial Disorientation
The Board considered that the weather conditions prevailing over the Mull of Kintyre and its offshore approaches at the time of the accident were conducive to spatial disorientation. The cloud base was ill-defined and broken, and the visibility beneath was very poor.

In the opinion of the Board, the lack of surface texture over the sea and the absence of an external horizon would make accurate visual flying difficult, and may have produced a ‘goldfish bowl’ effect. The pilots would therefore have had to combine external and instrument references to maintain their spatial awareness, with an increasing reliance on the instruments as the conditions deteriorated. Furthermore, any ‘goldfish bowl’ effect would have made it difficult for the pilots to accurately assess their in-flight visibility.
Nevertheless, both pilots were experienced in instrument flying, were rated and were current. There is no evidence to doubt the correct functioning of the AFCSs or any of the flight instruments. The crash parameters provided no indication to support or refute the possibility of spatial disorientation.
Nevertheless, it is possible that one or both of the pilots was suffering from spatial disorientation to an extent sufficient to reduce his capacity to deal with other demands of airmanship at a critical moment.

The Board concluded, therefore, that spatial disorientation may have been a contributory factor in the accident.

Evidence to the House of Lords Select Committee:
ACM Sir John Day. 27 Sep 01. Para 284.

“I tried very hard indeed to find various explanations. For example, I remember saying to Wing Commander, as he was then, Pulford, Group Captain Pulford now, and his team when they briefed me, "Surely the crew could have started to climb, lost control of the aircraft in cloud as a result of spatial disorientation or just bad instrument flying, and then crashed from that?" But the answer was, "No."

So, to coin a phrase, the 2 versions are not compatible; please share with us your views.

My best,
Brian

“Justice has no expiry date” – John Cook

[tucumseh]

And on RadAlt low height warning settings... surely the warning settings were mandatory? These things are not optional, to suit the whim of individual pilots.

As with other aspects of this case, especially those concerning airworthiness and fitness for purpose, MoD don’t want to dig too deeply.

What you are talking about is the settings on the RadAlt Indicators; and indeed it would seem from the evidence that the settings may be have been different from what one would expect. I leave that argument to those who know.

But elsewhere the evidence shows that the “black box”, which I doubt few here would recognise if they saw it, and certainly not the guts of it, was carrying certain “defects” (MoD’s word). Most notably the AGC (Automatic Gain Control) was wrongly set, resulting in incorrect information to the indicators from the range computer.

This has been dismissed by MoD as of no consequence.

Why? It may have been of no consequence to ZD576 (again, other people can comment) but the fact that such a crucial setting in the Tx/Rx was wrongly set in the first place demands investigation, rather than simply dismissing it. I think it is of consequence, if it fosters a lack of confidence in the kit – as with SuperTANS.

Again, the complete failure of MoD to dig deeper to get to the root of problems, thus helping prevent reoccurrence.

Dig deeper (i.e. conduct a proper investigation in accordance with the regs) and perhaps you’d find previous examples of spurious indications, or just plain wrong indications. Perhaps you’d find a lack of configuration control which allowed incorrect range computers to be fitted to this RadAlt, and its sister AN/APN 171. Perhaps you’d find that the 3rd Line maintainers were only given the 2nd Line Test equipment to conduct Depth C/D repairs. Perhaps you’d find a history of not bothering to conduct power interrupt testing because (a) the APs had no procedure and (b) no test equipment was provided anyway.

Oops, power interrupt. Back to the DECU problems.

These things are not optional.

Absolutely correct. Airworthiness regs are not optional, despite what the Chinook 2* and CDP said.

[dalek]

Cazatou,
Time and time again in my Air Force career I have started a multi stage task knowing it could not be completed within a normal crew duty day. So have you, and most others on this thread no doubt.
The only point of importance here, is that at the time of impact and at his planned landing time at Inverness, he would have been within his crew duty limits.
Once at Inverness, whether he planned to break crew duty, ask for an extension or a night stop, are matters of pure conjecture. Therefore they have no relevance to the crash

[dalek]

Cazatou,
Same question. I will keep it to one this time:
1. Do you still contend that all of the evidence given by Sqn Ldr Burke to the HOL, both factual and "expert opinion" was wrong.

[cazatou]

Brian

It looks to me as though Sir John was recalling a verbal debrief by the BOI and the President. He then decided, as the point had been raised, to insert that statement into the findings to make matters clear.