Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
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dalek
" You know just as well as I do that in fog you can have excellent conditions within metres of you".
Very true
Equally, instead of excellent conditions you can have large amounts of Strato - Granite within metres of you!!!
During WW2 Bomber Command alone lost 8,305 Aircrew in non operational accidents.
It is ironic that Mr Ellacott, who was the person closest to the crash of the Chinook , was on a walking holiday looking for WW2 aircraft crash sites.
" You know just as well as I do that in fog you can have excellent conditions within metres of you".
Very true
Equally, instead of excellent conditions you can have large amounts of Strato - Granite within metres of you!!!
During WW2 Bomber Command alone lost 8,305 Aircrew in non operational accidents.
It is ironic that Mr Ellacott, who was the person closest to the crash of the Chinook , was on a walking holiday looking for WW2 aircraft crash sites.
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Caz,
Nice to see you finally agree that the weather conditions in front of the Chinook may well have been excellent, took some time getting there but you made it in the end
Nice to see you finally agree that the weather conditions in front of the Chinook may well have been excellent, took some time getting there but you made it in the end
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Caz,
If we turn this line of questioning on its head for a minute; what you are categorically saying, 'with absolutely no doubt whatsoever', is that
at the point of WP change or before, that the weather was not fit for VFR ie less than 1nm horizontal vis and the ac was not 'clear of cloud, in sight of surface'?
Well if so, you are either a clairvoyant or daft.
Why?
1. Even G/C Pulford now admits that a WP change on the TANS would indicate that the crew were 'visual' with the WP (ie the lighthouse), the general area or at least intending to navigate to the next WP (Corran), staying seaward of the Mull by turning left and following the coast.
2. The lone yachtsman (with or without his cabin boy), who was on the sea and visual with the ac, estimated at worst weather as 1nm in haze and the ac at 3-400ft. This estimation has increased over the years - but even at its worst, the ac was VFR. Please bear in mind that the public generally underestimate the altitude of low-flying ac and the visibility. In many people's opinion the weather was probably a lot better than Mr Holbrook originally estimated. The trouble is that this is our most accurate and relevent estimation - as others have mentioned - the other observers were all ashore, up or near the hills and certainly not near where the ac was at the WP change.
3. Even the worst of the weather, on the Mull itself, had a cloudbase of about 300 ft (defined by lighthouse area) but admittedly, the vis below was worse - but the ac didn't go there, it eventually climbed into cloud, didn't turn far enough away from the Mull and then crashed into the high ground, some distance from the lighthouse. But what all the ROs seem to say is that because they crashed, the crew failed in their duty to keep their crew and passengers safe.
But that does NOT mean that the crew were negligent - as no-one wilfully wants to crash. This fact is crucial but the ROs can't see the difference - strange? Its like saying that because you crash your car in fog, you do so on purpose and therefore, it must be your fault and you must be negligent, without considering all the outside influences - which is barmy, for sure!
I think it would a very blinkered person to dismiss the fact that there may have been many mitigating circumstances or influencing factors in the case of ZD576 - especially as so much has come to light, or become more significant, after the BOI was completed.
Even in light of the original BOI, Pulford admitted that there may have been mitigating circumstances and he does not specifically mention 'negligence' in his comments - but Day and Wratten do. Sadly, none of these 3 men seemed to ask that all-important question....."why did the crew climb into cloud when they had almost certainly been VFR below?"
Once again, we come back to the FACT that no-one alive knows the answer to that one (mainly because ther was no CVR/ADR), which is the crux of the whole matter and as such, the 2nd and 3rd RO findings cannot match the burden of proof - 'with no doubt whatsoever'. The ROs have assumed that the crew commenced an inappropriately slow climb to S'alt - but we all know the dictum about 'ASS-U-ME'.
To me, all that Wratten, Day, the MoD (and their apparatchiks) can maintain is that "the ac crashed - with absolutely no doubt whatsoever"! In this respect they are, of course, correct. Regrettably, however, they seem unwilling to continue to ask the simple question 'why?' because, I suspect, they won't like the possible answers.
Oh Olive, I think the crew were a normal SF crew, if that helps!!!!
If we turn this line of questioning on its head for a minute; what you are categorically saying, 'with absolutely no doubt whatsoever', is that
at the point of WP change or before, that the weather was not fit for VFR ie less than 1nm horizontal vis and the ac was not 'clear of cloud, in sight of surface'?
Well if so, you are either a clairvoyant or daft.
Why?
1. Even G/C Pulford now admits that a WP change on the TANS would indicate that the crew were 'visual' with the WP (ie the lighthouse), the general area or at least intending to navigate to the next WP (Corran), staying seaward of the Mull by turning left and following the coast.
2. The lone yachtsman (with or without his cabin boy), who was on the sea and visual with the ac, estimated at worst weather as 1nm in haze and the ac at 3-400ft. This estimation has increased over the years - but even at its worst, the ac was VFR. Please bear in mind that the public generally underestimate the altitude of low-flying ac and the visibility. In many people's opinion the weather was probably a lot better than Mr Holbrook originally estimated. The trouble is that this is our most accurate and relevent estimation - as others have mentioned - the other observers were all ashore, up or near the hills and certainly not near where the ac was at the WP change.
3. Even the worst of the weather, on the Mull itself, had a cloudbase of about 300 ft (defined by lighthouse area) but admittedly, the vis below was worse - but the ac didn't go there, it eventually climbed into cloud, didn't turn far enough away from the Mull and then crashed into the high ground, some distance from the lighthouse. But what all the ROs seem to say is that because they crashed, the crew failed in their duty to keep their crew and passengers safe.
But that does NOT mean that the crew were negligent - as no-one wilfully wants to crash. This fact is crucial but the ROs can't see the difference - strange? Its like saying that because you crash your car in fog, you do so on purpose and therefore, it must be your fault and you must be negligent, without considering all the outside influences - which is barmy, for sure!
I think it would a very blinkered person to dismiss the fact that there may have been many mitigating circumstances or influencing factors in the case of ZD576 - especially as so much has come to light, or become more significant, after the BOI was completed.
Even in light of the original BOI, Pulford admitted that there may have been mitigating circumstances and he does not specifically mention 'negligence' in his comments - but Day and Wratten do. Sadly, none of these 3 men seemed to ask that all-important question....."why did the crew climb into cloud when they had almost certainly been VFR below?"
Once again, we come back to the FACT that no-one alive knows the answer to that one (mainly because ther was no CVR/ADR), which is the crux of the whole matter and as such, the 2nd and 3rd RO findings cannot match the burden of proof - 'with no doubt whatsoever'. The ROs have assumed that the crew commenced an inappropriately slow climb to S'alt - but we all know the dictum about 'ASS-U-ME'.
To me, all that Wratten, Day, the MoD (and their apparatchiks) can maintain is that "the ac crashed - with absolutely no doubt whatsoever"! In this respect they are, of course, correct. Regrettably, however, they seem unwilling to continue to ask the simple question 'why?' because, I suspect, they won't like the possible answers.
Oh Olive, I think the crew were a normal SF crew, if that helps!!!
!
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flipster
In answer to your question:-
YES - ABSOLUTELY - WITHOUT QUESTION !!!!
They should not have been where they were - at that speed -at that height - with those passengers - in that weather
Have I made myself clear?
PS There was nothing in the Tasking Signal that detailed that route; that height or that crew.
Now, can we please be informed which was the actual state of affairs in regard to Tasking on this Detatchment.? Was it really as stated to the BOI that "Detatchment Crews preferred to operate on a 'day on - day off basis"? If the answer to that Question is "Yes" then why have contributors to this thread purported to be the "Other Crew"?? Why have they stated that they were concerned about flying in the forecast weather conditions and that is the reason why Tapper & Cook flew the fatal sortie.
What procedures were in place to activate another crew in the event of overrun on prior tasks?
Why was none of the above presented to the HOL Committee??
More Tommorrow!!!
In answer to your question:-
YES - ABSOLUTELY - WITHOUT QUESTION !!!!
They should not have been where they were - at that speed -at that height - with those passengers - in that weather
Have I made myself clear?
PS There was nothing in the Tasking Signal that detailed that route; that height or that crew.
Now, can we please be informed which was the actual state of affairs in regard to Tasking on this Detatchment.? Was it really as stated to the BOI that "Detatchment Crews preferred to operate on a 'day on - day off basis"? If the answer to that Question is "Yes" then why have contributors to this thread purported to be the "Other Crew"?? Why have they stated that they were concerned about flying in the forecast weather conditions and that is the reason why Tapper & Cook flew the fatal sortie.
What procedures were in place to activate another crew in the event of overrun on prior tasks?
Why was none of the above presented to the HOL Committee??
More Tommorrow!!!
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Caz, you are right, they should not have been there. The problem arises when you ask yourself the question why were they there.
Furthermore, I'm not sure where you're coming from regarding the wider issues regarding detachment practises (breakfast, crew duty, crew changes). Are you trying to paint a picture of an organisation that routinely flirted with the rules? If so, how does this picture contribute with any objectivity towards the "absolutely no doubt whatsoever" line?
Finally, I don't think any of us would be having this argument if the aircraft had been fitted with appropriate CVR etc. I seem to recollect that a very large percentage of military aviation accident reports have included recommendations for voice/data recording capabilities. I'm not sure the MoD has yet addressed this weakness across it's fleet's. This must surely be a sorry reflection of the underlying arrogance and impotence of military airworthiness and safety management across the MoD.
Furthermore, I'm not sure where you're coming from regarding the wider issues regarding detachment practises (breakfast, crew duty, crew changes). Are you trying to paint a picture of an organisation that routinely flirted with the rules? If so, how does this picture contribute with any objectivity towards the "absolutely no doubt whatsoever" line?
Finally, I don't think any of us would be having this argument if the aircraft had been fitted with appropriate CVR etc. I seem to recollect that a very large percentage of military aviation accident reports have included recommendations for voice/data recording capabilities. I'm not sure the MoD has yet addressed this weakness across it's fleet's. This must surely be a sorry reflection of the underlying arrogance and impotence of military airworthiness and safety management across the MoD.
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Caz,
Approaching the waypoint they were at legal height within normal operating speed perameters in (probably?) VFR. They were a properly constituted crew, correctly authorised and on the approved route. At that stage what had they done wrong?
I agree they were not authorised to make a hole in the ground several seconds later. It is what happened in those critical seconds that count. I don't know what happened in those seconds neither do you.
Wratten and Day claim that by the waypoint "negligence" had already occured.
I agree with them in one respect only. RWTS had concluded on that day that the Chinook 2 should be grounded.
The flight should not have taken place.
Approaching the waypoint they were at legal height within normal operating speed perameters in (probably?) VFR. They were a properly constituted crew, correctly authorised and on the approved route. At that stage what had they done wrong?
I agree they were not authorised to make a hole in the ground several seconds later. It is what happened in those critical seconds that count. I don't know what happened in those seconds neither do you.
Wratten and Day claim that by the waypoint "negligence" had already occured.
I agree with them in one respect only. RWTS had concluded on that day that the Chinook 2 should be grounded.
The flight should not have taken place.
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dalek
You stated "in (probably?) VFR".
Evidence to the BOI regarding the actual weather at the time of the crash :-
Mr Murchie Lighthouse Keeper and Met Observer: "I would estimate the visibility at this stage to be 15 to 20 metres at the most".
Mr Lamont Lighthouse Keeper and Met Observer: " the visibility, as I drove over the hill from Campbeltown to the Lighthouse, was down to about 10 metres or less".
Mr Brocher: The weather was really bad at this time, there was a lot of mist and fog, visibility was only about 10 to 15 feet."
Mr Gresswell: "The weather conditions en route to the Mull of Kintyre were that of very dense fog."
Mrs Crabtree: " The weather was really bad, we couldn't see the hills on either side of us because of the thick mist."
Finally, Mr Ellacott: " I then heard the sound of a propellor going around for about four or five seconds and then I heard an explosion ....Visibility at that time was only about 9 or 10 feet maximum." "It was difficult to say how far I was from the explosion, but I don't think I could have been any more than 100 yards".
You stated "in (probably?) VFR".
Evidence to the BOI regarding the actual weather at the time of the crash :-
Mr Murchie Lighthouse Keeper and Met Observer: "I would estimate the visibility at this stage to be 15 to 20 metres at the most".
Mr Lamont Lighthouse Keeper and Met Observer: " the visibility, as I drove over the hill from Campbeltown to the Lighthouse, was down to about 10 metres or less".
Mr Brocher: The weather was really bad at this time, there was a lot of mist and fog, visibility was only about 10 to 15 feet."
Mr Gresswell: "The weather conditions en route to the Mull of Kintyre were that of very dense fog."
Mrs Crabtree: " The weather was really bad, we couldn't see the hills on either side of us because of the thick mist."
Finally, Mr Ellacott: " I then heard the sound of a propellor going around for about four or five seconds and then I heard an explosion ....Visibility at that time was only about 9 or 10 feet maximum." "It was difficult to say how far I was from the explosion, but I don't think I could have been any more than 100 yards".
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I think we all accept that the crash site was almost certainly in fog. It is
also quite probable, based on Holbrook,that the aircraft approached the Mull in legal VFR. As far as I know, no one knows the aircraft speed at the Mull waypoint. There is no ADR and the aircraft was not being tracked on radar.
I ask again. How were they negligent before the Waypoint?
It is the bit in the middle between the Waypoint where they were (probably) VFR and the crash site where thet were (almost certainly), IFR, that bothers me.
also quite probable, based on Holbrook,that the aircraft approached the Mull in legal VFR. As far as I know, no one knows the aircraft speed at the Mull waypoint. There is no ADR and the aircraft was not being tracked on radar.
I ask again. How were they negligent before the Waypoint?
It is the bit in the middle between the Waypoint where they were (probably) VFR and the crash site where thet were (almost certainly), IFR, that bothers me.
Avoid imitations
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at the point of WP change or before, that the weather was not fit for VFR ie less than 1nm horizontal vis and the ac was not 'clear of cloud, in sight of surface'?
It's been a long time since I've had access to a copy; were the actual authorised weather limits for the flight (in VMC) laid down by the BOI report?
cazatou said:
He is partly correct. "Those passengers" should not have been allowed anywhere near an aircraft with so many questions over its airworthiness.
cazatou,
Your constant failure to accept the simple fact that the weather conditions seen from waypoint change were very likely different from those at the Lighthouse is beginning to make you look a bit stupid in my opinion.
They should not have been where they were - at that speed -at that height - with those passengers - in that weather
cazatou,
Your constant failure to accept the simple fact that the weather conditions seen from waypoint change were very likely different from those at the Lighthouse is beginning to make you look a bit stupid in my opinion.
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pulse 1
I'll start with you, with 2 qualified Met Observers and their wives (who lived all year round on the Mull), plus five other eyewitnesses - how many eye witnesses do you need to cast doubt on the various different accounts from the "Lone Yachtsman" to the various Inquiries.
The BOI were criticised by the FAI for not asking the Yachtsman exactly what he could see on the Mull. I would suggest to you that if a witness states on oath that his position was "2 NM SW of the Mull" and that the visibility was "1 NM limited by haze" then it would seem pointless to ask that question. No mention was made regarding the "Cabin Boy" (or "Adult Male Companion") that featured in later reviews of the event in his evidence to the BOI.
The names of the "eye - witnesses" on the Mull were recorded by the Civil Police and those persons were interviewed on oath by the BOI. They show a remarkable level of agreement in regard to the actual weather conditions on the Mull - in contrast to the evidence of the Yachtsman. It is interesting to note that in his original statement to the Police he said that he was "2NM SW of the Mull and the visibility was 1 NM limited by haze". That would suggest to me that he could not see the Mull - or his evidence was incorrect.
That's enough for tonight - perhaps you would like to comment before I continue?
I'll start with you, with 2 qualified Met Observers and their wives (who lived all year round on the Mull), plus five other eyewitnesses - how many eye witnesses do you need to cast doubt on the various different accounts from the "Lone Yachtsman" to the various Inquiries.
The BOI were criticised by the FAI for not asking the Yachtsman exactly what he could see on the Mull. I would suggest to you that if a witness states on oath that his position was "2 NM SW of the Mull" and that the visibility was "1 NM limited by haze" then it would seem pointless to ask that question. No mention was made regarding the "Cabin Boy" (or "Adult Male Companion") that featured in later reviews of the event in his evidence to the BOI.
The names of the "eye - witnesses" on the Mull were recorded by the Civil Police and those persons were interviewed on oath by the BOI. They show a remarkable level of agreement in regard to the actual weather conditions on the Mull - in contrast to the evidence of the Yachtsman. It is interesting to note that in his original statement to the Police he said that he was "2NM SW of the Mull and the visibility was 1 NM limited by haze". That would suggest to me that he could not see the Mull - or his evidence was incorrect.
That's enough for tonight - perhaps you would like to comment before I continue?
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Caz
Since appear to have missed the point entirely (Dalek has explained it twice) and since you will be unable to furnish me with this week's lottery numbers, then I'm afraid I will have to assume that you are indeed 'daft'. Although I cannot prove you are daft with 'absolutely no doubt whatsoever', and as such, you may wish disagree but it is a view shared by a significant number and by Pulse as recently as this evening!
May I respectfully suggest you take yourself away and have a very harsh word with yourself. Out.
ShyT
re 1nm horizontal viz, COCIS
I believe that these were the limits stipulated in the Low-Flying Handbook for RW in the UK. There may have been (and probably were) different limits for Ops in NI and training in RAFG. If there were different promulgated limits, then these variations could have been contributory factors because, of course, they would have been confusing and even a mental distraction, if a crew, used to one set, had to shuttle between theatres and use different limits.
Does anybody know why a more-suitable mode of transport had not been arranged for the 'pax' on what had been a pre-arranged visit/conference - eg C130/146 etc to INV/KSS/LOS. Far better that than use a very scare theatre-asset, that was demonstrably unairworthy? Maybe this is was the negligent act?
what you are categorically saying, 'with absolutely no doubt whatsoever', is that
at the point of WP change or before, that the weather was not fit for VFR ie less than 1nm horizontal vis and the ac was not 'clear of cloud, in sight of surface'?
Well if so, you are either a clairvoyant or daft.
at the point of WP change or before, that the weather was not fit for VFR ie less than 1nm horizontal vis and the ac was not 'clear of cloud, in sight of surface'?
Well if so, you are either a clairvoyant or daft.
May I respectfully suggest you take yourself away and have a very harsh word with yourself. Out.
ShyT
re 1nm horizontal viz, COCIS
I believe that these were the limits stipulated in the Low-Flying Handbook for RW in the UK. There may have been (and probably were) different limits for Ops in NI and training in RAFG. If there were different promulgated limits, then these variations could have been contributory factors because, of course, they would have been confusing and even a mental distraction, if a crew, used to one set, had to shuttle between theatres and use different limits.
Does anybody know why a more-suitable mode of transport had not been arranged for the 'pax' on what had been a pre-arranged visit/conference - eg C130/146 etc to INV/KSS/LOS. Far better that than use a very scare theatre-asset, that was demonstrably unairworthy? Maybe this is was the negligent act?
Avoid imitations
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Does anybody know why a more-suitable mode of transport had not been arranged for the 'pax' on what had been a pre-arranged visit/conference - eg C130/146 etc to INV/KSS/LOS. Far better that than use a very scare theatre-asset, that was demonstrably unairworthy? Maybe this is was the negligent act?
The pax should have gone by any other means, including civvy air if nothing else was available. Someone in a high place was apparently determined to prove this aircraft was safe, irrespective of the reliability and safety issues surrounding it. To put so many valuable passengers in one suspect airframe seems irresponsibly stupid.
cazatou,
OK, I will try once more.
At point A, where your impressive list of impressive witnesses were, I am prepared to accept, with absolutely no doubt whatsoever, that there was fog with a visibility of less than 20 metres.
At Point B, about 1 mile away from Point B and close to where Mr Holbrook was, the weather would appear to be within RW VFR limits but I cannot be sure about that. I have no doubt whatsoever that the visibility was nothing like it was at Point A. Even allowing for apparent variations in Holbrook's testimony between BOI and HOL, it is clear that the weather at Point A was very different. You seem to be suggesting that these differences in his story mean that his testimony should be totally disregarded. (You seem to have a similar attitude to S.L. Burkes evidence on airworthiness too).
Conclusion: The visibility at Point A cannot be used to determine gross negligence "at waypoint change" i.e. Point B.
OK, I will try once more.
At point A, where your impressive list of impressive witnesses were, I am prepared to accept, with absolutely no doubt whatsoever, that there was fog with a visibility of less than 20 metres.
At Point B, about 1 mile away from Point B and close to where Mr Holbrook was, the weather would appear to be within RW VFR limits but I cannot be sure about that. I have no doubt whatsoever that the visibility was nothing like it was at Point A. Even allowing for apparent variations in Holbrook's testimony between BOI and HOL, it is clear that the weather at Point A was very different. You seem to be suggesting that these differences in his story mean that his testimony should be totally disregarded. (You seem to have a similar attitude to S.L. Burkes evidence on airworthiness too).
Conclusion: The visibility at Point A cannot be used to determine gross negligence "at waypoint change" i.e. Point B.
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Weather at lighthouse, IMC no doubt. I accept all the witness reports.
Weather at crash site, almost certainly IMC. But no witnesses.
Weather at turning point, out to sea, just off the Mull, probably VMC, based on best evidence. (Holbrook)
Again "where was the negligence before the turning point."
Weather at crash site, almost certainly IMC. But no witnesses.
Weather at turning point, out to sea, just off the Mull, probably VMC, based on best evidence. (Holbrook)
Again "where was the negligence before the turning point."
Just a numbered other
Caz,
I am well, thankyou.
You are beginning to look deliberately obtuse if you cannot see that it is not only possible, but extremely likely that although the weather on the mull was thick fog, just a few yards away, below cloud, the chinook was flying quite legally in VMC, obeying the COCIS rule of SH VFR. There is no conflict here.
Just why the aircraft continued, after a routine TANS waypoint change, slightly right, and into the Mull, instead of turning left along the coast, will never be known.
Because of that, the finding of gross negligence has not been proven beyond any doubt whatsoever.
Do I make myself clear?
I am well, thankyou.
You are beginning to look deliberately obtuse if you cannot see that it is not only possible, but extremely likely that although the weather on the mull was thick fog, just a few yards away, below cloud, the chinook was flying quite legally in VMC, obeying the COCIS rule of SH VFR. There is no conflict here.
Just why the aircraft continued, after a routine TANS waypoint change, slightly right, and into the Mull, instead of turning left along the coast, will never be known.
Because of that, the finding of gross negligence has not been proven beyond any doubt whatsoever.
Do I make myself clear?
A really irritating PPRuNer
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Hi all.
I am reluctant to get involved in the weather debate again, but one question, if I may.
Where, exactly, was the waypoint change made?
To those who have emailed me recently, please forgive me for not yet replying. Busy is an understatement at the moment, but I will respond as soon as I can.
Kind regards, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
I am reluctant to get involved in the weather debate again, but one question, if I may.
Where, exactly, was the waypoint change made?
To those who have emailed me recently, please forgive me for not yet replying. Busy is an understatement at the moment, but I will respond as soon as I can.
Kind regards, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
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IIRC
The change to WP B, Corran, was made about 1-2 miles before impact - perhaps close the yachtsman afloat - where the weather was, more than likely, suitable for VFR (>3-400ft cloudbase and >1nm vis, COCIS - but probably better than that). That undermines somewhat the ROs' assertion that the crew were negligent before the WP change.
flipster
The change to WP B, Corran, was made about 1-2 miles before impact - perhaps close the yachtsman afloat - where the weather was, more than likely, suitable for VFR (>3-400ft cloudbase and >1nm vis, COCIS - but probably better than that). That undermines somewhat the ROs' assertion that the crew were negligent before the WP change.
flipster
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With all of you trying to pontify, may I just point out that the waypoint change occurred 0.81 NM prior to the first waypoint on the Mull. It would appear that the Pilots were unaware - as most contributors still appear to be unaware -that the waypoint entered into the computer was NOT the lighthouse but the Helicopter Landing Site nearby. At this point it was already too late even to conduct an emergency climb to Safety Altitude - but it may have been possible to conduct an emergency climb and just clear the terrain ahead. This they failed to do.