Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
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Tandemrotor
As NC cannot remember the details of the Mod; how can you state that it made the aircraft safer to fly?
In fact, how can you be sure that there was such a Mod; it is, after all, nearly 15 years since this tragedy and memory is a fragile thing.
What is clear is that there has been no repetition of this tragedy despite there being no major modification to the Fleet as a direct result of Technical Failures which caused the crash. The reason for this is that there was not then (and there is not now) any evidence of such a Technical Failure.
Perhaps you would wish to comment on the disregard of STCASI's and GASO's?
Finally; perhaps you would agree that, if you are using a chart and log prepared by somebody else, it would be a good idea to check the "waypoints" to ensure that they are actually where you think they should be?
As NC cannot remember the details of the Mod; how can you state that it made the aircraft safer to fly?
In fact, how can you be sure that there was such a Mod; it is, after all, nearly 15 years since this tragedy and memory is a fragile thing.
What is clear is that there has been no repetition of this tragedy despite there being no major modification to the Fleet as a direct result of Technical Failures which caused the crash. The reason for this is that there was not then (and there is not now) any evidence of such a Technical Failure.
Perhaps you would wish to comment on the disregard of STCASI's and GASO's?
Finally; perhaps you would agree that, if you are using a chart and log prepared by somebody else, it would be a good idea to check the "waypoints" to ensure that they are actually where you think they should be?
Last edited by cazatou; 7th May 2009 at 10:29.
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As I recall (from memory rather than looking up just now), Boeing did recommend checks in the control closet for bonding etc in the immediate aftermath and as a result of this crash BUT dropped the requirement only a few months later - presumably because it was not worthwhile as problems were not being found.
Regarding TR's comments:
<<... "Look at this. I wouldn't even consider this a safe means of attachment if this was on my bicycle, and this is the flight control system of a helicopter!"
I am intrigued to know whether chinook240 can tell us how this item has changed since the accident?... >>
Well such means of attachment are common in a/c where weight is at a premium – and it has been good in an awful lot of 47Ds, before and since ZD576, has it not?
You are grabbing at straws with this control issue – you are postulating that a reliable a/c type had a very rare jam just when it was near a critical point on its route and just when it was carrying passengers of special value – and this despite there being no evidence of a jam.
Yet at this critical point there is evidence of an intention to land in a controlled fashion at a known LZ for Chinooks.
Anything but the unpalletable obvious?
Regarding TR's comments:
<<... "Look at this. I wouldn't even consider this a safe means of attachment if this was on my bicycle, and this is the flight control system of a helicopter!"
I am intrigued to know whether chinook240 can tell us how this item has changed since the accident?... >>
Well such means of attachment are common in a/c where weight is at a premium – and it has been good in an awful lot of 47Ds, before and since ZD576, has it not?
You are grabbing at straws with this control issue – you are postulating that a reliable a/c type had a very rare jam just when it was near a critical point on its route and just when it was carrying passengers of special value – and this despite there being no evidence of a jam.
Yet at this critical point there is evidence of an intention to land in a controlled fashion at a known LZ for Chinooks.
Anything but the unpalletable obvious?
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Caz
There was definately a mod carried out on the control pallets I removed enough of them for that purpose. I can't remember the details of the fix because it was done by the structure repair bay team off aircraft, not by Sqn techies.
Tandem
A heap of garbage seems a little excessive, perhaps it might be fairer to describe it as a work in progress.
Walter,
I don't think anyone in the pro camp seriously believes that the pallet de-bond, Fadec issues are going to one day provide the "smoking gun" that blows this case wide open, however, I believe that they help bolster the case that the finding of gross negligence beyond any reasonable doubt is totally unsustainable.
NC
There was definately a mod carried out on the control pallets I removed enough of them for that purpose. I can't remember the details of the fix because it was done by the structure repair bay team off aircraft, not by Sqn techies.
Tandem
A heap of garbage seems a little excessive, perhaps it might be fairer to describe it as a work in progress.
Walter,
I don't think anyone in the pro camp seriously believes that the pallet de-bond, Fadec issues are going to one day provide the "smoking gun" that blows this case wide open, however, I believe that they help bolster the case that the finding of gross negligence beyond any reasonable doubt is totally unsustainable.
NC
Work in Progress
It’s important to understand to what degree the Mk1 > Mk2 conversion was a work in progress. i.e. how mature was it and was it of acceptable quality.
MoD regulations acknowledge that every aircraft and equipment design is a work in progress, as there is a mandated requirement to Maintain the Build Standard, which must be reflected in the Safety Case.
It is a question of when a design is deemed safe enough to fly and, much later, enter Service operationally. This is a safety issue, although we all recognise that the political imperative often kicks in. In making this decision, the good book says “Professional engineering judgement is by far the most important part of Safety Management”. (The same paragraph states ““It has never happened before” is not valid evidence on its own, that a particular event will not happen”).
By 1994 MoD were 3 years into a policy of diluting this body of engineering experience (which came to a head in 1996 when CDP announced 600 job reductions at AbbeyWood as he didn’t see the need for engineering project managers). The practical effect was that, increasingly, MoD lost its capacity to apply professional engineering judgement, and the “advice” from e.g. Boscombe Down actually became the most significant authoritative input.
I’ve mentioned a few fundamental components of airworthiness there (judgement, experience, competence, resources, Build Standard, ensuring quality and maturity etc), and you may be able to cope if one of these defences in depth (to prevent accidents) is missing or compromised.
But, not only were ALL of them compromised, there were deliberate decisions made to save money by ditching some altogether. Thus, the Safety Management System had been compromised by the Political Imperative, breaching the basic rule. I think TR’s term “garbage” is a good description of the System which was meant to provide a safe aircraft.
The upshot is, I believe, the Mk2 entered Service prematurely. The design was immature, certainly in the area of FADEC software. There were various faults and (design) defects which, in isolation, may have been barely acceptable, but the cumulative effect should have been ringing bells. Not only that, the evidence shows a distinct lack of urgency to correct them.
In crude terms, it was a “simple” conversion programme but some new features in the Mk2 were crucial to flight safety and, in those circumstances, it is unwise to simply say “The Mk1 was ok, so that’s our safety baseline - just read across”. (And the tendency to over-rely on “read across” deserves a chapter of its own, being at the root of many an accident). In fact, only an idiot would not insist that the build standard was stabilised at induction to the conversion programme, giving you a KNOWN baseline, rather than an assumed one. Yes, it costs money, but given the mandated requirement to maintain that build standard was ditched 3 years previously, at the time it was a well known risk which project offices considered a routine task.
That a mandated, but missing, airworthiness component was considered routine is indeed an indictment of the System.
It’s important to understand to what degree the Mk1 > Mk2 conversion was a work in progress. i.e. how mature was it and was it of acceptable quality.
MoD regulations acknowledge that every aircraft and equipment design is a work in progress, as there is a mandated requirement to Maintain the Build Standard, which must be reflected in the Safety Case.
It is a question of when a design is deemed safe enough to fly and, much later, enter Service operationally. This is a safety issue, although we all recognise that the political imperative often kicks in. In making this decision, the good book says “Professional engineering judgement is by far the most important part of Safety Management”. (The same paragraph states ““It has never happened before” is not valid evidence on its own, that a particular event will not happen”).
By 1994 MoD were 3 years into a policy of diluting this body of engineering experience (which came to a head in 1996 when CDP announced 600 job reductions at AbbeyWood as he didn’t see the need for engineering project managers). The practical effect was that, increasingly, MoD lost its capacity to apply professional engineering judgement, and the “advice” from e.g. Boscombe Down actually became the most significant authoritative input.
I’ve mentioned a few fundamental components of airworthiness there (judgement, experience, competence, resources, Build Standard, ensuring quality and maturity etc), and you may be able to cope if one of these defences in depth (to prevent accidents) is missing or compromised.
But, not only were ALL of them compromised, there were deliberate decisions made to save money by ditching some altogether. Thus, the Safety Management System had been compromised by the Political Imperative, breaching the basic rule. I think TR’s term “garbage” is a good description of the System which was meant to provide a safe aircraft.
The upshot is, I believe, the Mk2 entered Service prematurely. The design was immature, certainly in the area of FADEC software. There were various faults and (design) defects which, in isolation, may have been barely acceptable, but the cumulative effect should have been ringing bells. Not only that, the evidence shows a distinct lack of urgency to correct them.
In crude terms, it was a “simple” conversion programme but some new features in the Mk2 were crucial to flight safety and, in those circumstances, it is unwise to simply say “The Mk1 was ok, so that’s our safety baseline - just read across”. (And the tendency to over-rely on “read across” deserves a chapter of its own, being at the root of many an accident). In fact, only an idiot would not insist that the build standard was stabilised at induction to the conversion programme, giving you a KNOWN baseline, rather than an assumed one. Yes, it costs money, but given the mandated requirement to maintain that build standard was ditched 3 years previously, at the time it was a well known risk which project offices considered a routine task.
That a mandated, but missing, airworthiness component was considered routine is indeed an indictment of the System.
Thank you tucumseh, for a readable authoritative and succinct resume of the road to purgatory. How on earth could air ranking professionals, be they pilots or engineers, participate in such a doomed enterprise? "I was merely obeying orders" doesn't even begin to explain this lemming like abandonment of fundamental Flight Safety principles. No matter what changes are made in house to rehabilitate UK Military Airworthiness Provision, the fact remains that if it could happen once then it can happen again and again. Airworthiness is not safe solely in the hands of the MOD, or any other user for that matter. It must be enforced by a separate and independent authority, an MAA.
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Dear All,
So a week on and no comprehensive rebutal of the scenario I postulated.
Remember, I do not say that this definitely happened, but to find gross negligence you must be able to say that this definitely did not happen.
Walter raised some fair points which I will address:
I envisaged a progressive failure with the slight left turn merely being the last straw that caused loss of control.
I have been in a pitching APC, where even with small pitches of 0.5-1 metre it was impossible to use the controls, so I do not find it that difficult to believe in a violently pitching aircraft, as postulated, it is impossible to manipulate controls effectively.
In the scenario I postulated I did not mention any engine run ups. The consequence of the postulated decu failure was misleading information.
Could you explain this more.
EG
So a week on and no comprehensive rebutal of the scenario I postulated.
Remember, I do not say that this definitely happened, but to find gross negligence you must be able to say that this definitely did not happen.
Walter raised some fair points which I will address:
if you look at the tracks, they were only closing with the shoreline at about 20 deg – only a slight turn left would have taken them up the coast – and presumably, being over the level sea, a lot less stressful control inputs were going on compared to when they were low flying over the 10 miles or so of Antrim hills that they had crossed earlier in the flight – such a coincidence that they should fail just there, surely?
It is also highly improbable that the engines would have been found closely matched and with no record of emergency power demands if they had been struggling with a control problem.
I have been in a pitching APC, where even with small pitches of 0.5-1 metre it was impossible to use the controls, so I do not find it that difficult to believe in a violently pitching aircraft, as postulated, it is impossible to manipulate controls effectively.
Regarding undemanded power surges – I have made the point before that had this occurred the obvious immediate response would surely have been to pull up so keeping the RPM within limits – this would have been to their advantage, a miracle if it had happened. Anyway, there are 3 things which I can think of which argue against any undemanded run-up: no history in the DECU of such; distance/time calculations by Boeing indicate that they had started to slow down (in airspeed) over the course of the leg from waypoint change to impact; the engines were found to have been at matched power (within limits normally requiring power trim by either the pilots or the FADEC and normally when in a steady state – I suggest such as level cruise, cruise climb, approach, etc).
In the scenario I postulated I did not mention any engine run ups. The consequence of the postulated decu failure was misleading information.
Not forgetting that unless they had a reason for going there, they were already imprudently close in, in the prevailing conditions, by
EG
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NC
'There was definately a mod carried out on the control pallets I removed enough of them for that purpose. I can't remember the details of the fix because it was done by the structure repair bay team off aircraft'
If you are talking of the control pallet afore of stn ? 120 on the LHS then it is the same pallett.
'I have enjoyed playing E mail tennis with you but we are not really advancing the cause, so it is probably time to agree to disagree on this point. But I will end by saying that in 25 years of working on the Chinook Mk1 and 2 including 5 years of instucting at the maintenance school I never once saw, adjusted, measured, pinned or taught anything remotely like you described'
This is not a contest!
I believe we are talking about the same thing, I also flew on the Mk1 and Mk2; just stn numbers that differ? and those only because I have been in other a/c types since? So I fully accept they are incorrect.
Were you present in Aldergrove the day prior to the a/c departing on its last flight? and did you view the delaminated control pallette?
'There was definately a mod carried out on the control pallets I removed enough of them for that purpose. I can't remember the details of the fix because it was done by the structure repair bay team off aircraft'
If you are talking of the control pallet afore of stn ? 120 on the LHS then it is the same pallett.
'I have enjoyed playing E mail tennis with you but we are not really advancing the cause, so it is probably time to agree to disagree on this point. But I will end by saying that in 25 years of working on the Chinook Mk1 and 2 including 5 years of instucting at the maintenance school I never once saw, adjusted, measured, pinned or taught anything remotely like you described'
This is not a contest!
I believe we are talking about the same thing, I also flew on the Mk1 and Mk2; just stn numbers that differ? and those only because I have been in other a/c types since? So I fully accept they are incorrect.
Were you present in Aldergrove the day prior to the a/c departing on its last flight? and did you view the delaminated control pallette?
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Maybe the big picture is just too hard to swallow at one go – perhaps you all could apply your knowledge to one significant aspect at a time.
Let's start with engine power:
(from memory)
Luckily (from an analysis perspective that is) the last manouevre was of insufficient duration for the thrust lever demand to have been reacted to by the engine management system and so we know the state of the engines just before impact.
AAIB etc had it that the engines were at matched power settiings and at an “intermediate level”;
Boeing's “Analysis of available data” had it that they had started to slow down on the final leg.
Why don't you all address these two related points?
Do some homework/ask around to clarify what “intermediate” meant – was it about right for coasting in on an approach? – just enough thrust to balance the weight while the speed washed off.
Because if it was and you agree with Boeing's analysis that it was slowing down, then it would seem that the intention was not to maintain the high cruise speed, continuing the route – nor to climb over the Mull. Just from this, the analysis problem is reduced significantly.
Let's start with engine power:
(from memory)
Luckily (from an analysis perspective that is) the last manouevre was of insufficient duration for the thrust lever demand to have been reacted to by the engine management system and so we know the state of the engines just before impact.
AAIB etc had it that the engines were at matched power settiings and at an “intermediate level”;
Boeing's “Analysis of available data” had it that they had started to slow down on the final leg.
Why don't you all address these two related points?
Do some homework/ask around to clarify what “intermediate” meant – was it about right for coasting in on an approach? – just enough thrust to balance the weight while the speed washed off.
Because if it was and you agree with Boeing's analysis that it was slowing down, then it would seem that the intention was not to maintain the high cruise speed, continuing the route – nor to climb over the Mull. Just from this, the analysis problem is reduced significantly.
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Tandemrotor,
Perhaps you would be so kind as to reply to the 2 Questions I asked you in Post 4332? They are, I would suggest, fundamental - given the difference between the scenarios posted on this thread as opposed to the evidence given on oath to the BOI.
Perhaps you would be so kind as to reply to the 2 Questions I asked you in Post 4332? They are, I would suggest, fundamental - given the difference between the scenarios posted on this thread as opposed to the evidence given on oath to the BOI.
Why assume evidence given under oath to a BOI is true? I know for a fact, of one MACR that lied under oath to a BOI, and is stil employed by HRH.
I do appreciate many disagree with this, not least Ainsworth, who has been happy to place this in writing.
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I have a very clear recollection of briefing Ainsworth on the supposed "new evidence" put forward by the Mull group. After a short discussion his view was that there was nothing new and nothing would change his mind or the Government on the findings of the BOI.
Seems I wrote a very clear and cogent destructiuon of the Mull group submission that the Minister clearly supported. So did S of S. So did CAS and ACAS.
So will every future S of S and PM.
After nearly 15 years and no change from a Government of either colour there is no prospect of any change of findings.
Seems I wrote a very clear and cogent destructiuon of the Mull group submission that the Minister clearly supported. So did S of S. So did CAS and ACAS.
So will every future S of S and PM.
After nearly 15 years and no change from a Government of either colour there is no prospect of any change of findings.
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Atlantic Cowboy is telling it as it is.
I suggest that the unjust verdict was politically expedient at the time and, given the ongoing sensitivities in the region, may remain so beyond our lifetime.
Thus the onus falls on interested parties, who wish to clear the names of the pilots, to prove that something other than negligence on behalf of the pilots caused the crash.
While the Mull Group is correct in that there was not sufficient evidence for the verdict of gross negligence, and that it was therefore unjust, I would suggest that their strategy of not digging into the flight planning and conduct lest anything detrimental to their cause emerge has had the effect of blinkering debate, intentional or not.
I believe that there could be sufficient evidence of an extra activity in the vicinity of the Mull – I have done my best to point out the parameters that indicate this – it requires people who were in the right positions at the time to recognise and correlate these parameters such that an authoritative statement can be made which could open up further formal investigations.
Any such extra task being exposed that has hitherto not been disclosed by the authorities would immediately void that unjust verdict – it could also ultimately lead to real justice.
I suggest that the unjust verdict was politically expedient at the time and, given the ongoing sensitivities in the region, may remain so beyond our lifetime.
Thus the onus falls on interested parties, who wish to clear the names of the pilots, to prove that something other than negligence on behalf of the pilots caused the crash.
While the Mull Group is correct in that there was not sufficient evidence for the verdict of gross negligence, and that it was therefore unjust, I would suggest that their strategy of not digging into the flight planning and conduct lest anything detrimental to their cause emerge has had the effect of blinkering debate, intentional or not.
I believe that there could be sufficient evidence of an extra activity in the vicinity of the Mull – I have done my best to point out the parameters that indicate this – it requires people who were in the right positions at the time to recognise and correlate these parameters such that an authoritative statement can be made which could open up further formal investigations.
Any such extra task being exposed that has hitherto not been disclosed by the authorities would immediately void that unjust verdict – it could also ultimately lead to real justice.
I have a very clear recollection of briefing Ainsworth on the supposed "new evidence" put forward by the Mull group. After a short discussion his view was that there was nothing new and nothing would change his mind or the Government on the findings of the BOI.
Seems I wrote a very clear and cogent destructiuon of the Mull group submission that the Minister clearly supported. So did S of S. So did CAS and ACAS.
So will every future S of S and PM.
Seems I wrote a very clear and cogent destructiuon of the Mull group submission that the Minister clearly supported. So did S of S. So did CAS and ACAS.
So will every future S of S and PM.
Your loyalty to the party line is very clear. I’m sure, like others, you thought it a thrill to brief Ainsworth (however intellectually unchallenging). But ask around your longer serving colleagues and they’ll tell you that it is you who’ll be hung out to dry when the truth emerges, as it surely will. Your only protection is to attain 2 Star level before that day; the lowest protected species. Step back and ask yourself why you are protecting people you almost certainly don’t know, and who wouldn’t give you a second glance. If you are a Civil Servant, are you sure you are adhering to the Civil Service Code? Your lack of objectivity and impartiality is startling.
The danger this places aviators in is equally clear; but then politicians don’t worry about that. The failure to adhere to very simple regulations meant an aircraft flew that day which was manifestly and demonstrably not fit for purpose. If the MoD’s policy of running down the airworthiness system had been exposed in the immediate aftermath, I wonder how many lives would have been saved subsequently. I wonder if you truly agree with the Chinook 2 Star of the day and CDP (as was) that, for example, airworthiness is optional, and can be traded out in order to meet time and cost. Or that withholding vital evidence is fine. That completely abrogating your duty of care is just dandy. Perhaps you should reflect on those past Ministers, including a Prime Minister who, when told the truth, immediately and publicly stated they would have overturned the verdict had they been so briefed. It is a shame they didn’t follow this through and seek action against those who lied to them, but that seems to be accepted in Government.
I well recall a vacancy arising in the MoD’s “Mull Team”, those charged with answering PQs and the like. An engineering post. The outgoing man had 30-odd years under his belt and was considered inexperienced, as per the personnel rules in the preceding years. A very fine engineer indeed. The Vacancy Notice didn’t ask for any normal qualifications, experience or proven competence. Only that applicants could write a good letter. That is, be told the party line and put it on paper. No thought required. Certainly no technical knowledge. A step change in recruitment policy, unique to that one post. In effect, a political post. I wonder why? Could it be that the Team knew that what they were told to write was spin and nonsense, that true context was missing and vital evidence was being withheld? Were they uncomfortable at how vulnerable their position was? I believe so.
I do hope Ainsworth made good coffee. One should always know ones limitations.
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Nice post Tuc.
Wonder how Atlantic Cowboy's ego is feeling this morning.
What a nob.
Hope they have a CS clear out when Labour lose the election, getting way too political for my liking. Administrators........can't even spell.
Wonder how Atlantic Cowboy's ego is feeling this morning.
What a nob.
Hope they have a CS clear out when Labour lose the election, getting way too political for my liking. Administrators........can't even spell.
Last edited by nigegilb; 3rd May 2009 at 08:43.
Atlantic Cowboy:
"Good day at work today, dear?" "Not bad, not bad at all although I say it myself, indeed quite satisfying. Something nice for dinner?" What a nasty small minded vindictive little world you inhabit, AC, along with all the other apparatchiks like you, bent on nothing more inspiring than seeking to please your minister. This thread is predicated on the honour of two deceased junior officers and the dishonourable way that senior officers destroyed their reputations for their own purposes. Why do I just know that already has your lips curling in wry contempt? Your post illustrates with far more clarity and precision the gulf that separates HM Forces and the MOD than I ever could. The first stands for what is excellent and noble in the ways that they serve this country with dedication and fortitude. The second is rotten to the core, betraying those that it owes a duty of care to by deliberately subverting the very regulations that it is mandated to enforce to ensure, inter-alia, aircraft that are airworthy and fit for purpose. That you are so proud of your piddling little contribution speaks volumes. I'm sure that you sleep soundly every night. It wouldn't occur to you not to.
Seems I wrote a very clear and cogent destructiuon of the Mull group submission that the Minister clearly supported
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John Purdey and Atlantic Cowboy just a repeat of my question of 11 Mar 09 (post 4071):
Now I think this question does need to be answered and Atlantic Cowboy seems to be the ideal person to answer it. Why is this important?
John Purdey you have asked on a number of occasions what has changed in the airworthiness state of the Mk2 Chinook since the 2 June 1994. Now I have been trying to think of the people on this thread who could answer that question and I think Atlantic Cowboy may be that person, in his post #3774 he tells us he was a member of the "Mull team" in a post about the much vaunted spreadsheet (that was not released). In it he states:
My recollection and knowledge of the spreadsheet is that it simply records dates of communication from members of the public, MPs, Lords etc. It has no information in it other than the subject matter of the correspondence and where it is filed. It certainly does not contain the airworthiness audit trail because that was not the purpose for which the speadsheet was designed.
To which I later asked:
can you enlighten us if there was a seperate document drawn up that recorded the airworthiness audit trail as part of the investigation and if such a document exists has it (to your knowledge) been made publicly available
Now that we are going around this bouy again, AC would you be kind enough to enlighten us if such a document existed and if so has it been made publically available? I am sure that you will agree John, if AC would be kind enough to answer that question, we may get closer to answering yours.
- The content of such a document will answer many of the questions placed on this thread concerning STIs, FADEC, Contol Pallets etc etc.
- If such a document does not exist it would indicate that the investigation was less than thorough.
- My question to John Purdey - Would the publication of (if it exists) an airworthiness audit trail be useful?
- My question to Atlantic Cowboy - Mindful of points 1 & 2 above, was/has an airworthiness audit trail document been drawn up?
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Chugalug 2
Thank you for your clear and effective contributions to this thread. As a (long-retired!) RAF test pilot, I entirely endorse your measured views. Please do not be put off by snide comments from the likes of JP, who seem to be pursuing their own separate agendas, which have nothing to do with the shining, noble purpose of this thread.
Seeing the success she has had with the equally honourable cause of Gurkha resettlement, should we be recruiting Joanna Lumley to the support of our cause?!
Seeing the success she has had with the equally honourable cause of Gurkha resettlement, should we be recruiting Joanna Lumley to the support of our cause?!
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Atlantic Cowboy,
I have never claimed to be a Chinook expert. I have, however listened to Sqn Ldr Burke. At the time of the accident, I believe he was one of the most qualified Chinook experts in the Royal Air Force. He reasons that there are more likely alternatives to aircrew error. Pray tell us why your opinions are superior to his?
I have never claimed to be a Chinook expert. I have, however listened to Sqn Ldr Burke. At the time of the accident, I believe he was one of the most qualified Chinook experts in the Royal Air Force. He reasons that there are more likely alternatives to aircrew error. Pray tell us why your opinions are superior to his?