As I recall (from memory rather than looking up just now), Boeing did recommend checks in the control closet for bonding etc in the immediate aftermath and as a result of this crash BUT dropped the requirement only a few months later - presumably because it was not worthwhile as problems were not being found.
Regarding TR's comments:
<<... "Look at this. I wouldn't even consider this a safe means of attachment if this was on my bicycle, and this is the flight control system of a helicopter!"
I am intrigued to know whether chinook240 can tell us how this item has changed since the accident?... >>
Well such means of attachment are common in a/c where weight is at a premium – and it has been good in an awful lot of 47Ds, before and since ZD576, has it not?
You are grabbing at straws with this control issue – you are postulating that a reliable a/c type had a very rare jam just when it was near a critical point on its route and just when it was carrying passengers of special value – and this despite there being no evidence of a jam.
Yet at this critical point there is evidence of an intention to land in a controlled fashion at a known LZ for Chinooks.
Anything but the unpalletable obvious?