Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
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PKPF68-77
re your points:
(1) The MOD reply implies that they cannot identify this individual – a real pity that.
(2) If they had no need or instruction to approach it very closely, they should have taken action earlier than the position of waypoint change (very close in) – if they had to get closer, for whatever reason, their problem would not have been that they could not see it but rather judging how far off they were – they would not have trusted the SuperTANS to have been accurate enough after a sea crossing.
(3) You could download and read Boeing's “Analysis of Available Data” (Mitchel), a decent effort, wherein it is calculated that they had indeed started to slow down significantly but that the increase in tail wind as they closley approached the landmass and crossed the shoreline compensated for the reduction achieved before the final few seconds.
A simple explanation for their actions is that they intended to approach a particular point on the Mull but something they were using as a local reference misled them in their judgment of range to go – that something would have had to have been trusted to have been more accurate than the SuperTANS as they had discarded the only useful waypoint to them , A, that had been stored in the SuperTANS.
re your points:
(1) The MOD reply implies that they cannot identify this individual – a real pity that.
(2) If they had no need or instruction to approach it very closely, they should have taken action earlier than the position of waypoint change (very close in) – if they had to get closer, for whatever reason, their problem would not have been that they could not see it but rather judging how far off they were – they would not have trusted the SuperTANS to have been accurate enough after a sea crossing.
(3) You could download and read Boeing's “Analysis of Available Data” (Mitchel), a decent effort, wherein it is calculated that they had indeed started to slow down significantly but that the increase in tail wind as they closley approached the landmass and crossed the shoreline compensated for the reduction achieved before the final few seconds.
A simple explanation for their actions is that they intended to approach a particular point on the Mull but something they were using as a local reference misled them in their judgment of range to go – that something would have had to have been trusted to have been more accurate than the SuperTANS as they had discarded the only useful waypoint to them , A, that had been stored in the SuperTANS.
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JP
As you will know, this is how you responded to my question:
Post:3853
You KNOW you avoided answering, and simply posed ANOTHER question!
Do we HAVE to play these infantile games?
I ask AGAIN, in view of the following:
Do you believe this aircraft, at this time was fit for purpose?
Thank you.
As you will know, this is how you responded to my question:
Post:3853
Tandemrotor. Apologies for not replying to your much earlier question, I must have been away, which was "May I just ask cazatou (K52), and john purdey: Was this aircraft fit for purpose?"
If we assume, purely for the purposes of this discussion, that the a/c was not fit for purpose, then please say exactly what mods were incorporated after the accident to so successfully prevent a repetition over the past 15 years.
If we assume, purely for the purposes of this discussion, that the a/c was not fit for purpose, then please say exactly what mods were incorporated after the accident to so successfully prevent a repetition over the past 15 years.
Do we HAVE to play these infantile games?
I ask AGAIN, in view of the following:
6. RWTS has carefully monitored the progress of this trial and has put tremendous effort into ensuring that it progresses safely to provide timely CA release recommendations. These recommendations with respect to FADEC have, to date, been ignored. Until RWTS is provided with a clear, unequivocal and realistic explanation of the faults described at references B through H, with corrective action, further Chinook HC2 flying shall not be authorised. A statement of 'No Fault Found' will no longer satisfy this requirement.
7. As a trials organisation, A&AEE has always been keenly aware of the risks associated with operating the Chinook HC2 and has tailored sortie profiles accordingly. Crews of the RAF have no such luxury and are likely at higher risk than the A&AEE crews. As such, RWTS deem it imperative that, in the strongest possible terms, the RAF should be provided with a recommendation to cease Chinook HC2 operations until the conditions established in paragraph 6 are satisfied
May I just ask cazatou (K52), and john purdey: Was this aircraft fit for purpose?
7. As a trials organisation, A&AEE has always been keenly aware of the risks associated with operating the Chinook HC2 and has tailored sortie profiles accordingly. Crews of the RAF have no such luxury and are likely at higher risk than the A&AEE crews. As such, RWTS deem it imperative that, in the strongest possible terms, the RAF should be provided with a recommendation to cease Chinook HC2 operations until the conditions established in paragraph 6 are satisfied
May I just ask cazatou (K52), and john purdey: Was this aircraft fit for purpose?
Thank you.
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Chinook
Tucumseh. My answer is that, not having access to the paperwork, I do not know whether it was fit or not. Perhaps Brian ("I have the documents") could help us. But now that I have given you my rather unsatisfactory answer, will you now replt to mine? REgards. JP
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Shy,
the litigation came about following damage to a Chinook during testing in the USA on 20 Jan 89. This legal action, between the MoD and Textron Lycoming went to arbitration and was settled in 1995 when the MoD was awarded $3 million in damages. No cash exchanged hands, but the compensation was recovered by way of amendments to other contracts (can't remember the exact wording).
It was said that the litigation was due to faulty testing procedures, but the MoD have been unable to locate the documents relating to this failed test procedure
In response to a Parliamentary question by Mr Frank Field, the then Armed Forces Minister, John Spellar replied, "At the time of the RAF Board of Inquiry into the Mull of Kintyre accident, Sir William Wratten was not aware of this litigation and did not recall the Wilmington incident that led to this legal action being taken. Sir John Day was aware that there had been a problem with FADEC testing, but did not know of the extent of the Department's legal claim."
No one thought it prudent to bring the matter to the attention of the President of the BoI either!
Mr Purdey,
contrary to what the Secretary of State for Defence would have you believe, I do not have all the documents. However, as he has said that they are available, I look forward to their arrival in the near future.
I don't know for certain whether the aircraft was fit for purpose, but as it had just 57.15 flying hours on the clock since the upgrade and it had the following problems, I would hazard a guess that it (ZD576) was not fit.
8 Apr 94 - Returned from Boeing. Has a FADEC related problem.
21 Apr 94 - Torque mismatch of 40% during transit to hover.
22 Apr 94 - No 1 engine is replaced.
26 Apr 94 - No torque indication to either engine with the engine control levers at the flight idle position. No 1 engine is replaced again.
3 May 94 - GPS failure on the RNS252. Transmitter is replaced.
5 May 94 - GPS fails again. This time the whole thing is replaced.
9 May 94 - No GPS feed to the RNS 252. The transmitter is, again, replaced.
10 May 94 - Thrust balance spring pallet detaches from the collective lever due to a bonding failure. Thrust & yaw assembly was replaced.
17 May 94 - During descent to low level the No 1 engine emergency power caption light illumunates three times. Engine temperature went beyond normal levels. No 1 engine was removed and rebuilt. Part of the FADEC system was returned to the manufacturer for examination.
26 May 94 - Numerous warning lights illuminate, including a 'master' warning light and a No 2 engine failure notification. Aircraft diverted.
31 May 94 - Aircraft delivered to Aldergrove. IR jammer has a problem and is replaced.
1 Jun 94 - During the first flight, there is a problem with the PTIT guage. It is also noted that there is interference on the UHF/AM radio, caused by the SuperTans equipment. Neither problem could be recreated on the ground.
Not to mention, of course that the AAIB investigators could not positively determine pre-impact serviceability.
My best, as always,
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
the litigation came about following damage to a Chinook during testing in the USA on 20 Jan 89. This legal action, between the MoD and Textron Lycoming went to arbitration and was settled in 1995 when the MoD was awarded $3 million in damages. No cash exchanged hands, but the compensation was recovered by way of amendments to other contracts (can't remember the exact wording).
It was said that the litigation was due to faulty testing procedures, but the MoD have been unable to locate the documents relating to this failed test procedure
In response to a Parliamentary question by Mr Frank Field, the then Armed Forces Minister, John Spellar replied, "At the time of the RAF Board of Inquiry into the Mull of Kintyre accident, Sir William Wratten was not aware of this litigation and did not recall the Wilmington incident that led to this legal action being taken. Sir John Day was aware that there had been a problem with FADEC testing, but did not know of the extent of the Department's legal claim."
No one thought it prudent to bring the matter to the attention of the President of the BoI either!
Mr Purdey,
contrary to what the Secretary of State for Defence would have you believe, I do not have all the documents. However, as he has said that they are available, I look forward to their arrival in the near future.
I don't know for certain whether the aircraft was fit for purpose, but as it had just 57.15 flying hours on the clock since the upgrade and it had the following problems, I would hazard a guess that it (ZD576) was not fit.
8 Apr 94 - Returned from Boeing. Has a FADEC related problem.
21 Apr 94 - Torque mismatch of 40% during transit to hover.
22 Apr 94 - No 1 engine is replaced.
26 Apr 94 - No torque indication to either engine with the engine control levers at the flight idle position. No 1 engine is replaced again.
3 May 94 - GPS failure on the RNS252. Transmitter is replaced.
5 May 94 - GPS fails again. This time the whole thing is replaced.
9 May 94 - No GPS feed to the RNS 252. The transmitter is, again, replaced.
10 May 94 - Thrust balance spring pallet detaches from the collective lever due to a bonding failure. Thrust & yaw assembly was replaced.
17 May 94 - During descent to low level the No 1 engine emergency power caption light illumunates three times. Engine temperature went beyond normal levels. No 1 engine was removed and rebuilt. Part of the FADEC system was returned to the manufacturer for examination.
26 May 94 - Numerous warning lights illuminate, including a 'master' warning light and a No 2 engine failure notification. Aircraft diverted.
31 May 94 - Aircraft delivered to Aldergrove. IR jammer has a problem and is replaced.
1 Jun 94 - During the first flight, there is a problem with the PTIT guage. It is also noted that there is interference on the UHF/AM radio, caused by the SuperTans equipment. Neither problem could be recreated on the ground.
Not to mention, of course that the AAIB investigators could not positively determine pre-impact serviceability.
My best, as always,
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
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Chinook
Brian. Many thanks; at last some facts to chew on! (By the way, it was you who said 'I have the documents' from which I suppose it was reasonable to think that you had them all). With all good wishes. JP
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Brian, thanks for your answers. I hadn't seen the list of unservicabilities suffered by the actual airframe and somthing therein glares out at me.
Please check your pms.
Please check your pms.
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Mr Purdey
You wrote to Brian:
I don't know the context of Brian's quote but his statement wouldn't appear to mean that he had ALL the documents. Even the MoD doesn't have ALL the documents, or at least it frequently claims not to have the ones that have been requested!
By the way, I have a question for you:
Do you agree with AM Wratten that the crew was grossly negligent prior to selecting the new waypoint and, if so, why?
Regards,
Meadowbank
You wrote to Brian:
By the way, it was you who said 'I have the documents' from which I suppose it was reasonable to think that you had them all
By the way, I have a question for you:
Do you agree with AM Wratten that the crew was grossly negligent prior to selecting the new waypoint and, if so, why?
Regards,
Meadowbank
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Chinook
Meadowbank. I'm afraid you must have missed many of the much earlier exchanges on the subject of negligence, and with due respect I suggest you scroll back. Have a good Christmas. Regards to all. JP
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PKPF68-77
You are a weather person and so should be able to go over all the available information from all sources with an experienced eye – and not get stuck on the conditions at Mac - It was only very near the Mull that conditions were bad coming from NI – the cloud base was well up and the isolated patches at low level were evidently not a problem during the sea crossing. As I have said before, they would only have had a problem if they had had to approach very closely for some reason.
If you want to consider their airmanship and their a/c's capabilities you could look at their path over the Antrim hills earlier in the flight. Boeing's analysis has it that they must have kept very much on track and maintained their high cruising speed all the way to the position of waypoint change to have gotten there by the time they did. So you can assume a track of 027 and plot this on very large maps. You would then perhaps see that they had negotiated about 10 miles of hills with very little headroom beneath the cloudbase, presumably exercising the controls vigorously and demonstrating that they were not at all lacking in ability that day.
Indeed, it is amazing that, after that leg, anyone could entertain the idea that such a crew could not have avoided what is essentially an isolated low hill. However, as I have been saying for a while, if they had a need to go to a point on the Mull, the conditions were bad for visual judgement of range as they approached.
You are a weather person and so should be able to go over all the available information from all sources with an experienced eye – and not get stuck on the conditions at Mac - It was only very near the Mull that conditions were bad coming from NI – the cloud base was well up and the isolated patches at low level were evidently not a problem during the sea crossing. As I have said before, they would only have had a problem if they had had to approach very closely for some reason.
If you want to consider their airmanship and their a/c's capabilities you could look at their path over the Antrim hills earlier in the flight. Boeing's analysis has it that they must have kept very much on track and maintained their high cruising speed all the way to the position of waypoint change to have gotten there by the time they did. So you can assume a track of 027 and plot this on very large maps. You would then perhaps see that they had negotiated about 10 miles of hills with very little headroom beneath the cloudbase, presumably exercising the controls vigorously and demonstrating that they were not at all lacking in ability that day.
Indeed, it is amazing that, after that leg, anyone could entertain the idea that such a crew could not have avoided what is essentially an isolated low hill. However, as I have been saying for a while, if they had a need to go to a point on the Mull, the conditions were bad for visual judgement of range as they approached.
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An even more damning Boscombe Down letter
Although I have given details of this a long time ago there is, in my view, an even more damning Boscombe Down letter dated 6 June 1994 from the Director of T & E (P&A) to DHP and MOD in addition to the OC RWTS letter aired last week on C4 news. The 6 June letter was not being wise after the event - it concerned matters that had been dicussed at a meeting on 25 May where, inter alia, it was noted that Boscombe had serious concerns about 15 in-service incidents of which 4 were listed in some detail as being a cause of major concern. The last of these four was on ZD 576 on 19 May as detailed in Brian's last post. What is interesting is that following the incident on 19 May ZD 576 was fitted with the engine from the first of these 4 "major" incidents which had been "no fault found". These in-service incidents were, if the letter is to be believed, the second main cause of Boscombe Down stopping their flight trials - thus contrary to what was said in Parliament it was not just a case of FADEC software and BD pedantry about the lack of an audit trail. Were these in-service incidents relevant to the accident - well we don't and never will know. Should they have been looked at by the BoI - yes very definitely - might they have raised more doubts - well I certainly think they should have done
As far as I am aware there is no evidence that the BD letters, and certainly not that of 6 June, were ever brought to the attention of the BoI, and I could not even be certain that the Reviewing Officers saw the 6 June letter (although we do know that the MOD Main Building copy went to Hels2, Flight Safety and ACAS with a note commenting that "by the time you see this it will have been overtaken by events"!). What we also know is that when DHP provided his brief to the MOD Legal Team for the Sherriff's FAI he did not mention either of these key BD letters - I would not think that he would have forgotten about them, so being cynical my personal assumption would have to be that MOD did not want these brought up as they would then have had to give them to the other side - just a personal opinion which I would be happy to be corrected on. As we all know, even without the benefit of the further doubts these letters would almost certainly have created the Sherriff did not anyway accept the gross negligence verdict. Also, as far as I am aware the 6 June letter did not get shown to the H of L Committee, but I am not at home so cannot check the transcripts to confirm this.
JB
As far as I am aware there is no evidence that the BD letters, and certainly not that of 6 June, were ever brought to the attention of the BoI, and I could not even be certain that the Reviewing Officers saw the 6 June letter (although we do know that the MOD Main Building copy went to Hels2, Flight Safety and ACAS with a note commenting that "by the time you see this it will have been overtaken by events"!). What we also know is that when DHP provided his brief to the MOD Legal Team for the Sherriff's FAI he did not mention either of these key BD letters - I would not think that he would have forgotten about them, so being cynical my personal assumption would have to be that MOD did not want these brought up as they would then have had to give them to the other side - just a personal opinion which I would be happy to be corrected on. As we all know, even without the benefit of the further doubts these letters would almost certainly have created the Sherriff did not anyway accept the gross negligence verdict. Also, as far as I am aware the 6 June letter did not get shown to the H of L Committee, but I am not at home so cannot check the transcripts to confirm this.
JB
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Hi PKPF68-77,
apologies. The tumbleweed, as you put it, is down to having other things to attend to.
I'll to answer your questions, as best I can.
1. Unfortunately, we will never know the answer to parts i - iv. The Captain of the aircraft has the ultimate say on things. However, that was not how Special Forces crews operated. If any of the crew were unhappy, they had equal say in the matter. They trusted each other's decision making, and opinions, absolutely. If anyone was not happy, they woould have made their views absolutely clear! The problem is that there was no cockpit voice recorder, so we will never know for certain.
2. Unlikely, but we will never know for sure.
3. Not really an answer, but I can't get my head around it either. Rick had actually carried out a low level abort in that area some weeks earlier and all crew knew the area really well. Why things ended up as they did will always be a mystery, but there are too many anomalies and incertainties to be able to say, with absolutely no doubt whatsoever, why this tragedy occurred.
My best, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
apologies. The tumbleweed, as you put it, is down to having other things to attend to.
I'll to answer your questions, as best I can.
1. Unfortunately, we will never know the answer to parts i - iv. The Captain of the aircraft has the ultimate say on things. However, that was not how Special Forces crews operated. If any of the crew were unhappy, they had equal say in the matter. They trusted each other's decision making, and opinions, absolutely. If anyone was not happy, they woould have made their views absolutely clear! The problem is that there was no cockpit voice recorder, so we will never know for certain.
2. Unlikely, but we will never know for sure.
3. Not really an answer, but I can't get my head around it either. Rick had actually carried out a low level abort in that area some weeks earlier and all crew knew the area really well. Why things ended up as they did will always be a mystery, but there are too many anomalies and incertainties to be able to say, with absolutely no doubt whatsoever, why this tragedy occurred.
My best, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
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If only we had the answers, PKPF68-77!
I can also advise you all that our submission to the MoD is now available on the Campaign website. Feel free to have a look. I'm sure it will spark a debate!
The Campaign for Justice for the Pilots of ZD576 (for those of you who have forgotten).
My sincere thanks to Chocks Wahay for all your help in making this possible.
Kind regards,
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
I can also advise you all that our submission to the MoD is now available on the Campaign website. Feel free to have a look. I'm sure it will spark a debate!
The Campaign for Justice for the Pilots of ZD576 (for those of you who have forgotten).
My sincere thanks to Chocks Wahay for all your help in making this possible.
Kind regards,
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
Thanks Brian, I've just downloaded it and should therefore finish my appraisal in 11 months time!
Could I also mention how delighted I am that the Chinook boys and girls in AFG have won the "Best Military Unit" award in the Millies (SUN Military Awards) prog on Sky1? I'm sure that Rick and Jon would also have been delighted that the essential and dangerous work that they do is so appreciated by their customers, for whom they in turn expressed their awe. Well done Wokkas, thoroughly well deserved!
Could I also mention how delighted I am that the Chinook boys and girls in AFG have won the "Best Military Unit" award in the Millies (SUN Military Awards) prog on Sky1? I'm sure that Rick and Jon would also have been delighted that the essential and dangerous work that they do is so appreciated by their customers, for whom they in turn expressed their awe. Well done Wokkas, thoroughly well deserved!
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John Purdey,
Thank you for your, as ever, polite reply. I didn't miss your earlier posts on the subject, but many opinions have been expressed on this thread and remembering exact positiions taken by each individual contributor is beyond my brain capacity. Thankfully, Pulse 1 pointed me in the right direction and I am now able to confirm your position (wouldn't it have been more polite simply to express it again?), which is:
We know from the yachtsman's evidence that the visibility outside of the clouds was "certainly in excess of 3 miles and possibly 5 miles". Further, he stated that, at the time of the accident, he could see the Antrim coast, which was 7 miles away.
Having flown in the area on many occasions, it is quite normal for excellent visibilty to exist outside any low cloud/hill fog patches and it is improbable that the pilots could not see the base of the Mull with the clouds sitting on it, when the waypoint change was made. Indeed, it is quite likely that, given their higher altitude (than the yachtsman's) this phenomenon was visible on (or soon after) crossing the Irish coast, just 16 nm from the Mull.
With a perfectly legal 5 nm (or more) visibility (even for flight in a fast jet at far higher speeds) the crew continued visually towards the hill, waiting for the appropriate moment to turn left towards Corran. There is nothing negligent in the course of action that I have just described.
Perhaps you would be kind enough to explain what I'm missing up to the Waypoint change? Merry Christmas to you and yours.
Thank you for your, as ever, polite reply. I didn't miss your earlier posts on the subject, but many opinions have been expressed on this thread and remembering exact positiions taken by each individual contributor is beyond my brain capacity. Thankfully, Pulse 1 pointed me in the right direction and I am now able to confirm your position (wouldn't it have been more polite simply to express it again?
), which is:
We do not of course know what the crew could see ahead of them, but the reports we have make it clear that there was cloud/mist/fog (take your pick) over some or all of those hilltops. I do know those hills, and I simply say that I myself would have turned away, especially since, having just made a sea crossing, I could not have known without any doubt whatever that I knew precisely where I was.
Having flown in the area on many occasions, it is quite normal for excellent visibilty to exist outside any low cloud/hill fog patches and it is improbable that the pilots could not see the base of the Mull with the clouds sitting on it, when the waypoint change was made. Indeed, it is quite likely that, given their higher altitude (than the yachtsman's) this phenomenon was visible on (or soon after) crossing the Irish coast, just 16 nm from the Mull.
With a perfectly legal 5 nm (or more) visibility (even for flight in a fast jet at far higher speeds) the crew continued visually towards the hill, waiting for the appropriate moment to turn left towards Corran. There is nothing negligent in the course of action that I have just described.
Perhaps you would be kind enough to explain what I'm missing up to the Waypoint change? Merry Christmas to you and yours.
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PKPF
There are some stunning, and highly relevent, high res aerial photos of the Mull lighthouse from several angles on a site marinas.com - you can view for free - hit the "map" button and zoom in like on google earth - hit the lighthouse icon and you will see the photos.
The landing area I have referred to (by waypoint A) stands out like a dogs ball.
.
Not being rude, PK, but I thought you still lived in the area - I seem to recall suggesting to you before last summer that you take some photos of the mist yourself (say from a boat) - I managed to take a few (and have posted some) and I live on the other side of the world.
I am also rather disappointed at your descriptions of weather formation - does it really matter if it is from a polar bears backside or whatever the tech terms were - it was blowing from the south over a fair bit of sea after a summers day - tends to be a bit moist? - cool it a bit and voila - common/predictable that it woulkd form on such headlands.
While you did at least use the "upslope" word, you did not describe what happens when a strong wind hits a sloping headland - that the lower layer gets compressed, speeds up, gets cooler, reaches its dew point well below the start of the oro cloud - veils the lower slopes following them - you can actually be above it but below the oro cloud. You must have seen it?
Just keep everything confusing like the others, eh?
There are some stunning, and highly relevent, high res aerial photos of the Mull lighthouse from several angles on a site marinas.com - you can view for free - hit the "map" button and zoom in like on google earth - hit the lighthouse icon and you will see the photos.
The landing area I have referred to (by waypoint A) stands out like a dogs ball.
.
Not being rude, PK, but I thought you still lived in the area - I seem to recall suggesting to you before last summer that you take some photos of the mist yourself (say from a boat) - I managed to take a few (and have posted some) and I live on the other side of the world.
I am also rather disappointed at your descriptions of weather formation - does it really matter if it is from a polar bears backside or whatever the tech terms were - it was blowing from the south over a fair bit of sea after a summers day - tends to be a bit moist? - cool it a bit and voila - common/predictable that it woulkd form on such headlands.
While you did at least use the "upslope" word, you did not describe what happens when a strong wind hits a sloping headland - that the lower layer gets compressed, speeds up, gets cooler, reaches its dew point well below the start of the oro cloud - veils the lower slopes following them - you can actually be above it but below the oro cloud. You must have seen it?
Just keep everything confusing like the others, eh?
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Vulcanite2
Many thanks Brian. I have just downloaded the submission and Government reply, and will wade through both after Christmas. However, the MOD reply seems to be the same old stonewalling which is most frustrating, especially for you after all your hard work.
My best wishes as always especially for Christmas and 2009; remember the parable of the importunate woman who got there in the end"!
My best wishes as always especially for Christmas and 2009; remember the parable of the importunate woman who got there in the end"!
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And so, upon reading and digesting the MoD’s response I find nothing where they explain away – for it is their accident to explain away – the specific issue raised of hydraulic contamination found in the crash aircraft.
A fractured tie-bolt that linked the pilot controls and the hydraulic servos operating the flight control systems also remains a possible cause. The undisputed evidence found: “The bolt was badly manufactured, with a second, redundant and roughly drilled split-pin hole in the threaded area.”
The MoD say it is not important to know the height or speed of the aircraft at Waypoint change. Negligence had occurred by the time the Waypoint change was made (at a time unknown). The belief the crew had inputted a WP change a postulated 18-21 seconds/1.75km before impact was found wanting when Boeing conceded the simulation could in no way be used to prove what was at best a theory working backwards.
I was curious to know more from Boeing, so I visited them at their military plant in Philadelphia, where ZD576 was born and updated. The Spanish fleet of Chinooks was being updated at that time and Boeing reps. graciously showed me around, allowing me to see the 'broom cupboard' controls area, the wiring, where a key tie-bolt would go. No-one at Boeing I spoke to knows why the Chinook crashed.
The MoD has had a special team of civil servants working the Chinook file. The aftermath has taken up hundreds if not thousands of hours of their time. Brian's suggestion that a more accurate finding would be to say Cause Not Positively Established/Unknown has merit. After all, all we want is the truth and it is that finding that seems the most truthful based on the available facts.
With new details based on eye-popping memos from Boscombe Down, Whitehall should let right be done. Sir Kevin Tebbitt's influence should force the department to move toward legitimacy. We're all tired.
The echo of tragedy surrounding the Mull is that even with the voices and commitment of prime ministers (Major, Thatcher), MoD secretaries of state and junior ministers, Scottish Secretaries, Northern Ireland secretaries, peers, the ministry of defence sits remote and dangerously detached.
Remarkable, the MoD has authority still on its side each time it replies in the negative to common sense argument. But with each year that passes it loses further shine from its shield of legitimacy and over further time it will have few defenders when its most natural defenders are us all.
A fractured tie-bolt that linked the pilot controls and the hydraulic servos operating the flight control systems also remains a possible cause. The undisputed evidence found: “The bolt was badly manufactured, with a second, redundant and roughly drilled split-pin hole in the threaded area.”
The MoD say it is not important to know the height or speed of the aircraft at Waypoint change. Negligence had occurred by the time the Waypoint change was made (at a time unknown). The belief the crew had inputted a WP change a postulated 18-21 seconds/1.75km before impact was found wanting when Boeing conceded the simulation could in no way be used to prove what was at best a theory working backwards.
I was curious to know more from Boeing, so I visited them at their military plant in Philadelphia, where ZD576 was born and updated. The Spanish fleet of Chinooks was being updated at that time and Boeing reps. graciously showed me around, allowing me to see the 'broom cupboard' controls area, the wiring, where a key tie-bolt would go. No-one at Boeing I spoke to knows why the Chinook crashed.
The MoD has had a special team of civil servants working the Chinook file. The aftermath has taken up hundreds if not thousands of hours of their time. Brian's suggestion that a more accurate finding would be to say Cause Not Positively Established/Unknown has merit. After all, all we want is the truth and it is that finding that seems the most truthful based on the available facts.
With new details based on eye-popping memos from Boscombe Down, Whitehall should let right be done. Sir Kevin Tebbitt's influence should force the department to move toward legitimacy. We're all tired.
The echo of tragedy surrounding the Mull is that even with the voices and commitment of prime ministers (Major, Thatcher), MoD secretaries of state and junior ministers, Scottish Secretaries, Northern Ireland secretaries, peers, the ministry of defence sits remote and dangerously detached.
Remarkable, the MoD has authority still on its side each time it replies in the negative to common sense argument. But with each year that passes it loses further shine from its shield of legitimacy and over further time it will have few defenders when its most natural defenders are us all.
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I hope this diagram will make it easier to visualise the orientation better - the cross at the bottom is the position of waypoint change (WPCHX) and the red line going up the map represents the bearing to Corran; also, a red line follows 035 mag (the course setting as found on the HP's HSI) which goes through the crash site.
It is clearly nonsense to think that after having changed the waypoint to Corran they would have been safe if they had turned onto that heading.
Nav info relative to Corran from where they were was worthless in comparison to the still useful waypoint A - there had to be a reason for their effectively discarding the GPS/Doppler nav system.
It is clearly nonsense to think that after having changed the waypoint to Corran they would have been safe if they had turned onto that heading.
Nav info relative to Corran from where they were was worthless in comparison to the still useful waypoint A - there had to be a reason for their effectively discarding the GPS/Doppler nav system.