Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)

[John Purdey]

Chinook

Meadowbank. Did you really think that CAS would not take such a close interest in what was bound to be a high profile accident. After all, the PM himself -as I recall- made an early statement in the House about it. (Long silence by me caused by absences abroad- and, no, not incarcerated!) John Purdey

[Brian Dixon]

Hi Mr Purdey,
welcome back. I hope that your travels were enjoyable.

One would assume that the Prime Minister would not make any public comments without first speaking to his advisors who, in turn, would probably have been briefed by the CAS or his team. I seem to recall that subsequently, Sir John Major has stated that had he known then, what he knows now, he would not have accepted the MoD's position.

The CAS did, indeed, take a close interest in this tragic case, so much so, that he made a non-too complimentary comment in a letter to a former colleague. The 'interest' as you put it, from those right at the top of the food chain clearly indicates the pressure the President of the Board of Inquiry must have been placed under. Mr Pulford is one of the few people who can hold his head up high, as he had the courage to both stick to his guns and stick to the facts.

What a pity that those entitled only to express an opinion could not do the same.

Hopefully the not-so-new Defence Secretary is getting up to speed with the case and will make a decision soon.

My best, as always.
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[cazatou]

Shy Torque,

I could comment (after consulting those in Authority current on the relevant Type) on Andover, Hercules, HS125 and BAe 146 incidents/accidents as I had direct experience of operating all those Aircraft Types. With Fast Jet and Helicopter incidents and accidents I consulted with the relevant Air Staff and Engineering Staff and passed my comments through them for approval prior to submission.

With regard to Incidents; I often found that a more "Broad Brush" approach was necessary. One example will suffice:

I was sitting alone in the FS Office one morning (GFSO was absent at Staff College) when a young (and very smart) LAC from the Movements Cell came in with a single sheet of A4 paper and said "We think this is for you Sir". The sheet of A4 held a cartoon which had been Faxed from RAFG and showed a Tornado Aircraft with "Tractor Tyres" crossing a newly ploughed field and a sign post saying "RAF XXXXX" 1/2 mile.

I phoned the SFSO at XXXXX who drove around the Airfield perimeter and located the Aircraft tracks in the undershoot area of the main runway. I then drafted a suitably worded signal from SASO to the Stn Cdr RAF XXXXX asking why no Incident Signal had been received regarding the touchdown by a Tornado in the undershoot - what damage had been suffered by the aircraft; and what further action he proposed to take over this Incident.

I then briefed SASO who reviewed the evidence and signed the signal.

It was not a 1st Tourist or somebody refreshing on type - it was a Sqn Exec who had failed to report the incident!!

I believe there were "ramifications".

Doubtless you will think my actions were reprehensible.

[ShyTorque]

Cazatou, My question was:

Why did you need to consult them "as required"? So are you saying you had more to do with the outcome of the BOI than you have previously declared?

I don't see a reply to that question, which I asked only with regard to the Mull accident.

I have no interest in commenting on your actions regarding fixed wing accidents such as the one you mentioned. They are totally irrelevant to this thread and I have no experience of those types. I would not even try to pass judgement on those involved. But thanks for asking.

I would be grateful if you could reply to the question I asked though.

Thank you again.

[meadowbank]

JP
Welcome back indeed.

Did you really think that CAS would not take such a close interest in what was bound to be a high profile accident.

So what you are saying is that CinC STC will have discussed what he was about to publish with CAS and will have therefore been aware of his views on the subject? It would seem to follow, therefore, that AOC 1 Gp will have performed a similar process with CinC STC. This way all the Command Chain ducks will have been put into a neat little row. Doesn't this seem a rather unfair process for those at the receiving end of this combined judgement? Wanting one day to be CinC STC himself, it was in AOC 1 Gp's interest to say what he knew CinC STC and CAS had already agreed, especially given CinC STC's "unequivocal views" as laid out in his appalling letter to Stn Cdrs in Feb 95.

The Board of Inquiry process has since been changed and, under the new regime, a finding of 'Gross Negligence' in these circumstances could not occur. Accordingly, the finding against Tapper & Cook should now be withdrawn.

[John Purdey]

Chinook

Meadowbank. Have a care! You know quite well that I said no such thing; indeed, I had understood from (much) earlier posts that CinC and AOC had expressly refused to discuss the findings until they had first seen the papers. With all good wishes, John Purdey

[Brian Dixon]

... and when the CinC did see the papers, he sent them back because the verdict was not the one that he wanted.

Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[cazatou]

Shy Torque,

Group Flight Safety Staff had a duty to comment on each and every incident and accident from a Flight Safety perspective. This would require consultation with the Air and Engineering Staff for that type of aircraft -irrespective of any assessment of Human Failings. It could also require consultation with Medical, Administrative, Air Traffic Control and Movements Staff.

This process would have been repeated at STC level and, in this particular case, it was repeated at MOD level with the final review carried out by CAS.

[John Purdey]

Chinook

Brian. Your 3732; I seem to recall you saying all those months ago that 'I have the documents'. Could you please say what exactly they reveal about the handling of the original BofI? Regards as always. JP

[Brian Dixon]

Mr Purdey.
Let me change that to "I still have the documents".

The Campaign gave it's word that no disclosure of said documents would be made until the SoS for Defence has made a decision. Nothing has changed to make us go back on our word.

Hopefully not much longer though.
Kind regards,
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[John Purdey]

Chinook

Brian. Understood. Let us hope that these disclusures will be made before too long, including of course a clear answer to my last question. With all good wishes, JP.

[John Purdey]

Chinook

Brian.
You tell us "... and when the CinC did see the papers, he sent them back because the verdict was not the one that he wanted. "
But that would mean that CinC was guilty of telling the HofL Select Committee what Churchill once called 'terminological inexactitudes' in other words LIES.
I do hope that you can justify such an astonishing accusation. John Purdey

[tucumseh]

John

But that would mean that CinC was guilty of telling the HofL Select Committee what Churchill once called 'terminological inexactitudes' in other words LIES.

I'm afraid telling porkies, or being economical with the truth, to HofC and Public Accounts Committees is par for the course. I can only speak from personal experience, but recall being held up to ridicule when I offered to brief our 4 Star to ensure he knew the facts. The record shows some of what he said was utter nonsense, and if anyone was interested they could trace adverse comments in recent Boards of Inquiry reports directly to these hearings. A good example;

House of Commons - Public Accounts - Thirty-Second Report

[Thud_and_Blunder]

JP - I once had the great misfortune to fly a certain 4-star on a task in an overseas theatre, with him at the controls while I occupied t'other front seat in my capacity as Sqn QHI. Before the flight I asked if he'd ever flown that type of aircraft before and without a moment's hesitation he replied in the negative. Now, as an instructor yourself you'll know not to ask a question to which you don't already know the answer - I'd already spoken to the QHI who'd flown with him previously.

Now if that certain 4-star happened to be someone being referred to here then it could be said that he has "form" (as members of the constabulary allegedly say) for telling porkies. That would be astonishing, wouldn't it? Or perhaps junior officers don't count and are there to be misled anyway, although I don't remember seeing that on my commissioning scroll.

[Brian Dixon]

Mr Purdey,
I'm not accusing anyone of lying. During the examination of Mr Wratten, by the HoL Select Committee on 28 September 01, he stated that he had sent the report back to the Board President.

Now, on the issue of 'Terminological inexactitudes', I would have to agree. There have been many, but one that sticks in my mind was the use of the phrase 'black box' during the Select Committee hearings. Used, with no intent to deceive, but simply to refer to a box that was coloured black and that just happened to provide some computer data.

Shall we just wait for the Secretary of State to report?

With every good wish,
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[John Purdey]

Chinook

Brian. It will not do. You are indeed accusing the CinC of lying. I have had an acqaintance check Hansard, and he tells me that during the oral Evidence in that September, on page 148 para 437 he read this reply by Wratten to the direct question by Lord Brennan. "..it was a prerogative that Air Vice Marshal Day and I had to send it [the findings] back to the Board of Inquiry and to draw that to their attention and to say, 'Come on, you have to be more positive than this. We did not do so......"
I also have received a PM from someone who was very close to the process at the time, and he is adamant that the findings were not sent back.
Meanwhile, since Wrattens address is in the public domain, why do you not get in touch with him so that this very serious allegation can be thrashed out by your lawyers and his?
Another suggestion that you might find helpful would be to contact (now AVM) Pulford who, as you know, was President of the Board?
I very much fear, Brian, that like many other contributors to this thread you are simply adding to the general confusion. As I said a couple of years ago here...'More smoke than Krakatao; more mirrors that the Great Hall of Versailles; more red herrings than a Shanghai trawler'.
Regards. JP

[Seldomfitforpurpose]

'More smoke than Krakatao; more mirrors that the Great Hall of Versailles; more red herrings than a Shanghai trawler'...........but not that one piece of evidence which proves conclusively the finding in this case, so I fully aggree with you JP that there is

'More smoke than Krakatao; more mirrors that the Great Hall of Versailles; more red herrings than a Shanghai trawler'.........

[Brian Dixon]

Mr Purdey,

I repeat - I am accusing no-one of lying. I take your point on the second sentence of Mr Wratten's evidence and accept that I misread it. Even irritating sods can make mistakes, and I therefore offer an apology.

Feel free to make the best use of this error. I'm sure you can twist it around to prop up the MoD's position.

Your final comments, after all these years, still do you no credit.

Kind regards,
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[walter kennedy]

While I was going through the analysis, final check, it struck me that many of you had perhaps not plotted the data on a big chart nor paced out the positions at the actual site (with a hand held GPS) and so may not be grasping the scale of the area on the Mull at and approaching the crash site – because one fundamental and relevant aspect would have been obvious to you had you done so, as I will attempt to explain briefly below:
Take the position where the waypoint was changed as that in the SuperTANS (AAIB deduced from position data at impact that STANS had been accurate in latter part of flight);
Accept Boeing's analysis that a turn to the right was made at that point;
Remember that a course setting of 035 was found set on the handling pilot's Horizontal Situation Indicator (HSI) – this of course meant a magnetic course and if you want to plot this on a map now you must use the magnetic variation appropriate at the time in that area;
Accept that waypoint A just happened to be on the threshold of a known landing spot for Chinooks on exercise – an obvious inner marker;
Accept that they were in clear air over the sea and the mist & cloud of concern was on the landmass affecting their sense of orientation from topography and blurring ground details past the shoreline making judgment of distance off the landmass the issue.
.
The final evasive manoeuvre did not start until the final few seconds – Boeing's analysis had it that the a/c had flown a straight track from waypoint change up to this final manoeuvre.
If you draw a line representing 035m from the position of waypoint change on a large map you will be able to see that the initial impact point is only 150 metres off to the left of this track.
Remember that the final evasive manoeuvre involved the a/c turning and slewing to the left but was only enacted in the final few seconds such that any deviation off track would be small and to the left.
Is it not intuitively obvious that the a/c was on 035 until the last few seconds? - the course setting as found on the handling pilot's HSI course selector.
So 035 looks deliberate? - and yet noteables on this site have dismissed it as pure coincidence.
.
If you work back from the crash site on 035m, using a ground speed of, say, 150kts, they would have crossed the shoreline at 13 sec before impact;
that is about 9 sec before the final evasive manouevre was initiated.
9s decision time when in low power regime (Boeing's analysis had them slowing down wrt TAS – the increase in wind at the Mull masking this) and perhaps wondering what was going on ...
Remember that the position where they changed the waypoint was already too close in in the prevailing conditions for this crew to have relied upon the STANS to have gotten them there at their cruising speed – despite having been pronounced accurate by AAIB in that part of the flight with hindsight, Flt Lt Tapper would not have trusted it after a sea crossing – and yet they made an intentional turn 8 deg to the right at that point.
There was no more suitable waypoint loaded into the STANS than waypoint A and this they had discarded – so what on earth is there that an experienced helicopter crew could have used as a reference at that point? Something that influenced their judgment more than the STANS and their growing perception of proximity to the landmass – something they trusted to be intrinsically accurate, perhaps – something that if conflicting with their senses could cause 9 seconds worth of hesitancy.

[John Purdey]

Chinook

Brian Dixon. Your apology should be directed to Wratten; you have his address.
Meanwhile, let us hope that the written submission to Sec of State does not contain any such serious and defamatory discrepancies caused by your "mis-readings". JP