"Root & Branch review of defence spending announced"
Join Date: Oct 2002
Location: Oxford
Posts: 97
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I hope the "root and branch" review includes training officers of all ranks and from all Services the importance of saying "no". And not just being a "yes man" hiding behind the phrase "can do".
Perhaps they could start with the courses run at Shrivenham?
Perhaps they could start with the courses run at Shrivenham?
Join Date: Feb 2007
Location: Exiled in England
Age: 48
Posts: 1,015
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
God help us all.
My crystal ball has now shattered (ok I threw it at the idiot lantern with the one eyed nostril miner on it). Get used to one thing, CUTS. They will prioritise everything else above defense and we (collectively as I still feel the pain and stand for thr anthem) are going to get absolutely shafted.
As soon as the Tories get in and have a look at the books, hatchets will come out and we will all be in the cakky. There is going to be blood and it is going to be painful. I am recommending you all get private healthcare squared away and scrimp and save like hell in your personal lives.
There is a storm coming and we will not be able to get out of it. I can see a revolution upon us if we are not carerful, it's canned food and shotgun time.
My crystal ball has now shattered (ok I threw it at the idiot lantern with the one eyed nostril miner on it). Get used to one thing, CUTS. They will prioritise everything else above defense and we (collectively as I still feel the pain and stand for thr anthem) are going to get absolutely shafted.
As soon as the Tories get in and have a look at the books, hatchets will come out and we will all be in the cakky. There is going to be blood and it is going to be painful. I am recommending you all get private healthcare squared away and scrimp and save like hell in your personal lives.
There is a storm coming and we will not be able to get out of it. I can see a revolution upon us if we are not carerful, it's canned food and shotgun time.
Join Date: Aug 2009
Location: Aylesbury
Age: 58
Posts: 378
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
.
I shouldnt laugh at the canned food and shotgun line, but... I couldn't help it. 
What is left of the English have, to their shame, become too supine to revolt. Apart from the reconstituted Milwall hooligans who form the core of the English Defence League, and the BNP, who'se agenda is less than pure, who would do it? Let alone who could do it?
The services wouldn't anyway and couldn't, even if they wanted to. They dont have the numbers or the inspirational leadership. And I cant see it being part of Dannatt's retirement plans either...
Forget the semantics of the politics of it, think about it in terms of personalities... the UK does not have a Musharraf, a Khomeini, a Castro or a Guevara, not a Walensa, a Mandela or a even a Tsvangirai in its numbers. No-one who could inspire anyone to make the sacrifices necessary.
All that you'd end up with is unco-ordinated street rioting by dumbed down unemployable hoodies in the northern post-industrial wastelands that would easily be dealt with by the police and would serve no political purpose except as a lever for more surveillance and more erosion of civil liberties.
Plus, the police have been so heavily politicized that any attempt at insurrection would be sniffed out and snuffed out within 24 hours at best or at worst, consistently undermined and then wiped out within a week.
Those who could have inspired (and conspired?) and took part are all either way too old or too dead already.
Sorry.... its going to be down to the lumpen, dumbed down, X-box playing, Celeb worshipping proles to sort this one out and get some political savvy and start taking an interest in politics instead of the apathy that we have at the moment. It will take a minimum of at least a generation to turn that around. Nothing will change. It'll just be more of the same and future generations will be left to pick up the tab.
Lets just hope that our backs arent going to be against the wall in the meantime. As I've said before, if those who made the ultimate sacrifice in WW1 and WW2 could have forseen how things would turn out, I should imagine they would have had grave doubts as to whether it was worth it.
What is left of the English have, to their shame, become too supine to revolt. Apart from the reconstituted Milwall hooligans who form the core of the English Defence League, and the BNP, who'se agenda is less than pure, who would do it? Let alone who could do it?
The services wouldn't anyway and couldn't, even if they wanted to. They dont have the numbers or the inspirational leadership. And I cant see it being part of Dannatt's retirement plans either...
Forget the semantics of the politics of it, think about it in terms of personalities... the UK does not have a Musharraf, a Khomeini, a Castro or a Guevara, not a Walensa, a Mandela or a even a Tsvangirai in its numbers. No-one who could inspire anyone to make the sacrifices necessary.
All that you'd end up with is unco-ordinated street rioting by dumbed down unemployable hoodies in the northern post-industrial wastelands that would easily be dealt with by the police and would serve no political purpose except as a lever for more surveillance and more erosion of civil liberties.
Plus, the police have been so heavily politicized that any attempt at insurrection would be sniffed out and snuffed out within 24 hours at best or at worst, consistently undermined and then wiped out within a week.
Those who could have inspired (and conspired?) and took part are all either way too old or too dead already.
Sorry.... its going to be down to the lumpen, dumbed down, X-box playing, Celeb worshipping proles to sort this one out and get some political savvy and start taking an interest in politics instead of the apathy that we have at the moment. It will take a minimum of at least a generation to turn that around. Nothing will change. It'll just be more of the same and future generations will be left to pick up the tab.
Lets just hope that our backs arent going to be against the wall in the meantime. As I've said before, if those who made the ultimate sacrifice in WW1 and WW2 could have forseen how things would turn out, I should imagine they would have had grave doubts as to whether it was worth it.
Tories Snap Budget
Tories pinpoint three defence projects for cuts in 'snap Budget' - Times Online
I wonder what other cuts they have under their sleeves, especially with regard to ISTAR assets. If I vote for the Tories, does that mean that I effectively vote for redundancy?
I wonder what other cuts they have under their sleeves, especially with regard to ISTAR assets. If I vote for the Tories, does that mean that I effectively vote for redundancy?
Join Date: Feb 2008
Location: Toulouse area, France
Age: 93
Posts: 435
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Correct spelling ???
While the politicians manoeuvre and spin before the imminent party conferences, "big announcements" are being whispered about "massive" defence cuts, with the rest of the Typhoon programme, the A400 and "carriers" figuring in the latest reports about Conservative plans (subject to break clauses about which the hopeful incumbent says he knows nothing, thus leaving a useful get-out for himself).
Nothing unusual in all this, but nobody has come up with the better, more accurate way to spell "Chancellor" - just leave out the "h" (and if necessary for the pedantic, change the "o" to "e", but the meaning should be clear before that). This too isn't new - the various occupants of the Woolsack have been at it for a good 50 years as far as defence goes, whatever their political "colour".
Political "leaders" may say what they would like, defence chiefs and the industry may try their hardest to put those wishes into effect, but the Canceller and his merry henchpersons have made sure that very little trickled towards the "sharp end".
Poor Britannia indeed (in both senses of the word)...
PS (Mods check for taste ?) Slight Freudian slip in the above post, about "supreme sacrifice" ... "grave doubts" ???
Nothing unusual in all this, but nobody has come up with the better, more accurate way to spell "Chancellor" - just leave out the "h" (and if necessary for the pedantic, change the "o" to "e", but the meaning should be clear before that). This too isn't new - the various occupants of the Woolsack have been at it for a good 50 years as far as defence goes, whatever their political "colour".
Political "leaders" may say what they would like, defence chiefs and the industry may try their hardest to put those wishes into effect, but the Canceller and his merry henchpersons have made sure that very little trickled towards the "sharp end".
Poor Britannia indeed (in both senses of the word)...
PS (Mods check for taste ?) Slight Freudian slip in the above post, about "supreme sacrifice" ... "grave doubts" ???
Join Date: Feb 2008
Location: London UK
Posts: 29
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Loads of spare cash for MoD
As I've posted before the MoD has a big windfall coming if they play their cards right. There's a big sale of MoD radio spectrum coming up that could raise up to £10bn. If those MPs who claim to be committed to defence got their act together they could put a lot of pressure on both Darling and Osborne to ring fence that money for the services, as they did on the sale of Chelsea Barracks.
Whether we need all of the big projects is a question that clearly we disagree about. At the moment all our efforts are focused on non-state actors but can we assume that this will always be the case?
In the last few years the Russian Government closed down airflilights over large parts of the Norwegian Sea during a Russian Navy 'exercise', invaded Georgia and continue to refuse to ratify the CFE Treaty. It is claimed that unofficial supporters of the Russian Government conducted a large scale cyber attack on a NATO ally, murdered a political exile living in London and continue to murder journalists on a regular basis.
On the other hand the Cold War is over and I don't think the Russian Armed Forces are anything like fit for purpose. The number of political prisoners in Russia today is nothing like the scale of the Soviet era, and the judiciary is far more independent.
Nothing is inevitable and we do have choices.
Whether we need all of the big projects is a question that clearly we disagree about. At the moment all our efforts are focused on non-state actors but can we assume that this will always be the case?
In the last few years the Russian Government closed down airflilights over large parts of the Norwegian Sea during a Russian Navy 'exercise', invaded Georgia and continue to refuse to ratify the CFE Treaty. It is claimed that unofficial supporters of the Russian Government conducted a large scale cyber attack on a NATO ally, murdered a political exile living in London and continue to murder journalists on a regular basis.
On the other hand the Cold War is over and I don't think the Russian Armed Forces are anything like fit for purpose. The number of political prisoners in Russia today is nothing like the scale of the Soviet era, and the judiciary is far more independent.
Nothing is inevitable and we do have choices.
Join Date: Nov 2004
Location: UK
Posts: 932
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Jabba TG12
What an excellent post. Thank-you. However, I hope you're wrong; I fear you're right.
Norman Stanley Fletcher
I don't know what makes you think that,
"Since that time I have watched with ever-growing incredulity at the state of our armed forces. Alas, the people who run them have spent a huge amount of time and money ensuring there are enough homosexuals employed to keep Stonewall happy, but not enough ordinary folk to ensure we can effectively run a war."
is anything other than ignorant and unacceptable bigotry. Would you have typed this if you substituted "black" "yellow" or "female" for "homosexual"?
For the record, the small number of homosexuals I've worked with in the forces have been uniformly excellent and I'd follow them to war without question. They've put up with a huge amount of narrow-minded prejudice like yours, and they're fine officers - well above average.
I presume that there are some lazy chislers out there who happen to be homosexuals - and that there were some homosexuals in the forces before equality. I also know that there are some lazy chislers out there who happen to be heterosexual - and I'd suggest that you judge people based on their work ethic and skill, rather than who they are sleeping with.
And no, I'm not gay. But it shouldn't make any difference if I was.
S41
What an excellent post. Thank-you. However, I hope you're wrong; I fear you're right.
Norman Stanley Fletcher
I don't know what makes you think that,
"Since that time I have watched with ever-growing incredulity at the state of our armed forces. Alas, the people who run them have spent a huge amount of time and money ensuring there are enough homosexuals employed to keep Stonewall happy, but not enough ordinary folk to ensure we can effectively run a war."
is anything other than ignorant and unacceptable bigotry. Would you have typed this if you substituted "black" "yellow" or "female" for "homosexual"?
For the record, the small number of homosexuals I've worked with in the forces have been uniformly excellent and I'd follow them to war without question. They've put up with a huge amount of narrow-minded prejudice like yours, and they're fine officers - well above average.
I presume that there are some lazy chislers out there who happen to be homosexuals - and that there were some homosexuals in the forces before equality. I also know that there are some lazy chislers out there who happen to be heterosexual - and I'd suggest that you judge people based on their work ethic and skill, rather than who they are sleeping with.
And no, I'm not gay. But it shouldn't make any difference if I was.
S41
OLD RED DAMASK
Join Date: Apr 2004
Location: Lancashire born. In Cebu now
Age: 70
Posts: 368
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
All that you'd end up with is unco-ordinated street rioting by dumbed down unemployable hoodies in the northern post-industrial wastelands that would easily be dealt with by the police and would serve no political purpose except as a lever for more surveillance and more erosion of civil liberties
Not going away from the thread our politicians on both sides are so hypocricital of their attitude to " Defence of the realm" that it makes me sick to my stomach.
Defence is a priority in this time of fanatics and wayward regimes. Having a Nuclear deterent always gives the option of retaliation at it's most extreme, though I really hope it never comes to that.
Ever since Blair thought himself as a typical Labour politician to commit our troops to wherever he could without thinking about the consequences the "plot was lost".
STOP the waste and cut back the bureaucrats created by this tinpot government with a non elected leader.
Join Date: Apr 2006
Location: Tullahoma TN
Posts: 482
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Conventional Trident
The Pentagon proposed the Conventional Trident Modification program in 2006 to diversify its strategic options, as part of a broader long-term strategy to develop worldwide rapid strike capabilities, dubbed "Prompt Global Strike".
The US $503 million program would have converted existing Trident II missiles (presumably two missiles per submarine) into conventional weapons, by fitting them with modified Mk4 reentry vehicles equipped with GPS for navigation update and a reentry guidance and control (trajectory correction) segment to perform 10 m class impact accuracy. No explosive is said to be used since the reentry vehicle's mass and hypersonic impact velocity provide sufficient mechanical energy and "effect". The second version of conventional warhead is fragmentation version that would disperse thousands of tungsten rods which could obliterate an area of 3000 square feet. (appoximately 280 square meters).[6] It offered the promise of accurate conventional strikes with little warning and flight time.
The primary drawback would have been establishing sufficient warning systems so that other nuclear countries would not mistake it for a nuclear launch which could provoke a counterattack. For that reason among others, this project raised a substantial debate before US Congress for the FY07 Defense budget, but also internationally.[7] Russian President Vladimir Putin, among others, warned that the project would increase the danger of accidental nuclear war. "The launch of such a missile could ... provoke a full-scale counterattack using strategic nuclear forces," Putin said in May 2006.[8]
...
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trident_(missile)
"(Conventional Trident Modification)'s advantages over other conventional strike capabilities is its ability to provide prompt response to threats around the globe," he said. "The (program) will allow national leadership to act in a crisis without a lengthy military buildup." Additional benefits of the Conventional Trident Modification are that it requires no forward-deployed or visible presence, has few if any requirements for allied overflight permission, and gives the enemy little or no warning before a strike, the spokesman said.
To ensure other countries don't mistake a conventional missile launch for a nuclear missile attack, DoD is developing confidence-building measures, such as advance notification and shared early warnings, he said. Also, DoD can borrow notification procedures from its long history of test launches of dual-role weapons systems. The Conventional Trident Modification program gives the United States a long-range strike option against targets beyond the range of current systems or that are heavily defended, the spokesman said. Also, the deployment of the program will send a message to adversaries that the United States is prepared to defend its national interests, he said. "If needed in the war on terrorism, the (Conventional Trident Modification program) can help deter state actors from sponsoring terrorism by imposing the threat of prompt conventional attack," he said.
This project supports efforts for both Advanced Strike Capability which will demonstrate the feasibility of producing intermediate size low cost rockets, and the development of a modification to the TRIDENT II (D5) strategic weapon system (SWS) to allow it to carry conventional payloads. The Conventional TRIDENT Modification (CTM) will adapt the TRIDENT II (D5) missile to carry conventional payloads.
Conventional TRIDENT Modification (CTM)
On 25 August 2003 the Department of the Navy, Strategic Systems Programs [SSP] issued a Request for Information (RFI) to determine the latest plans and programs including technology challenges and proposed solutions for affordable Submarine Launched Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (SLIRBMs), including launch considerations and potential payloads. Responses to this RFI were used by the Government to select presentations to be given at the upcoming SLIRBM Technical Exchange or to otherwise be reviewed by the government.
The SLIRBM requirements include: 1. System must be affordable 2. Range - IRBM 3. Missile diameter - 32.5 inches maximum [ie, half that of the current Trident-2] 4. Both conventional and nuclear payloads to be considered 5. Payload weights, diameters and length to be consistent with missile dimensions and range 6. Conventional payload system to have GPS accuracy 7. Missile subsystem hardened to Space Grade 8. Control of collateral damage to be considered (e.g., stage debris control) 9. Intermediate range ballistic missiles, including their payloads, and all of the launcher subsystem except for electronics, are to be contained within the 86 inch diameter TRIDENT missile launch tube 10. Usable missile tube length (for missile, payload and launcher) of 36 feet maximum.
...
SLIRBM is a conventional missile concept that builds on the heritage the two companies share in US Navy strategic missile development. Lockheed Martin and ATK provide the US Navy with the submarine-launched Trident D5 nuclear ballistic missile.
SLIRBM is designed to precisely deliver a conventional payload on target at ranges in excess of 1100 miles within 10-15 minutes of launch. ...
Submarine Launched Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (SLIRBM) / Submarine Launched Global Strike Missile (SLGSM)
The Pentagon proposed the Conventional Trident Modification program in 2006 to diversify its strategic options, as part of a broader long-term strategy to develop worldwide rapid strike capabilities, dubbed "Prompt Global Strike".
The US $503 million program would have converted existing Trident II missiles (presumably two missiles per submarine) into conventional weapons, by fitting them with modified Mk4 reentry vehicles equipped with GPS for navigation update and a reentry guidance and control (trajectory correction) segment to perform 10 m class impact accuracy. No explosive is said to be used since the reentry vehicle's mass and hypersonic impact velocity provide sufficient mechanical energy and "effect". The second version of conventional warhead is fragmentation version that would disperse thousands of tungsten rods which could obliterate an area of 3000 square feet. (appoximately 280 square meters).[6] It offered the promise of accurate conventional strikes with little warning and flight time.
The primary drawback would have been establishing sufficient warning systems so that other nuclear countries would not mistake it for a nuclear launch which could provoke a counterattack. For that reason among others, this project raised a substantial debate before US Congress for the FY07 Defense budget, but also internationally.[7] Russian President Vladimir Putin, among others, warned that the project would increase the danger of accidental nuclear war. "The launch of such a missile could ... provoke a full-scale counterattack using strategic nuclear forces," Putin said in May 2006.[8]
...
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trident_(missile)
"(Conventional Trident Modification)'s advantages over other conventional strike capabilities is its ability to provide prompt response to threats around the globe," he said. "The (program) will allow national leadership to act in a crisis without a lengthy military buildup." Additional benefits of the Conventional Trident Modification are that it requires no forward-deployed or visible presence, has few if any requirements for allied overflight permission, and gives the enemy little or no warning before a strike, the spokesman said.
To ensure other countries don't mistake a conventional missile launch for a nuclear missile attack, DoD is developing confidence-building measures, such as advance notification and shared early warnings, he said. Also, DoD can borrow notification procedures from its long history of test launches of dual-role weapons systems. The Conventional Trident Modification program gives the United States a long-range strike option against targets beyond the range of current systems or that are heavily defended, the spokesman said. Also, the deployment of the program will send a message to adversaries that the United States is prepared to defend its national interests, he said. "If needed in the war on terrorism, the (Conventional Trident Modification program) can help deter state actors from sponsoring terrorism by imposing the threat of prompt conventional attack," he said.
This project supports efforts for both Advanced Strike Capability which will demonstrate the feasibility of producing intermediate size low cost rockets, and the development of a modification to the TRIDENT II (D5) strategic weapon system (SWS) to allow it to carry conventional payloads. The Conventional TRIDENT Modification (CTM) will adapt the TRIDENT II (D5) missile to carry conventional payloads.
Conventional TRIDENT Modification (CTM)
On 25 August 2003 the Department of the Navy, Strategic Systems Programs [SSP] issued a Request for Information (RFI) to determine the latest plans and programs including technology challenges and proposed solutions for affordable Submarine Launched Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (SLIRBMs), including launch considerations and potential payloads. Responses to this RFI were used by the Government to select presentations to be given at the upcoming SLIRBM Technical Exchange or to otherwise be reviewed by the government.
The SLIRBM requirements include: 1. System must be affordable 2. Range - IRBM 3. Missile diameter - 32.5 inches maximum [ie, half that of the current Trident-2] 4. Both conventional and nuclear payloads to be considered 5. Payload weights, diameters and length to be consistent with missile dimensions and range 6. Conventional payload system to have GPS accuracy 7. Missile subsystem hardened to Space Grade 8. Control of collateral damage to be considered (e.g., stage debris control) 9. Intermediate range ballistic missiles, including their payloads, and all of the launcher subsystem except for electronics, are to be contained within the 86 inch diameter TRIDENT missile launch tube 10. Usable missile tube length (for missile, payload and launcher) of 36 feet maximum.
...
SLIRBM is a conventional missile concept that builds on the heritage the two companies share in US Navy strategic missile development. Lockheed Martin and ATK provide the US Navy with the submarine-launched Trident D5 nuclear ballistic missile.
SLIRBM is designed to precisely deliver a conventional payload on target at ranges in excess of 1100 miles within 10-15 minutes of launch. ...
Submarine Launched Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (SLIRBM) / Submarine Launched Global Strike Missile (SLGSM)
Join Date: Aug 2009
Location: Aylesbury
Age: 58
Posts: 378
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Nigel:
Apologies, strike the word "Northern". Just leave it as "Post Industrial Wasteland".
Peter:
Yes, I guess the closing line could have been better thought out.
I stand by the rest of the post though.
As another reader has pointed out, I sincerely hope I'm wrong.
Apologies, strike the word "Northern". Just leave it as "Post Industrial Wasteland".
Peter:
Yes, I guess the closing line could have been better thought out.
I stand by the rest of the post though.
As another reader has pointed out, I sincerely hope I'm wrong.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
Modern Elmo, you are interesting and exasperating in equal measure.
Sometimes you espouse an interesting point of view and at others you post loads of drivel from wikepedia with out comment. Please use a selective quote, post a link, make a comment, and keep it short!
Sometimes you espouse an interesting point of view and at others you post loads of drivel from wikepedia with out comment. Please use a selective quote, post a link, make a comment, and keep it short!
Join Date: Feb 2008
Location: London UK
Posts: 29
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Current MoD strategic assessment?
Bob Ainsworth, 15 Sept 2009
"In the 21st century it would appear that the threat of state on state warfare has receded.
While it is true that Britain faces no direct territorial challenge, as Hew Strachan has pointed out, the UK has been involved in four wars in the last 30 years - to recover the Falkands, the two Gulf Wars, and in Kosovo - where the opposing armed forces were those of another state.
Deterrence, both conventional and nuclear, remains a valid strategy.
But we have also been pitted against irregular forces – as in Iraq following the collapse of Saddam’s regime and now in Afghanistan.
Each of these conflicts carries within them aspects of both regular and irregular warfare.
The academic and intellectual debate on planning for defence against these different threats still rages.
I tend to agree with General Petraeus’s comment that “the truth is not to be found in any of these schools of thought, but rather in the debate among them”.
The growing trend in warfare is likely to be complexity - whether at sea, on land, or in the air – or in all probability an interdependent combination of all three."
If we agree with this view then what does this mean for the armed forces, and if it means more money can we wait a couple of years until the economy picks up?
"In the 21st century it would appear that the threat of state on state warfare has receded.
While it is true that Britain faces no direct territorial challenge, as Hew Strachan has pointed out, the UK has been involved in four wars in the last 30 years - to recover the Falkands, the two Gulf Wars, and in Kosovo - where the opposing armed forces were those of another state.
Deterrence, both conventional and nuclear, remains a valid strategy.
But we have also been pitted against irregular forces – as in Iraq following the collapse of Saddam’s regime and now in Afghanistan.
Each of these conflicts carries within them aspects of both regular and irregular warfare.
The academic and intellectual debate on planning for defence against these different threats still rages.
I tend to agree with General Petraeus’s comment that “the truth is not to be found in any of these schools of thought, but rather in the debate among them”.
The growing trend in warfare is likely to be complexity - whether at sea, on land, or in the air – or in all probability an interdependent combination of all three."
If we agree with this view then what does this mean for the armed forces, and if it means more money can we wait a couple of years until the economy picks up?
Join Date: Aug 2009
Location: Aylesbury
Age: 58
Posts: 378
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
OK.
So, if we accept what SofS has to say at face value (thinks: Almost certainly written for him by someone in MB, theres no way political animal of Bob's type would have that firm a grasp on the subject), then if that is the threat... what do we require to deliver against it?
"While it is true that Britain faces no direct territorial challenge"
Which means, its about projection, yes? Influence on the world stage? Who (apart from the obvious players) in the world, let alone Europe, may face a direct territorial challenge in the near future? Israel? Iran? North Korea? Syria? Pakistan? Somalia?
So... when is it going to be reflected in what we procure?
So, if we accept what SofS has to say at face value (thinks: Almost certainly written for him by someone in MB, theres no way political animal of Bob's type would have that firm a grasp on the subject), then if that is the threat... what do we require to deliver against it?
"While it is true that Britain faces no direct territorial challenge"
Which means, its about projection, yes? Influence on the world stage? Who (apart from the obvious players) in the world, let alone Europe, may face a direct territorial challenge in the near future? Israel? Iran? North Korea? Syria? Pakistan? Somalia?
So... when is it going to be reflected in what we procure?
Join Date: Aug 2006
Location: firmly on dry land
Age: 81
Posts: 1,541
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
As Jabba said, Force Projection.
Does the great British public want force projection? - No.
Can we afford a multi-facetted projection force? - No.
Does Europe have the political will and rectitude to match the USA in Force Projection? - No.
So, WTF do we want to do and will it be worth the effort?
That we depend on maritime trade is true, but so does most of the world including Saudi Arabia and China. Do they police SLOC? Can we police SLOC?
How about some frigates and corvettes to patrol our own shores, beef up the border security? Maintain existing air defence; it is just adequate. Disband all offensive forces except those bound into true international forces.
And has been said above, start culling at the top. Our local councils are starting to amalgamate; about time we went to a purple force with one HQ. We could still wear multi-hued uniforms.
Join Date: Feb 2008
Location: London UK
Posts: 29
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Jabba TG12
"Who (apart from the obvious players) in the world, let alone Europe, may face a direct territorial challenge in the near future?"
Good question. The South Koreans and the Taiwanese feel a bit more worried about this than we might but then should we be interested in helping them out? Closer to home the Baltic states don't feel especially comfortable at the moment and we do have a legal obligation to come to their defence. On the other hand some would say the Russians are no fools and are not going to directly attack a NATO member.
"Who (apart from the obvious players) in the world, let alone Europe, may face a direct territorial challenge in the near future?"
Good question. The South Koreans and the Taiwanese feel a bit more worried about this than we might but then should we be interested in helping them out? Closer to home the Baltic states don't feel especially comfortable at the moment and we do have a legal obligation to come to their defence. On the other hand some would say the Russians are no fools and are not going to directly attack a NATO member.
Join Date: Feb 2008
Location: London UK
Posts: 29
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Wader 2
Lord Halifax might have said that WW2 was a war of choice but you're right - we could have walked away from both Gulf Wars, Kosovo and the Falklands (that last decision would have stopped Mrs T from being re-elected in 1983)
Not sure the great British public have ever been asked whether they want force projection. They certainly wanted it during the Falklands war
We can afford to spend more, perhaps not now. MoD continues to sit on valuable assets that have nothing to do with the defence of the realm
You're right about Europe - with a few honourable exceptions (Poland, Estonia etc) currently they don't seem to have the stomach for force projection
Should we/could we depend on others to protect our SLOC? Do we really believe that only having forces for territorial defence is the best long term approach and what are 'true international forces'? NATO? The UN?
Lord Halifax might have said that WW2 was a war of choice but you're right - we could have walked away from both Gulf Wars, Kosovo and the Falklands (that last decision would have stopped Mrs T from being re-elected in 1983)
Not sure the great British public have ever been asked whether they want force projection. They certainly wanted it during the Falklands war
We can afford to spend more, perhaps not now. MoD continues to sit on valuable assets that have nothing to do with the defence of the realm
You're right about Europe - with a few honourable exceptions (Poland, Estonia etc) currently they don't seem to have the stomach for force projection
Should we/could we depend on others to protect our SLOC? Do we really believe that only having forces for territorial defence is the best long term approach and what are 'true international forces'? NATO? The UN?
Join Date: Aug 2006
Location: firmly on dry land
Age: 81
Posts: 1,541
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Not sure the great British public have ever been asked whether they want force projection. They certainly wanted it during the Falklands war
Had the Government not had the resolve and the media pickep up on it you can imagine a quite different Indie outcome - waht have the Falklands ever done for us? kind of thing.
We can afford to spend more, perhaps not now. MoD continues to sit on valuable assets that have nothing to do with the defence of the realm
Should we/could we depend on others to protect our SLOC?
The UN?
The UN?
The only global force (command) would be the UN. The only half-way functional international is of course NATO or any other US Command with friendly units attached.
Join Date: Jan 2007
Location: Essex
Age: 39
Posts: 60
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Ill be blunt.
29% approx of Budget is given to the social. So many non GB citizens on the take along with 2nd/3rd generation immigrants on the take. We should not be paying for peoples asylum. Period.
It will end up with facists gaining too much power the more this spirals out of control.
Gordon Brown is wet. His face is wet. His manifesto is wet. He is a "2Bob-wannabe" nice guy that everyone likes.
Man up and take both pride and control of your country.
Hang on your a jock.
29% approx of Budget is given to the social. So many non GB citizens on the take along with 2nd/3rd generation immigrants on the take. We should not be paying for peoples asylum. Period.
It will end up with facists gaining too much power the more this spirals out of control.
Gordon Brown is wet. His face is wet. His manifesto is wet. He is a "2Bob-wannabe" nice guy that everyone likes.
Man up and take both pride and control of your country.
Hang on your a jock.
Join Date: Jan 2007
Location: Essex
Age: 39
Posts: 60
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Also get Jock the personal abuse out and someone who has a balanced tri-service opinion.
Its like having an English referee ref an England International.
e.g: we dont F-35B variants. The Navy dont need carriers.
Sir ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz
:z zz:
Its like having an English referee ref an England International.
e.g: we dont F-35B variants. The Navy dont need carriers.
Sir ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz
:z zz:
Join Date: Apr 2006
Location: Tullahoma TN
Posts: 482
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
[edit]Development of bunker-busting weapons
Penetration with a hardened penetrator
A secant ogive ( drawing )
Further thinking on the subject envisions a penetrator, dropped from service height of a bomber aircraft, using kinetic energy to penetrate the shielding, and subsequently deliver a nuclear explosive to the buried target.
The problems with such a penetrator is the tremendous heat applied to the penetrator unit when striking the shielding (surface) at hundreds of meters per second. This has partially been solved by using metals such as tungsten (with a much higher melting point than steel), and altering the shape of the projectile (such as an ogive).
Altering the shape of the projectile to incorporate an ogive shape has yielded substantial results. Rocket sled testing at Eglin Air Force Base has demonstrated penetrations of 100 to 150 feet (46 m) in concrete[citation needed] when traveling at 4,000 ft/s (1,200 m/s). The reason for this is liquefaction of the concrete in the target, which tends to flow over the projectile. Variation in the speed of the penetrator can either cause it to be vaporized on impact (in the case of traveling too fast), or to not penetrate far enough (in the case of traveling too slow). An approximation for the penetration depth is obtained with an impact depth formula derived by Sir Isaac Newton.
[edit]Combination penetrator-explosive munitions
Another school of thought on nuclear bunker busters is using a light penetrator to travel 15 to 30 meters through shielding, and detonate a nuclear charge there. Such an explosion would generate powerful shock waves, which would be transmitted very effectively through the solid material comprising the shielding (see "scabbing" above).
[edit]Criticism
The main criticisms of nuclear bunker busters regard nuclear fallout and nuclear proliferation. The purpose of an earth-penetrating nuclear "bunker buster" is to reduce the required yield needed to ensure the destruction of the target by coupling the explosion to the ground, yielding a shock wave similar to an earthquake. For example, the United States retired the B-53 warhead, with a yield of 9 megatons, because the B-61 Mod 11 could attack similar targets with much lower yield (400 kilotons)[citation needed], due to the latter's superior ground penetration. Thus the fallout of a B-61 Mod 11 would likely be less than that of a B-53. Supporters note that this is one of the reasons nuclear bunker busters should be developed. Critics claim that developing new nuclear weapons sends a proliferating message to non-nuclear powers, undermining non-proliferation efforts.
Critics also worry that the existence of lower-yield nuclear weapons for relatively limited tactical purposes will lower the threshold for their actual use, thus blurring the sharp line between conventional weapons intended for use and weapons of mass destruction intended only for hypothetical deterrence and increasing the risk of escalation to higher-yield nuclear weapons.[1]
Fallout from any nuclear detonation is increased with proximity to the ground. While a megaton-class yield will inevitably throw up many tons of (newly) radioactive debris, which falls back to the earth as fallout, critics contend that despite their relatively minuscule explosive yield, nuclear bunker busters create more fallout per kiloton yield. Also, because of the subsurface detonation, radioactive debris may contaminate the local groundwater.
The scientific group Union of Concerned Scientists points out that, at the Nevada Test Site, the depth required to contain fallout from an average-yield nuclear test was over 100 meters, depending upon the weapon's yield. They contend that it is improbable that penetrators could be made to burrow so deeply. With yields between 0.3 and 340 kilotons, they argue, it is unlikely the blast would be completely contained.
Another criticism is that bunkers can be built at greater depth to make them more difficult to reach. The target's vulnerability is then limited to openings like the ventilation system, which are susceptible to conventional explosives. Proponents of nuclear bunker busters respond that deeper bunkers entail higher costs, limiting the potential enemies who can withstand nuclear bunker busters.
Politically, as well, such nuclear bunker busters are unpopular. Most targets are near cities[citation needed], critics argue, and even minimal fallout will inflict unacceptable levels of collateral damage. Furthermore, they state, the testing of new nuclear weapons would be prohibited by the proposed Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Although Congress refused to ratify the CTBT in 1999, the United States has adhered to the spirit of the treaty by maintaining a moratorium on nuclear testing since 1992.[2]
Finally, the need to use nuclear weapons in this role is questioned by critics[citation needed]. They argue that conventional ground-penetration weapons are able to destroy enough buried or strengthened sites to lessen or even remove the need to use nuclear technology. Other conventional weapons such as thermobaric weapons have proven effective in defeating buried targets which have not been hardened.
[edit]Development of bunker-busting weapons
B61 nuclear bomb
As early as 1944, the Wallis Tallboy bomb and subsequent Grand Slam weapons were designed to penetrate deeply fortified structures through sheer explosive power. These were not designed to directly penetrate defences, though they could do this (for example the Valentin submarine pens had ferrous concrete roofs 7 metres (23 ft) thick which were penetrated by two Grand Slams on 27 March 1945), but rather to penetrate under the target and explode leaving a camouflet (cavern) which would undermine foundations of structures above, causing it to collapse, thus negating any possible hardening. The destruction of targets such as the V3 guns at Mimoyecques or with the first operational use of the Tallboy. One bored through a hillside and exploded in the Saumur rail tunnel about 18 m (60 ft) below, completely blocking it thus showing that these weapons could destroy any hardened or deeply excavated installation. Modern targeting techniques allied with multiple strikes could unquestionably perform a similar task.[3][4][5]
Development continued, with weapons such as the nuclear B61, and conventional thermobaric weapons and GBU-28. One of the more effective housings, the GBU-28 used its large mass (2,130 kg / 4,700 lb) and casing (constructed from barrels of surplus 203 mm howitzers) to penetrate 6 meters (20 ft) of concrete, and more than 30 meters (100 ft) of earth.[6] The B61 Mod 11, which first entered military service in January 1997, was specifically developed to allow for bunker penetration, and is speculated to have the ability to destroy hardened targets a few hundred feet beneath the earth.[7]
While penetrations of 20–100 feet (30 m) were sufficient for some shallow targets, both the Soviet Union and the United States were creating bunkers buried under huge volumes of soil or reinforced concrete in order to withstand the multi-megaton thermonuclear weapons developed in the 1950s and 1960s. Bunker penetration weapons were initially designed out of this Cold War context.
Mountainous terrain in Afghanistan
The weapon was revisited in the post-Cold War during the 2001 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, and again during the 2003 invasion of Iraq. During the campaign in Tora Bora in particular, the United States believed that "vast underground complexes," deeply buried, were protecting opposing forces. Such complexes were not found. While a nuclear penetrator (the "Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator", or "RNEP") was never built, the DOE was allotted budget to develop it, and tests were conducted by the Air Force Research Laboratory.
The Bush administration removed its request for funding[8] of the weapon in October 2005. Additionally, US Senator Pete Domenici announced funding for the nuclear bunker-buster has been dropped from the Department of Energy's fiscal 2006 budget at the department's request.[9]
While the project for the RNEP seems to be in fact canceled, Jane's Information Group speculates[10] work may continue under another name.
Nuclear bunker buster - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Penetration with a hardened penetrator
A secant ogive ( drawing )
Further thinking on the subject envisions a penetrator, dropped from service height of a bomber aircraft, using kinetic energy to penetrate the shielding, and subsequently deliver a nuclear explosive to the buried target.
The problems with such a penetrator is the tremendous heat applied to the penetrator unit when striking the shielding (surface) at hundreds of meters per second. This has partially been solved by using metals such as tungsten (with a much higher melting point than steel), and altering the shape of the projectile (such as an ogive).
Altering the shape of the projectile to incorporate an ogive shape has yielded substantial results. Rocket sled testing at Eglin Air Force Base has demonstrated penetrations of 100 to 150 feet (46 m) in concrete[citation needed] when traveling at 4,000 ft/s (1,200 m/s). The reason for this is liquefaction of the concrete in the target, which tends to flow over the projectile. Variation in the speed of the penetrator can either cause it to be vaporized on impact (in the case of traveling too fast), or to not penetrate far enough (in the case of traveling too slow). An approximation for the penetration depth is obtained with an impact depth formula derived by Sir Isaac Newton.
[edit]Combination penetrator-explosive munitions
Another school of thought on nuclear bunker busters is using a light penetrator to travel 15 to 30 meters through shielding, and detonate a nuclear charge there. Such an explosion would generate powerful shock waves, which would be transmitted very effectively through the solid material comprising the shielding (see "scabbing" above).
[edit]Criticism
The main criticisms of nuclear bunker busters regard nuclear fallout and nuclear proliferation. The purpose of an earth-penetrating nuclear "bunker buster" is to reduce the required yield needed to ensure the destruction of the target by coupling the explosion to the ground, yielding a shock wave similar to an earthquake. For example, the United States retired the B-53 warhead, with a yield of 9 megatons, because the B-61 Mod 11 could attack similar targets with much lower yield (400 kilotons)[citation needed], due to the latter's superior ground penetration. Thus the fallout of a B-61 Mod 11 would likely be less than that of a B-53. Supporters note that this is one of the reasons nuclear bunker busters should be developed. Critics claim that developing new nuclear weapons sends a proliferating message to non-nuclear powers, undermining non-proliferation efforts.
Critics also worry that the existence of lower-yield nuclear weapons for relatively limited tactical purposes will lower the threshold for their actual use, thus blurring the sharp line between conventional weapons intended for use and weapons of mass destruction intended only for hypothetical deterrence and increasing the risk of escalation to higher-yield nuclear weapons.[1]
Fallout from any nuclear detonation is increased with proximity to the ground. While a megaton-class yield will inevitably throw up many tons of (newly) radioactive debris, which falls back to the earth as fallout, critics contend that despite their relatively minuscule explosive yield, nuclear bunker busters create more fallout per kiloton yield. Also, because of the subsurface detonation, radioactive debris may contaminate the local groundwater.
The scientific group Union of Concerned Scientists points out that, at the Nevada Test Site, the depth required to contain fallout from an average-yield nuclear test was over 100 meters, depending upon the weapon's yield. They contend that it is improbable that penetrators could be made to burrow so deeply. With yields between 0.3 and 340 kilotons, they argue, it is unlikely the blast would be completely contained.
Another criticism is that bunkers can be built at greater depth to make them more difficult to reach. The target's vulnerability is then limited to openings like the ventilation system, which are susceptible to conventional explosives. Proponents of nuclear bunker busters respond that deeper bunkers entail higher costs, limiting the potential enemies who can withstand nuclear bunker busters.
Politically, as well, such nuclear bunker busters are unpopular. Most targets are near cities[citation needed], critics argue, and even minimal fallout will inflict unacceptable levels of collateral damage. Furthermore, they state, the testing of new nuclear weapons would be prohibited by the proposed Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Although Congress refused to ratify the CTBT in 1999, the United States has adhered to the spirit of the treaty by maintaining a moratorium on nuclear testing since 1992.[2]
Finally, the need to use nuclear weapons in this role is questioned by critics[citation needed]. They argue that conventional ground-penetration weapons are able to destroy enough buried or strengthened sites to lessen or even remove the need to use nuclear technology. Other conventional weapons such as thermobaric weapons have proven effective in defeating buried targets which have not been hardened.
[edit]Development of bunker-busting weapons
B61 nuclear bomb
As early as 1944, the Wallis Tallboy bomb and subsequent Grand Slam weapons were designed to penetrate deeply fortified structures through sheer explosive power. These were not designed to directly penetrate defences, though they could do this (for example the Valentin submarine pens had ferrous concrete roofs 7 metres (23 ft) thick which were penetrated by two Grand Slams on 27 March 1945), but rather to penetrate under the target and explode leaving a camouflet (cavern) which would undermine foundations of structures above, causing it to collapse, thus negating any possible hardening. The destruction of targets such as the V3 guns at Mimoyecques or with the first operational use of the Tallboy. One bored through a hillside and exploded in the Saumur rail tunnel about 18 m (60 ft) below, completely blocking it thus showing that these weapons could destroy any hardened or deeply excavated installation. Modern targeting techniques allied with multiple strikes could unquestionably perform a similar task.[3][4][5]
Development continued, with weapons such as the nuclear B61, and conventional thermobaric weapons and GBU-28. One of the more effective housings, the GBU-28 used its large mass (2,130 kg / 4,700 lb) and casing (constructed from barrels of surplus 203 mm howitzers) to penetrate 6 meters (20 ft) of concrete, and more than 30 meters (100 ft) of earth.[6] The B61 Mod 11, which first entered military service in January 1997, was specifically developed to allow for bunker penetration, and is speculated to have the ability to destroy hardened targets a few hundred feet beneath the earth.[7]
While penetrations of 20–100 feet (30 m) were sufficient for some shallow targets, both the Soviet Union and the United States were creating bunkers buried under huge volumes of soil or reinforced concrete in order to withstand the multi-megaton thermonuclear weapons developed in the 1950s and 1960s. Bunker penetration weapons were initially designed out of this Cold War context.
Mountainous terrain in Afghanistan
The weapon was revisited in the post-Cold War during the 2001 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, and again during the 2003 invasion of Iraq. During the campaign in Tora Bora in particular, the United States believed that "vast underground complexes," deeply buried, were protecting opposing forces. Such complexes were not found. While a nuclear penetrator (the "Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator", or "RNEP") was never built, the DOE was allotted budget to develop it, and tests were conducted by the Air Force Research Laboratory.
The Bush administration removed its request for funding[8] of the weapon in October 2005. Additionally, US Senator Pete Domenici announced funding for the nuclear bunker-buster has been dropped from the Department of Energy's fiscal 2006 budget at the department's request.[9]
While the project for the RNEP seems to be in fact canceled, Jane's Information Group speculates[10] work may continue under another name.
Nuclear bunker buster - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia