"Root & Branch review of defence spending announced"
To get back onto the subject...........
Has anyone thought of the eventual effect of requiring civil servants (& government ministers) in a particular department had to have either a relevant professional qualification or five year's experience [acknowledged by a national body] in the subject.
That would mean that Alastair Darling & Gordon Brown would be barred from the chancellor's job, as neither have any financial qualifications. NHS civil servants would have nursing or medical qualifications, MOD civil servants would have either five year's service or a very few might have lectured at Sandhurst, Dartmouth etc.
This would give us a well educated civil service, with the benefit of seasoned active practitioners amongst them as well.
This would probably remove the vast swathes of overpaid, under employed deadbeats from the civil service. It would certainly remove any need for this government to employ its favourite fetish of throwing vast sums of money to consultants who appear to have little if any concept of the projects they are supposed to complete, but are quite happy to recommend the services of other consultants, usually at higher prices, or we find out that Gordon & Darling Darling have sold off another government arm for a pittance to some of their fly by night chums who are now being paid ten times what we used to pay to do a tenth of the job they used to
Distance may lend credence to apparent wisdom, but all we've got out of this sorry mess is smoke and mirrors & the country in an unending mortgage just after we finished paying the USA for World War II.
If we are to have a review, the politicians need to define what they expect of the services, then leave the service personnel to determine what they need to do they job, then the politicians need to come up with the funds to do it. But they will need to stop throwing cash about willy nilly to anything which does not turn a profit for the country.
Has anyone thought of the eventual effect of requiring civil servants (& government ministers) in a particular department had to have either a relevant professional qualification or five year's experience [acknowledged by a national body] in the subject.
That would mean that Alastair Darling & Gordon Brown would be barred from the chancellor's job, as neither have any financial qualifications. NHS civil servants would have nursing or medical qualifications, MOD civil servants would have either five year's service or a very few might have lectured at Sandhurst, Dartmouth etc.
This would give us a well educated civil service, with the benefit of seasoned active practitioners amongst them as well.
This would probably remove the vast swathes of overpaid, under employed deadbeats from the civil service. It would certainly remove any need for this government to employ its favourite fetish of throwing vast sums of money to consultants who appear to have little if any concept of the projects they are supposed to complete, but are quite happy to recommend the services of other consultants, usually at higher prices, or we find out that Gordon & Darling Darling have sold off another government arm for a pittance to some of their fly by night chums who are now being paid ten times what we used to pay to do a tenth of the job they used to
Distance may lend credence to apparent wisdom, but all we've got out of this sorry mess is smoke and mirrors & the country in an unending mortgage just after we finished paying the USA for World War II.
If we are to have a review, the politicians need to define what they expect of the services, then leave the service personnel to determine what they need to do they job, then the politicians need to come up with the funds to do it. But they will need to stop throwing cash about willy nilly to anything which does not turn a profit for the country.
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By which I mean, we will have to give up any realistic of prospect of being able to act independently, or lead a coalition, against any force more capable than the West Side Boys.
Are these "West Side Boys" a Muslim community after-school youth group? Surely you aren't threatening them?
Are these "West Side Boys" a Muslim community after-school youth group? Surely you aren't threatening them?
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
We have a job going. A sqn ldr ATC and a flt lt Int have both applied has also an ASDA Manager who has a glowing CV. The job is as an executive in a military unit, a job previously done by an RO.
Compare and discuss.
Compare and discuss.
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Summary
The projected service life of the US Ohio-class Trident submarines, built in Groton, Connecticut, is about 44 years. The 14 US submarines currently in service, which were built in the 1980s and 1990s, are due to be retired between 2029 and 2042, when the Trident D5 missiles they launch are also due to be taken out of service.
But, according to the Government’s White Paper [1], the original design life of the UK Vanguard-class Trident submarines, built in Barrow-in-Furness, was only 25 years, but it may be possible to extend this to 30 years of service life. As a result, the 4 UK submarines currently in service, which were built in the 1990s, are due to be retired between 2022 and 2028, that is, before any of the US submarines.
The British submarines spend a much smaller proportion of their life at sea. So, other things being equal, one would expect them to have a longer service life than their American equivalents. However, if the White Paper is to be believed, the most one can expect from them is a service life that is around 50% less.
This proposition that the UK Trident submarines can be operated for a maximum of 30 years is the fundamental assumption in the White Paper. From it, the Government concludes that replacement submarines must be built to enter service from 2024 onwards.
A second major assumption in the White Paper is that it will take 17 years to design and build a second generation of Trident submarines (to do the same job as the first generation). Hence, the Government concludes that a decision must be made in 2007 to build a second generation and to start design work.
... Had the UK bought Ohio-class submarines from the US, instead of building Vanguard-class submarines in the 1990s, then the oldest submarines would have been serviceable to around 2038 – and a UK decision about replacement would not be necessary until well into the 2020s, instead of in 2007.
Of course, buying American submarines was (and is) politically impossible, since, if both missiles and submarines were made in the USA, it would be next to impossible to maintain the fiction that Britain has an “independent” nuclear deterrent.
...
If the service life of the existing UK Trident submarines could be extended further, as Garwin et al suggest may be possible, so that the oldest is retired in 2029 (like the oldest US submarine) rather than 2022 (as projected in the White Paper) the possibility would open up of the UK emulating the US and phasing in the use of the new US missiles and new UK submarine launch platforms from 2029 onwards.
But that’s impossible – the White Paper says the maximum life of the UK submarines is 30 years. Because of the lower standard, and much shorter life, of the British-built Trident submarines, Britain must build a second generation of Trident submarines to enter service from 2024 onwards, submarines that may have to be modified later to launch the new US missiles, since, after 2042, there may be no serviceable Trident D5 missiles for them to use.
...
Annex A US Trident replacement system
The following is an extract from the Nuclear Posture Review, submitted to the US Congress by the Defense Department on 31 December 2001 [8], about a Trident replacement system, that is, missiles (SLBMs: submarine-launched ballistic missiles) and submarines (SSBNs: Sub-Surface Ballistic Nuclear-powered).
(Note that SSN stands for Sub-Surface Nuclear, that is, a nuclear-powered conventionally-armed submarine.)
"Follow-on [replacement] SSBN: ... DoD [Department of Defense] assumes the continued requirement for a sea-based strategic nuclear force. Therefore, the timeframe when the next generation SSBN will need to be deployed is about 2029 when the first of the remaining operational Trident SSBNs is planned to be retired. The Navy is currently studying two options for future follow-on SSBNs: (1) a variant of Virginia-class nuclear attack submarines (SSN); and (2) a dedicated SSBN (either a new design or a derivative of the Trident SSBN) ... If the decision is made to develop a new dedicated SSBN, a program would have to be initiated around 2016 to ensure that a new platform is available in 2029." (p. 42)
David Morrison
23 February 2007
Labour & Trade Union Review
David Morrison's Homepage
Decision to replace Trident submarines is premature, say US experts
Summary
The projected service life of the US Ohio-class Trident submarines, built in Groton, Connecticut, is about 44 years. The 14 US submarines currently in service, which were built in the 1980s and 1990s, are due to be retired between 2029 and 2042, when the Trident D5 missiles they launch are also due to be taken out of service.
But, according to the Government’s White Paper [1], the original design life of the UK Vanguard-class Trident submarines, built in Barrow-in-Furness, was only 25 years, but it may be possible to extend this to 30 years of service life. As a result, the 4 UK submarines currently in service, which were built in the 1990s, are due to be retired between 2022 and 2028, that is, before any of the US submarines.
The British submarines spend a much smaller proportion of their life at sea. So, other things being equal, one would expect them to have a longer service life than their American equivalents. However, if the White Paper is to be believed, the most one can expect from them is a service life that is around 50% less.
This proposition that the UK Trident submarines can be operated for a maximum of 30 years is the fundamental assumption in the White Paper. From it, the Government concludes that replacement submarines must be built to enter service from 2024 onwards.
A second major assumption in the White Paper is that it will take 17 years to design and build a second generation of Trident submarines (to do the same job as the first generation). Hence, the Government concludes that a decision must be made in 2007 to build a second generation and to start design work.
... Had the UK bought Ohio-class submarines from the US, instead of building Vanguard-class submarines in the 1990s, then the oldest submarines would have been serviceable to around 2038 – and a UK decision about replacement would not be necessary until well into the 2020s, instead of in 2007.
Of course, buying American submarines was (and is) politically impossible, since, if both missiles and submarines were made in the USA, it would be next to impossible to maintain the fiction that Britain has an “independent” nuclear deterrent.
...
If the service life of the existing UK Trident submarines could be extended further, as Garwin et al suggest may be possible, so that the oldest is retired in 2029 (like the oldest US submarine) rather than 2022 (as projected in the White Paper) the possibility would open up of the UK emulating the US and phasing in the use of the new US missiles and new UK submarine launch platforms from 2029 onwards.
But that’s impossible – the White Paper says the maximum life of the UK submarines is 30 years. Because of the lower standard, and much shorter life, of the British-built Trident submarines, Britain must build a second generation of Trident submarines to enter service from 2024 onwards, submarines that may have to be modified later to launch the new US missiles, since, after 2042, there may be no serviceable Trident D5 missiles for them to use.
...
Annex A US Trident replacement system
The following is an extract from the Nuclear Posture Review, submitted to the US Congress by the Defense Department on 31 December 2001 [8], about a Trident replacement system, that is, missiles (SLBMs: submarine-launched ballistic missiles) and submarines (SSBNs: Sub-Surface Ballistic Nuclear-powered).
(Note that SSN stands for Sub-Surface Nuclear, that is, a nuclear-powered conventionally-armed submarine.)
"Follow-on [replacement] SSBN: ... DoD [Department of Defense] assumes the continued requirement for a sea-based strategic nuclear force. Therefore, the timeframe when the next generation SSBN will need to be deployed is about 2029 when the first of the remaining operational Trident SSBNs is planned to be retired. The Navy is currently studying two options for future follow-on SSBNs: (1) a variant of Virginia-class nuclear attack submarines (SSN); and (2) a dedicated SSBN (either a new design or a derivative of the Trident SSBN) ... If the decision is made to develop a new dedicated SSBN, a program would have to be initiated around 2016 to ensure that a new platform is available in 2029." (p. 42)
David Morrison
23 February 2007
Labour & Trade Union Review
David Morrison's Homepage
Decision to replace Trident submarines is premature, say US experts
Donkey
For my part, when I joined the Civil Service (as a prospective aeronautical engineer) I was told that it would be about 15 years before I attained the necessary competence and experience to get onto the lowest rung of project management - if that was to be my chosen career path. I was called a young whippersnapper when I did it in 12 (5 promotions).
At that most junior PM grade, I could not be marked "fitted" for promotion until I had managed projects in a range of engineering disciplines, in Land, Sea and (of course) Air, in every stage of the "procurement cycle" (i.e. Concept, Development etc). 120+ projects later I got one step up the PE ladder. I accepted this, because in my department the rule was applied equally and fairly.
Then we got 21 year old direct entrants, who did 2 years and then grade skipped to be boss; never having managed anything but the simplest task, and occasionally a project. And never having had to retrospectively attain and demonstrate the competencies and experience demanded of others. Then CDP got shot of the experienced staffs, saying PE did not need engineers to manage technology projects. His solution, as you rightly point out, was consultants. The aforesaid PMs became simple consultancy task managers. THAT is where the root of many procurement problems lie. Some old hands remain, but they are despised and sidelined in DE&S.
I try to avoid commenting on serving officers posted to IPTs, but I'm sure they all have the necessary experience and can tell you all about their 50 most successful projects.
Has anyone thought of the eventual effect of requiring civil servants (& government ministers) in a particular department had to have either a relevant professional qualification or five year's experience [acknowledged by a national body] in the subject.
At that most junior PM grade, I could not be marked "fitted" for promotion until I had managed projects in a range of engineering disciplines, in Land, Sea and (of course) Air, in every stage of the "procurement cycle" (i.e. Concept, Development etc). 120+ projects later I got one step up the PE ladder. I accepted this, because in my department the rule was applied equally and fairly.
Then we got 21 year old direct entrants, who did 2 years and then grade skipped to be boss; never having managed anything but the simplest task, and occasionally a project. And never having had to retrospectively attain and demonstrate the competencies and experience demanded of others. Then CDP got shot of the experienced staffs, saying PE did not need engineers to manage technology projects. His solution, as you rightly point out, was consultants. The aforesaid PMs became simple consultancy task managers. THAT is where the root of many procurement problems lie. Some old hands remain, but they are despised and sidelined in DE&S.
I try to avoid commenting on serving officers posted to IPTs, but I'm sure they all have the necessary experience and can tell you all about their 50 most successful projects.
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Talking to chums working in various HQs and MOD, there is apparently a rumour now doing the rounds that there is serious consideration to cutting the RAF to around 30,000 in any coming defence review.
What could you expect? I hear
12 Months tax-free lump sum
Gratuity on reaching your IPP
Full pension past IPP non index linked to 55
Index linked from IPP to 55 on 55th birthday and RPI from thence on
If so, where do I sign up?
Is that the highly scientific and efficient way that a Defence Review is conducted?
Come up with a nice round number out of thin air, 30,000 this time (wasn't it 40,000 last time?) and then work out who you need to get rid of to get down to that figure
Come up with a nice round number out of thin air, 30,000 this time (wasn't it 40,000 last time?) and then work out who you need to get rid of to get down to that figure
Apparently the Air Force is just too expensive - or so the logic goes behind this rumour.
But if you cut the Air Force - or any of the Services - back to such an extent that they really aren't capable of carrying out the duties required of them, then surely in terms of value for money, that means that whatever is left simply isn't value for money, making it ripe for abolition.
Where is that tipping point for the 21st century RAF?
But if you cut the Air Force - or any of the Services - back to such an extent that they really aren't capable of carrying out the duties required of them, then surely in terms of value for money, that means that whatever is left simply isn't value for money, making it ripe for abolition.
Where is that tipping point for the 21st century RAF?
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I can see us out of the stan within the next government term, purely down to cost and public apathy.
God Help us all when that happens...
The good news; despite what the Tories are saying, I expect there to be equally painful cuts in benefits and the NHS, as they say, no pain, no gain.
We have been living well beyond our means in this country for 10 years now. May I now suggest it is payback time (and then some?)
God Help us all when that happens...
The good news; despite what the Tories are saying, I expect there to be equally painful cuts in benefits and the NHS, as they say, no pain, no gain.
We have been living well beyond our means in this country for 10 years now. May I now suggest it is payback time (and then some?)
Smells more like an options thinkpiece. Similar tales doing the rounds last year for a 15000 "person" Navy. Doesn't mean it's going to happen - that said, indicates the budget led "people are too expensive" mindset in MB/Whitehall.......
I can see us out of the stan within the next government term, purely down to cost and public apathy.
God Help us all when that happens...
God Help us all when that happens...
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They havent even seen the state of the public finances properly yet...
Just wait and see what happens when they open the book on PFI/Pensions/un-budgeted commitments
The NHS will get its comeuppance, just as we will.
Just wait and see what happens when they open the book on PFI/Pensions/un-budgeted commitments
The NHS will get its comeuppance, just as we will.
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This from Richard Beedall's Web site:
The government identified a number of options for future of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent, in approximate order of increasing cost these were:
•Don't replace Trident - leaving France as the only EU member with nuclear weapons;
•A small force of vulnerable land based ballistic missiles.
•Ship based ballistic missiles - probably initially Trident.
•Build a new class of SSBN's, initially carrying extended life Trident missiles or a replacement submarine ballistic missile system.
•Develop a cruise missile with a nuclear warhead, air launched by a force of 20 RAF strike aircraft supported by 20 dedicated refuelling aircraft.
A submarine based solution was announced as the preferred choice in December 2006. Initial government estimates were that the programme would cost about £20 billion, perhaps about £9 billion of which (in current money) is for the replacement of the replacing the four Vanguard’s with another class of 16 tube ballistic missile submarines. If this money was taken solely from the RN's current share of the MOD's equipment budget then no other new ships or submarines could be ordered for the RN for a period of at least 15 years.
SLEP'ing the Vanguard's
In addition to new build, MOD officials investigated the costs involved with a service life extension programme (SLEP) for the four existing Vanguard class submarines, and their Trident missiles, re-entry vehicles and W-76 derivative nuclear warheads. Since 2006 the government and MOD have apparently assumed as a near given a 5 year extension in the V's service life, from 25 to 30 years.
Developments in the USA (see below) indicates that it might be possible for the UK to economically extend the system to serve for yet another 10-15 years - but this would be very costly. At the very least the boats would unexpectedly need another expensive long overhaul period and refuelling (LOP(R)), and their hulls and nuclear steam plant would need to be critically inspected and recertified. Some UK experts (e.g. Commodore Tim Hare RN (Rtd)) believe that the Vanguard's are being too hard worked for a full SLEP (extending their service life by 20 years) to be possible, rather than the 5 year life extension widely discussed. it's also worth noting that SLEP'ing the V's would almost inevitably result in the loss of a national nuclear submarine construction capability, and this will have to be factored in.
Across the Atlantic, the US Department of Defense is pressing ahead with a Trident II D-5 life extension (LE) program, the first contracts for which were awarded in 2002. The USN now expects to operate the Trident II D5 missile from SLEP'ed Ohio class submarines until about 2042. Also, on 26 May 2005 the US Department of Defense announced the award to Lockheed Martin a $9 million contract in regards to development of an affordable Submarine Launched Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (SLIRBM). The SLIRBM will have a maximum diameter of 32.5 inches, less than half the diameter of a Trident II, but a range not exceeding 2000 nm, again less than half that of a Trident II. The missile could accommodate both nuclear and non-nuclear GPS guided warheads. Allegedly, UK MOD officials have already been involved in discussions about the project.
http://frn.beedall.com/fsm.htm
The government identified a number of options for future of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent, in approximate order of increasing cost these were:
•Don't replace Trident - leaving France as the only EU member with nuclear weapons;
•A small force of vulnerable land based ballistic missiles.
•Ship based ballistic missiles - probably initially Trident.
•Build a new class of SSBN's, initially carrying extended life Trident missiles or a replacement submarine ballistic missile system.
•Develop a cruise missile with a nuclear warhead, air launched by a force of 20 RAF strike aircraft supported by 20 dedicated refuelling aircraft.
A submarine based solution was announced as the preferred choice in December 2006. Initial government estimates were that the programme would cost about £20 billion, perhaps about £9 billion of which (in current money) is for the replacement of the replacing the four Vanguard’s with another class of 16 tube ballistic missile submarines. If this money was taken solely from the RN's current share of the MOD's equipment budget then no other new ships or submarines could be ordered for the RN for a period of at least 15 years.
SLEP'ing the Vanguard's
In addition to new build, MOD officials investigated the costs involved with a service life extension programme (SLEP) for the four existing Vanguard class submarines, and their Trident missiles, re-entry vehicles and W-76 derivative nuclear warheads. Since 2006 the government and MOD have apparently assumed as a near given a 5 year extension in the V's service life, from 25 to 30 years.
Developments in the USA (see below) indicates that it might be possible for the UK to economically extend the system to serve for yet another 10-15 years - but this would be very costly. At the very least the boats would unexpectedly need another expensive long overhaul period and refuelling (LOP(R)), and their hulls and nuclear steam plant would need to be critically inspected and recertified. Some UK experts (e.g. Commodore Tim Hare RN (Rtd)) believe that the Vanguard's are being too hard worked for a full SLEP (extending their service life by 20 years) to be possible, rather than the 5 year life extension widely discussed. it's also worth noting that SLEP'ing the V's would almost inevitably result in the loss of a national nuclear submarine construction capability, and this will have to be factored in.
Across the Atlantic, the US Department of Defense is pressing ahead with a Trident II D-5 life extension (LE) program, the first contracts for which were awarded in 2002. The USN now expects to operate the Trident II D5 missile from SLEP'ed Ohio class submarines until about 2042. Also, on 26 May 2005 the US Department of Defense announced the award to Lockheed Martin a $9 million contract in regards to development of an affordable Submarine Launched Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (SLIRBM). The SLIRBM will have a maximum diameter of 32.5 inches, less than half the diameter of a Trident II, but a range not exceeding 2000 nm, again less than half that of a Trident II. The missile could accommodate both nuclear and non-nuclear GPS guided warheads. Allegedly, UK MOD officials have already been involved in discussions about the project.
http://frn.beedall.com/fsm.htm
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The SLIRBM will have a maximum diameter of 32.5 inches
First Virginia Class Payload Tube Increases Force's Versatility
Story Number: NNS090521-02
5/21/2009
From Program Executive Office, Submarines Public Affairs
WASHINGTON (NNS) -- Program Executive Office Submarines' Virginia-class Program Office marked a substantial milestone May 15 with the delivery of the first Virginia payload tube (VPT).
Built by General Dynamics Electric Boat (GDEB), the VPT arrived at GDEB's Virginia-class shipbuilding partner Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding's Newport News (NGSB-NN) facility for inclusion in Pre-Commissioning Unit North Dakota's (SSN 784) bow. As part of a teaming arrangement, NGSB-NN builds all Virginia-class bows while GDEB constructs all of the VPTs.
As the lead submarine being built under the third, or Block III contract, North Dakota will be the first Virginia-class submarine equipped with VPTs.
Unlike the first 10 Virginia-class submarines that housed 12 Tomahawk cruise missiles in individual Vertical Launch System (VLS) tubes, all Virginia-class submarines beginning with North Dakota will utilize two, 87.5-inch diameter, 35-plus ton tubes to house and launch the same number of missiles.
http://www.navy.mil/search/print.asp?story_id=45461&VIRIN=58533&imagetype=1&page=1
32.5", 87.5", hmmm.
First Virginia Class Payload Tube Increases Force's Versatility
Story Number: NNS090521-02
5/21/2009
From Program Executive Office, Submarines Public Affairs
WASHINGTON (NNS) -- Program Executive Office Submarines' Virginia-class Program Office marked a substantial milestone May 15 with the delivery of the first Virginia payload tube (VPT).
Built by General Dynamics Electric Boat (GDEB), the VPT arrived at GDEB's Virginia-class shipbuilding partner Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding's Newport News (NGSB-NN) facility for inclusion in Pre-Commissioning Unit North Dakota's (SSN 784) bow. As part of a teaming arrangement, NGSB-NN builds all Virginia-class bows while GDEB constructs all of the VPTs.
As the lead submarine being built under the third, or Block III contract, North Dakota will be the first Virginia-class submarine equipped with VPTs.
Unlike the first 10 Virginia-class submarines that housed 12 Tomahawk cruise missiles in individual Vertical Launch System (VLS) tubes, all Virginia-class submarines beginning with North Dakota will utilize two, 87.5-inch diameter, 35-plus ton tubes to house and launch the same number of missiles.
http://www.navy.mil/search/print.asp?story_id=45461&VIRIN=58533&imagetype=1&page=1
32.5", 87.5", hmmm.
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...
The Block III submarines will be the first of the class to be fitted with the Virginia Payload Tubes (VPT), a development of the modified former ballistic missile launch tubes in the Ohio-class converted cruise missile subs. Two VPTs in the bow of each of the new submarines will replace 12 vertical launch tubes used for Tomahawk cruise missiles in previous submarines. The 92-inch-wide VPTs each can hold six cruise missiles.
U.S. Navy Orders 8 New Subs - Defense News
Block III: The Changes
The most obvious change is the switch from 12 vertical launch tubes, to 12 missiles in 2 tubes that use technology from the Ohio Class special forces/ strike SSGN program. The Virginia’s hull has a smaller cross-section than the converted ballistic missile SSGNs, so the “6-shooters” will be shorter and a bit wider. Nevertheless, they will share a great deal of common technology, allowing innovations on either platform to be incorporated into the other submarine class during major maintenance milestones. Net savings are about $8 million to program baseline costs.
8 more USN Virginia class submarines? (Block III, revised bow)
Further, replacing 12 vertical launch tubes with two 92-inch VPTs not only reduces construction and lifecycle costs, but also significantly expands their ability to accept future payloads.
http://thetension.*************/2008...-virginia.html
"The VPTs provide commonality with the SSGN tubes, so payloads developed for one can go into the other," said Rear Adm. William Hilarides, Program Executive Officer, Submarines. "This affords the submarine force incredible flexibility and versatility to the far future."
First Virginia Class Payload Tube Increases Force's Versatility
The Block III submarines will be the first of the class to be fitted with the Virginia Payload Tubes (VPT), a development of the modified former ballistic missile launch tubes in the Ohio-class converted cruise missile subs. Two VPTs in the bow of each of the new submarines will replace 12 vertical launch tubes used for Tomahawk cruise missiles in previous submarines. The 92-inch-wide VPTs each can hold six cruise missiles.
U.S. Navy Orders 8 New Subs - Defense News
Block III: The Changes
The most obvious change is the switch from 12 vertical launch tubes, to 12 missiles in 2 tubes that use technology from the Ohio Class special forces/ strike SSGN program. The Virginia’s hull has a smaller cross-section than the converted ballistic missile SSGNs, so the “6-shooters” will be shorter and a bit wider. Nevertheless, they will share a great deal of common technology, allowing innovations on either platform to be incorporated into the other submarine class during major maintenance milestones. Net savings are about $8 million to program baseline costs.
8 more USN Virginia class submarines? (Block III, revised bow)
Further, replacing 12 vertical launch tubes with two 92-inch VPTs not only reduces construction and lifecycle costs, but also significantly expands their ability to accept future payloads.
http://thetension.*************/2008...-virginia.html
"The VPTs provide commonality with the SSGN tubes, so payloads developed for one can go into the other," said Rear Adm. William Hilarides, Program Executive Officer, Submarines. "This affords the submarine force incredible flexibility and versatility to the far future."
First Virginia Class Payload Tube Increases Force's Versatility
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I left the RAF on voluntary redundancy in 1995 - it is by far the best move I have ever made. I gave my heart and soul to it when I was in, but amazingly discovered a great world outside once I left. Since that time I have watched with ever-growing incredulity at the state of our armed forces. Alas, the people who run them have spent a huge amount of time and money ensuring there are enough homosexuals employed to keep Stonewall happy, but not enough ordinary folk to ensure we can effectively run a war. I have not the slightest doubt that 'root and branch' means in practice 'way less people and equipment'. Needless to say, once we have finally guaranteed we have smaller armed forces than the average African banana republic, the nation will be assured by whichever Prime Minister is in power at the time that of course we have sufficient defences to save our nation from all known aggressors. As long as the Argentinians do not try to invade the Falklands again, or the fire brigade does not go on strike over the winter, then I am sure he will be proven right.
Tragically, our armed services are now no more than a peope's militia - the main difference being that a people's militia would have more manpower. Take the money and run chaps - our nation is, alas, on its last legs, and one of those legs is about to be amputated above the knee.
Tragically, our armed services are now no more than a peope's militia - the main difference being that a people's militia would have more manpower. Take the money and run chaps - our nation is, alas, on its last legs, and one of those legs is about to be amputated above the knee.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
I notice that 'root and branch' is singularly appropriate given our man's previous work on the environmental committee.
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Root & Branch?
Some very interesting points raised over the last three pages, along with the more mournful, impending feelings of doom.
This is essentially a sop during the party conference season.
Given this governments propensity for governing by headline chasing within a 24-hour news cycle rather than looking forward medium or long term, I think we can reasonably expect any such greenpaper to be extremely long on dumbed down soundbites and very very short on actual substance, very short on what exactly NL may have in mind for the future. Someone else has already alluded to this that to be able to revise properly not just your defence spending, but also your entire strategy in such a short space of time is barking.
Again, as has already been said, you've got to know what you expect the mission to be for your forces, what the threat level is going to be and from where, what you're likely to be involved in before you can start reasonably equipping and recruiting, etc. Unless you're just going to chuck piles of money at it and end up with a broad spectrum capability. That option, plainly is not on offer.
So, what do we expect of our forces? Does anyone really know? Less inter-nation conflict and more against disparate bands of extremists? Or is it foreseen that the likes of Iran, North Korea, even Pakistan or Venezuela, or Libya, or whoever may emerge as threats to world peace and stability? What is the percieved wisdom?
What should be the driver, if anything, for this future strategy, if we dont know ourselves? The overall NATO mission, if we are going to stay in it?
Do we still think we're a world power, purely by virtue of being a permanent member of the UNSC (again, only because we were one of the 5 original nuclear powers)? I cant help but think that those who consistently think and expect us to punch way above our weight are as guilty of living in the past as those who are in danger of sleepwalking us into being salami sliced into non-existance. Is it about time that we stopped playing PCSO to the US's World Policeman and let the rest of the world get on with it? Arguably so, I may think (IMVHO, naturally...)
The very least we ought to be concerned about is defence of the realm, the homeland. Given that we only have at any one time, six ships to protect the UK coastline, I think we might be a bit pushed. I'm not even going to go into AD.... those who know will know what has happened on that front over the last ten years and how it is being led at the moment and the direction it is going in. It is, beyond doubt, an embarrassment and lest I be accused of looking backwards, has achieved more than what a certain undertall Austrian with questionable facial hair managed to achieve seventy odd years ago.
At least, once you know what the mission is, then you can tailor your procurement and your force sizes accordingly. This is something we have not got at the moment.
As soon as I saw the words "root and branch", I was worried. Main reason being yes, this is what is needed, but the root and branch bit that needs reform is primarily in Main Building and Whitehall. I cannot see this supposed review/reform getting anywhere near the same postcode, let alone having any effect on what happens in MB/HMG. The effects of FLF and SDR 98 were felt (from my own RAF experience) more at Group and Command level, with most things being pulled into Wycombe as CINCUKAIR sought to protect and consolidate his empire. I cannot see that it would have been any different for the other two services. So, the part that needed reform more than any other, ie * level and above, never even got a sniff of it.
The mere fact that Jock Stirrup has got the brazen chutzpah to say that the 1998 SDR has served us well, given the situation we find ourselves in just compounds the fact that the man has been singularly unsuited to command at the highest level since the year dot. Unfortunately, with the exceptions of Dannatt and Richards, this is the regrettable calibre of leadership our services are left with, each one trading in their backbones for the extra thick stripe on the arm and the associated pensions.
If a significant part of the percieved problem is money, then as the old adage goes, you have to follow it to see where it is going. Despite paying lip service to Joint Operations, it still remains exactly that. Lip service. We still have far too much single-service stovepiping in terms of procurement and policy. The single service chiefs are still far too obsessed with their own toys regardless of how they should fit into the overall defence strategy. At the current juncture, I'm not sure I'd consider us properly equipped for anything at all, let alone Herrick.
Unfortunately when your leaders sell out the futures of their services to the Treasury, this is what you end up with. Some of the accounting practises in MOD have been breathtaking, but it is starting to catch up with them, they are running out of mirrors and the supply of smoke is not what it was. Shifting things off the balance sheet and outsourcing virtually everything in sight and putting the rest on PFI is maybe financially acceptable, but it diminishes the capability of the services to deliver against the objectives. Yes, there had to be some peace dividend after the end of the Cold War. But, civilianisation has gone far too far, particularly in the supply, distribution and engineering chains - and even considering PFI for AAR, a strategic force multiplier is, to my mind, utter madness. These financial sleights-of-hand are all well and good for short term political gain, but I dont seriously believe that this is the way to defend the nation. Outsourcing has gone far too far, at the expense of expertise that the services had in abundance not ten years ago and particularly from an IT perspective, this has been wasted in favour of outsourcing everything to EDS/Atlas.
Well, I started off thinking that I could come up with something constructive, but I'm afraid my deep rooted cynicism has taken over. I'm afraid that so long as the service chiefs continue to put their own advancement ahead of the requirements of their services and the mission objectives as a whole, then it is only likely to get worse. They stood back and watched what were world class forces wither on the vine 10-15 years ago and they will do the same again. They will continue to waste money hand over fist because they dont know any better and dont want to know. They will continue to outsource and consult for everything because they still do not understand the expertise that they have sacrificed to save their own necks. Root and branch reform of MOD will not get within the M25, let alone within the Underground Zone 1. As long as procurement is politically led, rather than buying off the shelf, you're always going to pay way over the odds and wait an awful lot longer for something that either doesnt do what you need it to do now, let alone when you ordered it, let alone when it is going to be delivered. And lessons are never learned, they are only identified.
Its down to a heinous failure of leadership at single, joint service and ministerial level and a deep seated antipathy to the armed forces from our current PM, surrounded by both other ministers and MP's far too spineless and self serving to do anything about it.
Personally, I can understand those who appear to be thinking that its time to get out before it gets any worse. Because it will, for sure and our current political and military leaders and their pet causes are not worth dying for.
In short, a completely hollow gesture.
This is essentially a sop during the party conference season.
Given this governments propensity for governing by headline chasing within a 24-hour news cycle rather than looking forward medium or long term, I think we can reasonably expect any such greenpaper to be extremely long on dumbed down soundbites and very very short on actual substance, very short on what exactly NL may have in mind for the future. Someone else has already alluded to this that to be able to revise properly not just your defence spending, but also your entire strategy in such a short space of time is barking.
Again, as has already been said, you've got to know what you expect the mission to be for your forces, what the threat level is going to be and from where, what you're likely to be involved in before you can start reasonably equipping and recruiting, etc. Unless you're just going to chuck piles of money at it and end up with a broad spectrum capability. That option, plainly is not on offer.
So, what do we expect of our forces? Does anyone really know? Less inter-nation conflict and more against disparate bands of extremists? Or is it foreseen that the likes of Iran, North Korea, even Pakistan or Venezuela, or Libya, or whoever may emerge as threats to world peace and stability? What is the percieved wisdom?
What should be the driver, if anything, for this future strategy, if we dont know ourselves? The overall NATO mission, if we are going to stay in it?
Do we still think we're a world power, purely by virtue of being a permanent member of the UNSC (again, only because we were one of the 5 original nuclear powers)? I cant help but think that those who consistently think and expect us to punch way above our weight are as guilty of living in the past as those who are in danger of sleepwalking us into being salami sliced into non-existance. Is it about time that we stopped playing PCSO to the US's World Policeman and let the rest of the world get on with it? Arguably so, I may think (IMVHO, naturally...)
The very least we ought to be concerned about is defence of the realm, the homeland. Given that we only have at any one time, six ships to protect the UK coastline, I think we might be a bit pushed. I'm not even going to go into AD.... those who know will know what has happened on that front over the last ten years and how it is being led at the moment and the direction it is going in. It is, beyond doubt, an embarrassment and lest I be accused of looking backwards, has achieved more than what a certain undertall Austrian with questionable facial hair managed to achieve seventy odd years ago.
At least, once you know what the mission is, then you can tailor your procurement and your force sizes accordingly. This is something we have not got at the moment.
As soon as I saw the words "root and branch", I was worried. Main reason being yes, this is what is needed, but the root and branch bit that needs reform is primarily in Main Building and Whitehall. I cannot see this supposed review/reform getting anywhere near the same postcode, let alone having any effect on what happens in MB/HMG. The effects of FLF and SDR 98 were felt (from my own RAF experience) more at Group and Command level, with most things being pulled into Wycombe as CINCUKAIR sought to protect and consolidate his empire. I cannot see that it would have been any different for the other two services. So, the part that needed reform more than any other, ie * level and above, never even got a sniff of it.
The mere fact that Jock Stirrup has got the brazen chutzpah to say that the 1998 SDR has served us well, given the situation we find ourselves in just compounds the fact that the man has been singularly unsuited to command at the highest level since the year dot. Unfortunately, with the exceptions of Dannatt and Richards, this is the regrettable calibre of leadership our services are left with, each one trading in their backbones for the extra thick stripe on the arm and the associated pensions.
If a significant part of the percieved problem is money, then as the old adage goes, you have to follow it to see where it is going. Despite paying lip service to Joint Operations, it still remains exactly that. Lip service. We still have far too much single-service stovepiping in terms of procurement and policy. The single service chiefs are still far too obsessed with their own toys regardless of how they should fit into the overall defence strategy. At the current juncture, I'm not sure I'd consider us properly equipped for anything at all, let alone Herrick.
Unfortunately when your leaders sell out the futures of their services to the Treasury, this is what you end up with. Some of the accounting practises in MOD have been breathtaking, but it is starting to catch up with them, they are running out of mirrors and the supply of smoke is not what it was. Shifting things off the balance sheet and outsourcing virtually everything in sight and putting the rest on PFI is maybe financially acceptable, but it diminishes the capability of the services to deliver against the objectives. Yes, there had to be some peace dividend after the end of the Cold War. But, civilianisation has gone far too far, particularly in the supply, distribution and engineering chains - and even considering PFI for AAR, a strategic force multiplier is, to my mind, utter madness. These financial sleights-of-hand are all well and good for short term political gain, but I dont seriously believe that this is the way to defend the nation. Outsourcing has gone far too far, at the expense of expertise that the services had in abundance not ten years ago and particularly from an IT perspective, this has been wasted in favour of outsourcing everything to EDS/Atlas.
Well, I started off thinking that I could come up with something constructive, but I'm afraid my deep rooted cynicism has taken over. I'm afraid that so long as the service chiefs continue to put their own advancement ahead of the requirements of their services and the mission objectives as a whole, then it is only likely to get worse. They stood back and watched what were world class forces wither on the vine 10-15 years ago and they will do the same again. They will continue to waste money hand over fist because they dont know any better and dont want to know. They will continue to outsource and consult for everything because they still do not understand the expertise that they have sacrificed to save their own necks. Root and branch reform of MOD will not get within the M25, let alone within the Underground Zone 1. As long as procurement is politically led, rather than buying off the shelf, you're always going to pay way over the odds and wait an awful lot longer for something that either doesnt do what you need it to do now, let alone when you ordered it, let alone when it is going to be delivered. And lessons are never learned, they are only identified.
Its down to a heinous failure of leadership at single, joint service and ministerial level and a deep seated antipathy to the armed forces from our current PM, surrounded by both other ministers and MP's far too spineless and self serving to do anything about it.
Personally, I can understand those who appear to be thinking that its time to get out before it gets any worse. Because it will, for sure and our current political and military leaders and their pet causes are not worth dying for.
In short, a completely hollow gesture.
Join Date: Apr 2005
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Nurse, Ref your 9 Jul question on the ratio of Civil Servants to Military.
The organisation I work for used to be 100% light blue, headed by a Wg Cdr, split into 3 Sqns of 4 Flts, lead by Sqn Ldrs and Flt Lts accordingly. Each of those posts was deemed digital and essential, so no detachments during a tour.
We are now lead by a Sqn Ldr, with 2 JOs and 7 Civil Servants. Our outputs have increased and our wage bill has plummeted. The logic is simple; if the uniformed man cannot deploy, civilianise his post for half the salary. Your CS employee does not get posted every 2-3 years so becomes competent at his job; therefore overall numbers can be cut. He will have no military distractions, and so puts in a full day’s work at the primary job he is paid to do.
I well aware of the many shortcomings to this argument, but if civilianisation is used in the right places can be to everyone’s benefit.
Donkey, Ref your comment that the Civil Service contains vast swathes of overpaid, under employed deadbeats.
I and my 6 CS colleagues referred to above had all reached SNCO or Senior Officer rank before our posts were civilianised. We all to a man retain our Service work ethic. Furthermore, I regularly work alongside other CS organisations and, in my experience, see a similar mix of quality to the uniformed services. It is easy to target the CS, and I can give you plenty of examples of complete wasters wearing uniform.
I am all in favour of a fair Defence Review. But will we get one?
The organisation I work for used to be 100% light blue, headed by a Wg Cdr, split into 3 Sqns of 4 Flts, lead by Sqn Ldrs and Flt Lts accordingly. Each of those posts was deemed digital and essential, so no detachments during a tour.
We are now lead by a Sqn Ldr, with 2 JOs and 7 Civil Servants. Our outputs have increased and our wage bill has plummeted. The logic is simple; if the uniformed man cannot deploy, civilianise his post for half the salary. Your CS employee does not get posted every 2-3 years so becomes competent at his job; therefore overall numbers can be cut. He will have no military distractions, and so puts in a full day’s work at the primary job he is paid to do.
I well aware of the many shortcomings to this argument, but if civilianisation is used in the right places can be to everyone’s benefit.
Donkey, Ref your comment that the Civil Service contains vast swathes of overpaid, under employed deadbeats.
I and my 6 CS colleagues referred to above had all reached SNCO or Senior Officer rank before our posts were civilianised. We all to a man retain our Service work ethic. Furthermore, I regularly work alongside other CS organisations and, in my experience, see a similar mix of quality to the uniformed services. It is easy to target the CS, and I can give you plenty of examples of complete wasters wearing uniform.
I am all in favour of a fair Defence Review. But will we get one?