Nimrod crash in Afghanistan Tech/Info/Discussion (NOT condolences)
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Good Morning Ed Sett, I see we have moved back to the old thread. No problems.
I am afraid the report takes into consideration "In light of that measures taken", and still regards the fuel system as non-ALARP.
DV
I am afraid the report takes into consideration "In light of that measures taken", and still regards the fuel system as non-ALARP.
DV
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EdSet
The report says the fuel system is not ALARP. The latest copy of Defence Standards defines ALARP as:
This seems to include a good measure of wriggle room for an aircraft or its fuel system to be declared ALARP if as with Nimrod it has a desperately needed capability and yet the report specifically says that the fuel system - not just the air-to-air refuelling system, the fuel system - is not ALARP.
The latest copy of defence standards defines safe as:
So ALARP seems to be the one factor that has to be present.
http://www.dstan.mod.uk/data/00/056/01000400.pdf
The report says the fuel system is not ALARP. The latest copy of Defence Standards defines ALARP as:
As Low As Reasonably Practicable. A risk is ALARP when it has been
demonstrated that the cost of any further Risk Reduction, where the
cost includes the loss of defence capability as well as financial or other
resource costs, is grossly disproportionate to the benefit obtained from
that Risk Reduction.
demonstrated that the cost of any further Risk Reduction, where the
cost includes the loss of defence capability as well as financial or other
resource costs, is grossly disproportionate to the benefit obtained from
that Risk Reduction.
The latest copy of defence standards defines safe as:
Risk has been demonstrated to have been reduced to a level that is
ALARP and broadly acceptable or tolerable, and relevant prescriptive
safety requirements have been met, for a system in a given application
in a given operating environment.
ALARP and broadly acceptable or tolerable, and relevant prescriptive
safety requirements have been met, for a system in a given application
in a given operating environment.
http://www.dstan.mod.uk/data/00/056/01000400.pdf
From today's The Sunday Times:
Des Browne, the defence secretary, appears to have misled MPs when he told them an independent report had ruled that the RAF’s Nimrod aircraft were safe to fly.
See: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/new...cle3736587.ece
Des Browne, the defence secretary, appears to have misled MPs when he told them an independent report had ruled that the RAF’s Nimrod aircraft were safe to fly.
See: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/new...cle3736587.ece
Is there a link to the actual QQ report - I'm not sure who to believe here, so I'd like to read it myself.
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As a comparison to the civil aircraft industry, In May 2001, the Federal Aviation Administration released a comprehensive Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR No. 88) requiring all the airframe manufacturers and Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) holders to conduct a safety review of all fuel system components. Included were requirements to prepare special maintenance inspections that operators of transport aircraft would use to determine the continued safety and airworthiness of the fuel system on their respective aircraft. This was also taken on by EASA.
As part of the process to get to ALARP, as per SFAR88, all staff, from the Hangar cleaner through to the “chief cheese” receive at least a 2 hour briefing per annum on aircraft fuel systems and safety. The technical staffs receive a more comprehensive training programme with regular refresher training, all under the watchful eye of EASA!
A good basic overview is here: http://www.fus-goodrich1.com/sfar88/...w.asp?expand=6
As part of the process to get to ALARP, as per SFAR88, all staff, from the Hangar cleaner through to the “chief cheese” receive at least a 2 hour briefing per annum on aircraft fuel systems and safety. The technical staffs receive a more comprehensive training programme with regular refresher training, all under the watchful eye of EASA!
A good basic overview is here: http://www.fus-goodrich1.com/sfar88/...w.asp?expand=6
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No JFZ90 there is no copy of the QinetiQ report on the TimesOnline site, that is a mistake by whoever put the story up on the website. It is as you surmised the MoD's safety rules and should have been linked as such later in the sentence. I am trying to get it changed. We cannot put a copy of the QQ report on the web because it is copyright controlled and was issued under FOI with a warning that it therefore could not be disseminated.
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Now I know why I have been refused these documents under freedom of information. Well done Jimmy Jones for obtaining this report through freedom of information and Mick Smith for publishing this. Absolutley shocking and cruel. RIP Crew 3.
No JFZ90 there is no copy of the QinetiQ report on the TimesOnline site, that is a mistake by whoever put the story up on the website. It is as you surmised the MoD's safety rules and should have been linked as such later in the sentence. I am trying to get it changed. We cannot put a copy of the QQ report on the web because it is copyright controlled and was issued under FOI with a warning that it therefore could not be disseminated.
Now I know why I have been refused these documents under freedom of information. Well done Jimmy Jones for obtaining this report through freedom of information and Mick Smith for publishing this. Absolutley shocking and cruel. RIP Crew 3.
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Going back to that definition of ALARP I can quite easily see - given the wriggle room - how the RAF or the MoD could have said as far as we are concerned the aircraft is ALARP. But what happened here is not that. What happened here is that Des Browne said an independent report by QinetiQ had declared the fuel system safe, and if the risk has to be ALARP for the system to be safe, which is what the defence standards document says, then QinetiQ most definitely didn't do that.
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I have read Mick Smith's report a number of times, and it is clear that what is being said it that the Nimrod was not safe at the time of the accident, and it still wasn't safe in mid 2007 when the QinetiQ report was published. This is after all the mitigation concerning hot air pipes and SCP being isolated had been taken into consideration.
I suspect that when Des Browne claimed last Dec that the aicraft was safe, the same degree of "spin" was being applied to the word "safe" as was applied to the famous "15 mins threat" from Saddam's rockets. And we all know how that turned out.
If MoD can not conform to the safety rules that they set, based on those outlined by HSE, then I have concerns for those crews who are required to fly Nimrod today. I know there will be cries of "I wouldn't fly if I did not think it was safe", but for God sake start to examine the facts.
Des Browne and CAS decided, last December, to play with the meaning of "safe", because to apply the rules, that they have set, would mean grounding the fleet.
DV
I suspect that when Des Browne claimed last Dec that the aicraft was safe, the same degree of "spin" was being applied to the word "safe" as was applied to the famous "15 mins threat" from Saddam's rockets. And we all know how that turned out.
If MoD can not conform to the safety rules that they set, based on those outlined by HSE, then I have concerns for those crews who are required to fly Nimrod today. I know there will be cries of "I wouldn't fly if I did not think it was safe", but for God sake start to examine the facts.
Des Browne and CAS decided, last December, to play with the meaning of "safe", because to apply the rules, that they have set, would mean grounding the fleet.
DV
Going back to that definition of ALARP I can quite easily see - given the wriggle room - how the RAF or the MoD could have said as far as we are concerned the aircraft is ALARP.
But what happened here is not that. What happened here is that Des Browne said an independent report by QinetiQ had declared the fuel system safe, and if the risk has to be ALARP for the system to be safe, which is what the defence standards document says, then QinetiQ most definitely didn't do that.
I think your comments Mick confirm you have realised this. If I understand this correctly then you have just confirmed that a story that was published on Page 2 of my paper this morning was probably fundamentally flawed and hence you could conclude a rather unfair slur on Des B. People often talk about stuff in the papers being incorrect or spun, but I can't remember the the last time the journolist concerned admitted this was the case on the same day his article appeared across the country!!
Last edited by JFZ90; 13th Apr 2008 at 16:14.
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JFZ 90. With all due respect, if you are not careful you are going to disappear up your own jet pipe on this one.
As I read the Mick Smith report, the bottom line is that QinetiQ declared the Nimrod fuel system "Tolerable but not ALARP"; and that is Not Safe. QED
Any one who tries to claim that it is safe is misleading aircrews and the general public.
DV
As I read the Mick Smith report, the bottom line is that QinetiQ declared the Nimrod fuel system "Tolerable but not ALARP"; and that is Not Safe. QED
Any one who tries to claim that it is safe is misleading aircrews and the general public.
DV
JFZ 90. With all due respect, if you are not careful you are going to disappear up your own jet pipe on this one.
As I read the Mick Smith report, the bottom line is that QinetiQ declared the Nimrod fuel system "Tolerable but not ALARP"; and that is Not Safe. QED
Any one who tries to claim that it is safe is misleading aircrews and the general public.
DV
As I read the Mick Smith report, the bottom line is that QinetiQ declared the Nimrod fuel system "Tolerable but not ALARP"; and that is Not Safe. QED
Any one who tries to claim that it is safe is misleading aircrews and the general public.
DV
You can argue about what "tolerably safe" means, but even to an uneducated reader its fairly obvious this patently does not mean "unsafe" as I think you are trying to imply.
Further, in the recommendations, QinetiQ state that the given lims and mtn activities in place "mitigate the fuel system risks to acceptable levels". "Acceptable" is not a word QinetiQ/Boscombe are prone to using lightly and if there was any reason to say the aircraft was not safe they would absolutely not hesitate to say so.
It is hard for me to see how Mick has concluded that Des B misled anyone in his statement based on whats in the QQ report - on the contrary I now see his article as misleading in itself, based as it is on twisting & exaggerating the significance of some statements relating to ALARP.
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JFZ90: You must of gone to the same spin school as Des Browne and CAS. What part of Def Stan 00-56 (issue 4) do you not understand.
If it is not ALARP it is NOT SAFE.
QinetiQ say the system in not ALARP.
Now, come on JFZ, this is not rocket science.
The levels of risk are; Broadly Acceptable, Tolerable and Unacceptable.
"Tolerably Safe" is a term which does exist.
DV
If it is not ALARP it is NOT SAFE.
QinetiQ say the system in not ALARP.
Now, come on JFZ, this is not rocket science.
The levels of risk are; Broadly Acceptable, Tolerable and Unacceptable.
"Tolerably Safe" is a term which does exist.
DV
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JFZ90
The article is not misleading in any way. It states accurately that the QinetiQ report found the system tolerable but not ALARP. It goes into extensive detail to explain why ALARP is a key part of the definition of safe under the MoD's own rules and being tolerable is not enough. If it is not ALARP then it is not safe.
Does the limited paperwork you have access to say it is ALARP or does it say it is not ALARP? It says it is not ALARP.
Does it also say that in order to be ALARP no fewer than 30 recommendations need to be taken up? Yes it does.
How many of those relate to AAR? Just five.
Look again at the definition of safe under the MoD's own rules - Defence Standards 00-56 as issued in April 2007.
Does that definition say that being tolerably safe is enough? No it doesnt. The system must be ALARP and either broadly acceptable or tolerable. If QinetiQ says it isnt ALARP then it can not be deemed safe under the MoD's own rules.
The article is not misleading in any way. It states accurately that the QinetiQ report found the system tolerable but not ALARP. It goes into extensive detail to explain why ALARP is a key part of the definition of safe under the MoD's own rules and being tolerable is not enough. If it is not ALARP then it is not safe.
Does the limited paperwork you have access to say it is ALARP or does it say it is not ALARP? It says it is not ALARP.
Does it also say that in order to be ALARP no fewer than 30 recommendations need to be taken up? Yes it does.
How many of those relate to AAR? Just five.
Look again at the definition of safe under the MoD's own rules - Defence Standards 00-56 as issued in April 2007.
Risk has been demonstrated to have been reduced to a level that is
ALARP and broadly acceptable or tolerable, and relevant prescriptive
safety requirements have been met, for a system in a given application
in a given operating environment.
ALARP and broadly acceptable or tolerable, and relevant prescriptive
safety requirements have been met, for a system in a given application
in a given operating environment.
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JFZ90; Can I draw your attention to what the "educated" BOI said about the Nimrod Safety Case (2-22):
"NSC is a body is a body of evidence that assures that the aircraft is safe to operate within the Statement of Operating Intent and Usage. It is a suite of documents providing a written demonstration that risks have been reduced to As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP)"
That body of evidence does not exist, and that is why the fuel system is not ALARP.
I fully appreciate that QinetiQ/Boscombe will not use "acceptable" lightly. But they also know the implications of using the term "broadly acceptable", and they do not use it.
DV
"NSC is a body is a body of evidence that assures that the aircraft is safe to operate within the Statement of Operating Intent and Usage. It is a suite of documents providing a written demonstration that risks have been reduced to As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP)"
That body of evidence does not exist, and that is why the fuel system is not ALARP.
I fully appreciate that QinetiQ/Boscombe will not use "acceptable" lightly. But they also know the implications of using the term "broadly acceptable", and they do not use it.
DV
Mick
In short, the reason I can state that I found your article misleading is that when I read it I came to the conclusion that the QinetiQ report must fundamentally contradict the statements that Des B gave to the house some time ago. I think this is exactly what you wanted our readers to conclude.
This is an extremely serious accusation, and if true would suggest he was either lying or trying to hide the fact that the aircraft was in fact not safe. The severity of this inference is no doubt why your editor felt it appropriate to have it on page 2 of your paper this morning.
However, on reading (admittedly only parts of) the report, QinetiQ clearly state that the measures taken, in their view, "mitigate the fuel system risks to acceptable levels".
This provides quite a different spin on the story, and is entirely consistent with what Des said. I can only conclude therefore that the ALARP comments in the same document are being taken out of context deliberately to create a 'story'.
In short, the reason I can state that I found your article misleading is that when I read it I came to the conclusion that the QinetiQ report must fundamentally contradict the statements that Des B gave to the house some time ago. I think this is exactly what you wanted our readers to conclude.
This is an extremely serious accusation, and if true would suggest he was either lying or trying to hide the fact that the aircraft was in fact not safe. The severity of this inference is no doubt why your editor felt it appropriate to have it on page 2 of your paper this morning.
However, on reading (admittedly only parts of) the report, QinetiQ clearly state that the measures taken, in their view, "mitigate the fuel system risks to acceptable levels".
This provides quite a different spin on the story, and is entirely consistent with what Des said. I can only conclude therefore that the ALARP comments in the same document are being taken out of context deliberately to create a 'story'.
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You arent listening really are you JFZ90? Des said QinetiQ had said the fuel system was safe. QinetiQ actually said it was tolerably safe but not ALARP. ALARP is a fundamental part of the MoD's own definition of safe. Under those rules, a system cannot be safe without it. Tolerably safe is not good enough on its own. It must be ALARP. That's not my rules, that's the MoD's own rules.