Nimrod crash in Afghanistan Tech/Info/Discussion (NOT condolences)
Design Flaw
Winco states:
The problem here is that it WAS forseen and it WAS predicted.
The problem here is that it WAS forseen and it WAS predicted.
Looking at the history behind the design flaw, hightlighted by the IPTL, would suggest that there were plenty of opportunities for the catastrophic implications of that flaw to have come to light. However, no one did. I draw on the BOI report for the facts.
Early 1950s - First post-war jet airliner designed with fuel system intended only for ground refuelling, including blow-off valves to protect tank structure from over-pressurisation.
Late 1960s - MR1 designed with Spey engines and insulated hot bleed air crossfeed pipe for ground and air starting of engines. Also, fuel tanks (No 7) added to wing root trailing edge to extend range. Both sets of pipes passing through same area (No 7 tank dry bay). Not a great issue as hot air only present at idle temperatures on ground or briefly for air starting.
1970s - RAF operating world's most successful anti-submarine patrol aircraft at height of cold war. Range extended by routine shutting down of engines - a fact widely known certainly within the RAF, if not the public. This led to the crossfeed pipe being left open during flight (for quick restarts) with much higher bleed air temperatures - a fact probably not know to engineers or BAES.
Late-1970s - MR1 upgraded to MR2 with new mission system equipment necessitating additional cooling provided by new Supplementary Cooling Pack (SCP) in tail with connecting ducting passing through bottom of No 7 tank dry bay. The SCP, when in use, constantly draws air from the crossfeed air pipe at higher engine rpms and temperatures.
1982 - Urgent modification to add AAR capability for the Falklands conflict. This mod was very Heath Robinson and bears no resemblance to the current installation (except probe).
1980s - Aborted development of AEW3 looked at formal embodiment of AAR and identified blow-off implications. Some work taken forward to MR2
designs but much of information was archived or binned when AEW3 was cancelled.
late-1980s - AAR formally incorporated on MR2 and R1 with fuel feed into main refuelling gallery. Blow-off values removed from No 5 (front low fuselage tank) because of possible fuel ingestion into engines, if operated.
Date unknown - Introduction of Tristar tanker with higher output than Victors or VC10s.
Throughout - Groundcrew were aware of blow-off during ground refuel if flow rate too high as tanks reach full. Fact not known to aircrew. Any blow-off was seen as a safety device operating correctly.
2004 - IPT/BAES Hazard Analysis identifies hazards of co-located hot air and fuel pipes. Risk assessment under-rated risk and missed opportunity to catch previous oversights (from above).
As the BOI concluded "the formal incorporation of AAR ... did not identify the full implications of successive changes to the fuel system".
Nigglib states:
The risks associated with the design fault were not appreciated until the crash, but the day after the crash the SCP as a source of fire was removed.
The risks associated with the design fault were not appreciated until the crash, but the day after the crash the SCP as a source of fire was removed.
For those contributors with knowledge of high level policy and safety knowledge within DLO and/or DPA (like Tucs and SH), have you made yourselves know to the QC doing the Nimrod Review? If not your views will not have any relevance or impact.
As a personal view, I do not see any possibility of a MAA being established outside the MOD. Who would pay for it, except the MOD budget. I believe the problem lies with the loss of RAF control when the support organization charged with airworthiness was subsumed into DLO under one budget fighting with all the other demands from Land and Sea.
The MOD and RAF tend to work in its own little areas (ie. IPT, airstaff, aircrew, maintainers) with some and necessary same-level communication but little up-and-down outside specializations. As a result, some important things are not recognised or acted upon until the worst happens as in this case. I agree with other contributors that the level of corporate knowledge in all areas has diminished over the past 20 years.
Finally, can anyone explain why the has been no press coverage on the Coroner's Inquest for most of last week?
Softie
Last edited by Softie; 19th May 2008 at 20:37. Reason: Minor grammatical corrections
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Finally, can anyone explain why the has been no press coverage on the Coroner's Inquest for most of last week?
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Softie's History of the Nimrod
Softie's outline of Nimrod development is spot on. However, there was one development that interests me and I would be grateful if anyone can confirm it; its the bit in bold print:
On a technical matter, its my opinion that the pipe probably didn't get very hot due to a lack of significant air flow through it, due to balanced pressure from the opposing engines. And, just for accuracy, the pipe was only open while one or more engines was shut down; assuming that the Routine Engine shut down checks existed then. Would any pilots or engs from that era care to comment?
Ed
PS. Buoy 15, this subject lay dormant for a few months after the BOI report. It is only to be expected that the Inquest will re-generate interest as information, not published in the BOI report (intercom tape, etc), comes into the public (and the RAF in general) domain. I miss the guys, too, and there is absolutely no enjoyment in discussing the subject. But, we have a responsibility to the bereaved families to learn from the deaths of their loved ones and do our individual best to ensure that it never happens again. I don't believe that PPrune is influential in the corridors of power, but sensible and sensitive facts that appear here can be useful to the front line air and ground crews who do not receive the information in their normal work routines. You would not have known that Air Cdre George Beber stated that the buck stopped with him. We can debate whether or not he is right, but the fact is, he said it on oath, in front of the families, to their faces. Its worth reporting that we have an honourable man among our leaders.
1970s - RAF operating world's most successful anti-submarine patrol aircraft at height of cold war. Range extended by routine shutting down of engines - a fact widely known certainly within the RAF, if not the public. This led to the crossfeed pipe being left open during flight (for quick restarts) with much higher bleed air temperatures - a fact probably not known to engineers or BAES.
Ed
PS. Buoy 15, this subject lay dormant for a few months after the BOI report. It is only to be expected that the Inquest will re-generate interest as information, not published in the BOI report (intercom tape, etc), comes into the public (and the RAF in general) domain. I miss the guys, too, and there is absolutely no enjoyment in discussing the subject. But, we have a responsibility to the bereaved families to learn from the deaths of their loved ones and do our individual best to ensure that it never happens again. I don't believe that PPrune is influential in the corridors of power, but sensible and sensitive facts that appear here can be useful to the front line air and ground crews who do not receive the information in their normal work routines. You would not have known that Air Cdre George Beber stated that the buck stopped with him. We can debate whether or not he is right, but the fact is, he said it on oath, in front of the families, to their faces. Its worth reporting that we have an honourable man among our leaders.
Nimrod safety changes incomplete
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7410544.stm
Safety recommendations made after 14 servicemen died when a Nimrod aircraft crashed in Afghanistan have not been fully implemented, the MoD has said.
Thirty recommendations were made after the 2006 crash. Inquests into the 14 deaths are currently taking place.
Defence secretary Des Browne said 21 of the 30 were being implemented and three considered, while six were "on hold".
But Westminster SNP leader Angus Robertson said it was "unacceptable" they had not all been fully introduced.
Mr Robertson, who represents the Nimrod home base of RAF Kinloss, said under the MoD's own rules, for an aircraft to be considered safe, any risk must be reduced to a level that is as low as reasonably practical.
But he said the announcement by Mr Browne, which he made in a letter to the Moray MP, showed this had not happened.
The MoD said the report and recommendations were part of a more comprehensive safety review of the Nimrod air system, which was continuing.
Thirty recommendations were made after the 2006 crash. Inquests into the 14 deaths are currently taking place.
Defence secretary Des Browne said 21 of the 30 were being implemented and three considered, while six were "on hold".
But Westminster SNP leader Angus Robertson said it was "unacceptable" they had not all been fully introduced.
Mr Robertson, who represents the Nimrod home base of RAF Kinloss, said under the MoD's own rules, for an aircraft to be considered safe, any risk must be reduced to a level that is as low as reasonably practical.
But he said the announcement by Mr Browne, which he made in a letter to the Moray MP, showed this had not happened.
The MoD said the report and recommendations were part of a more comprehensive safety review of the Nimrod air system, which was continuing.
Excellent - and useful - potted history, Softie, thank you very much.
On a small point
I’ve been rabitting on to the public at airshows for 30 years, and whenever I covered Nimrod in the days when its main job was Kipper Fleet-ing. I always used to mention the shutting down of two engines while on task. It was one of the significant arguments about the world’s only maritime 4-jet versus the turboprop remainder.
On the question of why no press coverage, perhaps I can add a little to what Mick says. I’ve probably been at the inquest more often than most of HM 4th Estate. But I’m a broadcast hack, and I don’t have the contacts in the written press to sell regularly to them. When I was at the Hercules inquest in Trowbridge, I did two weekly upsums for BBC News Online - but when I offered them something similar last Friday (after a week with little other coverage) they declined, saying they were happy to await the verdict. I expressed my unhappiness at their lack of interest (which I suppose I may live to regret....).
But I believe it was especially unfortunate, because, as I told them, last thing on Friday, Robert Dicketts, father of Corporal Oliver Dicketts, put this question to Philip Sleight, Senior AAIB Inspector:
“You said in your evidence that Nimrod would not have qualified for a (civil) airworthiness certificate. When you link that to the Coroner’s (rhetorical) question earlier in the week about whether it wasn’t time to ground the whole fleet, doesn’t that give you pause for thought?”
The Coroner intervened to say that this question was not one Mr Sleight could reasonably answer, but he did add another rhetorical question about whether it wasn’t time for accident inquiries to be standardised across the military and civil fields.
But anyway, the Beeb wasn’t interested. or maybe they just don’t like my reporting........
Things are a bit better this week - with Olly Hemans of INS News Agency there most of the week, and Simon Evans of PA filing today.
And the Coroner does plan to deliver his verdict on Friday.
Btw, a bit surprised no one’s mentioned the hero status that Mr Coroner Walker achieved on last Sunday’s Bremner Bird & Fortune on Channel 4. The George Parr interview was fantastic, pitting Andrew Walker’s earlier inquest sallies against the feeble replies of the MoD. You can see it again (till next Sat, I think) at
http://www.channel4.com/video/bremne...e_box4#popover
although if you have a Mac, Channel 4 is having some ridiculous spat with Apple and it won’t work. Harrumph. (Fortunately I do have an audio recording
)
airsound
On a small point
routine shutting down of engines - a fact widely known certainly within the RAF, if not the public.
On the question of why no press coverage, perhaps I can add a little to what Mick says. I’ve probably been at the inquest more often than most of HM 4th Estate. But I’m a broadcast hack, and I don’t have the contacts in the written press to sell regularly to them. When I was at the Hercules inquest in Trowbridge, I did two weekly upsums for BBC News Online - but when I offered them something similar last Friday (after a week with little other coverage) they declined, saying they were happy to await the verdict. I expressed my unhappiness at their lack of interest (which I suppose I may live to regret....).
But I believe it was especially unfortunate, because, as I told them, last thing on Friday, Robert Dicketts, father of Corporal Oliver Dicketts, put this question to Philip Sleight, Senior AAIB Inspector:
“You said in your evidence that Nimrod would not have qualified for a (civil) airworthiness certificate. When you link that to the Coroner’s (rhetorical) question earlier in the week about whether it wasn’t time to ground the whole fleet, doesn’t that give you pause for thought?”
The Coroner intervened to say that this question was not one Mr Sleight could reasonably answer, but he did add another rhetorical question about whether it wasn’t time for accident inquiries to be standardised across the military and civil fields.
But anyway, the Beeb wasn’t interested. or maybe they just don’t like my reporting........
Things are a bit better this week - with Olly Hemans of INS News Agency there most of the week, and Simon Evans of PA filing today.
And the Coroner does plan to deliver his verdict on Friday.
Btw, a bit surprised no one’s mentioned the hero status that Mr Coroner Walker achieved on last Sunday’s Bremner Bird & Fortune on Channel 4. The George Parr interview was fantastic, pitting Andrew Walker’s earlier inquest sallies against the feeble replies of the MoD. You can see it again (till next Sat, I think) at
http://www.channel4.com/video/bremne...e_box4#popover
although if you have a Mac, Channel 4 is having some ridiculous spat with Apple and it won’t work. Harrumph. (Fortunately I do have an audio recording
)airsound
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And here is the PA copy
DOOMED NIMROD 'HAD SERIOUS DESIGN FLAW'
An RAF Nimrod spy plane which crashed in Afghanistan, killing four servicemen from the region and 10 others, had a serious design flaw, an inquest has heard.
A senior engineer from BAE Systems, the British defence and aerospace firm, said his predecessors who made the Nimrod some 40 years ago also failed to fit a fire protection system on a key area of risk on the aircraft.
Nimrod XV230, a 37-year-old craft, exploded in mid-air near Kandahar on September 2 2006 shortly after undergoing air-to-air refuelling.
Sgt John Langton, 29, Flt Lt Steven Swarbrick, 28, both of Liverpool, Sgt Gary Quilliam, 42, of Manchester, and Flt Lt Allan Squires, 39, of Clatterbridge on the Wirrall, were killed in the crash alongside 10 of their colleagues.
The tragedy is believed to have been caused by fuel leaking in one of the craft's dry bays, then igniting on contact with a hot air pipe, the men's inquest has heard.
The hearing in Oxford was told on Tuesday that a section of hot air pipe in XV230's Dry Bay 7 was not lagged to protect it from igniting fuel in the event of a leak from a fuel pipe below it.
Although the hot air pipe, which can reach temperatures of up to 500C, is insulated in most parts of the aircraft, it remains uncovered in Dry Bay 7, the inquest heard.
Andrew Walker, the coroner, said: "What we have here amounts to a serious design flaw, because we could have a single point failure (where just one fault could cause a serious problem)."
Martin Breakell, BAE's chief Nimrod engineer, agreed although he stressed this scenario would be very unlikely.
Mr Breakell, asked by the coroner if he considered the lack of a fire suppressant system to be a serious failure, said: "It is a serious failure."
Tom McMichael, head of airworthiness at BAE's Military Air Solutions, said that if the evidence heard today was correct, the Nimrod planes had, at the time of the tragedy, been flying in an unairworthy state for 37 years.
Mr McMichael said because Dry Bay 7 was potentially a single-point failure area, it should have been fitted with a fire-suppressant system. That it was not meant it should never have been passed fit to fly, he said.
Mr Walker, pondering on the decisions of those who passed the Nimrod airworthy four decades ago, asked: "Was it not a serious possibility that no one really recognised the risks associated with this aircraft?"
"It is a possibility," replied Mr McMichael.
An "acceptance conference", to decide the Nimrod's airworthiness, took place in August 1968 and it was declared fit to fly.
The coroner, reacting to today's evidence, said: "So, at the end of the acceptance conference, on the evidence as it stands, this aircraft was not airworthy."
The inquest was adjourned until tomorrow.
An RAF Nimrod spy plane which crashed in Afghanistan, killing four servicemen from the region and 10 others, had a serious design flaw, an inquest has heard.
A senior engineer from BAE Systems, the British defence and aerospace firm, said his predecessors who made the Nimrod some 40 years ago also failed to fit a fire protection system on a key area of risk on the aircraft.
Nimrod XV230, a 37-year-old craft, exploded in mid-air near Kandahar on September 2 2006 shortly after undergoing air-to-air refuelling.
Sgt John Langton, 29, Flt Lt Steven Swarbrick, 28, both of Liverpool, Sgt Gary Quilliam, 42, of Manchester, and Flt Lt Allan Squires, 39, of Clatterbridge on the Wirrall, were killed in the crash alongside 10 of their colleagues.
The tragedy is believed to have been caused by fuel leaking in one of the craft's dry bays, then igniting on contact with a hot air pipe, the men's inquest has heard.
The hearing in Oxford was told on Tuesday that a section of hot air pipe in XV230's Dry Bay 7 was not lagged to protect it from igniting fuel in the event of a leak from a fuel pipe below it.
Although the hot air pipe, which can reach temperatures of up to 500C, is insulated in most parts of the aircraft, it remains uncovered in Dry Bay 7, the inquest heard.
Andrew Walker, the coroner, said: "What we have here amounts to a serious design flaw, because we could have a single point failure (where just one fault could cause a serious problem)."
Martin Breakell, BAE's chief Nimrod engineer, agreed although he stressed this scenario would be very unlikely.
Mr Breakell, asked by the coroner if he considered the lack of a fire suppressant system to be a serious failure, said: "It is a serious failure."
Tom McMichael, head of airworthiness at BAE's Military Air Solutions, said that if the evidence heard today was correct, the Nimrod planes had, at the time of the tragedy, been flying in an unairworthy state for 37 years.
Mr McMichael said because Dry Bay 7 was potentially a single-point failure area, it should have been fitted with a fire-suppressant system. That it was not meant it should never have been passed fit to fly, he said.
Mr Walker, pondering on the decisions of those who passed the Nimrod airworthy four decades ago, asked: "Was it not a serious possibility that no one really recognised the risks associated with this aircraft?"
"It is a possibility," replied Mr McMichael.
An "acceptance conference", to decide the Nimrod's airworthiness, took place in August 1968 and it was declared fit to fly.
The coroner, reacting to today's evidence, said: "So, at the end of the acceptance conference, on the evidence as it stands, this aircraft was not airworthy."
The inquest was adjourned until tomorrow.
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This is a copy of part of my post on 2nd Dec 2007,
"Large ac self-protection has simply been ignored until very recently.
Ignored by people who have never been to war, or whose only experience is life in a fast jet. Tuc you are suggesting that combat survivability and ac self-protection should be at the core of the design. I could not agree more. We lost XV230 even though we learnt the hard way on the Herc fleet that fuel tanks explode. We await the BoI for the Herc that was destroyed on a strip in Iraq. I believe that too was a fuel tank explosion.
So to the future. The word from military officers in MoD is that MRA4 is an old design, procured a long time ago. Well, the design was only frozen last December. I have been told that large aircraft safety and combat survivability is now taken very seriously. So seriously that A400M OBIGGS has not been funded yet. The plan for MRA4 is to introduce it into service without FDA, OBIGGS, BBay Fire protection, under floor fire protection, probe inerting protection, dual skin AAR pipework.
I am sorry, but that is simply not good enough."
"Large ac self-protection has simply been ignored until very recently.
Ignored by people who have never been to war, or whose only experience is life in a fast jet. Tuc you are suggesting that combat survivability and ac self-protection should be at the core of the design. I could not agree more. We lost XV230 even though we learnt the hard way on the Herc fleet that fuel tanks explode. We await the BoI for the Herc that was destroyed on a strip in Iraq. I believe that too was a fuel tank explosion.
So to the future. The word from military officers in MoD is that MRA4 is an old design, procured a long time ago. Well, the design was only frozen last December. I have been told that large aircraft safety and combat survivability is now taken very seriously. So seriously that A400M OBIGGS has not been funded yet. The plan for MRA4 is to introduce it into service without FDA, OBIGGS, BBay Fire protection, under floor fire protection, probe inerting protection, dual skin AAR pipework.
I am sorry, but that is simply not good enough."
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Nige
You must have been somewhere hot and sunny when the BOI into the Herc blown up at Amarah was published last week.
http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/Ab...30Mk4Zh876.htm
You must have been somewhere hot and sunny when the BOI into the Herc blown up at Amarah was published last week.
http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/Ab...30Mk4Zh876.htm
Last edited by Mick Smith; 20th May 2008 at 22:33. Reason: Incapable of inserting a url!
I sincerely hope this doesn’t mean the MoD will claim that this all happened in the past and we now have “a robust airworthiness regulatory framework”. As has been said many times in the past (years before ACM Loader re-iterated it in the BoI report) the framework may be robust but implementation is not.
What did or didn’t happen in 1968 may have been an oversight or error but, in the words of a famous man, “an error does not become a mistake unless you refuse to fix it”. Not only did MoD refuse to fix it, but in the late 90s they ruled that delivering aircraft safety is optional and implementing mandated components of airworthiness is a disciplinary offence. This was upheld as recently as last year. End of, as far as I’m concerned.
What did or didn’t happen in 1968 may have been an oversight or error but, in the words of a famous man, “an error does not become a mistake unless you refuse to fix it”. Not only did MoD refuse to fix it, but in the late 90s they ruled that delivering aircraft safety is optional and implementing mandated components of airworthiness is a disciplinary offence. This was upheld as recently as last year. End of, as far as I’m concerned.
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Tuc, I wonder if Nimrod has suffered from its status as a maritime aircraft? We already know that the crews have to fly without TCAS, a fact I find astonishing. Nimrod comes under the recent control of AOC 2 Gp, but it is not certificated as an Air Transport aircraft, managing to avoid AT regulations aimed at improving aircraft safety. Procurement of MRA4 is something of a one off.
RAF AT assets meanwhile, are steadily improving in terms of DAS, fuel tank protection. In fact the Herc fleet must have one of the best systems in the world.
I think the plan for MRA4 is to introduce it and improve combat safety with the use of UORs, but the aircraft will be needed on the front line immediately. The RAF (at war), appears to have failed to insist on combat survivability being at the core design. There is no way on earth an American military aircraft would be procured in such a fashion-why do we? Lack of money? Or a lack of coherency?
RAF AT assets meanwhile, are steadily improving in terms of DAS, fuel tank protection. In fact the Herc fleet must have one of the best systems in the world.
I think the plan for MRA4 is to introduce it and improve combat safety with the use of UORs, but the aircraft will be needed on the front line immediately. The RAF (at war), appears to have failed to insist on combat survivability being at the core design. There is no way on earth an American military aircraft would be procured in such a fashion-why do we? Lack of money? Or a lack of coherency?
Last edited by nigegilb; 21st May 2008 at 08:08.
I think the plan for MRA4 is to introduce it and improve combat safety with the use of UORs, but the aircraft will be needed on the front line immediately. The RAF (at war), appears to have failed to insist on combat survivability being at the core design. There is no way on earth an American military aircraft would be procured in such a fashion-why do we? Lack of money? Or a lack of coherency?
There is an old, but true, saying. One man’s Urgent Operational Requirement is another man’s total incompetence and lack of foresight. It may be about money now, but if you don’t ask in the first place………. Coherent? MoD? Not only does the left hand not know what the right is doing, it’s debatable if either knows the other exists.
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An RAF Nimrod which exploded in mid-air, killing 14 British servicemen, was not airworthy at the time, its own manufacturer admitted today/yesterday (Thurs).
Hushed gasps from bereaved relatives of the men could be heard as BAE Systems’ chief engineer for the Nimrod conceded the point at an inquest into the deaths.
Martin Breakell said that based on what he had learned during the 12-day hearing, the ageing plane should not have left the ground.
Yesterday/on Wednesday Group Captain Colin Hickman admitted that the Nimrod was only “tolerably safe” because of faults identified since the crash.
BAE Systems Ltd is the successor to British Aerospace, which designed and built the Nimrod in the 1960s, modelling it on the De Havilland Comet airliner.
Mr Breakell’s comments today/yesterday (Thurs) came in response to a direct question from a family member as to whether he believed the aircraft was safe to fly.
After initially arguing that he was not qualified to decide on certain parts of the Nimrod, he was pressed by the crew’s relatives and the coroner.
He responded: “I concur that in regards to the evidence on the incident, then no, it wasn’t (airworthy).”
On September 2, 2006, Nimrod XV230, at the age of 37 the oldest plane in the fleet, caught fire and exploded while on NATO operations against the Taliban in Afghanistan.
The inquest, in Oxford’s County Hall, has heard evidence from numerous witnesses from the RAF, BAE Systems and other maintenance and fuelling contractors, as well as a parts manufacturer.
Andrew Walker, the assistant deputy coroner for Oxfordshire, has examined different theories as to what caused the devastating fire, which led to the greatest loss of life among the British Armed Forces in a single incident since the Falklands War.
Theories put forward by investigators, including the RAF’s own Board of Inquiry, have focussed on a possible fuel leak onto a hot air pipe in a compartment next to one of the fuel tanks.
However, Mr Walker remains apparently unconvinced of the validity of the RAF’s conclusion and instructed Mr Breakell to examine whether a leak on the high pressure system on one of the Rolls Royce Spey engines could have been to blame.
The witness concluded, after consulting engineers at the Nimrod’s base at RAF Kinloss, in Scotland, that it was possible the fault lay with the engine system.
He added that he was “staggered” to learn from Rolls Royce that an engine could continue to function normally with a leak of up to 1,000 gallons per hour.
Group Captain Nicholas Sharpe, the president of the Board of Inquiry, discounted the new information and said he stood by the board’s findings, as he said they were, on the balance of probabilities, the most compelling reasons for the fire.
While clearly struggling to accept Gp Capt Sharpe’s stance,the coroner said: “I have to say it is not my intention to criticise, directly or indirectly, the Board of Inquiry’s findings.
“One must not forget that without the BoI, what is described as a serious design fault on this aircraft would continue to go unnoticed, and that is no small achievement.”
Michael Rawlinson, the lawyer for 13 of the 14 families, together with Mick Bell, whose brother Gerard died in the crash, paid tribute to the BoI team for their work.
The inquest, which began on Tuesday, May 6 with a visit by a Nimrod to RAF Brize Norton, Oxon., for families to view, is expected to end tomorrow/today (Fri) when the coroner will record his verdicts.
ends
Hushed gasps from bereaved relatives of the men could be heard as BAE Systems’ chief engineer for the Nimrod conceded the point at an inquest into the deaths.
Martin Breakell said that based on what he had learned during the 12-day hearing, the ageing plane should not have left the ground.
Yesterday/on Wednesday Group Captain Colin Hickman admitted that the Nimrod was only “tolerably safe” because of faults identified since the crash.
BAE Systems Ltd is the successor to British Aerospace, which designed and built the Nimrod in the 1960s, modelling it on the De Havilland Comet airliner.
Mr Breakell’s comments today/yesterday (Thurs) came in response to a direct question from a family member as to whether he believed the aircraft was safe to fly.
After initially arguing that he was not qualified to decide on certain parts of the Nimrod, he was pressed by the crew’s relatives and the coroner.
He responded: “I concur that in regards to the evidence on the incident, then no, it wasn’t (airworthy).”
On September 2, 2006, Nimrod XV230, at the age of 37 the oldest plane in the fleet, caught fire and exploded while on NATO operations against the Taliban in Afghanistan.
The inquest, in Oxford’s County Hall, has heard evidence from numerous witnesses from the RAF, BAE Systems and other maintenance and fuelling contractors, as well as a parts manufacturer.
Andrew Walker, the assistant deputy coroner for Oxfordshire, has examined different theories as to what caused the devastating fire, which led to the greatest loss of life among the British Armed Forces in a single incident since the Falklands War.
Theories put forward by investigators, including the RAF’s own Board of Inquiry, have focussed on a possible fuel leak onto a hot air pipe in a compartment next to one of the fuel tanks.
However, Mr Walker remains apparently unconvinced of the validity of the RAF’s conclusion and instructed Mr Breakell to examine whether a leak on the high pressure system on one of the Rolls Royce Spey engines could have been to blame.
The witness concluded, after consulting engineers at the Nimrod’s base at RAF Kinloss, in Scotland, that it was possible the fault lay with the engine system.
He added that he was “staggered” to learn from Rolls Royce that an engine could continue to function normally with a leak of up to 1,000 gallons per hour.
Group Captain Nicholas Sharpe, the president of the Board of Inquiry, discounted the new information and said he stood by the board’s findings, as he said they were, on the balance of probabilities, the most compelling reasons for the fire.
While clearly struggling to accept Gp Capt Sharpe’s stance,the coroner said: “I have to say it is not my intention to criticise, directly or indirectly, the Board of Inquiry’s findings.
“One must not forget that without the BoI, what is described as a serious design fault on this aircraft would continue to go unnoticed, and that is no small achievement.”
Michael Rawlinson, the lawyer for 13 of the 14 families, together with Mick Bell, whose brother Gerard died in the crash, paid tribute to the BoI team for their work.
The inquest, which began on Tuesday, May 6 with a visit by a Nimrod to RAF Brize Norton, Oxon., for families to view, is expected to end tomorrow/today (Fri) when the coroner will record his verdicts.
ends
Last edited by nigegilb; 22nd May 2008 at 18:49.
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What sticks in my throat more than anything was listening to that useless CAS we have at the moment, Torpey, when he claimed that the aircraft were 'as safe as necessary' (or something like that)
Clearly Gp Capt Hickman felt slightly differently, with his statement of 'the Nimrod was only “tolerably safe” '
It just shows how ignorant of the facts the CAS was, and probably still is.
Go now Torpey, you are well past your sell-by date, just like the aircraft. Instead of being hell-bent on getting more Typhoons and getting rid of the Arrows and closing Scampton, concentrate on the things that are of importance to the RAF at the moment, little things such as Airworthiness of aircraft, aircraft fire protection and Flight Safety.
Clearly Gp Capt Hickman felt slightly differently, with his statement of 'the Nimrod was only “tolerably safe” '
It just shows how ignorant of the facts the CAS was, and probably still is.
Go now Torpey, you are well past your sell-by date, just like the aircraft. Instead of being hell-bent on getting more Typhoons and getting rid of the Arrows and closing Scampton, concentrate on the things that are of importance to the RAF at the moment, little things such as Airworthiness of aircraft, aircraft fire protection and Flight Safety.
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for the families
there is not alot that i can offer or be of any use but i want to take this opportunity to say that my heart goes out to all the families and colleagues and friends affected by this tragic, unecessary loss. i will have you in my thoughts tomorrow as the verdict is delivered and i pray that you all find some peace in this sad journey we are left to walk through.
hold your head up high and be proud in your boys.
with love
chappie
hold your head up high and be proud in your boys.
with love
chappie
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Torpy said it was as safe as it needs to be, without specifying what risks he wanted his men to continue to run.
Baber appears to be saying that if it is not tolerably safe, with a risk as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP), it is not airworthy.
Hickman appears to be saying tolerably safe, but not ALARP is OK, so long as one is working towards ALARP.
How long has that taken so far, 37 years?
A coherent airworthiness system? Would help if the men in uniform could get their ducks in a row.
Hickman appears to be saying he does not agree with some regs in JSP553 as Tuc has said, he is NOT allowed to set the standards, he is required to meet them. Rule number 1.
Confused? I am. Does the RAF comply with JSP553 or not? Does the RAF comply with Def Stan, or not?
Is this aircraft about to be grounded? And what about MRA4?
I would also like to extend my thoughts to the families for tomorrow's verdict. I am shocked by what has been revealed at this Inquest.
Systemic failure? I hope Mr Walker feels able to express an opinion on the implementation of military airworthiness, I have heard enough MoD spin to last a lifetime.
It is my understanding that Baber is correct here, but how can two IPTLs appear to be interpreting airworthiness regulations in two different ways?
Baber appears to be saying that if it is not tolerably safe, with a risk as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP), it is not airworthy.
Hickman appears to be saying tolerably safe, but not ALARP is OK, so long as one is working towards ALARP.
How long has that taken so far, 37 years?
A coherent airworthiness system? Would help if the men in uniform could get their ducks in a row.
Hickman appears to be saying he does not agree with some regs in JSP553 as Tuc has said, he is NOT allowed to set the standards, he is required to meet them. Rule number 1.
Confused? I am. Does the RAF comply with JSP553 or not? Does the RAF comply with Def Stan, or not?
Is this aircraft about to be grounded? And what about MRA4?
I would also like to extend my thoughts to the families for tomorrow's verdict. I am shocked by what has been revealed at this Inquest.
Systemic failure? I hope Mr Walker feels able to express an opinion on the implementation of military airworthiness, I have heard enough MoD spin to last a lifetime.
It is my understanding that Baber is correct here, but how can two IPTLs appear to be interpreting airworthiness regulations in two different ways?
Last edited by nigegilb; 22nd May 2008 at 16:17.
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Winco
You have very understandably misinterpreted what the IPTL said. His belief stated in the witness box and mirroring what the SoS said in the House of Commons, citing CAS, was that although the aircraft was only "tolerably safe" and not ALARP it was nevertheless safe. Since the aircraft was "tolerably safe" it was OK to work towards being ALARP while still flying and they were aiming towards being ALARP by the end of the year.
You have very understandably misinterpreted what the IPTL said. His belief stated in the witness box and mirroring what the SoS said in the House of Commons, citing CAS, was that although the aircraft was only "tolerably safe" and not ALARP it was nevertheless safe. Since the aircraft was "tolerably safe" it was OK to work towards being ALARP while still flying and they were aiming towards being ALARP by the end of the year.
Winco
You have very understandably misinterpreted what the IPTL said. His belief stated in the witness box and mirroring what the SoS said in the House of Commons, citing CAS, was that although the aircraft was only "tolerably safe" and not ALARP it was nevertheless safe. Since the aircraft was "tolerably safe" it was OK to work towards being ALARP while still flying and they were aiming towards being ALARP by the end of the year.
You have very understandably misinterpreted what the IPTL said. His belief stated in the witness box and mirroring what the SoS said in the House of Commons, citing CAS, was that although the aircraft was only "tolerably safe" and not ALARP it was nevertheless safe. Since the aircraft was "tolerably safe" it was OK to work towards being ALARP while still flying and they were aiming towards being ALARP by the end of the year.
Last edited by JFZ90; 22nd May 2008 at 19:08.