Future Carrier (Including Costs)
The ocean hasn't changed for millennia, and a maritime nation doesn't need carriers right up to the time it really, really does. In the meantime they perform an important role exercising with our international allies and giving the government flexible options to respond to unexpected military or civil events anywhere in the world. For the cost over their lifetime they're a bargain.
I agree they have a role - the question is can you afford them or would the money be better spent elsewhere?
Thread Starter
WW2 is a long time ago WEBF - things change. Even the Falklands (where both sides had carriers but one never used theirs) is a long time ago.
yes merchant ships have grown but at nothing like the rate of carriers.
Carriers have become bigger, more expensive ($13Bn just for the vessel for a Ford) and far fewer than in 1945 - losing one now would be a national catastrophe so they will be kept well back
Extrapolating from 1939-45 is comparing two very different worlds
yes merchant ships have grown but at nothing like the rate of carriers.
Carriers have become bigger, more expensive ($13Bn just for the vessel for a Ford) and far fewer than in 1945 - losing one now would be a national catastrophe so they will be kept well back
Extrapolating from 1939-45 is comparing two very different worlds
I am not merchant ship historian, but a quick Google finds some interesting statics:
Liberty ship (over 2700 built): 14 245 tons.
Point class RO RO: 23 000 tonnes (a tonne (metric) is larger than an imperial ton)
LTC John UD Page class: 74 700 (US) tons - enough to carry all the equipment for a brigade.
These are/were ships built for Government and wartime purposes. As for normal merchant ships, the SS Clan Fraser was completed in 1939 and requisitioned for war service. at 7529 tons. The RO RO container ships operated by ACL on a transatlantic route are over 100 000 ton(nes?) in size - pretty much the same as a Ford class carrier! Losing any ship carrying a brigade's worth of equipment would be disastrous, as would losing an amphibious ship full of marines.
Originally Posted by Asturias56
I agree they have a role - the question is can you afford them or would the money be better spent elsewhere?
To achieve sea control in a given area of the world's oceans, a naval force must be capable of exercising control over its environment above, below, and on the surface of the sea. This multi-environment aspect of sea control is often ignored or misunderstood by people who are are unfamiliar with naval strategy. It is for this reason that submarines are not by themselves considered to be sea control platforms because of their inability to control the airspace above the surface. On the other hand, the modern aircraft carrier with attack, fighter, and ASW aircraft embarked is considered the ideal sea control platform because of its ability to achieve control in all warfare environments.
From a paper quoted here on the carrier/sea control discussion. Submarines are still unable to control airspace, surface warships are still unable to visually identify and splash aircraft at the same range as a fighter, and a big deck offers continues to provide the most convenient platform for multiple ASW helicopters - the logistics and maintenance can be concentrated in one place and coordination made, and a larger ship provides a more stable deck for helicopter operations than a smaller one. The curvature of the Earrh still limits the radio/radar horizon of shipborne sensors and communication systems.
Cost and complexity hasn't gone up like the Carriers tho has it?
If we're going back into the past I just think of Nelson's statement that what he never had enough of was frigates.....................
If we're going back into the past I just think of Nelson's statement that what he never had enough of was frigates.....................
I came across a RAND report on the subject of naval vessel price inflation. It is nearly 20 years old but I suspect the essentials haven't changed dramatically. Interestingly CVNs show the lowest cost growth presumably because labour costs are a larger component than for other types and the weapon system inflation component is much smaller as the air component is not part of the ship cost but is the major weapon system. Fighter aircraft show an annualised growth of 9.3% over the same period which is very similar to naval vessels. A comparison was made against passenger vessels which showed a similar rate of cost growth, this was partly attributed to the growth in size of cruise vessels over the period.
CVN inflation was the lowest in the table below, submitted by retired CNO Admiral Vernon Clark USN in his evidence to Congress.
CVN inflation was the lowest in the table below, submitted by retired CNO Admiral Vernon Clark USN in his evidence to Congress.
Last edited by SLXOwft; 3rd Jan 2024 at 13:53. Reason: spelling
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Then there is ship inflation. In the old days, if the Navy wanted a destroyer, they built a destroyer, but as time went by, it got harder to get a destroyer past the bean counters, so now they call it a frigate, and certain carriers became through deck cruisers. 😀
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/202...-new-frigates/
Navy has so few sailors it has to decommission ships
New frigates unable to be manned unless two existing warships are taken out of service
The Royal Navy has so few sailors it has to decommission two warships to staff its its new class of frigates, The Telegraph can reveal.
HMS Westminster, which was recently refurbished at huge expense to the taxpayer, and HMS Argyll will be decommissioned this year. The crews will be sent to work across the new fleet of Type 26 frigates as they come into service.
It comes at a time when the Armed Forces is experiencing a significant recruitment crisis, with the Navy having suffered a collapse in the flow of new recruits into the service.
A defence source told The Telegraph: “We will have to take manpower from one area of the Navy in order to put into a new area of the force.”
The Ministry of Defence (MoD) has ordered eight Type 26 frigates. They will be the Navy’s most advanced submarine-hunting warships to date.
However, HMS Glasgow, the first of the new Type 26s to come onboard, will not be operational until 2028 at the earliest, followed by HMS Cardiff, which is expected by the end of the decade.
The move will bring the number of frigates in Britain’s surface fleet down to just nine until the two new ships arrive.
The MoD has ordered six more Type 26 frigates but they are not expected to start arriving until the 2030s…..
A Whitehall source justified the move and said the decision allowed the military to focus on “updating the Navy into a modern, hi-tech fighting force”.
The source said: “It is always emotive when ships that have a long history of service come to the end of their working life. They and the sailors who crewed them have done the country proud. But decommissioning them is the right decision. The new Type 26 frigates will be in service before those ships can be refitted.”….
‘Dropping like flies’
Lord West, the former first sea lord, questioned why the Navy was decommissioning warships without having a new fleet ready to take over. He warned the UK’s warships were “dropping like flies”.
“We are losing operational ships, which is all very well as long as there’s no war in the next few years,” he said.
Lord West cited the Falklands war of 1982 where the UK lost two destroyers and two frigates, and a further 12 were damaged, as an example of needing a larger surface fleet. “With the number we’ve got, if we get involved in any action we are really poorly placed,” he warned.
He added: “If the Government had taken seriously the issue of frigate numbers over the last 10 years there would be sufficient to meet the requirements of trade protection in the Red Sea.”
HMS Westminster, which featured in the James Bond film, Tomorrow Never Dies, is described on the Navy’s website as having “recently returned to service after one of the longest, most comprehensive and complex revamps in her lifetime” following a 2017 refurbishment and was set to undergo another £100 million refit.
Around the same time, HMS Argyll, the longest serving Type 23 frigate in the Navy, underwent a multi-million pound refit to return her to the front line.
After being decommissioned, the ships will either be scrapped or sold to an ally.
Last year, James Cartlidge, the defence procurement minister, insisted HMS Westminster was “part of a modernisation programme being implemented to all Type 23s that are in upkeep”, when asked in Parliament if there were plans to scrap it….
Tobias Ellwood, the former chairman of the defence select committee, said it was “baffling” to decommission two frigates at a time where the UK’s surface fleet is “massively overstretched”.
“During the Gulf War the Royal Navy boasted 51 frigates and destroyers,” Mr Ellwood said. “That number will soon fall to just 16. Yet our world is more dangerous than any time since 1945.”
He added: “The strength of today’s Royal Navy is simply inadequate to handle the ever complex threat picture that is harming our economy.”…
Navy has so few sailors it has to decommission ships
New frigates unable to be manned unless two existing warships are taken out of service
The Royal Navy has so few sailors it has to decommission two warships to staff its its new class of frigates, The Telegraph can reveal.
HMS Westminster, which was recently refurbished at huge expense to the taxpayer, and HMS Argyll will be decommissioned this year. The crews will be sent to work across the new fleet of Type 26 frigates as they come into service.
It comes at a time when the Armed Forces is experiencing a significant recruitment crisis, with the Navy having suffered a collapse in the flow of new recruits into the service.
A defence source told The Telegraph: “We will have to take manpower from one area of the Navy in order to put into a new area of the force.”
The Ministry of Defence (MoD) has ordered eight Type 26 frigates. They will be the Navy’s most advanced submarine-hunting warships to date.
However, HMS Glasgow, the first of the new Type 26s to come onboard, will not be operational until 2028 at the earliest, followed by HMS Cardiff, which is expected by the end of the decade.
The move will bring the number of frigates in Britain’s surface fleet down to just nine until the two new ships arrive.
The MoD has ordered six more Type 26 frigates but they are not expected to start arriving until the 2030s…..
A Whitehall source justified the move and said the decision allowed the military to focus on “updating the Navy into a modern, hi-tech fighting force”.
The source said: “It is always emotive when ships that have a long history of service come to the end of their working life. They and the sailors who crewed them have done the country proud. But decommissioning them is the right decision. The new Type 26 frigates will be in service before those ships can be refitted.”….
‘Dropping like flies’
Lord West, the former first sea lord, questioned why the Navy was decommissioning warships without having a new fleet ready to take over. He warned the UK’s warships were “dropping like flies”.
“We are losing operational ships, which is all very well as long as there’s no war in the next few years,” he said.
Lord West cited the Falklands war of 1982 where the UK lost two destroyers and two frigates, and a further 12 were damaged, as an example of needing a larger surface fleet. “With the number we’ve got, if we get involved in any action we are really poorly placed,” he warned.
He added: “If the Government had taken seriously the issue of frigate numbers over the last 10 years there would be sufficient to meet the requirements of trade protection in the Red Sea.”
HMS Westminster, which featured in the James Bond film, Tomorrow Never Dies, is described on the Navy’s website as having “recently returned to service after one of the longest, most comprehensive and complex revamps in her lifetime” following a 2017 refurbishment and was set to undergo another £100 million refit.
Around the same time, HMS Argyll, the longest serving Type 23 frigate in the Navy, underwent a multi-million pound refit to return her to the front line.
After being decommissioned, the ships will either be scrapped or sold to an ally.
Last year, James Cartlidge, the defence procurement minister, insisted HMS Westminster was “part of a modernisation programme being implemented to all Type 23s that are in upkeep”, when asked in Parliament if there were plans to scrap it….
Tobias Ellwood, the former chairman of the defence select committee, said it was “baffling” to decommission two frigates at a time where the UK’s surface fleet is “massively overstretched”.
“During the Gulf War the Royal Navy boasted 51 frigates and destroyers,” Mr Ellwood said. “That number will soon fall to just 16. Yet our world is more dangerous than any time since 1945.”
He added: “The strength of today’s Royal Navy is simply inadequate to handle the ever complex threat picture that is harming our economy.”…
I think this was mentioned as likely on this thread way back if we built and manned two carriers without expanding the size of the Navy - and I see Lord West has joined Lord Nelson on his views about the need for more frigates.............
see MIGHTYGEMS post on page 199 in 2017 for example
"And they are still short of sailors to man them, sorry, crew them.
Navy's £6.2bn warships at 'risk' because of understaffing | Daily Mail Online"
see MIGHTYGEMS post on page 199 in 2017 for example
"And they are still short of sailors to man them, sorry, crew them.
Navy's £6.2bn warships at 'risk' because of understaffing | Daily Mail Online"
Hmmmm. Usually when Alan ("It wasn't me, I didn't see anything when I was 1SL") West pipes up, its often best to assume the opposite. He had a fine combat record, less so on achieving Flag rank (IMO at least) and definitely not once out.
In this particular case, the issue is not the carriers, rather an overall personnel crisis that has been brewing for some time, coupled with some "interesting" material state and industrial capacity limitations. This leads to an attractive option for budgeting staffs, where particular ships have been run on far too long and now require (at least on Babcock planning assumptions) years in dockyard hands to make good their material state. In which case, why not decommission them and use the crews freed up to assuage the recruitment and retention issues? The cause of the personnel shortage is not "the carriers" despite the desperate hopes of some and their equally desperate attempts to link Nelsons frigates with todays. If only they knew what they were talking about.....
In this particular case, the issue is not the carriers, rather an overall personnel crisis that has been brewing for some time, coupled with some "interesting" material state and industrial capacity limitations. This leads to an attractive option for budgeting staffs, where particular ships have been run on far too long and now require (at least on Babcock planning assumptions) years in dockyard hands to make good their material state. In which case, why not decommission them and use the crews freed up to assuage the recruitment and retention issues? The cause of the personnel shortage is not "the carriers" despite the desperate hopes of some and their equally desperate attempts to link Nelsons frigates with todays. If only they knew what they were talking about.....
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Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Size of RN/RM in 1991 pre-GW: 62, 000.
Size of RN/RM in 2023, 33,300*
(* DCA Command Paper target for 2021 was 30,450 full time and 3,100 reserves)
Size of RN/RM in 2023, 33,300*
(* DCA Command Paper target for 2021 was 30,450 full time and 3,100 reserves)
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What those stats don't show is that the problem is recruitment and retention in a very tight jobs market, exacerbated by below inflation pay settlements and pinch point harmony issues. They also don't show a rebalance of almost 1000 posts from the RM to RN to cover off things like manning the carriers, such that although the overall headcount remains at 30450, there are 1000 more matelots and 1000 less Royal in that total.
The issue is the fall in trained strength - 1100 or so as shown in link below. Apparently the RAF have more than double that shortfall, which I'm sure our frigate enthusiast friend will be along shortly to confirm that it's all down to "the carriers".
https://researchbriefings.files.parl...0/CBP-7930.pdf
IIRC the armed services have often had recruitment issues over the past 30 years - the Army in particular has been reducing regiments etc for ages - and having to recruit in Fiji etc.
Whilst NAB and I do not agree about the UK Carriers I think we do agree that procurement and long term planning for the RN has been ... less than optimum....
The politicians seem unable to grasp the need for long term planning and commitments - a steady run-down of shipbuilding (what a brilliant idea it was to close Portsmouth for example - not!), stop start replacement programmes, general underfunding - it's been going on for decades now. It's not good.
Whilst NAB and I do not agree about the UK Carriers I think we do agree that procurement and long term planning for the RN has been ... less than optimum....
The politicians seem unable to grasp the need for long term planning and commitments - a steady run-down of shipbuilding (what a brilliant idea it was to close Portsmouth for example - not!), stop start replacement programmes, general underfunding - it's been going on for decades now. It's not good.
The politicians seem unable to grasp the need for long term planning and commitments - a steady run-down of shipbuilding (what a brilliant idea it was to close Portsmouth for example - not!), stop start replacement programmes, general underfunding - it's been going on for decades now. It's not good.
The biggest issue in MoD appears to be the belief that RDEL funding is a "bad thing" and cannot possibly ever be permanently increased. Because RDEL pays for people, this is what restricts numbers of people, their wages, their day to day op costs, supporting contracts for logistics and all the other things that make the entity as a whole work. That includes funding the procurement and in-service support staff to actually allow enough of them to conduct their activities in an efficient, sensible manner.
Fix that - and its primarily an accounting and subsequently communications piece - and you go a long way to fixing some of the more intractable problems.
"That includes funding the procurement and in-service support staff to actually allow enough of them to conduct their activities in an efficient, sensible manner."
Agreed - but reading Citadel of Waste (see the thread) makes you despair
Agreed - but reading Citadel of Waste (see the thread) makes you despair
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Unprecedented:
RN is appealing to the retired community via LinkedIn for a new Rear Admiral - Director of Submarines.
No suitable internal candidate to replace two-star @RAdmSAsquith
https://archive.is/2024.01.05-143432...ting-l6sc8wm2z
RN is appealing to the retired community via LinkedIn for a new Rear Admiral - Director of Submarines.
No suitable internal candidate to replace two-star @RAdmSAsquith
https://archive.is/2024.01.05-143432...ting-l6sc8wm2z
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
And the other boot drops….
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/news/uk/r...sels-2s2r3mbfs
Mothballing assault ships ‘will spell the end of Royal Marines
’Two amphibious assault ships are to be mothballed under government plans to make up for a severe sailor shortage in what critics have described as “the beginning of the end for the Royal Marines”.
Grant Shapps, the defence secretary, has put forward proposals to retire HMS Albion and HMS Bulwark from active service, The Times can reveal.
The move would free more than 200 sailors to crew new ships. But a source familiar with the plans said it would weaken the elite force by taking away one of its central purposes — storming beaches from the sea. “It would be the beginning of the end for the Royal Marines,” they said.
The manpower crisis is deemed so acute across the navy that the Ministry of Defence is also planning to decommission two older vessels, HMS Westminster and HMS Argyll, as soon as this year. The crews of all four ships would be sent to work across the new fleet of Type 26 frigates as they come into service.
It is understood that the Royal Navy has been pushing for the vessels to be scrapped and Royal Marine numbers to be slashed for years to spare other assets but Ben Wallace, the former defence secretary, repeatedly refused.
He told senior naval chiefs that the sailors could be found from within the existing service, as thousands are currently in shore-based roles.
A senior naval source said the final plans for the amphibious assault ships were on the desk of Rishi Sunak, the prime minister, who is expected to give them the go-ahead. An MoD source said that no decision had been made, adding: “If a decision is made on them, they would remain in a state of extended readiness.”….
By mothballing HMS Albion and HMS Bulwark, up to 250 sailors will be released to man the new frigates, of which there will eventually be eight. They will be the navy’s most advanced submarine-hunting warships to date….
HMS Bulwark and HMS Albion’s role is to “deliver the punch of the Royal Marines ashore by air and by sea, with boats from the landing dock in the belly of the ship and by assault helicopter from the two-spot flight deck”, according to the navy.
The ships had been expected to remain in service until the early 2030s, with HMS Bulwark recently given an expensive refit. A naval source said they would be “kept in the cupboard” to be “dusted off” if needed.
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/news/uk/r...sels-2s2r3mbfs
Mothballing assault ships ‘will spell the end of Royal Marines
’Two amphibious assault ships are to be mothballed under government plans to make up for a severe sailor shortage in what critics have described as “the beginning of the end for the Royal Marines”.
Grant Shapps, the defence secretary, has put forward proposals to retire HMS Albion and HMS Bulwark from active service, The Times can reveal.
The move would free more than 200 sailors to crew new ships. But a source familiar with the plans said it would weaken the elite force by taking away one of its central purposes — storming beaches from the sea. “It would be the beginning of the end for the Royal Marines,” they said.
The manpower crisis is deemed so acute across the navy that the Ministry of Defence is also planning to decommission two older vessels, HMS Westminster and HMS Argyll, as soon as this year. The crews of all four ships would be sent to work across the new fleet of Type 26 frigates as they come into service.
It is understood that the Royal Navy has been pushing for the vessels to be scrapped and Royal Marine numbers to be slashed for years to spare other assets but Ben Wallace, the former defence secretary, repeatedly refused.
He told senior naval chiefs that the sailors could be found from within the existing service, as thousands are currently in shore-based roles.
A senior naval source said the final plans for the amphibious assault ships were on the desk of Rishi Sunak, the prime minister, who is expected to give them the go-ahead. An MoD source said that no decision had been made, adding: “If a decision is made on them, they would remain in a state of extended readiness.”….
By mothballing HMS Albion and HMS Bulwark, up to 250 sailors will be released to man the new frigates, of which there will eventually be eight. They will be the navy’s most advanced submarine-hunting warships to date….
HMS Bulwark and HMS Albion’s role is to “deliver the punch of the Royal Marines ashore by air and by sea, with boats from the landing dock in the belly of the ship and by assault helicopter from the two-spot flight deck”, according to the navy.
The ships had been expected to remain in service until the early 2030s, with HMS Bulwark recently given an expensive refit. A naval source said they would be “kept in the cupboard” to be “dusted off” if needed.
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Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Telegraph (@SheridanDani) and Times (@larisamlbrown) have reported that the Royal Navy is planning to scrap or pay off 2 x Type 23 and both LPDs
Pinstripedline analysis asks if this is a pragmatic reality check or more bad news for the Royal Navy?
http://tinyurl.com/26sra849
Pinstripedline analysis asks if this is a pragmatic reality check or more bad news for the Royal Navy?
http://tinyurl.com/26sra849
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Writing was on the wall for the LPD as soon as Royal decided that the Future CDO Force and not 3Cdo Bde was the future.
Last edited by Not_a_boffin; 6th Jan 2024 at 18:41.
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Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Indirectly related - is this something we are now doing right?
http://tinyurl.com/2p92n2mh
Revitalizing US Navy Shipbuilding
The US Navy's ship program is sick, but the fixes aren't rocket science.
http://tinyurl.com/2p92n2mh
Revitalizing US Navy Shipbuilding
The US Navy's ship program is sick, but the fixes aren't rocket science.
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That article is full of inappropriate or inaccurate deductions and examples. There are some truths in it, but by accident rather than a well thought-out argument.
It also cites the US "Navy Matters" website which is run by someone who appears never to have set foot on an active warship, but believes everything the internet says.
It also cites the US "Navy Matters" website which is run by someone who appears never to have set foot on an active warship, but believes everything the internet says.
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Somewhat adrift for the discussion as I have been trying to calm down but here are my increasingly random thoughts. You never know, Shapps may have been reroled be for he can do any of this, although I suspect it's HMT driven.
HMS Argyll is a GP T23 so her replacement will be a T31 - Venturer will be afloat within 6 months and due to commission by the end of next year; Babcock aim to deliver all 5 by the end of 2028. On the ASW side last I heard is that Glasgow is due to commission around the end of 2026 with Cardiff and Belfast following at approximately 18 month intervals accelerating to a year for the 5 batch II vessels. Given the 53 months it took to refit the Iron Duck, even if they restarted Westminster's refit she might not be ready for a pre-FOST work up before Glasgow.
As to Nelson's frigates, he wanted them for the Georgian equivalent of ISTAR, communications, and taking damaged ships of the line under tow. These are no longer the roles of minor warships.
The recruitment and retention problems aren't news the numbers have been under the required level for years, plus the Andrew has had a perpetual struggle with aircrew numbers, and as I think I posted before, the nature of the submarine service means it is struggling even more. I increasingly wonder if the small crews of modern warships have negative psychological and morale effects lacking the support of a larger naval community. If one looks at FFs Leander v T23, DDs T42 v T45, and LPDs Fearless v Albion the crews of the current generation are roughly 1/2 to 2/3 but the ships are much more capable. A QEC fishhead crew is roughly the same as an Invincible. In the capability gap area the crew (excl air group and Royals) of Ocean was 1/3 that of the Rusty B. We have single escorts playing the role of a cruiser at the height of pax-Brittanica, granted in the case of a T45 displacing much the same as a WW2 heavy cruiser but with a crew 1/3 the size and limited ASuW armament (indeed the same crew numbers as a Modified Black Swan sloop). In peace the cruiser would carried the implicit message Nemo me impune lacessit threatening the revenge of a battle fleet somewhere over the horizon, I don't think such fear is generated by our scattered escorts. In the days of the steam navy ships with such small crews would have been part of a deployed squadron with a depot ship or alongside a stone frigate and as such part of a larger naval community. I also wonder if the RN's much lauded recruitment adds have been counterproductive. In a climate of employment levels that are nearly at the highest level since records began, young people have been sold unrealistic expectations of the financial benefits of a university education which has lost its rarity value, and the technically literate people the RN and RAF are among those who assume they deserve starting salaries well in excess of the median for the whole working population, there is a need to identify USPs beyond fitness, waving firearms, and runs ashore and 'made in the Royal Navy'.
It should be remembered that one of the reasons there were a number of ships new enough to be worth reactiving from the Standby Squadron in 1982, was the extreme manpower crisis in the the late '70s and early '80s this lead to the earlier than planned retirement of a number of ships especially crew hungry ones like Blake and Tiger.
To me the fleet has for the last half-century has effectively been equipped as a green-water navy but given an intermittent and increasingly frequent blue-water tasking. The pocket carriers of the QE Class are to me sized for an LHA role but as N_a_B has previously reminded us we don't have the nuclear engineers to properly support the SSBN and much shrunken SSN fleets. A fact coupled with all flavours of HMGs's perpetual penny pinching prevented the UK having the CATOBAR CVNs that a Strike Carrier capability really requires and the necessary escort numbers to provide adequate 360° ASW, ASuW and AAW screens. Escort vessels should be, in the last resort, present in sufficient numbers to be able to be sacrificed to support the major assets, the problem is until the QECs arrived the Navy had gone through two generations with virtually no major units. Escorts have become bloated in size, cost and roles such that they can be barely afforded and certainly not sacrificed and cannot replaced until they are worn out long passed their initially planned OSDs. Nor do we maintain the capacity to replace them temporarily with inactive but reasonably modern ships (which admitedly brings problems - though the batch one Rivers returned to service and that was thought impossible by some.)
The beginning of the end for the Royals was the loss of Four One in 1981* as was demonstrated the following year when 3 Cdo Bde had to borrow two pongo battalions to stage an operation How they've lasted another forty years is nothing short of a miracle. Four Two has now been emasculated and with Four Three is now performing the Naval equivalent of the Rocks' Force Protection role. (*possibly even the disbanding of the 'real' Four Three on 1968)
I struggle to understand the purpose of FCF and LRG. An LPD plus a Bay LSD were the original theoretical minimum amphibious vessels composing an LRG (with a T45 and a logistics ship) but with the forward deployment of two and only one active and possibly soon no LPDs how does the concept work? I suppose one could argue a Bay is a hybrid LPD/LSL but there are only three and one of them is effectively the 9 MCMS depot ship at HMS Jufair. So what happens when one is in refit and the RFA is struggling even more than the RN to recruit and retain to provide crews. Beyond flag waving, I honestly can't see what the actual pupose of a rotating forward based single company of Royals, with elements supporting arms, is even with their wizzy new toys and new doctrines. I am sure Vlad the bad and his generals don't see them making a threatening contribution to the defence of NATO's northern flank. It strikes me that FCF is to deliver a 'special forces light' tripwire company expecting support to be delivered as effectively and rapidly as to 6th Airborne in Operation Varsity but will be lucky to get it as slowly and ineffectively as Op Garden supplied it to the 1st Airborne participants in Op Market. The old error of only preparing to fight the last war applies; it suits the purposes of politicians and to some extent (V)VSOs to convince themselves, despite their statements to the contrary, the UK will only ever be involved in low intensity, highly asymmetric conflicts.
In my fantasy fleet an LRG would consist of a USS Bougainville equivalent LHA with flights of F-35Bs, AH-64Es, H-47ERs (the "Honestly Mr Congressman, it's not an FMS MH-47G " version), Merlin HM2 (ASW & ASAC) a mix of Wildcat AH1 and HMA2s (Martlet/Sea Venom/Stingray equipped), and variously roled UAV, UUV and USVs. It would carry a full commando with support elements. It would be supported by an LSD(A), an FSS, two AAW and two ASW escorts. I had better put down the gin and sober up.
HMS Argyll is a GP T23 so her replacement will be a T31 - Venturer will be afloat within 6 months and due to commission by the end of next year; Babcock aim to deliver all 5 by the end of 2028. On the ASW side last I heard is that Glasgow is due to commission around the end of 2026 with Cardiff and Belfast following at approximately 18 month intervals accelerating to a year for the 5 batch II vessels. Given the 53 months it took to refit the Iron Duck, even if they restarted Westminster's refit she might not be ready for a pre-FOST work up before Glasgow.
As to Nelson's frigates, he wanted them for the Georgian equivalent of ISTAR, communications, and taking damaged ships of the line under tow. These are no longer the roles of minor warships.
The recruitment and retention problems aren't news the numbers have been under the required level for years, plus the Andrew has had a perpetual struggle with aircrew numbers, and as I think I posted before, the nature of the submarine service means it is struggling even more. I increasingly wonder if the small crews of modern warships have negative psychological and morale effects lacking the support of a larger naval community. If one looks at FFs Leander v T23, DDs T42 v T45, and LPDs Fearless v Albion the crews of the current generation are roughly 1/2 to 2/3 but the ships are much more capable. A QEC fishhead crew is roughly the same as an Invincible. In the capability gap area the crew (excl air group and Royals) of Ocean was 1/3 that of the Rusty B. We have single escorts playing the role of a cruiser at the height of pax-Brittanica, granted in the case of a T45 displacing much the same as a WW2 heavy cruiser but with a crew 1/3 the size and limited ASuW armament (indeed the same crew numbers as a Modified Black Swan sloop). In peace the cruiser would carried the implicit message Nemo me impune lacessit threatening the revenge of a battle fleet somewhere over the horizon, I don't think such fear is generated by our scattered escorts. In the days of the steam navy ships with such small crews would have been part of a deployed squadron with a depot ship or alongside a stone frigate and as such part of a larger naval community. I also wonder if the RN's much lauded recruitment adds have been counterproductive. In a climate of employment levels that are nearly at the highest level since records began, young people have been sold unrealistic expectations of the financial benefits of a university education which has lost its rarity value, and the technically literate people the RN and RAF are among those who assume they deserve starting salaries well in excess of the median for the whole working population, there is a need to identify USPs beyond fitness, waving firearms, and runs ashore and 'made in the Royal Navy'.
It should be remembered that one of the reasons there were a number of ships new enough to be worth reactiving from the Standby Squadron in 1982, was the extreme manpower crisis in the the late '70s and early '80s this lead to the earlier than planned retirement of a number of ships especially crew hungry ones like Blake and Tiger.
To me the fleet has for the last half-century has effectively been equipped as a green-water navy but given an intermittent and increasingly frequent blue-water tasking. The pocket carriers of the QE Class are to me sized for an LHA role but as N_a_B has previously reminded us we don't have the nuclear engineers to properly support the SSBN and much shrunken SSN fleets. A fact coupled with all flavours of HMGs's perpetual penny pinching prevented the UK having the CATOBAR CVNs that a Strike Carrier capability really requires and the necessary escort numbers to provide adequate 360° ASW, ASuW and AAW screens. Escort vessels should be, in the last resort, present in sufficient numbers to be able to be sacrificed to support the major assets, the problem is until the QECs arrived the Navy had gone through two generations with virtually no major units. Escorts have become bloated in size, cost and roles such that they can be barely afforded and certainly not sacrificed and cannot replaced until they are worn out long passed their initially planned OSDs. Nor do we maintain the capacity to replace them temporarily with inactive but reasonably modern ships (which admitedly brings problems - though the batch one Rivers returned to service and that was thought impossible by some.)
The beginning of the end for the Royals was the loss of Four One in 1981* as was demonstrated the following year when 3 Cdo Bde had to borrow two pongo battalions to stage an operation How they've lasted another forty years is nothing short of a miracle. Four Two has now been emasculated and with Four Three is now performing the Naval equivalent of the Rocks' Force Protection role. (*possibly even the disbanding of the 'real' Four Three on 1968)
I struggle to understand the purpose of FCF and LRG. An LPD plus a Bay LSD were the original theoretical minimum amphibious vessels composing an LRG (with a T45 and a logistics ship) but with the forward deployment of two and only one active and possibly soon no LPDs how does the concept work? I suppose one could argue a Bay is a hybrid LPD/LSL but there are only three and one of them is effectively the 9 MCMS depot ship at HMS Jufair. So what happens when one is in refit and the RFA is struggling even more than the RN to recruit and retain to provide crews. Beyond flag waving, I honestly can't see what the actual pupose of a rotating forward based single company of Royals, with elements supporting arms, is even with their wizzy new toys and new doctrines. I am sure Vlad the bad and his generals don't see them making a threatening contribution to the defence of NATO's northern flank. It strikes me that FCF is to deliver a 'special forces light' tripwire company expecting support to be delivered as effectively and rapidly as to 6th Airborne in Operation Varsity but will be lucky to get it as slowly and ineffectively as Op Garden supplied it to the 1st Airborne participants in Op Market. The old error of only preparing to fight the last war applies; it suits the purposes of politicians and to some extent (V)VSOs to convince themselves, despite their statements to the contrary, the UK will only ever be involved in low intensity, highly asymmetric conflicts.
In my fantasy fleet an LRG would consist of a USS Bougainville equivalent LHA with flights of F-35Bs, AH-64Es, H-47ERs (the "Honestly Mr Congressman, it's not an FMS MH-47G " version), Merlin HM2 (ASW & ASAC) a mix of Wildcat AH1 and HMA2s (Martlet/Sea Venom/Stingray equipped), and variously roled UAV, UUV and USVs. It would carry a full commando with support elements. It would be supported by an LSD(A), an FSS, two AAW and two ASW escorts. I had better put down the gin and sober up.
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