Somewhat adrift for the discussion as I have been trying to calm down but here are my increasingly random thoughts. You never know, Shapps may have been reroled be for he can do any of this, although I suspect it's HMT driven.
HMS Argyll is a GP T23 so her replacement will be a T31 - Venturer will be afloat within 6 months and due to commission by the end of next year; Babcock aim to deliver all 5 by the end of 2028. On the ASW side last I heard is that Glasgow is due to commission around the end of 2026 with Cardiff and Belfast following at approximately 18 month intervals accelerating to a year for the 5 batch II vessels. Given the 53 months it took to refit the Iron Duck, even if they restarted Westminster's refit she might not be ready for a pre-FOST work up before Glasgow.
As to Nelson's frigates, he wanted them for the Georgian equivalent of ISTAR, communications, and taking damaged ships of the line under tow. These are no longer the roles of minor warships.
The recruitment and retention problems aren't news the numbers have been under the required level for years, plus the Andrew has had a perpetual struggle with aircrew numbers, and as I think I posted before, the nature of the submarine service means it is struggling even more. I increasingly wonder if the small crews of modern warships have negative psychological and morale effects lacking the support of a larger naval community. If one looks at FFs Leander v T23, DDs T42 v T45, and LPDs Fearless v Albion the crews of the current generation are roughly 1/2 to 2/3 but the ships are much more capable. A QEC fishhead crew is roughly the same as an Invincible. In the capability gap area the crew (excl air group and Royals) of Ocean was 1/3 that of the Rusty B. We have single escorts playing the role of a cruiser at the height of pax-Brittanica, granted in the case of a T45 displacing much the same as a WW2 heavy cruiser but with a crew 1/3 the size and limited ASuW armament (indeed the same crew numbers as a Modified Black Swan sloop). In peace the cruiser would carried the implicit message Nemo me impune lacessit threatening the revenge of a battle fleet somewhere over the horizon, I don't think such fear is generated by our scattered escorts. In the days of the steam navy ships with such small crews would have been part of a deployed squadron with a depot ship or alongside a stone frigate and as such part of a larger naval community. I also wonder if the RN's much lauded recruitment adds have been counterproductive. In a climate of employment levels that are nearly at the highest level since records began, young people have been sold unrealistic expectations of the financial benefits of a university education which has lost its rarity value, and the technically literate people the RN and RAF are among those who assume they deserve starting salaries well in excess of the median for the whole working population, there is a need to identify USPs beyond fitness, waving firearms, and runs ashore and 'made in the Royal Navy'.
It should be remembered that one of the reasons there were a number of ships new enough to be worth reactiving from the Standby Squadron in 1982, was the extreme manpower crisis in the the late '70s and early '80s this lead to the earlier than planned retirement of a number of ships especially crew hungry ones like Blake and Tiger.
To me the fleet has for the last half-century has effectively been equipped as a green-water navy but given an intermittent and increasingly frequent blue-water tasking. The pocket carriers of the QE Class are to me sized for an LHA role but as N_a_B has previously reminded us we don't have the nuclear engineers to properly support the SSBN and much shrunken SSN fleets. A fact coupled with all flavours of HMGs's perpetual penny pinching prevented the UK having the CATOBAR CVNs that a Strike Carrier capability really requires and the necessary escort numbers to provide adequate 360° ASW, ASuW and AAW screens. Escort vessels should be, in the last resort, present in sufficient numbers to be able to be sacrificed to support the major assets, the problem is until the QECs arrived the Navy had gone through two generations with virtually no major units. Escorts have become bloated in size, cost and roles such that they can be barely afforded and certainly not sacrificed and cannot replaced until they are worn out long passed their initially planned OSDs. Nor do we maintain the capacity to replace them temporarily with inactive but reasonably modern ships (which admitedly brings problems - though the batch one Rivers returned to service and that was thought impossible by some.)
The beginning of the end for the Royals was the loss of Four One in 1981* as was demonstrated the following year when 3 Cdo Bde had to borrow two pongo battalions to stage an operation How they've lasted another forty years is nothing short of a miracle. Four Two has now been emasculated and with Four Three is now performing the Naval equivalent of the Rocks' Force Protection role. (*possibly even the disbanding of the 'real' Four Three on 1968)
I struggle to understand the purpose of FCF and LRG. An LPD plus a Bay LSD were the original theoretical minimum amphibious vessels composing an LRG (with a T45 and a logistics ship) but with the forward deployment of two and only one active and possibly soon no LPDs how does the concept work? I suppose one could argue a Bay is a hybrid LPD/LSL but there are only three and one of them is effectively the 9 MCMS depot ship at HMS Jufair. So what happens when one is in refit and the RFA is struggling even more than the RN to recruit and retain to provide crews. Beyond flag waving, I honestly can't see what the actual pupose of a rotating forward based single company of Royals, with elements supporting arms, is even with their wizzy new toys and new doctrines. I am sure Vlad the bad and his generals don't see them making a threatening contribution to the defence of NATO's northern flank. It strikes me that FCF is to deliver a 'special forces light' tripwire company expecting support to be delivered as effectively and rapidly as to 6th Airborne in Operation Varsity but will be lucky to get it as slowly and ineffectively as Op Garden supplied it to the 1st Airborne participants in Op Market. The old error of only preparing to fight the last war applies; it suits the purposes of politicians and to some extent (V)VSOs to convince themselves, despite their statements to the contrary, the UK will only ever be involved in low intensity, highly asymmetric conflicts.
In my fantasy fleet an LRG would consist of a USS Bougainville equivalent LHA with flights of F-35Bs, AH-64Es, H-47ERs (the "Honestly Mr Congressman, it's not an FMS MH-47G " version), Merlin HM2 (ASW & ASAC) a mix of Wildcat AH1 and HMA2s (Martlet/Sea Venom/Stingray equipped), and variously roled UAV, UUV and USVs. It would carry a full commando with support elements. It would be supported by an LSD(A), an FSS, two AAW and two ASW escorts. I had better put down the gin and sober up.