Originally Posted by
Asturias56
WW2 is a long time ago WEBF - things change. Even the Falklands (where both sides had carriers but one never used theirs) is a long time ago.
yes merchant ships have grown but at nothing like the rate of carriers.
Carriers have become bigger, more expensive ($13Bn just for the vessel for a Ford) and far fewer than in 1945 - losing one now would be a national catastrophe so they will be kept well back
Extrapolating from 1939-45 is comparing two very different worlds
Are the Americans keeping their carriers 'well back'? Does the UK carrier commitment to NATO include a 'well back' clause - if so why have they frequently been in the Norwegian Sea or even up in Arctic waters? What about the French, Italian, and Spanish ones that have pushed forward?
I am not merchant ship historian, but a quick Google finds some interesting statics:
Liberty ship (over 2700 built): 14 245 tons.
Point class RO RO: 23 000 tonnes (a tonne (metric) is larger than an imperial ton)
LTC John UD Page class: 74 700 (US) tons -
enough to carry all the equipment for a brigade.
These are/were ships built for Government and wartime purposes. As for normal merchant ships, the SS
Clan Fraser was completed in 1939 and requisitioned for war service. at 7529 tons. The RO RO container ships operated by ACL on a transatlantic route are over 100 000 ton(nes?) in size - pretty much the same as a
Ford class carrier! Losing any ship carrying a brigade's worth of equipment would be disastrous, as would losing an amphibious ship full of marines.
Originally Posted by Asturias56
I agree they have a role - the question is can you afford them or would the money be better spent elsewhere?
Is there a better alternative to protect things such as crisis response shipping or amphibious forces from submarine, surface, air, and land based threats whilst also providing the ability to project power ashore?
To achieve sea control in a given area of the world's oceans, a naval force must be capable of exercising control over its environment above, below, and on the surface of the sea. This multi-environment aspect of sea control is often ignored or misunderstood by people who are are unfamiliar with naval strategy. It is for this reason that submarines are not by themselves considered to be sea control platforms because of their inability to control the airspace above the surface. On the other hand, the modern aircraft carrier with attack, fighter, and ASW aircraft embarked is considered the ideal sea control platform because of its ability to achieve control in all warfare environments.
From a paper quoted
here on the
carrier/sea control discussion. Submarines are still unable to control airspace, surface warships are still unable to visually identify and splash aircraft at the same range as a fighter, and a big deck offers continues to provide the most convenient platform for multiple ASW helicopters - the logistics and maintenance can be concentrated in one place and coordination made, and a larger ship provides a more stable deck for helicopter operations than a smaller one. The curvature of the Earrh still limits the radio/radar horizon of shipborne sensors and communication systems.