DEFO back at CX
Join Date: Jul 2013
Location: one country, one system
Age: 55
Posts: 505
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Nobody cares. Do people now avoid Air Asia? Or Air France?
It's business.
Cathay Profit Margin Under Pressure as Fuel Hedging Losses Mount - Bloomberg
It's business.
Cathay Profit Margin Under Pressure as Fuel Hedging Losses Mount - Bloomberg
Problem is, the bean counters and actuaries in each airline look at the probabilities and calculate that the cheapness of MPL's and low-timers outweighs the cost of a possible loss of one or even two hulls. After two, they may do something about it.
It's the ugly face of capitalism.
It's the ugly face of capitalism.
Join Date: Jul 2013
Location: one country, one system
Age: 55
Posts: 505
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
“Cathay’s task is to remove costs to sustain affordable mass market luxury product,” said Will Horton, an analyst at CAPA Centre for Aviation, in Hong Kong. “Cathay is running a major hub in a high-cost location. Unlike other high-cost hubs, such as Tokyo, the local market is not as loyal and not as willing to pay a premium for a local operator.”
Bloomberg today.
Tell me, TooLongtimeinCX, which part don't you understand?
You guys are playing with fire and don't even realise it.
Bloomberg today.
Tell me, TooLongtimeinCX, which part don't you understand?
You guys are playing with fire and don't even realise it.
Last edited by Sam Ting Wong; 16th Aug 2016 at 02:07.
Join Date: Mar 2008
Location: London
Posts: 1,539
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
STW. Most of us don't CARE anymore. And I personally won't let my value be defined by fear and intimidation. Sad that you come across as a frightened ferret with it's tail between its legs. Grow a pair.
Join Date: Jul 2013
Location: one country, one system
Age: 55
Posts: 505
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Trafalgar,
I don't believe you.
You care enough to post ( a lot) , you care enough to vote agains a TA, you care enough to follow CC and a training ban.
You care enough to call me cowardly because I think this war is not only wrong, but reckless.
You care enough to risk your B scale contract plus future benefits so that C scale new joiners can live in Mid Levels.
You do care. A lot.
I don't believe you.
You care enough to post ( a lot) , you care enough to vote agains a TA, you care enough to follow CC and a training ban.
You care enough to call me cowardly because I think this war is not only wrong, but reckless.
You care enough to risk your B scale contract plus future benefits so that C scale new joiners can live in Mid Levels.
You do care. A lot.
Last edited by Sam Ting Wong; 16th Aug 2016 at 03:03.
Join Date: Mar 2008
Location: London
Posts: 1,539
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
STW. The simple fact you think our resistance to continual attacks and degradation of our contracts is 'wrong' confirms to me your are misguided and cowardly. Fear will result in only one outcome. The exact outcome that the tactics of our management seek. Your attitude only helps promote and advance those goals. You are of course entitled to your opinion.
Join Date: Mar 2011
Location: Not for Sale
Posts: 330
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
STW:
Because the remuneration package weeded out the low-time or inexperienced applicants. The min requirements used to be 1000 hrs TT. But to be competitive for the job an applicant really needed 3000-5000 hrs along with approx. 1000 hrs multi engine Command time and/or jet time. As you mentioned earlier: supply and demand. Supply an attractive reward & the demand will be such that it will attract applicants accordingly. Now, with the C Scale package, applicants with the experience that once used to be the norm are now by far (very far) the absolute exception. Pay bananas, you'll get monkeys.
I also know of applicants who got in as B Scale SO's with just over 1000 hrs TT. They had tertiary degrees in Science and could fly the pants off most people with 5 times those hours. So hours does not always equate to competence (however I do believe there is a coalition).
So we discuss TRAINING standards to replace lack of experience. Some mental pigmies here have categorically stated how real aircraft flying is a waste of time in lieu of the illustrious simulator. You know, the same one you can crash by screwing up your V1 cut when at MTOW but walk away from and laugh about later... No. Not the same and never will. In the real aircraft we learned from out mistakes because the jeopardy was real and as such the lessons learned, experience grown and professionalism gained.
So correct me please on the realities of CX's SO sim training. An SO from the B Scale era was required to fulfil 12 or 14 full-flight sim sessions prior to commencement of line training. But a C Scale SO with far, far, FAR, F A R less experience now only receives 4 FFS sessions? So do you think CX is really still putting safety and training first - seriously? What's scariest of all is that these spiky haired brats honestly believe they have "The Right Stuff' as true guardians of the AP....until a TCAS RA occurs and the other pilot is out taking leak.... (Happy to be corrected on the FFS SO training syllabus).
That's what a union does. They stand together for the betterment of ALL, and not just themselves. Too many of the fast becoming majority don't see that. They see me-first only and it being all too tough to live on a disgraceful remuneration package that they asked for, and what's more see themselves as "doing all the heavy lifting" in this TB and CC state of affairs.
(However at CX I'll acknowledge that it's only when the AOA and the membership see their own money or lifestyle threatened do they act. By allowing C Scale to even happen without so much as whisper of action is evidence enough... And so now they're fighting to play catch up against what should have never been allowed to occur from the beginning).
Yes, C Scale is here to stay. However is what form it takes toward the future is the debate and worth fighting for. Do nothing and let's set the stop watch for D Scale. And then you'll all wonder "How did this happen [AGAIN.....]"?
I don't remember much opposition at the time expat SO's still got B.
I also know of applicants who got in as B Scale SO's with just over 1000 hrs TT. They had tertiary degrees in Science and could fly the pants off most people with 5 times those hours. So hours does not always equate to competence (however I do believe there is a coalition).
So we discuss TRAINING standards to replace lack of experience. Some mental pigmies here have categorically stated how real aircraft flying is a waste of time in lieu of the illustrious simulator. You know, the same one you can crash by screwing up your V1 cut when at MTOW but walk away from and laugh about later... No. Not the same and never will. In the real aircraft we learned from out mistakes because the jeopardy was real and as such the lessons learned, experience grown and professionalism gained.
So correct me please on the realities of CX's SO sim training. An SO from the B Scale era was required to fulfil 12 or 14 full-flight sim sessions prior to commencement of line training. But a C Scale SO with far, far, FAR, F A R less experience now only receives 4 FFS sessions? So do you think CX is really still putting safety and training first - seriously? What's scariest of all is that these spiky haired brats honestly believe they have "The Right Stuff' as true guardians of the AP....until a TCAS RA occurs and the other pilot is out taking leak.... (Happy to be corrected on the FFS SO training syllabus).
...on the one hand you clearly have nothing but contempt for our new-joiners, on the other hand you fall into your sword to get them more housing.
(However at CX I'll acknowledge that it's only when the AOA and the membership see their own money or lifestyle threatened do they act. By allowing C Scale to even happen without so much as whisper of action is evidence enough... And so now they're fighting to play catch up against what should have never been allowed to occur from the beginning).
Yes, C Scale is here to stay. However is what form it takes toward the future is the debate and worth fighting for. Do nothing and let's set the stop watch for D Scale. And then you'll all wonder "How did this happen [AGAIN.....]"?
Last edited by ChinaBeached; 16th Aug 2016 at 14:11.
CB I think you will find that new SOs are doing about 9 full flight sim sessions before line training. Half way through line training they will also complete another sim. Following that for the next 6 months in the company they will be doing roughly 1 sim every month. Why try and just spread false information?
Join Date: Mar 2011
Location: Not for Sale
Posts: 330
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Interesting. So it's true that applicants with extremely less experience than the past SO new joiners receive less sim training prior to getting in to the real aircraft.
I'd still like to confirm the exact number of (min) FFS for a new B Scale SO as opposed to what the (C Scale) syllabus is now.
Thanks.....
I'd still like to confirm the exact number of (min) FFS for a new B Scale SO as opposed to what the (C Scale) syllabus is now.
Thanks.....
Join Date: Mar 2008
Location: London
Posts: 1,539
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
ChinaBeached: You last comment, "C scale is here to stay" is exactly indicative of all that has gone wrong in CX since the mid-90's. The company has strategically undermined and destroyed the value of our contracts and we have collectively done nothing to stop them. Now, when we have finally implemented a strategy that has not only stopped CX from operating the airline as they wish, and put them on notice that there is a high expectation and insistence on obtaining a proper contract with proper work rules, out of our own woodwork the weak and easily cowed come to the fore. It might be worth reminding everyone that the US industry also went through the B scale phase back in the 90's as well. The big difference is that due to their employees resisting and fighting back, all the US majors ditched the B scale and now only have one proper scale. All with proper salaries, pensions, medical and travel benefits. We have gone from arguably the best airline in the world to work for to one of the unhappiest, most ill-managed airlines in the space of 20 years. Does anyone actually think that acquiescing to the plans of this management is going to result in a career worth investing your working life in? Of will it result in the modern day equivalent of the plantation worker, where you're beaten regularly and thrown a few pennies a day to work until you finally drop dead of exhaustion? I personally have no doubt which of those options represents the path CX is taking us on. Laying down and letting the AT's of the world get her way is a guarantee that you will either die on the job miserable, or have to find another career elsewhere before that happens. The ONLY strategy is to maintain resistance and unity and force CX to accept that the only way to run this airline is with the cooperation and mutual respect with it's highly trained aircrew. There can be no other option, for either party, no matter how long that takes.
Join Date: Jul 2013
Location: one country, one system
Age: 55
Posts: 505
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Chinabeached,
I am simply not as worried as you regarding experience/skills of our new joiners. I never made a bad experience myself, I think they will do just fine.
But I can see you are genuinely concerned and I respect that.
I am simply not as worried as you regarding experience/skills of our new joiners. I never made a bad experience myself, I think they will do just fine.
But I can see you are genuinely concerned and I respect that.
Join Date: Mar 2011
Location: Not for Sale
Posts: 330
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The company has strategically undermined and destroyed the value of our contracts and we have collectively done nothing to stop them.
Now, when we have finally.....
Just look at the calibre of brains trust that boasts of being the "new generation" at CX... And that we're all living in the past; who defend C Scale as a good thing; who vote for short term bandaids instead of long term security.... Again, look at the present to view the future.
C Scale is here to stay as much as B Scale will be grandfathered out. Or as I sadly call this whole methodology: "prima nocta".
Last edited by ChinaBeached; 16th Aug 2016 at 19:04.
Join Date: Nov 2007
Location: Where You Aren't
Posts: 506
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
This is what we've become, monkeys who don't touch the thrust levers because we expect the airplane to do it for us automatically. Time to get out of this career before some monkey kills me.
https://www.flightglobal.com/news/ar...de-risk-428468
EasyJet incident highlights 'open descent' mode risk
12 AUGUST, 2016
UK investigators have reiterated the need to understand aircraft behaviour in various modes after the stall-protection system intervened on an EasyJet Airbus A320 during a visual approach to Paphos.
It had been conducting a left-hand circuit to runway 29, following a service from London Luton on 7 January last year.
The aircraft had been cleared to descend from 4,000ft to 1,500ft and the crew was using ‘open descent’ mode on the A320, with the engines at idle thrust and the autopilot maintaining a target speed using pitch.
When the first officer, who was flying, started the base turn he disconnected the autopilot. But the captain was pre-occupied by a radio call and a subsequent instruction to turn off the flight director was “overlooked”, says the UK Air Accidents Investigation Branch.
With the flight director left on, the aircraft crucially remained at idle thrust. To maintain airspeed the pilot needed to follow the flight director’s pitch commands.
“Thrust will not increase when the pitch commands are not followed and there is a decay in speed, until the low-speed protections activate,” says the inquiry.
“Flight crew are accustomed to the speed protections afforded by the [autothrust] and…if misunderstood, there can be an expectation that the [autothrust] will vary the thrust to maintain the target speed.”
The A320 had turned onto the base leg while descending through 3,100ft at 165kt.
But as the aircraft turned, the first officer stated that the airspeed was decaying. It descended through 2,680ft with airspeed just 5kt above the lowest selectable – a threshold which provides a margin to the stall speed – at 12° nose-up pitch and a high angle-of-attack.
The airspeed continued to decay, to 2kt below lowest selectable, and the first officer focused on the speed situation.
“In the turn, the pitch attitude increased and the rate of descent decreased, leading to a further reduction in airspeed,” says the inquiry, adding that this triggered the automatic stall-protection system.
The inquiry notes that the first officer had made aft sidestick inputs despite the reduction in airspeed, indicating that he was losing situational awareness.
With the aircraft pitched 10.5° nose-up and climbing through 2,900ft, the first officer handed control to the captain. The captain was startled by the decision, and had to assess an unexpected situation, but the crew subsequently initiated a missed approach and regained control of the aircraft.
Although the pilots had received specific training on automation modes, and the first officer had been made aware of risks associated with ‘open descent’, the inquiry says the crew demonstrated a “breakdown in procedures” and a “lack of appropriate reaction” to the airspeed reduction.
EasyJet had previously provided a programme of automated flight-mode awareness simulator training but, following the Paphos incident, additional procedures involving mode announcement have been introduced.
https://www.flightglobal.com/news/ar...de-risk-428468
EasyJet incident highlights 'open descent' mode risk
12 AUGUST, 2016
UK investigators have reiterated the need to understand aircraft behaviour in various modes after the stall-protection system intervened on an EasyJet Airbus A320 during a visual approach to Paphos.
It had been conducting a left-hand circuit to runway 29, following a service from London Luton on 7 January last year.
The aircraft had been cleared to descend from 4,000ft to 1,500ft and the crew was using ‘open descent’ mode on the A320, with the engines at idle thrust and the autopilot maintaining a target speed using pitch.
When the first officer, who was flying, started the base turn he disconnected the autopilot. But the captain was pre-occupied by a radio call and a subsequent instruction to turn off the flight director was “overlooked”, says the UK Air Accidents Investigation Branch.
With the flight director left on, the aircraft crucially remained at idle thrust. To maintain airspeed the pilot needed to follow the flight director’s pitch commands.
“Thrust will not increase when the pitch commands are not followed and there is a decay in speed, until the low-speed protections activate,” says the inquiry.
“Flight crew are accustomed to the speed protections afforded by the [autothrust] and…if misunderstood, there can be an expectation that the [autothrust] will vary the thrust to maintain the target speed.”
The A320 had turned onto the base leg while descending through 3,100ft at 165kt.
But as the aircraft turned, the first officer stated that the airspeed was decaying. It descended through 2,680ft with airspeed just 5kt above the lowest selectable – a threshold which provides a margin to the stall speed – at 12° nose-up pitch and a high angle-of-attack.
The airspeed continued to decay, to 2kt below lowest selectable, and the first officer focused on the speed situation.
“In the turn, the pitch attitude increased and the rate of descent decreased, leading to a further reduction in airspeed,” says the inquiry, adding that this triggered the automatic stall-protection system.
The inquiry notes that the first officer had made aft sidestick inputs despite the reduction in airspeed, indicating that he was losing situational awareness.
With the aircraft pitched 10.5° nose-up and climbing through 2,900ft, the first officer handed control to the captain. The captain was startled by the decision, and had to assess an unexpected situation, but the crew subsequently initiated a missed approach and regained control of the aircraft.
Although the pilots had received specific training on automation modes, and the first officer had been made aware of risks associated with ‘open descent’, the inquiry says the crew demonstrated a “breakdown in procedures” and a “lack of appropriate reaction” to the airspeed reduction.
EasyJet had previously provided a programme of automated flight-mode awareness simulator training but, following the Paphos incident, additional procedures involving mode announcement have been introduced.
Join Date: Mar 2008
Location: London
Posts: 1,539
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
So, the FO flying, mentions that 'speed is decaying', and simply pitches the nose of the aircraft up, without adding thrust (a basic concept that earlier generation pilots would do instinctively). Then, he continues to watch the speed decay and still doesn't add any thrust....ok. Then, he abruptly hands control back to the Captain. Ok, seems like a normal day in the new 'spiky hair brigade' era. I know, let's have 8 years of only hiring cadets with no experience. What could possibly go wrong. 
Join Date: Mar 2011
Location: Not for Sale
Posts: 330
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Exactly.... Experience creates instinct.
STW: it's not what happens 99% that gets you in trouble, it's the 1% that should never have happened in the first place. The fact that it seems evident that the bare basics are missing when already on a jet transport should make you and all of us worried. (As per that 1% situation with the TCAS RA and failure to react. Is that 1% a one-off or indicative of the true standards that have yet to be exposed?)
(But I think this thread is drifting....)
STW: it's not what happens 99% that gets you in trouble, it's the 1% that should never have happened in the first place. The fact that it seems evident that the bare basics are missing when already on a jet transport should make you and all of us worried. (As per that 1% situation with the TCAS RA and failure to react. Is that 1% a one-off or indicative of the true standards that have yet to be exposed?)
(But I think this thread is drifting....)
Join Date: Oct 2007
Location: Hong Kong
Posts: 541
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Trigger warning: Sarcasm.....
Oval....but....but....but.....with those under slung engines if he/she had added thrust they would have lost control!!! It's an unusual attitude....or is it a stall...I don't know....but would it not have been better to reduce thrust and push the nose over?
Oval....but....but....but.....with those under slung engines if he/she had added thrust they would have lost control!!! It's an unusual attitude....or is it a stall...I don't know....but would it not have been better to reduce thrust and push the nose over?
Join Date: Oct 2009
Location: Hong Kong
Posts: 601
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Continuing the thread drift and along similar lines to Oval's post.
Asiana 214. Total experience of the pilots in the control seats: 22126 hours.
Oval, if you're going to leave this career for the stated reasons, presumably you're going to stop flying as a passenger too? To do otherwise would be illogical.
STP
Asiana 214. Total experience of the pilots in the control seats: 22126 hours.
Oval, if you're going to leave this career for the stated reasons, presumably you're going to stop flying as a passenger too? To do otherwise would be illogical.
STP
Join Date: Mar 2008
Location: London
Posts: 1,539
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
STP. Asiana.....really?, that is where you want to go with this? As you well know, there is a cultural authority control gradient to blame there. A further review of asian accidents (korean ones in particular!) would suggest that there is a deep flaw at the heart of their cultural approach to operating aircraft. I'm sorry if that isn't politically correct, but then that term is meaningless when lives are at stake. Sadly, CX is slowly reducing it's operational integrity in the same direction. Lack of experience and a multi-cultural approach to managing the operation will lead to only one headline. Only a matter of time.
Join Date: Oct 2009
Location: Hong Kong
Posts: 601
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Trafalgar you're absolutely right. How stupid of me to think that we were referring to only a specific type of hours when we use them as a metric for experience. I didn't realise that we could only refer to caucasian hours when equating the two. I sincerely didn't mean to inject a racial theme to this debate so please forgive me if I did so.
Just to get back into everyone's good books as to how useful hours are as an indication of experience can I put forward the following examples?
QF1. Total experience of the pilots in the control seats: 24854 hours (Captain ex-QF cadet; FO ex-GA and regional). If we include the SO (ex-RAAF), total experience on the flight deck: 31539 hours.
Southwest 345. Total experience of the pilots in the control seats: 17722 hours.
In all honesty though, these probably don't count either as the first crew were antipodean, with the accident occuring at a foreign airport and the captain of the second was a woman.
My point is, and always has been, that hours in and of themselves, are a meaningless metric to hang your hat on when deciding whether or not a pilot is likely to be competent. Logically, prior to the advent of cadet programmes and MPL schemes, 100% of all airline accidents and incidents involved experienced pilots so believing with such apparent certainty that "experienced" pilots will reduce the accident rate and "inexperienced" pilots will increase the accident rate is a fallacious argument in my opinion.
Clearly I don't know whether reduced experience will or will not affect the worldwide incident/accident rate but I'm prepared to have an open mind until statistics can prove one way or the other. Anyway, we'll all be travelling on pilotless aircraft soon so the whole argument is moot.
STP
Just to get back into everyone's good books as to how useful hours are as an indication of experience can I put forward the following examples?
QF1. Total experience of the pilots in the control seats: 24854 hours (Captain ex-QF cadet; FO ex-GA and regional). If we include the SO (ex-RAAF), total experience on the flight deck: 31539 hours.
Southwest 345. Total experience of the pilots in the control seats: 17722 hours.
In all honesty though, these probably don't count either as the first crew were antipodean, with the accident occuring at a foreign airport and the captain of the second was a woman.
My point is, and always has been, that hours in and of themselves, are a meaningless metric to hang your hat on when deciding whether or not a pilot is likely to be competent. Logically, prior to the advent of cadet programmes and MPL schemes, 100% of all airline accidents and incidents involved experienced pilots so believing with such apparent certainty that "experienced" pilots will reduce the accident rate and "inexperienced" pilots will increase the accident rate is a fallacious argument in my opinion.
Clearly I don't know whether reduced experience will or will not affect the worldwide incident/accident rate but I'm prepared to have an open mind until statistics can prove one way or the other. Anyway, we'll all be travelling on pilotless aircraft soon so the whole argument is moot.
STP