The Equivocator

Nige

Thank you for putting some context on the emotional side of the inquest. This is a difficult topic for many, I have no wish to peer into the pool of private grief of the relatives; your comment yesterday I believed to be gratuitous. In context, it is clearly not.

Thank you for posting JR's input to the inquest, which I must profess to find slightly confusing; I hope for the Coroner and the relatives he was more logical in court. Unusually, I agree with Tucumseh here. These things are inextricably linked.

There are some elements of this process quietly smiling at how they appear to have escaped from criticism; I think the laudable ESF campaign has unwittingly contributed to this.

It is of interest to me what element of the DEC this was and at what rank? 1*, SO1,2? DEC ELS or DEC TA? These very people who you suggest faced 'no choice' some time ago in the fitting of ESF, have given you a cursory nod , fitted a limited ESF capability to AT ac and yet are STILL happy to let AT ac operate in theatre airspace without ESF.

I have (you may be surprised to hear!) a lot of respect for your continued quest for better self protection of our AT fleets. I suspect you will disagree, but a downside of your work here is that the debate has been skewed firmly in the direction of ESF, it's benefits and the negligence in the decision not to purchase it a while ago.

As a friend of many on the crew, you have been (absolutely rightly) very careful to avoid any potential criticism of the crew. The relatives, obviously, have done likewise. This is why I believe we have let some of the real 'criminals' almost off the hook.

Let me make a clear statement at this point: I am not criticising any of my friends on XV179. They are clearly not culpable at any point.

Nonetheless, debate around has continued to avoid major dissection of tactics, decision processes and orders from the cmd chain. Discussion of the tactics at some point falls at the decision of the crew to fly day OLF. This, in some quarters, might be seen as tacit criticism of the captain. The BoI addressed this point, but failed to elevate it to (IMHO) the correct level of importance. The BoI was very close to the coalface in this incident; I am sure they did their best, but I can't help thinking greater detachment might have provided a different set of recs.

This ac had a limitation; no ESF.

This limitation was understood by elements of the cmd chain, if not in its entirety.

The ac was not specifically forbidden to operate at OLF heights.

Tactical advice comes from the AWC. They have platform protection specialists.

Tactical advice should be mandatory.

Ac at 3000' with or without ESF is still flying.

Steady presented with all the facts? Ac at 3000'. No story...

Let me add some of my emotion here; I think about my friends on XV179 on a daily basis. It makes me absolutely livid that an major element of this debate has been aimed at the EC area; there are any others who should be dragged before the coroner. These others, in the same cmd chains, are laughing behind their hands.

chappie

believe you me there were many more i wanted called and there were many who despite being in the witness box and faced by a full of court room really got off scott free. i am, as are others of us left behind, perfectly aware of when the lies are being told and the truth is still out there.

now, time for boys to rest in peace and time for the heavy weight of a conscience to weigh heavily on those who know........long may it be a heavy burden for you.

nigegilb

Thanks for coming on Chappie, you earned the respect of people here a long time ago, I am sure everyone hopes you get the closure you deserve next week and a long overdue apology from the MoD.

I agree with what Equiv is saying, I believe he would be even more angry if he was party to off the record MoD briefing. I am holding my fire on that info, waiting to see the MoD response to the Coroner's verdict next week. But if they are reading this, be sure to understand that I know.

Equiv, it has been a frustrating experience, I want to explain to you in public but I ask that you respect my decision not to deal with the thrust of your comment.

Suffice to say the following;

Low level was a legitimate tactic at the time. Special Forces crews are particularly highly trained in low flying such that they are cleared to OLF heights. Every single detachment I carried out in my time involved low flying.
Before the tragedy there was no order from High Command to cease daylight low level. Senior Commanders in Permanent Joint Head Quarters, Strike Command and 2Gp were aware of the vulnerability of Hercules aircraft to fuel tank explosion. They chose neither to provide fuel tank protection nor to order the cessation of daylight low level until AFTER the shooting down of XV179.

Unforgivably, they did not inform the crews on the frontline of the extreme danger they were in.

Is that clear enough Equiv?

WRT large aircraft protection. The current minimum equipment list has been explained to me but if you have any specifics with which I might be able to assist, simply PM me.

If you have any doubts about how effective this foam campaign has been and Graham Knight's epic Nimrod battle, then the recent Strike Command engineering hit squad should bring some comfort. They are touring flying squadrons tightening up engineering paperwork in the wake of Nimrod BoI recs concerning the state of airworthiness and its implementation in the military. A lot more will be revealed about the MR2 in the coming weeks.

I would like to deal with one point of criticism from John Reid. He criticised the foam campaign because it highlighted the Hercules vulnerability to fuel tank explosion. I thought I had dealt with this issue when the BoI was published.

The Boi was published on the internet for any bad guy sitting around the world to down load and see for himself how a giant transport aircraft was shot down. I still do not understand to this day why that report was released with enough detail to expose fuel tank vulnerability to anyone interested and without a single Hercules aircraft having the protection on board. Regardless of MoD spin, there was no initial decision to fit foam to MK3A or J Fleet. That decision was taken after the foam campaign started, so no apologies from me.

I would have thought that 26 years of knowledge of vulnerability and protection was enough.

I agree with Chappie. The boys would have probably hated all this publicity. When next week is over I hope the families can go home in the knowledge that this appalling event will never be repeated.

As for consciences, I still cannot understand the mentality of the people who did nothing. They bring shame to their uniform.

Chugalug2

Me:
The Equivocator:
Nigegilb:
The reason I draw attention to those who have been instrumental in drawing out the extent of the MOD's deliberate and illegal flouting of UK Military Airworthiness Regulations enforcement over the past two decades is not to ensure their "imminent beatification", indeed I'm quite sure they'd much prefer I give it a rest, but to concentrate the minds of those whom Nige speaks of in his quote above. If they were listed here it might well be said to be a "bit Daily Mail", but I will leave that aspect to the Coroners, from the one state institution it would seem prepared to unveil this shocking conspiracy. Time, perhaps, for those who now fill such posts to take stock of their own actions and to know for sure the extent of their own responsibilities and what they must do if prevailed upon to subvert them. Rhetoric will no longer cut the mustard, any more than it does if trapped in a minefield with injured men and defective equipment.

nigegilb

Bit of common sense from the North;

armed forces let down

Troops betrayed by military masters

Published: 18/10/2008
THERE was a time, in the not-too-distant past, when the term “military precision” was used to describe an exercise which had been carried out to perfection. It was, self-evidently, an acknowledgment that when it came to planning and execution, nobody did it better than the armed forces. How times have changed, if the evidence from two separate inquests yesterday portray accurately the current state of affairs. Both involved the death of British servicemen on active service, and both demonstrated how the men and women on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan are being betrayed by their military masters.
In the case of Scots Corporal Mark Wright, who died shielding a badly-injured colleague after members of his battalion had strayed into a minefield, an inquest in Oxford heard evidence of penny-pinching, inefficiency and poor communication, all of which contributed towards his needless death.
Simultaneously, less than 70 miles away, another inquest, this time into the death of 10 servicemen killed when a Hercules transport plane was brought down by small-arms fire, was hearing that it had been established three years earlier that gunfire could cause the plane’s wing-located fuel tanks to explode, but that information had not been passed on to the crews who were flying them. Neither had the aircraft been fitted with an explosion-suppressant foam which could have averted the disaster.
Britain’s armed forces are, quite rightly, lauded as the best in the world, the ultimate professionals who lay down their lives daily for their country. Sadly, the professionalism of the men and women in theatre appears not to be matched by the desk jockeys in Whitehall who, in the words of one coroner, should hang their heads in shame.

RaPs

FF
If that's a fact then nothing will surprise the families any more after what's already come to light, thanks to the summer recess!

flipster

FF

Thank you for removing your post re herc TAT. I'm sure you didn't mean to but it could have been construed as criticising the crew of XV179.

FYI - as a main sqn exec, we never recieved TATs via RAFCCIS - in fact, they were very rare animals indeed - I think I only ever read one (a paper copy) in the 3.5 years I was a flt cdr and, sadly, it was not the one in question.

I believe these reports were given a very small circulation because of their classification and relevance to 'they who must not be named'. This, with hindsight, is a great, great shame but, nonetheless, I find it very hard to believe that anyone who had read the report in question would have then continued to operate in daylight at LL. As a result, I don't believe that report ever got to the sqn.

I am just glad that we did our damnedest to ensure that our 'slick frames' (even less protected than XV179) only operated well away from highest-risk 'flight profiles'. Had we not done so then we could have lost many more ac. This was common-sense to us but, even then, was not a view shared by as many as you might have expected - certainly at higher levels!

Also, I can assure you that there were a number of sqn crews who, had they seen that TAT report, would 'not have been backward in coming forward' to highlight it to the boss and the execs. (These crews were not limited to those who had operated ac fitted with ESF ...IYKWIM!). Eventually, some people did come forward and, as a result, we included ESF in the main sqn's LI report, which if you recall, apparently disappeared into the 'ether' after leaving the sqn!

Even then, ESF was not at the very top of the wish list. As I have stated in the past, I believe that the whole of the Herc and AT fleet had been lulled into a false sense of security beacuse of Albert's long record of success in dealing with small arms fire and also because of the perception it would never be approved because of cost and ac down-time. I wish we hadn't been so assuming - this haunts me still.

The sad fact remains however, that there were people in high places (some very high) who knew well the risks we were facing and chose neither to tell us, nor to change our tactics accordingly and nor to provide us with sufficient ac protection. It is debatable whether this was because of malice aforethought, political reasons, career protection, incompetence, lack of awareness or because it just slipped through an over-worked, over-stretched and under-resourced Service. Whatever the reason, some of these people will be distraught with themselves for not doing more and rightly so. In the future, I hope they remember the lessons they have learnt and are better people and leaders as a result.

Regrettably, there will be others who will always deny their own failings in this tragedy. Unable to see any other point of view than their own, they always believe themselves 'in the right' and remain bullish and supremely over-confident to the point of arrogance. They are few but they are the worst type of commander. Even then, I hope that they can eventually see the error of their ways. If not, then they should rot!

All we can hope for is that our present commanders are more accutely aware of their responsibilities to those on the front line, our aircraft are better protected and also that the present command, control and intelligence communication system is far more robust than in 2005. I believe that is the case and, whatever the outcome, the inquest and the ESF campaign have acheived this much. I hope for all our sakes and especially those of the families, it is possible to imagine therefore, that the loss of life on XV179 has not been entirely in vain and, as a result, perhaps the chances of this happening again are far more remote?

Unfortunately, what will probably remain unresolved for some time is the airworthiness and fitness for purpose process for 'legacy' aircraft. I agree with the many who are convinced that the present system is incapable of implementing the extant airworthiness regulations because of years of neglect and budget cuts. IMHO this makes the probability of another tragedy like XV179 more likely.

The MoD has two options - either:

a. Chug's totally new independent airworthiness system that will ensure compliance or

b. to provide the present system with the right resources in terms of funding and expert people who are 'named' and empowered to ensure the regulations are followed to the letter.

Either way, we must ensure our servicemen and women are properly protected when they risk their lives on our behalf - they are entitled to expect that much.


flipster

I wish more people would realise that because we have so few assets, Flight Safety, Airworthiness and Fitness-for-Purpose is even more important in wartime than it is in peacetime!

nigegilb

Agree with your sentiment Flip, sadly, I have to say with just 2 days to go to the verdict I am hearing that exactly the same procurement mistake is about to happen with A400M as befell Herc J Model. I have lodged the information with the inquest investigator in the hope that at the eleventh hour clarification can be sought from the MoD and that hopefully, my fears will be proved wrong.

If not, I am afraid it is the case that the MoD never learns.

Nuff said for the moment.

For the record I have been told that electronic information aka TAT report is routinely destroyed after 5 years! 5 years, that is the same as a Major is it not?
I suggested that to assist the information trawl the classified documents register should be checked. The only hard copy was with AWC, there was absolutely no trace of the document at PJHQ, Air, (Strike) and 2 Gp. Strange, when a trawl was carried out in 2006, well inside the 5 year time frame for all THREE reports. But as Flip says, there is absolutely no evidence that the TAT ever made it to the Squadrons. As Flip indicates, there were plenty of strong personalities around to ensure the vulnerability and associated mitigation would have been given legs.

All 2Gp needed to have done was pass it to the DEC he has already testified that he wouldn't have foreseen too many problems getting funding, if only he had seen it.

MoD will announce some kind of computer tracking system to ensure this never happens again. Pity the MoD didn't think of that when the Computer system was brought in 9 years ago........

flipster

Nige,

That is worrying news indeed and highlights, even more clearly, the need for a better system of procurement.

If we can't get MoD/DEC ELS to cough up for ESF/OBIGGS for the A400 then what chance will it have against against all the other threats out there!?

What about all the other current ac that are vulnerable?

In the light of the Herc and Nimrod Inquests, I sincerely hope all IPTs are reviewing their vulnerability assessments, hazard logs and safety cases to ensure FFP and AW, both now and in the future, against current defined threats (and maybe even those that our enemies are dreaming up for future use)?

I also hope that all the DECs and HM Treasury are digging deep to fund this?

If not, our procurement system runs the the risk of doing the enemy's job for him!

Considering the amount of billions of £££s the gov't has just lavished upon our greedy, immoral and reckless finnancial institutions, it would seem fair for the generally frugal MoD to ask for a bit of the same treatment?

nigegilb

Flip, FTP (in this case FTI), is funded, for the moment, but other crucial systems are not. Meaning that potentially less than half of the A400M Fleet will be FFP. The Inquest is plugged into the MoD at very high levels. This issue must be sorted in the next 48 hours.

BTW hazard log has nothing to do with FFP, according to IPTL at Herc Inquest.
FFP was for someone else to worry about, ie. DEC and User.

flipster

As I say, we could be making the enemy's job easier rather than more difficult!
It makes me want to scream!!!

airsound

Nige and Flip
FYI

Brigadier Hamish McNish (Dir Eqpt Capability in Logs and Support Apr 2005 to Apr 2008) said in evidence about the A-400M at the Inquest:
1. They didn't have funding to fit the OBIGGS gas generators, so they funded the pipework with the intention of going for the Pro-Fit system, which takes hours (rather than days or weeks) to fit to an individual aircraft.
2. He was not aware of any plan to use the A-400M only in benign environments.

He also said that all 25 A-400s, all 24 C-130Js and all 6 C-17s have or will have fuel tank protection.

airsound

philrigger

Nigegilb


For the record I have been told that electronic information aka TAT report is routinely destroyed after 5 years! 5 years, that is the same as a Major is it not?

For what it is worth, I think you will now find that a major:

J - 12 years or 11,250 hrs

k - 4000 hours or 6 years

nigegilb

Cheers Phil, never had the pleasure of flying the "J". 12 years, puts the electronic destruction policy into perspective, thanks for that.


Airsound, I now understand that FTI is funded but I referred to another crucial system that is a partial fit. Just as the MK3 was used in Afg, so could we see, the situation happening again. Because unlike the Australian Govt, there is no such guarantee from either the RAF or British Govt that crews won't once more be sent to war without protection if there was an operational requirement.

Edited to add, I understand it was the intention to have full fleet protection on the A400M but this was revised on grounds of cost. Given the importance placed on this Inquest, I hope this matter is dealt with urgently.


"Role Mods (Partial Fit) are a legitimate device. The up-side is, MoD save money on capital procurement costs. However, it is not always as simple a calculation as it seems. Immediately, two configurations are created - with and without. The IPT must MAINTAIN the two build standards. Again, this is what gives lie to the IPTL claim that fitness for purpose is nothing to do with him.


The source documents are;

Use Study - How, when, where, why it will be used (both the a/c and DAS).

The Fit Policy - How many at each standard and flying rate. (Full Fit, Partial Fit, IUR, IR6, Training etc).
Vulnerability Analysis


All mapped to the User Requirement and System Requirement Documents - both DEC's responsibility. That is, if the Use Study says "In theatre" and the VA says "Need DAS", then it is an apparent contradiction for the Fit Policy to only have Partial. This is what requirement scrutiny is meant to tease out, to ensure sufficient provision has been made. If they want Partial Fit,(*ac) there MUST be complementary entries in the Use Study to say that "a max of * will be used in a situation requiring DAS" and the Through Life Management Plan will articulate the arrangement for transferring the Role MoD (DAS) between a/c. And, remember, the UK based training a/c MUST reflect the In use build standard. In very simple terms, if 25 A400M are sufficient if all have DAS, you may find that you actually need, say, 27 if you have a partial fit. This calculation is meant to be done by DEC.
If the uses are so varied that a "lesser" standard in terms of self protection is acceptable for some a/c, then a firm line must be drawn between the two standards. So much so, that a strict interpretation of the regs says two Mks must be created (A400M and, say, A400MDAS). This is especially true if the DAS is a DA Mod (in the build standard at delivery) and not a Service Mod. Given the purpose - self protection - one must come down on the side of new Mk. The main reason is because it forces the User to always consider and recognise the fact that he can't just send a non-DAS a/c into a theatre where the Threat Analysis show he needs DAS. The attitude "A C130J is a C130J" is not valid if one is protected and the other not. (The regs don't cater for such an application of common sense and pragamatism, but are a bit more black and white - they lean toward creating a different Mk. That is, failsafe).
All this is routine stuff, and applies to equipment as well as the whole a/c. The general principles are laid down on 00-57, 05-123 and 05-125/2."

Chugalug2

Flipster, may I just say how impressed I am at your objective account of, when a Sqn Exec, being betrayed effectively twice by your seniors? Betrayed once because the very people above all who needed to be made aware of the TAT report, the Squadron Aircrew, were denied it. Betrayed twice because, unaware of that risk but rightly aware of the wing tank vulnerability of the Hercules, their request for ESF protection was ignored, not considered and rejected, simply ignored. I assume the same CoC was responsible for both betrayals and that many of those who were party to them are still around. Whether they be arrogant, in denial, or guilt ridden they did (or rather didn't) what they felt was expected of them from above, which I suspect means that given the same scenario, the same outcome would result. Just as with a Squadron, where it was my experience that a good boss meant a good Squadron and vice versa, irrespective of the Execs (sorry!), the same goes for the Military Staffs. I am not excusing those who have reneged on their responsibilities here, they will have to live with the consequences of their actions just as others have had to die for them. I am saying that Airworthiness is just too crucial to be left to the whim of Senior Officers with the power to compromise it for their own short term purposes. That is why I call for a separate and independent MAA, because the MOD should not be judge and jury as well as chief suspect. Self regulation is a delusion, as the Banks have recently demonstrated to our considerable cost and the same applies to Military Staffs in respect of the enforcement of UK Military Airworthiness Regulations.

nigegilb

That was self-evident at the Inquest, when the man responsible for the airworthiness of the Hercules, pointedly distanced himself from any requirement to be actively concerned with enhancing the build standard to achieve fitness for purpose.

The inter-relation between FFP and airworthiness appears not to be understood by the wider military audience. Hence at the eleventh hour, it would appear that the vast majority of the A400M Fleet will be good for jollies to the States but completely unfit for front-line duties. Might as well have bought a dreamliner. But hey, it will be airworthy in the strictest sense of the word, so job done. And when the next crisis appears on a Friday afternoon, what will RAF heads be tempted to say? It's OK the military will bear the risk. Back to square one, again.

You are right Chug, these people can't be trusted to do the right thing.

Chugalug2

I think we need to concentrate on the system, Nige, rather than the people. They come and they go, but the system remains. Given a new CAS, CinC, AOC etc etc, we may well be told that; "Its all going to be all right now chaps, just relax!" But eventually the system would just slip back into its same old bad ways again as now. That is why we have a CAA, to protect Airlines and Aircrews from themselves, so that "just" and "only" are not part of the lexicon of civil aviation, and that is why we must have an MAA. As Flipster so rightly says, a military airfleet that is so much reduced in size needs more not less Flight Safety protection, of which Airworthiness is simply a part. The snide remarks aimed at 'elf 'n safety' show a culture within the present RAF which is neither professional nor realistic. RAF Flight Safety always had a Raison d'Etre of maintaining Operational Effectiveness rather than Safety for its own sake. Better to lose Aircraft and even Crew in mortal combat than never get there at all because of an avoidable accident. That may sound harsh and unfeeling, but it counts in the cold audits of Military Effectiveness, and has been repeated as often by those who have been bereaved by such accidents.

Edited to add : Better still,of course, to survive the combat scenario because of proper protection!

flipster

Chug,

I don't really know enough detail to say for sure that a MAA is the definite way ahead. We'd have to ask someone who knows the system - Tuc? Safety Helmut? Safeware? etc

However, I agree that the procurement system is definitely 'broken beyond economic repair' and neither do I trust those 'at the' top to fix it!
As a result, my instinct also says that a fully independent MAA should be the answer.

Good luck to all over the next 24 hours, especially the families - you will be in my thoughts.

flipster

Chugalug2

flip, I quite agree that we need as much informed input on the enforcement of Military Airworthiness Regulation as possible. This is surely the next logical MOD failure to confront and to cure, so that the tragedies that are the subject of this thread and others can be said to have some meaning rather than simply shear waste. As you say, our thoughts are with the bereaved of this accident right now, but it would hopefully be of some solace for them to know that it at least finally led to change, fundamental and permanent change rather than mere smoke and mirrors, so making the odds of such grief for other families being much less in future. I am sure that there are many problems associated with establishing a separate and independent MAA, but we are now all very much more aware of the gamble we would be taking to leave things in the direct control of the MOD. There has to be a total reform of the MOD anyway, IMHO, but Airworthiness should not be part of that, for to repeat myself, Self Regulation is a delusion and in aviation it is a fatal one.

Safeware

Nige, Actually, it is the prime place to record such info - 00-56 iss 4 Pt 1:

and from Pt2, so you know who should be watching over it:sw