G-ARPI - The Trident Tragedy: 40 years ago today
Scotbill,
I am sorry if I gave the impression of being tribal, that was not my intention. I understand the underlying philosophy behind the monitored approach and have no doubt it worked well. My point is that, in a way that is similar to the 'overuse' of automatics on modern aircraft today, where pilots have insufficient practice hand flying, the BEA handover of control for most of the flight allowed some captains on Tridents to be too easily 'carried' by their co-pilots. And if this was compounded by too much time on Shuttle backup the results were plain to see.
I also fully accept that the 'old style' training methods being used on the 747 fleet at that time needed to be much improved - and they were, but it took time. In addition, I query the wisdom of changing types when nearing the end of one's flying carreer. A number of the older BOAC pilots failed the Concorde course because the were unable to adapt. This is no reflection on any of these pilots as people. As Scotbill says 'pilots are much of a muchness wherever' they are.
More to the point, knowing Simon Ticehurst's parents as I did, it made me acutely aware of how many people well beyond those immediately involved are affected by any accident.
Finally, as always, accidents have multiple contributory causes - the Swiss cheese effect. I have little doubt that BEA's management processes were a major contributory factor and this was not fully explored in the inquiry afterwards.
I am sorry if I gave the impression of being tribal, that was not my intention. I understand the underlying philosophy behind the monitored approach and have no doubt it worked well. My point is that, in a way that is similar to the 'overuse' of automatics on modern aircraft today, where pilots have insufficient practice hand flying, the BEA handover of control for most of the flight allowed some captains on Tridents to be too easily 'carried' by their co-pilots. And if this was compounded by too much time on Shuttle backup the results were plain to see.
I also fully accept that the 'old style' training methods being used on the 747 fleet at that time needed to be much improved - and they were, but it took time. In addition, I query the wisdom of changing types when nearing the end of one's flying carreer. A number of the older BOAC pilots failed the Concorde course because the were unable to adapt. This is no reflection on any of these pilots as people. As Scotbill says 'pilots are much of a muchness wherever' they are.
More to the point, knowing Simon Ticehurst's parents as I did, it made me acutely aware of how many people well beyond those immediately involved are affected by any accident.
Finally, as always, accidents have multiple contributory causes - the Swiss cheese effect. I have little doubt that BEA's management processes were a major contributory factor and this was not fully explored in the inquiry afterwards.
Was it 12 feet?
Shuttle back up might have created a problem but loss of handling skills cannot be blamed on the monitored approach as roles were reversed with P2 handling. Bear in mind that those transferring to long haul were all of the Hamble/Oxford generation.
In BEA the general expectation on command conversion for a pilot of reasonable track record was that he would pass. Thus the early part of the course was devoted to teaching and that support gradually reduced to the dumb FO role.
One of my Senior Training Managers enunciated a simple philosophy:
a) If anyone has trouble the first step is to change the Training Captain
b) There is no point in telling an experienced pilot he has done something wrong unless you can tell him why he got it wrong and, more importantly, what he can do to make it better.
(Ace pilots do not necessarily make good trainers because they may not even understand the problem).
By contrast, a 747 "trainer" said in the bar to one of my colleagues, "I would not presume to tell another pilot how to fly!" and another was reported as having said to a command conversion on his first line sector LHR - Anchorage, "You're a captain, get on with it."
We had incompetent trainers in BEA too - completely bereft of that ability to diagnose another pilot's problem which to me is a fundamental requirement in a trainer.
I have never believed that there is any point in having a court of enquiry into an accident. The truth is likely to be the first casualty as lawyers attempt to cover their respective clients' asses.
Last edited by scotbill; 9th Jan 2013 at 09:58.
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Many people quote the misselection of the droops by one of the pilots in this accident and forget that the handling pilot failing to fly the appropriate speed by 20 knots was also a contributory factor.
Last edited by Pull what; 11th Jan 2013 at 22:54.
Been travelling which included taking Jerry keighley's dad to lunch in Swalesdale where his family had built a house in the 30s. Bill had been shot down on a suicide mission in 1940 and spent the war in Stalag Luft Drei and participated in the death march. His son was P2 in papa Inida.
If Hamble boy cares to read my blog - trustthepilot.blog.com - he will understand that he is 100% wrong re research.
The accident period I refer to was Novemeber 1971 until I joined the VC-10 which was 1977.
Vanguard known corrosion ignored. all dead.
Papa india.
What became X-ray mike - training Nicosia.
707 at Prestwick - training!
707 Heraklion - written off on landing but flown back to Gatwick with pax without engineering clearance.
T3 mid air - atc but some criticism of crew lookout.
Viscount on air test flew into cloud with hard centre.
1E at Bilbao - hit puddle.
Not exactly in chronological order.
And a steward who fell to his death from incorrectly installed Airstairs in Rome. (FR aren't whiter than driven snow in this respect).
There were so many other near disasters - many I haven't written about but one was when the crew apparently went the wrong side of the checker board and nearly took out downtown HKG.
Agree with Aileron drag re the huge difference in changing from BEA to BOAC - I was nearly chopped.
Cunningham stated that the Trident was designed, tested and certified to carry out a standard take off climb to an acceleration altitude. A continuous acceleration at this altitude and flap retraction at requisite speeds in one go.
This was carried out at climb power.
It was also Davies recommended procedure in Handling the big jets. He gave evidence but I didn't read the file and there is no mention of it in the report.
I flew six different airliners for three companies - about another six variants and no one bar BEA did such a foolish noise abatement.
Throttle back sometimes at 500ft, set a dangerously low amount of power, whip up the flaps and fly around V2+10 on the backside of the drag curve.
Whilst we had some fantastically skilled pilots in BEA there was what we called a significant "pony express" mentality - get the mail through whatever.
It didn't matter what the book says or airmanship - my job is to get the pax to X even if I don't take prisoners.
We called it "cowboys" although the modern term is apparently "cavalier" so I suppose that excludes the circumcised amongst us. (and Les on the grounds of size). - private joke to another pruner.
Safe flying.
If Hamble boy cares to read my blog - trustthepilot.blog.com - he will understand that he is 100% wrong re research.
The accident period I refer to was Novemeber 1971 until I joined the VC-10 which was 1977.
Vanguard known corrosion ignored. all dead.
Papa india.
What became X-ray mike - training Nicosia.
707 at Prestwick - training!
707 Heraklion - written off on landing but flown back to Gatwick with pax without engineering clearance.
T3 mid air - atc but some criticism of crew lookout.
Viscount on air test flew into cloud with hard centre.
1E at Bilbao - hit puddle.
Not exactly in chronological order.
And a steward who fell to his death from incorrectly installed Airstairs in Rome. (FR aren't whiter than driven snow in this respect).
There were so many other near disasters - many I haven't written about but one was when the crew apparently went the wrong side of the checker board and nearly took out downtown HKG.
Agree with Aileron drag re the huge difference in changing from BEA to BOAC - I was nearly chopped.
Cunningham stated that the Trident was designed, tested and certified to carry out a standard take off climb to an acceleration altitude. A continuous acceleration at this altitude and flap retraction at requisite speeds in one go.
This was carried out at climb power.
It was also Davies recommended procedure in Handling the big jets. He gave evidence but I didn't read the file and there is no mention of it in the report.
I flew six different airliners for three companies - about another six variants and no one bar BEA did such a foolish noise abatement.
Throttle back sometimes at 500ft, set a dangerously low amount of power, whip up the flaps and fly around V2+10 on the backside of the drag curve.
Whilst we had some fantastically skilled pilots in BEA there was what we called a significant "pony express" mentality - get the mail through whatever.
It didn't matter what the book says or airmanship - my job is to get the pax to X even if I don't take prisoners.
We called it "cowboys" although the modern term is apparently "cavalier" so I suppose that excludes the circumcised amongst us. (and Les on the grounds of size). - private joke to another pruner.
Safe flying.
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This is all fascinating stuff and brings back many memories of my days as an ex-apprentice working in Tech 1 at LHR, on Tridents and L1011s in the late 70s. While I enjoyed working on the Tridents, it's true that some of the old-school captains could be a bit challenging at times.
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Re: book called "Disasters in the Air", by Jan Bartelski, formerly KLM. He has selected certain aviation accidents that are shrouded in some uncertainty. Given the blanks left by the lack of a CVR on PI, he finds the incident fertile ground.
The gist of his explanation lies in the idea that Key's airspeed indicator was reading high. This notion is used to explain Key's settings in the autopilot as well as the more serious question of selecting droops up at 162 knots. He also questions whether a P1 who is in the midst of a coronary event could have the stamina and strength to override the stick pusher three times, and reach back to finally disable the stick system, which he would be motivated to do if he truly believed that he had attained 225 knots (and nearing the 250 knots at which, Bartelski says, flying with droops lowered could damage these leading edge devices).
My immediate questions:
*Is it the P1 or the P2 who might have actually overridden the stick push? Key vs Keighley would weigh heavily in this question, given the issue of a possible coronary event. Bartelski's argument rests on the idea that Key was not incapacitated at this time, and was in the throes of an instrument error. OTOH, a few earlier posts would indicate that perhaps the P2 was expected to initiate the override, which one assumes Keighley was capable of doing.
*If Key's airspeed indicator was inaccurate, why would there be no indications of it on previous flights (unless it had just gone bad, of course)? Were PI's logs examined? If not, are they currently in storage somewhere?
*I understand that it was Ticehurst's function to monitor all phases of the flight during climbout, which would include (one would hope), discerning, and reacting to, early droop retraction. It is easy to be critical, but something was amiss here, though the confusion could have been overwhelming, especially if Key was actually incapacitated (which Bartelki disputes, based on stick push override). Any thoughts?
Bartelski does acknowledge the issue of CRM: Key may have initiated droop retraction, or given the order to do so, at a moment that was clearly inappropriate in the eyes of Keighley and Ticehurst, who may have been reluctant to countermand a P1 with a 'reputation'.
The gist of his explanation lies in the idea that Key's airspeed indicator was reading high. This notion is used to explain Key's settings in the autopilot as well as the more serious question of selecting droops up at 162 knots. He also questions whether a P1 who is in the midst of a coronary event could have the stamina and strength to override the stick pusher three times, and reach back to finally disable the stick system, which he would be motivated to do if he truly believed that he had attained 225 knots (and nearing the 250 knots at which, Bartelski says, flying with droops lowered could damage these leading edge devices).
My immediate questions:
*Is it the P1 or the P2 who might have actually overridden the stick push? Key vs Keighley would weigh heavily in this question, given the issue of a possible coronary event. Bartelski's argument rests on the idea that Key was not incapacitated at this time, and was in the throes of an instrument error. OTOH, a few earlier posts would indicate that perhaps the P2 was expected to initiate the override, which one assumes Keighley was capable of doing.
*If Key's airspeed indicator was inaccurate, why would there be no indications of it on previous flights (unless it had just gone bad, of course)? Were PI's logs examined? If not, are they currently in storage somewhere?
*I understand that it was Ticehurst's function to monitor all phases of the flight during climbout, which would include (one would hope), discerning, and reacting to, early droop retraction. It is easy to be critical, but something was amiss here, though the confusion could have been overwhelming, especially if Key was actually incapacitated (which Bartelki disputes, based on stick push override). Any thoughts?
Bartelski does acknowledge the issue of CRM: Key may have initiated droop retraction, or given the order to do so, at a moment that was clearly inappropriate in the eyes of Keighley and Ticehurst, who may have been reluctant to countermand a P1 with a 'reputation'.
*If Key's airspeed indicator was inaccurate, why would there be no indications of it on previous flights (unless it had just gone bad, of course)? Were PI's logs examined? If not, are they currently in storage somewhere?
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DaveReidUK,
Given the fact that someone retracted the droops 63 knots and 1300 feet below prescribed limits, and four trained men could not understand the resultant stall warning, I'd say any amount of confusion - during the 'event' or the investigation - is possible.
Given the fact that someone retracted the droops 63 knots and 1300 feet below prescribed limits, and four trained men could not understand the resultant stall warning, I'd say any amount of confusion - during the 'event' or the investigation - is possible.
Given the fact that someone retracted the droops 63 knots and 1300 feet below prescribed limits, and four trained men could not understand the resultant stall warning, I'd say any amount of confusion - during the 'event' or the investigation - is possible.
Since an important part of any investigation is to explore the possibility of precursor technical issues as a causal factor, it's frankly insulting to any investigation bureau (the UK AAIB in this case) to suggest that it's "possible" that they didn't bother to look at the aircraft's paperwork.
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My sister and I were playing in a field near Sunnymeads, Wraysbury and we saw the plane coming down. It was only recently, following a frightening incident on a transatlantic flight, that I looked up the details of the accident that we had witnessed. I was shocked to find out that there was no mention of an engine fire. My sister and I had not spoken of the incident in 40 years, but when I questioned her about her memories of what she had seen, they were the same as mine. The plane was coming down slowly, not on the usual flight path. As I starred at it I could see flames coming up from the underside, such that as I looked at it it felt like my gaze was causing it to burn. I was 10 years old at the time but I had always believed that the pilot was a hero, bringing the plane down away from the busy road and Staines, in an attempt to land it back at Heathrow.
Interesting witness statement AJ3287.
The Trident was in a 'deep stall' at the time - very little or no control would have been available to the pilots, notwithstanding the fact that the captain was probably incapacitated leaving a very inexperienced copilot at the controls.
The engine fire you report was probably because of engine surges due to the disrupted airflow entering the engines at an extreme angle for which the intakes weren't designed.
Do you recall any noises/sounds?
The Trident was in a 'deep stall' at the time - very little or no control would have been available to the pilots, notwithstanding the fact that the captain was probably incapacitated leaving a very inexperienced copilot at the controls.
The engine fire you report was probably because of engine surges due to the disrupted airflow entering the engines at an extreme angle for which the intakes weren't designed.
Do you recall any noises/sounds?
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When PI crashed everyone was amazed it didn't kill hundreds on the ground - impacting in essentially open ground
Immediately some developers realised that here was valuable real estate going begging in Staines and moved in
One of my old friends lived there for a while - can't remember the name they gave the road officially but it was always known as "trident Terrace" to both occupants and the townsfolk for years...................
Immediately some developers realised that here was valuable real estate going begging in Staines and moved in
One of my old friends lived there for a while - can't remember the name they gave the road officially but it was always known as "trident Terrace" to both occupants and the townsfolk for years...................
Interesting thread. I was a contemporary of Blind Pew at Hamble and find amusing his claim to be the star of course 702. I spent nine years on the Trident - up to it’s withdrawal from service. And I must say that I find some of Blind Pew's memories quite different to my own experience. I look back on my time on the Gripper with much affection.
However, in the early 1970's, things were a bit different and I must agree with him, the airline was state owned and not well managed, as a company or politically. A large proportion of Capts were ex WWII or National service and perhaps not so uniform in performance. Coming from prop types, some struggled with the Trident. A few were overbearing and downright difficult, but CRM had not yet been conceived. However, most of us managed to simply to get on with the job and I would like to think produced a more humble type of captain when our turn came. Promotion was slow, so we had an exceptionally long apprenticeship. It was noticeable that when the first Hamble trained pilots gained their commands, attitudes toward colleagues improved.
There is a tone of aggrieved rant in BP's posts, not many pilots left BA, perhaps he did the right thing in leaving for Swissair and I hope that he found things more to his liking there. But I imagine not.
A few other points. He makes it sound as if the Trident was a dangerous and unstable aircraft. It was not. Trident was handicapped by by its engines, not bad, just too small. (imposed on the manufacturer by BEA)
Now reaching the point of this thread. The greatest error in Trident's design - and certification, was that, incredibly, the flaps and droop/slats were commanded by separate levers. (The T1 employed drooped leading edges, while the T2 & T3 used slats, but the controls were the same.)
This defect allowed the droop to be retracted improperly, placing Papa India 60kt its below its speed for the configuration and well into the stall. As to who performed these actions including the stick-push override operation become unimportant, the design should never have been approved. After Papa India, an extra baulk was introduced in the quadrant and all slat/flap selections were made with almost exaggerated care.
BP gives the impression that Trident was a dangerous and unstable aircraft. It was not.
Trident was fast, very fast, I have seen Mach Nos. close to sonic and all without displaying any bad tendencies or need artificial protection. No high speed buffet or need for Mach trim, bank angle limiter, recovery speed brake etc. The aircraft was a delight to fly. It could do things that no other airliner could in its time and some that they still cannot do now.
It was very easy to fly, but the simulator less so. Apparently, because the CAA decided that the fuselage mounted engines presented insufficient asymmetric challenge. So, the sim had its engines mounted an imaginary18ft outboard (If I recall correctly) as well as being very pitch unstable unlike the aircraft itself. As for BP’s assertion that Trident was speed unstable on the approach nonsense, but like any jet, get it on the back of the drag curve and much power was required to recover speed, just like any jet.
Tridents autoland capability was revolutionary, though the mechanism used to achieve this seems quaint nowadays, employing triplex parallel circuits from ILS receiver to control surface actuator. But remember, this was an electro-mechanical system, no electronics. I remember on a few occasions doing four Cat3 autolands on a single day when we Tridents were the only traffic in the skies and it was 12ft/75m if BP's photographic memory needs a nudge.
Another area where Trident was a leader, was in Quick Access flight data recording. In order to gain approval for its groundbreaking Cat3 autoland, all the aircraft were equipped with a 72 channel flight data recorder, extraordinary at the time. On the completion of these trials, the evidence of these recordings could have been used in many ways. Keeping the pilots in line? In fact, the company, in cooperation with BALPA came up with the enlightened SESMA programme, whereby data derived was used to monitor performance and detect deviations and used in an intelligent manner, rather than as a weapon against offending pilots. It has been a model of its type.
A consequence of Papa India was the mandatory adoption of CVR, as without this information, despite the FDR, the actual events of the Staines accident will never be known, only their outcomes and contributing factors.
For those of you who might have been taken in by BP’s bitter and jaundiced posts, I would suggest that you look up some of the many Trident threads to discover its many fans.
However, in the early 1970's, things were a bit different and I must agree with him, the airline was state owned and not well managed, as a company or politically. A large proportion of Capts were ex WWII or National service and perhaps not so uniform in performance. Coming from prop types, some struggled with the Trident. A few were overbearing and downright difficult, but CRM had not yet been conceived. However, most of us managed to simply to get on with the job and I would like to think produced a more humble type of captain when our turn came. Promotion was slow, so we had an exceptionally long apprenticeship. It was noticeable that when the first Hamble trained pilots gained their commands, attitudes toward colleagues improved.
There is a tone of aggrieved rant in BP's posts, not many pilots left BA, perhaps he did the right thing in leaving for Swissair and I hope that he found things more to his liking there. But I imagine not.
A few other points. He makes it sound as if the Trident was a dangerous and unstable aircraft. It was not. Trident was handicapped by by its engines, not bad, just too small. (imposed on the manufacturer by BEA)
Now reaching the point of this thread. The greatest error in Trident's design - and certification, was that, incredibly, the flaps and droop/slats were commanded by separate levers. (The T1 employed drooped leading edges, while the T2 & T3 used slats, but the controls were the same.)
This defect allowed the droop to be retracted improperly, placing Papa India 60kt its below its speed for the configuration and well into the stall. As to who performed these actions including the stick-push override operation become unimportant, the design should never have been approved. After Papa India, an extra baulk was introduced in the quadrant and all slat/flap selections were made with almost exaggerated care.
BP gives the impression that Trident was a dangerous and unstable aircraft. It was not.
Trident was fast, very fast, I have seen Mach Nos. close to sonic and all without displaying any bad tendencies or need artificial protection. No high speed buffet or need for Mach trim, bank angle limiter, recovery speed brake etc. The aircraft was a delight to fly. It could do things that no other airliner could in its time and some that they still cannot do now.
It was very easy to fly, but the simulator less so. Apparently, because the CAA decided that the fuselage mounted engines presented insufficient asymmetric challenge. So, the sim had its engines mounted an imaginary18ft outboard (If I recall correctly) as well as being very pitch unstable unlike the aircraft itself. As for BP’s assertion that Trident was speed unstable on the approach nonsense, but like any jet, get it on the back of the drag curve and much power was required to recover speed, just like any jet.
Tridents autoland capability was revolutionary, though the mechanism used to achieve this seems quaint nowadays, employing triplex parallel circuits from ILS receiver to control surface actuator. But remember, this was an electro-mechanical system, no electronics. I remember on a few occasions doing four Cat3 autolands on a single day when we Tridents were the only traffic in the skies and it was 12ft/75m if BP's photographic memory needs a nudge.
Another area where Trident was a leader, was in Quick Access flight data recording. In order to gain approval for its groundbreaking Cat3 autoland, all the aircraft were equipped with a 72 channel flight data recorder, extraordinary at the time. On the completion of these trials, the evidence of these recordings could have been used in many ways. Keeping the pilots in line? In fact, the company, in cooperation with BALPA came up with the enlightened SESMA programme, whereby data derived was used to monitor performance and detect deviations and used in an intelligent manner, rather than as a weapon against offending pilots. It has been a model of its type.
A consequence of Papa India was the mandatory adoption of CVR, as without this information, despite the FDR, the actual events of the Staines accident will never be known, only their outcomes and contributing factors.
For those of you who might have been taken in by BP’s bitter and jaundiced posts, I would suggest that you look up some of the many Trident threads to discover its many fans.
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AJ, thank you for a sensible, well reasoned, non-hysterical, factual post from a person fully conversant with the aircraft. It makes a refreshing change.
On a different note, I was visiting friends in Deepcut at the time it happened and have a memory of an initial report of a four years old girl being taken to hospital having survived the initial impact but who died either en route or shortly after arrival at the hospital, however, I have never since seen, heard mention of or any reference to it. The crash was a tragedy but it seems to have had some positive results which have hopefully gone on to make flying safer for all of us.
On a different note, I was visiting friends in Deepcut at the time it happened and have a memory of an initial report of a four years old girl being taken to hospital having survived the initial impact but who died either en route or shortly after arrival at the hospital, however, I have never since seen, heard mention of or any reference to it. The crash was a tragedy but it seems to have had some positive results which have hopefully gone on to make flying safer for all of us.
Adverse yaw...if you had read my tome you will see that I had more chop flights than anyone else on my course and if Duff Mitchell is to be believed more than anyone else in the history of Hamble.
I see that you first flew the Vanguard so you would have little idea whatsoever what it was like to go straight from Hamble onto the Trident during a period of the worst industrial action in the history of BEA and a period where we crashed a lot of aircraft...three or four in my first year.
A straight wing turbo prop is a very different kettle of fish to an underpowered swept wing jet.
You will also realise the debt that I owed to people like Stan Romaine who took it upon himself to teach me how to land the Trident and regain my confidence..whilst others would not let me touch the controls.
Perhaps I was wrong to dare to pen a letter about what we had really been taught during our Trident conversion course for inclusion in the public inquiry...but I felt that I had a moral responsibility...as did George Childs who paid for it with his career...read his testimony...if you can be bothered to visit Waterside.
And while you are there read some of the other testimonies...they really opened my eyes.
I spent a lot of time researching my book and asking former colleagues about their opinions.
Mine are not unique and some of their stories shocked me.
But it is an autobiography and not a general history book.
You also have forgotten the "stall procedure amendment" or perhaps you weren't on the Trident in 1972.
No doubt training changed after the demise of 118 souls.
And you probably didn't witness the way Stan Key was treated.
I am also indebted to the guys in BOAC who helped me through the enormous leap going from BEA to part 1 on the VC 10 when my mates were still not allowed to fly manual throttle nor take the autopilot out without asking.
Lord King and the BOAC training/management guys changed the airline around to the great company it is today.
Perhaps you suffer from the BEA tribalism.
I was extremely fortunate to get the Swissair job and I have to thank the crews on the duck for their patience and help whilst I learnt what it was to be a professional and not just a bus driver.
In SR..I learnt how to throw a jet around with ease..no FD...manual throttle...final configuration at 400ft...speed stabilised later.
A proper salary and all the bits that went with the best airline in Europe.
And of course a first class modern quasi military training establishment.
You write nonsense about the Trident flap/droop system ...how do you think other aircraft operate...one lever...with the last stage changing the leading edge devices configuration.
And of course you are forgetting fundamentals ...one reaches an acceleration altitude and then accelerates to climb speed progressively ...it was the unique BEA noise proceedure more than anything else that caused the crash as Cats eyes Cunningham said in his testimony..and as Davies writes in his book.
Next you will be writing that BEA were the first airline in the world to use autoland....and the good old slick Trident operation....you have obviously never followed one in in a DC9 or BAC 111.
Standard proceedure if we couldn't over take one in descent was reduce to minimum clean..
Step back and remember it is always very easy to blame dead men and forget that they were put into an impossible position by those that run a flawed system which is not adequately policed. NCTT.
I guess you probably appreciate that what happened to Glen Stewart..Brian Abrahams has a very accurate post on PPrune...with only a couple of bits missing....and where many of us could have ended up.
A very sobering read of how someone can be hung out to dry whilst trying to do the best for his passengers and employer.
Ps as to the numbers who left..6 copilots and 3 captains from BEA that I knew on the Trident and around 10 from BA to SR..most ex Tridents and most ex Hamble or Oxford..And not forgetting the half dozen or so of my course who went to Man/Bhm and highlands as soon as they could.....
I see that you first flew the Vanguard so you would have little idea whatsoever what it was like to go straight from Hamble onto the Trident during a period of the worst industrial action in the history of BEA and a period where we crashed a lot of aircraft...three or four in my first year.
A straight wing turbo prop is a very different kettle of fish to an underpowered swept wing jet.
You will also realise the debt that I owed to people like Stan Romaine who took it upon himself to teach me how to land the Trident and regain my confidence..whilst others would not let me touch the controls.
Perhaps I was wrong to dare to pen a letter about what we had really been taught during our Trident conversion course for inclusion in the public inquiry...but I felt that I had a moral responsibility...as did George Childs who paid for it with his career...read his testimony...if you can be bothered to visit Waterside.
And while you are there read some of the other testimonies...they really opened my eyes.
I spent a lot of time researching my book and asking former colleagues about their opinions.
Mine are not unique and some of their stories shocked me.
But it is an autobiography and not a general history book.
You also have forgotten the "stall procedure amendment" or perhaps you weren't on the Trident in 1972.
No doubt training changed after the demise of 118 souls.
And you probably didn't witness the way Stan Key was treated.
I am also indebted to the guys in BOAC who helped me through the enormous leap going from BEA to part 1 on the VC 10 when my mates were still not allowed to fly manual throttle nor take the autopilot out without asking.
Lord King and the BOAC training/management guys changed the airline around to the great company it is today.
Perhaps you suffer from the BEA tribalism.
I was extremely fortunate to get the Swissair job and I have to thank the crews on the duck for their patience and help whilst I learnt what it was to be a professional and not just a bus driver.
In SR..I learnt how to throw a jet around with ease..no FD...manual throttle...final configuration at 400ft...speed stabilised later.
A proper salary and all the bits that went with the best airline in Europe.
And of course a first class modern quasi military training establishment.
You write nonsense about the Trident flap/droop system ...how do you think other aircraft operate...one lever...with the last stage changing the leading edge devices configuration.
And of course you are forgetting fundamentals ...one reaches an acceleration altitude and then accelerates to climb speed progressively ...it was the unique BEA noise proceedure more than anything else that caused the crash as Cats eyes Cunningham said in his testimony..and as Davies writes in his book.
Next you will be writing that BEA were the first airline in the world to use autoland....and the good old slick Trident operation....you have obviously never followed one in in a DC9 or BAC 111.
Standard proceedure if we couldn't over take one in descent was reduce to minimum clean..
Step back and remember it is always very easy to blame dead men and forget that they were put into an impossible position by those that run a flawed system which is not adequately policed. NCTT.
I guess you probably appreciate that what happened to Glen Stewart..Brian Abrahams has a very accurate post on PPrune...with only a couple of bits missing....and where many of us could have ended up.
A very sobering read of how someone can be hung out to dry whilst trying to do the best for his passengers and employer.
Ps as to the numbers who left..6 copilots and 3 captains from BEA that I knew on the Trident and around 10 from BA to SR..most ex Tridents and most ex Hamble or Oxford..And not forgetting the half dozen or so of my course who went to Man/Bhm and highlands as soon as they could.....
Last edited by blind pew; 22nd Nov 2013 at 18:23.
A view from down the road - and monitored approaches
Hello ex-BEA and ex-BOAC folks,
Been catching up on the last year of this fascinating thread. I enjoyed most of my career with your theoretical competitor down at Gatwick (HMG's "second force", never permitted to operate flights out of Heathrow) - until you gobbled us up in 1988. Perhaps my outside perspective may be of some interest, and it's not intended to be offensive.
I was already a BUA cadet at AST Perth in 1966 when the first BEA/BOAC course started there, presumably due to Hamble being oversubscribed. As you cadets had all passed the same selection processes at Hamble, it astonishes me that there should subsequently have been tribalism between you on the basis of a random (?) posting to BEA or BOAC. Sounds rather like school. But I suppose that - unlike ours - your jobs were so guaranteed, and you had so much spare time on your hands, that you could afford the luxury?
FWIW, we all had to do our copliot apprenticeships in secondment to associate companies of BUA, so had to wait several years before going on jets like the 1-11 and VC10. The up-sides of that were that we got loads of handling practice early-on, and when we got our first jet we were in a two-pilot crew - meaning we were never on an F/E's panel or a sextant.
Although in my tiny associate company we had more than our share of old captains - including ex-WW2 and retired BEA/BOAC/BSAA(!) - there was a culture of captains giving leg-for-leg, where possible, that was observed by all but two or three of them. We had several captains whose CRM skills would not be tolerated today, and a few lousy handlers, but many great ones too.
When we later became jet copilots in Caledonian-BUA, and had had our black balls removed, we resumed leg-for-leg handling. Like a captain's leg, that meant being PF for the whole flight, including taxiing (except on our B707s, where we didn't have a tiller). AFAIK, monitored approaches were never trialled in BUA, Caledonian or BCAL.
There were one or two VC10 skippers whose handling was marginal on simulator checks, but the sim was not that representative in some respects. In the air on long-haul, the copilot was sometimes sidelined in the dialogue between the captain and F/E, but I don't think any of us was loath to speak up when necessary. One-Eleven cockpits were run as a two-man team, and I don't remember ever being left out of the loop, even if a few skippers were slightly non-standard. No airs and graces there.
Quote from Bergerie 1 (my emphasis):
"I understand the underlying philosophy behind the monitored approach and have no doubt it worked well. My point is that, in a way that is similar to the 'overuse' of automatics on modern aircraft today, where pilots have insufficient practice hand flying, the BEA handover of control for most of the flight allowed some captains on Tridents to be too easily 'carried' by their co-pilots."
So what happened on the copilot's leg in half-decent weather? Was there not a complete role-reversal?
At the time BA took over BCAL, we were just introducing the A320 into service. We handful of crews - nearly all ex-BCAL for the first year or so - were generally resistant to the imposition of monitored approaches; knowing little about them and mostly not keen to learn. Fortunately, our fleet management was committed to making the A320 fleet the best in BA, and apparently all fleets would have to conform to them as a BA standard. We soon knuckled down, particularly when we moved up to LHR permanently after a summer of LGW ops.
If the destination wx necessitated an autoland, the captain had to do the leg, but in other respects the leg-for-leg philosophy was retained. It's fairly unusual for two consecutive landings to be affected. Our handover of PF duties to the PNL usually took place not at TOC, but just before the PL (landing pilot) conducted his/her pre-descent briefing. If the PL became visual early on finals, (s)he could take over early - configuration changes and checklist permitting. If the wx was worse than Cat 1, the captain would handle the G/A or autoland, but otherwise role-reversal was complete. It all became second-nature.
Up at LHR we gradually became aware that not only were the B747 fleets not conforming to the standard, but neither was the recalcitrant B737. I wonder what the situation is today, but any suggestion that the monitored-approach philosophy in BA might allow below-average captains to be propped up by their copilots simply doesn't make sense today.
Been catching up on the last year of this fascinating thread. I enjoyed most of my career with your theoretical competitor down at Gatwick (HMG's "second force", never permitted to operate flights out of Heathrow) - until you gobbled us up in 1988. Perhaps my outside perspective may be of some interest, and it's not intended to be offensive.
I was already a BUA cadet at AST Perth in 1966 when the first BEA/BOAC course started there, presumably due to Hamble being oversubscribed. As you cadets had all passed the same selection processes at Hamble, it astonishes me that there should subsequently have been tribalism between you on the basis of a random (?) posting to BEA or BOAC. Sounds rather like school. But I suppose that - unlike ours - your jobs were so guaranteed, and you had so much spare time on your hands, that you could afford the luxury?
FWIW, we all had to do our copliot apprenticeships in secondment to associate companies of BUA, so had to wait several years before going on jets like the 1-11 and VC10. The up-sides of that were that we got loads of handling practice early-on, and when we got our first jet we were in a two-pilot crew - meaning we were never on an F/E's panel or a sextant.
Although in my tiny associate company we had more than our share of old captains - including ex-WW2 and retired BEA/BOAC/BSAA(!) - there was a culture of captains giving leg-for-leg, where possible, that was observed by all but two or three of them. We had several captains whose CRM skills would not be tolerated today, and a few lousy handlers, but many great ones too.
When we later became jet copilots in Caledonian-BUA, and had had our black balls removed, we resumed leg-for-leg handling. Like a captain's leg, that meant being PF for the whole flight, including taxiing (except on our B707s, where we didn't have a tiller). AFAIK, monitored approaches were never trialled in BUA, Caledonian or BCAL.
There were one or two VC10 skippers whose handling was marginal on simulator checks, but the sim was not that representative in some respects. In the air on long-haul, the copilot was sometimes sidelined in the dialogue between the captain and F/E, but I don't think any of us was loath to speak up when necessary. One-Eleven cockpits were run as a two-man team, and I don't remember ever being left out of the loop, even if a few skippers were slightly non-standard. No airs and graces there.
Quote from Bergerie 1 (my emphasis):
"I understand the underlying philosophy behind the monitored approach and have no doubt it worked well. My point is that, in a way that is similar to the 'overuse' of automatics on modern aircraft today, where pilots have insufficient practice hand flying, the BEA handover of control for most of the flight allowed some captains on Tridents to be too easily 'carried' by their co-pilots."
So what happened on the copilot's leg in half-decent weather? Was there not a complete role-reversal?
At the time BA took over BCAL, we were just introducing the A320 into service. We handful of crews - nearly all ex-BCAL for the first year or so - were generally resistant to the imposition of monitored approaches; knowing little about them and mostly not keen to learn. Fortunately, our fleet management was committed to making the A320 fleet the best in BA, and apparently all fleets would have to conform to them as a BA standard. We soon knuckled down, particularly when we moved up to LHR permanently after a summer of LGW ops.
If the destination wx necessitated an autoland, the captain had to do the leg, but in other respects the leg-for-leg philosophy was retained. It's fairly unusual for two consecutive landings to be affected. Our handover of PF duties to the PNL usually took place not at TOC, but just before the PL (landing pilot) conducted his/her pre-descent briefing. If the PL became visual early on finals, (s)he could take over early - configuration changes and checklist permitting. If the wx was worse than Cat 1, the captain would handle the G/A or autoland, but otherwise role-reversal was complete. It all became second-nature.
Up at LHR we gradually became aware that not only were the B747 fleets not conforming to the standard, but neither was the recalcitrant B737. I wonder what the situation is today, but any suggestion that the monitored-approach philosophy in BA might allow below-average captains to be propped up by their copilots simply doesn't make sense today.
Last edited by Chris Scott; 29th Nov 2013 at 08:28. Reason: "second force" added. 1967 corrected to 1966.