Re: book called "Disasters in the Air", by Jan Bartelski, formerly KLM. He has selected certain aviation accidents that are shrouded in some uncertainty. Given the blanks left by the lack of a CVR on PI, he finds the incident fertile ground.
The gist of his explanation lies in the idea that Key's airspeed indicator was reading high. This notion is used to explain Key's settings in the autopilot as well as the more serious question of selecting droops up at 162 knots. He also questions whether a P1 who is in the midst of a coronary event could have the stamina and strength to override the stick pusher three times, and reach back to finally disable the stick system, which he would be motivated to do if he truly believed that he had attained 225 knots (and nearing the 250 knots at which, Bartelski says, flying with droops lowered could damage these leading edge devices).
My immediate questions:
*Is it the P1 or the P2 who might have actually overridden the stick push? Key vs Keighley would weigh heavily in this question, given the issue of a possible coronary event. Bartelski's argument rests on the idea that Key was not incapacitated at this time, and was in the throes of an instrument error. OTOH, a few earlier posts would indicate that perhaps the P2 was expected to initiate the override, which one assumes Keighley was capable of doing.
*If Key's airspeed indicator was inaccurate, why would there be no indications of it on previous flights (unless it had just gone bad, of course)? Were PI's logs examined? If not, are they currently in storage somewhere?
*I understand that it was Ticehurst's function to monitor all phases of the flight during climbout, which would include (one would hope), discerning, and reacting to, early droop retraction. It is easy to be critical, but something was amiss here, though the confusion could have been overwhelming, especially if Key was actually incapacitated (which Bartelki disputes, based on stick push override). Any thoughts?
Bartelski does acknowledge the issue of CRM: Key may have initiated droop retraction, or given the order to do so, at a moment that was clearly inappropriate in the eyes of Keighley and Ticehurst, who may have been reluctant to countermand a P1 with a 'reputation'.