Scotbill,
I am sorry if I gave the impression of being tribal, that was not my intention. I understand the underlying philosophy behind the monitored approach and have no doubt it worked well. My point is that, in a way that is similar to the 'overuse' of automatics on modern aircraft today, where pilots have insufficient practice hand flying, the BEA handover of control for most of the flight allowed some captains on Tridents to be too easily 'carried' by their co-pilots. And if this was compounded by too much time on Shuttle backup the results were plain to see.
I also fully accept that the 'old style' training methods being used on the 747 fleet at that time needed to be much improved - and they were, but it took time. In addition, I query the wisdom of changing types when nearing the end of one's flying carreer. A number of the older BOAC pilots failed the Concorde course because the were unable to adapt. This is no reflection on any of these pilots as people. As Scotbill says 'pilots are much of a muchness wherever' they are.
More to the point, knowing Simon Ticehurst's parents as I did, it made me acutely aware of how many people well beyond those immediately involved are affected by any accident.
Finally, as always, accidents have multiple contributory causes - the Swiss cheese effect. I have little doubt that BEA's management processes were a major contributory factor and this was not fully explored in the inquiry afterwards.