You may be right - it was indeed a long time ago. What I do remember at base training was that the Trident could make an auto go around from that DH without the wheels touching the ground.
Shuttle back up might have created a problem but loss of handling skills cannot be blamed on the monitored approach as roles were reversed with P2 handling. Bear in mind that those transferring to long haul were all of the Hamble/Oxford generation.
In BEA the general expectation on command conversion for a pilot of reasonable track record was that he would pass. Thus the early part of the course was devoted to teaching and that support gradually reduced to the dumb FO role.
One of my Senior Training Managers enunciated a simple philosophy:
a) If anyone has trouble the first step is to change the Training Captain
b) There is no point in telling an experienced pilot he has done something wrong unless you can tell him
why he got it wrong and, more importantly, what he can do to make it better.
(Ace pilots do not necessarily make good trainers because they may not even understand the problem).
By contrast, a 747 "trainer" said in the bar to one of my colleagues, "I would not presume to tell another pilot how to fly!" and another was reported as having said to a command conversion on his first line sector LHR - Anchorage, "You're a captain, get on with it."
We had incompetent trainers in BEA too - completely bereft of that ability to diagnose another pilot's problem which to me is a fundamental requirement in a trainer.
I have never believed that there is any point in having a court of enquiry into an accident. The truth is likely to be the first casualty as lawyers attempt to cover their respective clients' asses.