Practicing manual flying in jet transport ops.
Folks,
If you need to consult the QRH to handle an overspeed, might I suggest you should not be on the flight deck.
At the risk of stating the bleeding obvious, going a bit fast has nothing like the hazard of going "too slow".
Upsets happen at low speed, not high speed. We have come a long way since B707 days, "mach tuck" is no longer a big issue.
Tootle pip!!
If you need to consult the QRH to handle an overspeed, might I suggest you should not be on the flight deck.
At the risk of stating the bleeding obvious, going a bit fast has nothing like the hazard of going "too slow".
Upsets happen at low speed, not high speed. We have come a long way since B707 days, "mach tuck" is no longer a big issue.
Tootle pip!!
Thread Starter
"mach tuck" is no longer a big issue.
If you need to consult the QRH to handle an overspeed, might I suggest you should not be on the flight deck.
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I've never failed a check flight or simulator session for the following.
FMC scratchpad message: "MORE DRAG REQUIRED"
Common sense tells me to fly the aircraft where I want it to be flown & correct the flight path, speed or configuration. Maybe even ask for a speed waiver.
If I do that, the message will disappear.
However my QRH CHECKLIST INTRODUCTION chapter or company procedure indicates I should be calling for the "FMC MESSAGE NON NORMAL CHECKLIST".
Same logic applies to a overspeed, fly the aircraft first.
MC
FMC scratchpad message: "MORE DRAG REQUIRED"
Common sense tells me to fly the aircraft where I want it to be flown & correct the flight path, speed or configuration. Maybe even ask for a speed waiver.
If I do that, the message will disappear.
However my QRH CHECKLIST INTRODUCTION chapter or company procedure indicates I should be calling for the "FMC MESSAGE NON NORMAL CHECKLIST".
Same logic applies to a overspeed, fly the aircraft first.
MC
Folks,
Firstly, let me say that I have only flown Boeing large aircraft, not Airbus, and only worked for airlines that expected the pilot in command to be the pilot in command, and a pilot.
However, I doubt that Airbus says much different to Boeing. ie: Read the fine print for the "let out" statements empowering the PIC.
Every manual/QRH of every Boeing that I have ever used is very clear, the pilot in command is not limited, in carrying out action that he or she deems appropriate, by any statement that this is limited to those items that have recall items, and is limited to those recall items only, or, for that matter, limited to only procedures in the QRH.
I repeat, if a pilot cannot arrest an overspeed (or underspeed), having determined the reason, without reference to a QRH. should not be on the flight deck and certainly not be the PIC.
Any management that produces purported policies that seek to limit the authority of the pilot in command, particularly if they are contrary to the AFM, and as described by some of you, is not fit to be in an executive management position in an airline.
Some years ago, twice, Qantas had A330 suffer sever altitude excursions (with cabin crew/passenger injuries), the proper immediate actions were to disconnect the AP and regain control of the aircraft.
There was criticism, at the time, of the PIC's actions, the usual armchair pundits and Monday morning were critical of the crews not "using the QRH".
Is anybody here seriously suggesting that the crews, in such circumstance, should leave the AP/AT engaged while the aeroplane is horsing around all over the sky, while they dig out the QRH, to see what it says???
Needless to say, in each case, the pilots were confident in their abilities to hand fly the aeroplane anywhere in its flight envelope ---- that only comes from practice hand flying at all altitudes.
In another example, speaking of personal experience, a pilot mishandles reverse in gusty crosswinds, resulting in a stall and rapidly rising EGT ---- what are you going to do?? Let the engine cook. while you slow down enough to even think of digging out the QRH, which does not have a recall item, but does have a procedure that leads to shutting the engine down?? Or just shut the engine down ?? Having done the latter, I limited the EGT overtemp. to nothing more than an inspection on next base maintenance visit. To have "followed the procedure" would have resulted in an engine change.
Also speaking of personal experience of engine failures, I have always opted to disconnect the AP/AT early in an asymmetric approach, to make certain all the trims are where I want them and I am physically "plugged in", in both cases an engine out AP Autoland was not an option (one was the IGS at Kai Tak ). Not a good time to find out your personal flying skills are not up to date.
Things like this might only happen once (or never) in a career, but if they do, it is a very poor show if the PIC is found wanting for skills adequate for the situation.
Tootle pip!!
Firstly, let me say that I have only flown Boeing large aircraft, not Airbus, and only worked for airlines that expected the pilot in command to be the pilot in command, and a pilot.
However, I doubt that Airbus says much different to Boeing. ie: Read the fine print for the "let out" statements empowering the PIC.
Every manual/QRH of every Boeing that I have ever used is very clear, the pilot in command is not limited, in carrying out action that he or she deems appropriate, by any statement that this is limited to those items that have recall items, and is limited to those recall items only, or, for that matter, limited to only procedures in the QRH.
I repeat, if a pilot cannot arrest an overspeed (or underspeed), having determined the reason, without reference to a QRH. should not be on the flight deck and certainly not be the PIC.
Any management that produces purported policies that seek to limit the authority of the pilot in command, particularly if they are contrary to the AFM, and as described by some of you, is not fit to be in an executive management position in an airline.
Some years ago, twice, Qantas had A330 suffer sever altitude excursions (with cabin crew/passenger injuries), the proper immediate actions were to disconnect the AP and regain control of the aircraft.
There was criticism, at the time, of the PIC's actions, the usual armchair pundits and Monday morning were critical of the crews not "using the QRH".
Is anybody here seriously suggesting that the crews, in such circumstance, should leave the AP/AT engaged while the aeroplane is horsing around all over the sky, while they dig out the QRH, to see what it says???
Needless to say, in each case, the pilots were confident in their abilities to hand fly the aeroplane anywhere in its flight envelope ---- that only comes from practice hand flying at all altitudes.
In another example, speaking of personal experience, a pilot mishandles reverse in gusty crosswinds, resulting in a stall and rapidly rising EGT ---- what are you going to do?? Let the engine cook. while you slow down enough to even think of digging out the QRH, which does not have a recall item, but does have a procedure that leads to shutting the engine down?? Or just shut the engine down ?? Having done the latter, I limited the EGT overtemp. to nothing more than an inspection on next base maintenance visit. To have "followed the procedure" would have resulted in an engine change.
Also speaking of personal experience of engine failures, I have always opted to disconnect the AP/AT early in an asymmetric approach, to make certain all the trims are where I want them and I am physically "plugged in", in both cases an engine out AP Autoland was not an option (one was the IGS at Kai Tak ). Not a good time to find out your personal flying skills are not up to date.
Things like this might only happen once (or never) in a career, but if they do, it is a very poor show if the PIC is found wanting for skills adequate for the situation.
Tootle pip!!
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Agree with you whole heartedly Leadie, but
Spare a thought for GA operators, who lack the legal department or funds, who are obliged to set in cement in their ops manuals that the PIC has no perogative to do anything but blindly follow the QRH.
To disagree with the FOI's opinion results in the "Not fit and proper person" threat being marched out, or your manual not approved so your CEO is left with a few Million bucks worth of machinery he cant use.
How much of this is being pushed by our "Safety" regulator??
Spare a thought for GA operators, who lack the legal department or funds, who are obliged to set in cement in their ops manuals that the PIC has no perogative to do anything but blindly follow the QRH.
To disagree with the FOI's opinion results in the "Not fit and proper person" threat being marched out, or your manual not approved so your CEO is left with a few Million bucks worth of machinery he cant use.
How much of this is being pushed by our "Safety" regulator??
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FCOM is "for guidance only"...
Our friends at CASA have made an art form of insisting that the guidance is indeed cast in stone! 
Otherwise, they would have to search for some intellect and some understanding of what "not unreasonable" actually means... best of luck on that!
Otherwise, they would have to search for some intellect and some understanding of what "not unreasonable" actually means... best of luck on that!
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Are we missing the point?
Surely that is to follow the correct procedures, whether from memory or by reference.
The only exception being in rare circumstances where published procedures do not cover the situation.
Surely that is to follow the correct procedures, whether from memory or by reference.
The only exception being in rare circumstances where published procedures do not cover the situation.
My understanding is that the Boeing preamble of this:
is in relation to this:
Such as the 777 pilot facing a simultaneous overspeed/underspeed which Boeing said could never happen.
Leadie your A330 scenarios pre-date the QRH procedure now specified for an overspeed. One of the A330 altitude excursions was to do with flight control software problems and not a simple overspeed. So like your EGT overtemp experience a unique circumstance and one where PIC experience and judgement is required, I am not disagreeing with you on that point. All manufacturers and operators expect you to follow the published procedures in the first instance. Airbus state that with an overspeed your first action is extend the speedbrakes to full. If you're going to start disconnecting the A/P and A/T and cock it up then you really have no where to go in defending your actions. Merely stating that "I was the PIC and felt that I could handle the situation in a manner different to that specified by the manufacturer." leaves the CP shaking his head muttering "Another test pilot wannabe."
Every manual/QRH of every Boeing that I have ever used is very clear, the pilot in command is not limited, in carrying out action that he or she deems appropriate,
The only exception being in rare circumstances where published procedures do not cover the situation.
Leadie your A330 scenarios pre-date the QRH procedure now specified for an overspeed. One of the A330 altitude excursions was to do with flight control software problems and not a simple overspeed. So like your EGT overtemp experience a unique circumstance and one where PIC experience and judgement is required, I am not disagreeing with you on that point. All manufacturers and operators expect you to follow the published procedures in the first instance. Airbus state that with an overspeed your first action is extend the speedbrakes to full. If you're going to start disconnecting the A/P and A/T and cock it up then you really have no where to go in defending your actions. Merely stating that "I was the PIC and felt that I could handle the situation in a manner different to that specified by the manufacturer." leaves the CP shaking his head muttering "Another test pilot wannabe."
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Leadsled, relax.
The overspeed checklist I refer to in the Boeing 737NG QRH is a memory checklist. It specifically says to correct an overspeed by adjusting thrust, and if necessary attitude. It does not say to use speedbrake.
If I subsequently use speedbrake to arrest an overspeed when I could have just used thrust/attitude, and the resulting turbulent airflow causes damage the the elevator trim tab, I may have to explain why I acted contrary to the FCOM. (The early Boeing 737NG had issues with high speed speedbrake use on the elevator trim tab which needed an AD to address.)
The "out" which is referred to in a post above is available if the PIC believes that following the FCOM will result in a reduced safety outcome, or if the PIC believes that an alternative course of action will result in an increased safety outcome.
Sound knowledge of the FCOM and the experience of when to follow it or not is what determines who should be on the flight deck. It's not just WWII stick and rudder skills anymore. But yes, you do need to know how and when it is appropriate to hand fly the aircraft, and practice same when conditions are appropriate.
The overspeed checklist I refer to in the Boeing 737NG QRH is a memory checklist. It specifically says to correct an overspeed by adjusting thrust, and if necessary attitude. It does not say to use speedbrake.
If I subsequently use speedbrake to arrest an overspeed when I could have just used thrust/attitude, and the resulting turbulent airflow causes damage the the elevator trim tab, I may have to explain why I acted contrary to the FCOM. (The early Boeing 737NG had issues with high speed speedbrake use on the elevator trim tab which needed an AD to address.)
The "out" which is referred to in a post above is available if the PIC believes that following the FCOM will result in a reduced safety outcome, or if the PIC believes that an alternative course of action will result in an increased safety outcome.
Sound knowledge of the FCOM and the experience of when to follow it or not is what determines who should be on the flight deck. It's not just WWII stick and rudder skills anymore. But yes, you do need to know how and when it is appropriate to hand fly the aircraft, and practice same when conditions are appropriate.
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Leadie,
I recall a B767 in Thailand I believe had a thrust reverser deploy on climb.
The impossible happened, the engine maintained climb thrust, by the time the crew woke up to exactly what had happened the aircraft was on its back heading down.
We tried to reproduce the event in a simulator, had to dodgy up the software to get it to do it, but in all instances where the crew took immediate manual control the situation was recoverable, those that remained on auto pilot crashed.
I do believe with the best will in the world you can't write procedures to cover every event that may happen. At the end of the day it must come down to a judgement call by the PIC. If thats to be taken away, then automate the whole thing and do away with pilots altogether.
I recall a B767 in Thailand I believe had a thrust reverser deploy on climb.
The impossible happened, the engine maintained climb thrust, by the time the crew woke up to exactly what had happened the aircraft was on its back heading down.
We tried to reproduce the event in a simulator, had to dodgy up the software to get it to do it, but in all instances where the crew took immediate manual control the situation was recoverable, those that remained on auto pilot crashed.
I do believe with the best will in the world you can't write procedures to cover every event that may happen. At the end of the day it must come down to a judgement call by the PIC. If thats to be taken away, then automate the whole thing and do away with pilots altogether.
Leadsled,
The post further back was to do with the mishandling of an overspeed by the crew on an A320.
As posted - the QRH actions for an AIRBUS for overspeed CLEARLY state
AP:KEEP ON
SPEED BRAKES LEVER .... FULL
THRUST REDUCTION .... MONITOR
Whilst not officially a memory item - it essentially is- because you don't have time to consult the qrh when encountering an overspeed.
The Jetstar crew handled this extremely poorly, of which I can only assume it is due to a lack of training in the sim of overspeed events.
There is no place for handling a big jet at 41000 ft manually. Humans just can't do it as well as an autopilot to handle the reduced longitudinal stability at high altitude.
The post further back was to do with the mishandling of an overspeed by the crew on an A320.
As posted - the QRH actions for an AIRBUS for overspeed CLEARLY state
AP:KEEP ON
SPEED BRAKES LEVER .... FULL
THRUST REDUCTION .... MONITOR
Whilst not officially a memory item - it essentially is- because you don't have time to consult the qrh when encountering an overspeed.
The Jetstar crew handled this extremely poorly, of which I can only assume it is due to a lack of training in the sim of overspeed events.
There is no place for handling a big jet at 41000 ft manually. Humans just can't do it as well as an autopilot to handle the reduced longitudinal stability at high altitude.
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The overspeed checklist I refer to in the Boeing 737NG QRH is a memory checklist. It specifically says to correct an overspeed by adjusting thrust, and if necessary attitude. It does not say to use speedbrake.
The industry is quite dynamic & constantly changing, so it is often wise not to be too dogmatic about some issues.
I also agree with LeadSled. A pilot who knows how to actually fly, rather than just manage, would know what to do in order to slow the aircraft down safely & should not have to refer to the printed word.
I recall a B767 in Thailand I believe had a thrust reverser deploy on climb.
As a matter of interest, a good mate of mine was the Captain of that Lauda flight into Bangkok, a problem with the thrust reverser was evident on that previous flight, and logged. It manifested itself as non-normal rudder trim inputs on climb. As a captain on functionally identical B767 at the time, my interest was more than casual. I agree entirely that the situation was recoverable by disconnecting the AP/AT, and hand flying, we tried just about every possible combination in the sim.
is in relation to this:
Not so, it was a general statement, not quite Mr. Boeing's exact words.
Such as the 777 pilot facing a simultaneous overspeed/underspeed which Boeing said could never happen.
Indeed, although not quite in these words: "If it can happen, it will", there is a statement in the Boeing aircraft I have flown, that tells the crew that Boeing do not claim to cover all possible eventualities, in (hopefully) rare cases, a properly trained and experienced crew will have to make it up as they go along.
Re. the two A330 incidents (accidents??) I mentioned, I am well aware of the details, and the eventual cause determined, the (Northrop??) ADCs were fitted to a variety of aircraft.
I find the difference between the Boeing and Airbus checklists interesting re. use of speedbrake. It always seems to me that Airbus logic in this area is a little strange. A bit like putting a foot on the brake, without taking your foot off the accelerator on a car.
Boeing has long cautioned the use of speedbrake, going back to the B707, the turbulent wake caused cumulative damage to the horizontal stab. Later model Boeing aircraft I have flown suppress inboard spoilers to limit turbulent air over the horizontal stabs.
I recall some of the logic in the A-310, where such as a flap overspeed with AP/AT engaged was "controlled" with an auto-trim pitch up, instead of a power reduction. This was in part the reason for the loss of an A-310 at Nagoya, and a spectacular loss of control over Paris, only a very smart pilot, handflying, recovered control. REcovery on AP was not possible.
Both accident reports are well worth reading, particularly those of you who doubt the value of keeping your hand flying skills 100% up to scratch.
Remember, it is modern "glass" aircraft that gave rise to significant additions to flightdeck vocabulary, being: "I haven't seen that one before" and " What's the bastard doing to us now". And: "Now I can't fly for sh1t, but I can type 100wpm". Make certain you can still fly.
As Asiana didn't realise, mode confusion can be a really seriously dangerous problem, hardly a new discovery. The guaranteed solution, in flight is: "Eliminate the suspect mode(s)" --- which will often mean hand flying.
Tootle pip!!
Useful debate, good reading. Learning lots.
I find it interesting that in the past 12 months we have seen several events unfold as the result of inappropriate use of automation.
The obvious one being Asiana.
But the 744 and the 737 that landed at the wrong airports in the US could also be considered the result of inappropriate use of automation, albeit under reliance versus over reliance. Both events could well have had fatal outcomes and both were probably the result of completely ignoring the assistance that onboard systems were providing. Indeed the 744 was conducting a GPS approach at the time and the crew must have completely botched some crossing heights to arrive at the pavement several miles short of where the ND was telling them where to go.
Just goes to show that although Southwest pilots hand fly more than most others (encouraged to and MANY sectors flown) it still doesn’t mean we get a good result every time.
I find it interesting that in the past 12 months we have seen several events unfold as the result of inappropriate use of automation.
The obvious one being Asiana.
But the 744 and the 737 that landed at the wrong airports in the US could also be considered the result of inappropriate use of automation, albeit under reliance versus over reliance. Both events could well have had fatal outcomes and both were probably the result of completely ignoring the assistance that onboard systems were providing. Indeed the 744 was conducting a GPS approach at the time and the crew must have completely botched some crossing heights to arrive at the pavement several miles short of where the ND was telling them where to go.
Just goes to show that although Southwest pilots hand fly more than most others (encouraged to and MANY sectors flown) it still doesn’t mean we get a good result every time.
I would take a small bet that there is no statement in a B777 manual that could be reasonably interpreted as meaning the above.
The unreliable airspeed procedures supplied in the nonnormal section of the QRH have been expanded significantly for the 747-400, 757, and 767 and will eventually be expanded for other current-production models. The procedures contain a reference to indications, which can be individual discrete indications or engine indication and crew alerting system (EICAS) messages that basically point out the evidence of unreliable airspeed/Mach. Other examples of this evidence are provided in the QRH, such as
Speed or altitude information not consistent with pitch attitude and thrust setting.
Airspeed/Mach failure flags.
Blank or fluctuating airspeed displays.
Variation between captain and first officer airspeed displays.
Amber line through one or more PFD or ADI flight mode annunciations.
Overspeed indications.
Simultaneous overspeed and stall warnings.
The 777 system is a complex design that addresses these malfunctions. With only one bad source or failure, the system automatically switches away from that source, and the crew will not notice any difference.
Speed or altitude information not consistent with pitch attitude and thrust setting.
Airspeed/Mach failure flags.
Blank or fluctuating airspeed displays.
Variation between captain and first officer airspeed displays.
Amber line through one or more PFD or ADI flight mode annunciations.
Overspeed indications.
Simultaneous overspeed and stall warnings.
The 777 system is a complex design that addresses these malfunctions. With only one bad source or failure, the system automatically switches away from that source, and the crew will not notice any difference.
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Just to clear something up with the Lauda Air accident, this is one of the findings from the accident report
Boeing had never modelled a thrust reverser deployment at high speed and it was only after extrapolating from low speed testing that any model was input into the simulators. Only by using extreme control inputs within a 4-6 second window could the situation be recovered by Boeing test pilots.
I seem to remember that Nikki Lauda had to put a lot of pressure on Boeing to admit that it was a design fault in the reverser system and not pilot error.
Simulations of a 25 percent lift loss resulting from an in-flight deployment of the left engine thrust reverser indicated that recovery from the event was uncontrollable for an unexpecting flight crew.
I seem to remember that Nikki Lauda had to put a lot of pressure on Boeing to admit that it was a design fault in the reverser system and not pilot error.
Only by using extreme control inputs within a 4-6 second window could the situation be recovered.
All procedures for deployment of reverse in flight have the same starting point, thrust to idle, then shut down the offending engine, having confirmed it is the correct engine to shut down
Where asymmetric thrust is an immediate problem, get rid of the asymmetry.
I am not, for one moment, suggesting pilot error was the cause of the accident, but it was recoverable, and there was at least some advanced warning of a reverser problem.
At least some B767 simulators, at the time, had a model for reverse thrust in flight, but I have no idea of the parameters.
Tootle pip!!