Folks,
Firstly, let me say that I have only flown Boeing large aircraft, not Airbus, and only worked for airlines that expected the pilot in command to be the pilot in command, and a pilot.
However, I doubt that Airbus says much different to Boeing. ie: Read the fine print for the "let out" statements empowering the PIC.
Every manual/QRH of every Boeing that I have ever used is very clear, the pilot in command is not limited, in carrying out action that he or she deems appropriate, by any statement that this is limited to those items that have recall items, and is limited to those recall items only, or, for that matter, limited to only procedures in the QRH.
I repeat, if a pilot cannot arrest an overspeed (or underspeed), having determined the reason, without reference to a QRH. should not be on the flight deck and certainly not be the PIC.
Any management that produces purported policies that seek to limit the authority of the pilot in command, particularly if they are contrary to the AFM, and as described by some of you, is not fit to be in an executive management position in an airline.
Some years ago, twice, Qantas had A330 suffer sever altitude excursions (with cabin crew/passenger injuries), the proper immediate actions were to disconnect the AP and regain control of the aircraft.
There was criticism, at the time, of the PIC's actions, the usual armchair pundits and Monday morning were critical of the crews not "using the QRH".
Is anybody here seriously suggesting that the crews, in such circumstance, should leave the AP/AT engaged while the aeroplane is horsing around all over the sky, while they dig out the QRH, to see what it says???
Needless to say, in each case, the pilots were confident in their abilities to hand fly the aeroplane anywhere in its flight envelope ---- that only comes from practice hand flying at all altitudes.
In another example, speaking of personal experience, a pilot mishandles reverse in gusty crosswinds, resulting in a stall and rapidly rising EGT ---- what are you going to do?? Let the engine cook. while you slow down enough to even think of digging out the QRH, which does not have a recall item, but does have a procedure that leads to shutting the engine down?? Or just shut the engine down ?? Having done the latter, I limited the EGT overtemp. to nothing more than an inspection on next base maintenance visit. To have "followed the procedure" would have resulted in an engine change.
Also speaking of personal experience of engine failures, I have always opted to disconnect the AP/AT early in an asymmetric approach, to make certain all the trims are where I want them and I am physically "plugged in", in both cases an engine out AP Autoland was not an option (one was the IGS at Kai Tak ). Not a good time to find out your personal flying skills are not up to date.
Things like this might only happen once (or never) in a career, but if they do, it is a very poor show if the PIC is found wanting for skills adequate for the situation.
Tootle pip!!