Practicing manual flying in jet transport ops.
I don't recall working with anyone (16 years of multi-crew ops) that has less ability yet he's so quick to remind me that he's got "1500 hours on type". Offer any advice and he runs to management complaining about the 'bastard captain' which I most definitely am not.
If the passengers can tell the difference between the A/P and hand flying, that is a measure of how somebody's hand flying skills have deteriorated or were not good enough in the first place.
Tootle pip!!
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A must read!
Got this from the guy himself. I was introduced to him in SIN a few days ago. He is a Boeing instructor now on their 787 sim in SIN.
Cheers
HR
"After I retired from UAL as a Standards Captain on the 400, I got a job as a simulator instructor working for Alteon (a Boeing subsidiary) at Asiana. When I first got there, I was shocked and surprised by the lack of basic piloting skills shown by most of the pilots. It is not a normal situation with normal progression from new hire, right seat, left seat taking a decade or two. One big difference is that ex-Military pilots are given super-seniority and progress to the left seat much faster. Compared to the US, they also upgrade fairly rapidly because of the phenomenal growth by all Asian air carriers. By the way, after about six months at Asiana, I was moved over to KAL and found them to be identical. The only difference was the color of the uniforms and airplanes. I worked in Korea for 5 long years and although I found most of the people to be very pleasant, its a minefield of a work environment ... for them and for us expats.
One of the first things I learned was that the pilots kept a web-site and reported on every training session. I don't think this was officially sanctioned by the company, but after one or two simulator periods, a database was building on me (and everyone else) that told them exactly how I ran the sessions, what to expect on checks, and what to look out for. For example; I used to open an aft cargo door at 100 knots to get them to initiate an RTO and I would brief them on it during the briefing. This was on the B-737 NG and many of the captains were coming off the 777 or B744 and they were used to the Master Caution System being inhibited at 80 kts. Well, for the first few days after I started that, EVERYONE rejected the takeoff. Then, all of a sudden they all got it and continued the takeoff (in accordance with their manuals). The word had gotten out. I figured it was an overall PLUS for the training program.
We expat instructors were forced upon them after the amount of fatal accidents (most of the them totally avoidable) over a decade began to be noticed by the outside world. They were basically given an ultimatum by the FAA, Transport Canada, and the EU to totally rebuild and rethink their training program or face being banned from the skies all over the world. They hired Boeing and Airbus to staff the training centers. KAL has one center and Asiana has another. When I was there (2003-2008) we had about 60 expats conducting training KAL and about 40 at Asiana. Most instructors were from the USA, Canada, Australia, or New Zealand with a few stuffed in from Europe and Asia. Boeing also operated training centers in Singapore and China so they did hire some instructors from there.
This solution has only been partially successful but still faces ingrained resistance from the Koreans. I lost track of the number of highly qualified instructors I worked with who were fired because they tried to enforce normal standards of performance. By normal standards, I would include being able to master basic tasks like successfully shoot a visual approach with 10 kt crosswind and the weather CAVOK. I am not kidding when I tell you that requiring them to shoot a visual approach struck fear in their hearts ... with good reason. Like this Asiana crew, it didnt compute that you needed to be a 1000 AGL at 3 miles and your sink rate should be 600-800 Ft/Min. But, after 5 years, they finally nailed me. I still had to sign my name to their training and sometimes if I just couldnt pass someone on a check, I had no choice but to fail them. I usually busted about 3-5 crews a year and the resistance against me built. I finally failed an extremely incompetent crew and it turned out he was the a high-ranking captain who was the Chief Line Check pilot on the fleet I was teaching on. I found out on my next monthly trip home that KAL was not going to renew my Visa. The crew I failed was given another check and continued to fly while talking about how unfair Captain "Brown" was.
Any of you Boeing glass-cockpit guys will know what I mean when I describe these events. I gave them a VOR approach with an 15 mile arc from the IAF. By the way, KAL dictated the profiles for all sessions and we just administered them. He requested two turns in holding at the IAF to get set up for the approach. When he finally got his nerve up, he requested Radar Vectors to final. He could have just said he was ready for the approach and I would have cleared him to the IAF and then Cleared for the approach and he could have selected Exit Hold and been on his way. He was already in LNAV/VNAV PATH. So, I gave him vectors to final with a 30 degree intercept. Of course, he failed to Extend the FAF and he couldnt understand why it would not intercept the LNAV magenta line when he punched LNAV and VNAV. He made three approaches and missed approaches before he figured out that his active waypoint was Hold at XYZ. Every time he punched LNAV, it would try to go back to the IAF ... just like it was supposed to do. Since it was a check, I was not allowed (by their own rules) to offer him any help. That was just one of about half dozen major errors I documented in his UNSAT paperwork. He also failed to put in ANY aileron on takeoff with a 30-knot direct crosswind (again, the weather was dictated by KAL).
This Asiana SFO accident makes me sick and while I am surprised there are not more, I expect that there will be many more of the same type accidents in the future unless some drastic steps are taken. They are already required to hire a certain percentage of expats to try to ingrain more flying expertise in them, but more likely, they will eventually be fired too. One of the best trainees I ever had was a Korean/American (he grew up and went to school in the USA) who flew C-141s in the USAF. When he got out, he moved back to Korea and got hired by KAL. I met him when I gave him some training and a check on the B-737 and of course, he breezed through the training. I give him annual PCs for a few years and he was always a good pilot. Then, he got involved with trying to start a pilots union and when they tired to enforce some sort of duty rigs on international flights, he was fired after being arrested and JAILED!
The Koreans are very very bright and smart so I was puzzled by their inability to fly an airplane well. They would show up on Day 1 of training (an hour before the scheduled briefing time, in a 3-piece suit, and shined shoes) with the entire contents of the FCOM and Flight Manual totally memorized. But, putting that information to actual use was many times impossible. Crosswind landings are also an unsolvable puzzle for most of them. I never did figure it out completely, but I think I did uncover a few clues. Here is my best guess. First off, their educational system emphasizes ROTE memorization from the first day of school as little kids. As you know, that is the lowest form of learning and they act like robots. They are also taught to NEVER challenge authority and in spite of the flight training heavily emphasizing CRM/CLR, it still exists either on the surface or very subtly. You just cant change 3000 years of culture.
The other thing that I think plays an important role is the fact that there is virtually NO civil aircraft flying in Korea. Its actually illegal to own a Cessna-152 and just go learn to fly. Ultra-lights and Powered Hang Gliders are Ok. I guess they dont trust the people to not start WWIII by flying 35 miles north of Inchon into North Korea. But, they dont get the kids who grew up flying (and thinking for themselves) and hanging around airports. They do recruit some kids from college and send then to the US or Australia and get them their tickets. Generally, I had better experience with them than with the ex-Military pilots. This was a surprise to me as I spent years as a Naval Aviator flying fighters after getting my private in light airplanes. I would get experienced F-4, F-5, F-15, and F-16 pilots who were actually terrible pilots if they had to hand fly the airplane. What a shock!
Finally, I'll get off my box and talk about the total flight hours they claim. I do accept that there are a few talented and free-thinking pilots that I met and trained in Korea. Some are still in contact and I consider them friends. They were a joy! But, they were few and far between and certainly not the norm.
Actually, this is a worldwide problem involving automation and the auto-flight concept. Take one of these new first officers that got his ratings in the US or Australia and came to KAL or Asiana with 225 flight hours. After takeoff, in accordance with their SOP, he calls for the autopilot to be engaged at 250 after takeoff. How much actual flight time is that? Hardly one minute. Then he might fly for hours on the autopilot and finally disengage it (MAYBE?) below 800 after the gear was down, flaps extended and on airspeed (autothrottle). Then he might bring it in to land. Again, how much real flight time or real experience did he get. Minutes! Of course, on the 777 or 747, its the same only they get more inflated logbooks.
So, when I hear that a 10,000 hour Korean captain was vectored in for a 17-mile final and cleared for a visual approach in CAVOK weather, it raises the hair on the back of my neck."
(signed)
Cheers
HR
"After I retired from UAL as a Standards Captain on the 400, I got a job as a simulator instructor working for Alteon (a Boeing subsidiary) at Asiana. When I first got there, I was shocked and surprised by the lack of basic piloting skills shown by most of the pilots. It is not a normal situation with normal progression from new hire, right seat, left seat taking a decade or two. One big difference is that ex-Military pilots are given super-seniority and progress to the left seat much faster. Compared to the US, they also upgrade fairly rapidly because of the phenomenal growth by all Asian air carriers. By the way, after about six months at Asiana, I was moved over to KAL and found them to be identical. The only difference was the color of the uniforms and airplanes. I worked in Korea for 5 long years and although I found most of the people to be very pleasant, its a minefield of a work environment ... for them and for us expats.
One of the first things I learned was that the pilots kept a web-site and reported on every training session. I don't think this was officially sanctioned by the company, but after one or two simulator periods, a database was building on me (and everyone else) that told them exactly how I ran the sessions, what to expect on checks, and what to look out for. For example; I used to open an aft cargo door at 100 knots to get them to initiate an RTO and I would brief them on it during the briefing. This was on the B-737 NG and many of the captains were coming off the 777 or B744 and they were used to the Master Caution System being inhibited at 80 kts. Well, for the first few days after I started that, EVERYONE rejected the takeoff. Then, all of a sudden they all got it and continued the takeoff (in accordance with their manuals). The word had gotten out. I figured it was an overall PLUS for the training program.
We expat instructors were forced upon them after the amount of fatal accidents (most of the them totally avoidable) over a decade began to be noticed by the outside world. They were basically given an ultimatum by the FAA, Transport Canada, and the EU to totally rebuild and rethink their training program or face being banned from the skies all over the world. They hired Boeing and Airbus to staff the training centers. KAL has one center and Asiana has another. When I was there (2003-2008) we had about 60 expats conducting training KAL and about 40 at Asiana. Most instructors were from the USA, Canada, Australia, or New Zealand with a few stuffed in from Europe and Asia. Boeing also operated training centers in Singapore and China so they did hire some instructors from there.
This solution has only been partially successful but still faces ingrained resistance from the Koreans. I lost track of the number of highly qualified instructors I worked with who were fired because they tried to enforce normal standards of performance. By normal standards, I would include being able to master basic tasks like successfully shoot a visual approach with 10 kt crosswind and the weather CAVOK. I am not kidding when I tell you that requiring them to shoot a visual approach struck fear in their hearts ... with good reason. Like this Asiana crew, it didnt compute that you needed to be a 1000 AGL at 3 miles and your sink rate should be 600-800 Ft/Min. But, after 5 years, they finally nailed me. I still had to sign my name to their training and sometimes if I just couldnt pass someone on a check, I had no choice but to fail them. I usually busted about 3-5 crews a year and the resistance against me built. I finally failed an extremely incompetent crew and it turned out he was the a high-ranking captain who was the Chief Line Check pilot on the fleet I was teaching on. I found out on my next monthly trip home that KAL was not going to renew my Visa. The crew I failed was given another check and continued to fly while talking about how unfair Captain "Brown" was.
Any of you Boeing glass-cockpit guys will know what I mean when I describe these events. I gave them a VOR approach with an 15 mile arc from the IAF. By the way, KAL dictated the profiles for all sessions and we just administered them. He requested two turns in holding at the IAF to get set up for the approach. When he finally got his nerve up, he requested Radar Vectors to final. He could have just said he was ready for the approach and I would have cleared him to the IAF and then Cleared for the approach and he could have selected Exit Hold and been on his way. He was already in LNAV/VNAV PATH. So, I gave him vectors to final with a 30 degree intercept. Of course, he failed to Extend the FAF and he couldnt understand why it would not intercept the LNAV magenta line when he punched LNAV and VNAV. He made three approaches and missed approaches before he figured out that his active waypoint was Hold at XYZ. Every time he punched LNAV, it would try to go back to the IAF ... just like it was supposed to do. Since it was a check, I was not allowed (by their own rules) to offer him any help. That was just one of about half dozen major errors I documented in his UNSAT paperwork. He also failed to put in ANY aileron on takeoff with a 30-knot direct crosswind (again, the weather was dictated by KAL).
This Asiana SFO accident makes me sick and while I am surprised there are not more, I expect that there will be many more of the same type accidents in the future unless some drastic steps are taken. They are already required to hire a certain percentage of expats to try to ingrain more flying expertise in them, but more likely, they will eventually be fired too. One of the best trainees I ever had was a Korean/American (he grew up and went to school in the USA) who flew C-141s in the USAF. When he got out, he moved back to Korea and got hired by KAL. I met him when I gave him some training and a check on the B-737 and of course, he breezed through the training. I give him annual PCs for a few years and he was always a good pilot. Then, he got involved with trying to start a pilots union and when they tired to enforce some sort of duty rigs on international flights, he was fired after being arrested and JAILED!
The Koreans are very very bright and smart so I was puzzled by their inability to fly an airplane well. They would show up on Day 1 of training (an hour before the scheduled briefing time, in a 3-piece suit, and shined shoes) with the entire contents of the FCOM and Flight Manual totally memorized. But, putting that information to actual use was many times impossible. Crosswind landings are also an unsolvable puzzle for most of them. I never did figure it out completely, but I think I did uncover a few clues. Here is my best guess. First off, their educational system emphasizes ROTE memorization from the first day of school as little kids. As you know, that is the lowest form of learning and they act like robots. They are also taught to NEVER challenge authority and in spite of the flight training heavily emphasizing CRM/CLR, it still exists either on the surface or very subtly. You just cant change 3000 years of culture.
The other thing that I think plays an important role is the fact that there is virtually NO civil aircraft flying in Korea. Its actually illegal to own a Cessna-152 and just go learn to fly. Ultra-lights and Powered Hang Gliders are Ok. I guess they dont trust the people to not start WWIII by flying 35 miles north of Inchon into North Korea. But, they dont get the kids who grew up flying (and thinking for themselves) and hanging around airports. They do recruit some kids from college and send then to the US or Australia and get them their tickets. Generally, I had better experience with them than with the ex-Military pilots. This was a surprise to me as I spent years as a Naval Aviator flying fighters after getting my private in light airplanes. I would get experienced F-4, F-5, F-15, and F-16 pilots who were actually terrible pilots if they had to hand fly the airplane. What a shock!
Finally, I'll get off my box and talk about the total flight hours they claim. I do accept that there are a few talented and free-thinking pilots that I met and trained in Korea. Some are still in contact and I consider them friends. They were a joy! But, they were few and far between and certainly not the norm.
Actually, this is a worldwide problem involving automation and the auto-flight concept. Take one of these new first officers that got his ratings in the US or Australia and came to KAL or Asiana with 225 flight hours. After takeoff, in accordance with their SOP, he calls for the autopilot to be engaged at 250 after takeoff. How much actual flight time is that? Hardly one minute. Then he might fly for hours on the autopilot and finally disengage it (MAYBE?) below 800 after the gear was down, flaps extended and on airspeed (autothrottle). Then he might bring it in to land. Again, how much real flight time or real experience did he get. Minutes! Of course, on the 777 or 747, its the same only they get more inflated logbooks.
So, when I hear that a 10,000 hour Korean captain was vectored in for a 17-mile final and cleared for a visual approach in CAVOK weather, it raises the hair on the back of my neck."
(signed)
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would appear that it's not limited to Asian carriers,
Incident: Jetstar A320 enroute on Mar 12th 2014, alpha floor activation
Incident: Jetstar A320 enroute on Mar 12th 2014, alpha floor activation
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Captain with well known Middle Eastern carrier operating wide-bodies turned off his flight director to keep his hand on raw data VMC climb after passing 10,000 ft.
Having done 10 minutes of this he re-engaged the FD and went on as usual. Some time later was hauled in for tea and no bikkies by senior management and told that the recording system recorded the fact he had his FD off for 10 minutes and an explanation demanded. He replied it was a nice day and perfectly safe. He was warned not to switch off the FD at anytime in flight otherwise disciplinary action would be taken against him.
How absolutely pitiful is the scared reaction by management. Automatic monkeys now rule the air - no doubt about it.
Having done 10 minutes of this he re-engaged the FD and went on as usual. Some time later was hauled in for tea and no bikkies by senior management and told that the recording system recorded the fact he had his FD off for 10 minutes and an explanation demanded. He replied it was a nice day and perfectly safe. He was warned not to switch off the FD at anytime in flight otherwise disciplinary action would be taken against him.
How absolutely pitiful is the scared reaction by management. Automatic monkeys now rule the air - no doubt about it.
would appear that it's not limited to Asian carriers,
JQ A320
"..noticed the airspeed was increasing"
"The crew reduced thrust to idle, extended the speedbrakes and disengaged the autopilot"
Why would the crew respond in this fashion? Who trained them to do that?
"..noticed the airspeed was increasing"
"The crew reduced thrust to idle, extended the speedbrakes and disengaged the autopilot"
Why would the crew respond in this fashion? Who trained them to do that?
.....who said they were even trained for this situation?
Perhaps it may have been discussed about 5 years ago during endorsement/line training and never thought about after.
One thing that stands out to me these days is the "training down " element rather than "training up", a legacy of inexperience in all areas if you'll excuse the expression.
Jetstar are not alone.
Perhaps it may have been discussed about 5 years ago during endorsement/line training and never thought about after.
One thing that stands out to me these days is the "training down " element rather than "training up", a legacy of inexperience in all areas if you'll excuse the expression.
Jetstar are not alone.
Trained? Just read your FCOM, I can't think if a single case where a potential overspeed should be dealt with by disconnecting the A/P. My aircraft FCOM specifically states not to.
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"The crew reduced thrust to idle, extended the speedbrakes and disengaged the autopilot"
Why would the crew respond in this fashion? Who trained them to do that?
Why would the crew respond in this fashion? Who trained them to do that?
Try the Airbus A320 QRH overspeed checklist
OVERSPEED RECOVERY
Applicable to: ALL
As soon as the speed exceeds VMO/MMO, apply the following actions:
AP : KEEP ON
SPEED BRAKES LEVER....................................................... ............................. FULL
THRUST REDUCTION................................................... ............ MONITOR
Applicable to: ALL
As soon as the speed exceeds VMO/MMO, apply the following actions:
AP : KEEP ON
SPEED BRAKES LEVER....................................................... ............................. FULL
THRUST REDUCTION................................................... ............ MONITOR
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Lookleft,
Instead of being such a smarta*se with your comment
, I wonder if the previous post might have been a reference to the speed brakes bit.
Rarely is anything black and white.
Instead of being such a smarta*se with your comment
, I wonder if the previous post might have been a reference to the speed brakes bit.Rarely is anything black and white.
I wonder if the previous post might have been a reference to the speed brakes bit.
Why would the crew respond in this fashion? Who trained them to do that?
The original poster replied to me in this fashion
Lookleft, thankyou.
Instead of being such a smarta*se with your comment
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Captain with well known Middle Eastern carrier operating wide-bodies turned off his flight director to keep his hand on raw data VMC climb after passing 10,000 ft.
Having done 10 minutes of this he re-engaged the FD and went on as usual. Some time later was hauled in for tea and no bikkies by senior management and told that the recording system recorded the fact he had his FD off for 10 minutes and an explanation demanded. He replied it was a nice day and perfectly safe. He was warned not to switch off the FD at anytime in flight otherwise disciplinary action would be taken against him.
How absolutely pitiful is the scared reaction by management. Automatic monkeys now rule the air - no doubt about it.
Having done 10 minutes of this he re-engaged the FD and went on as usual. Some time later was hauled in for tea and no bikkies by senior management and told that the recording system recorded the fact he had his FD off for 10 minutes and an explanation demanded. He replied it was a nice day and perfectly safe. He was warned not to switch off the FD at anytime in flight otherwise disciplinary action would be taken against him.
How absolutely pitiful is the scared reaction by management. Automatic monkeys now rule the air - no doubt about it.
Thread Starter
Air Crash Investigations TV. Ethiopean Airlines loss of control on night departure
TV Channel 7Two in Melbourne Tuesday 25 March 9.30pm.
This crash was the archetypal lack manual flying skills versus automation dependency - a subject frequently discussed over recent years in Pprune. The 737 departs on an uncomplicated SID at night over water. The captain gets disorientated, the co-pilot is no help at all, the aircraft eventually stalls and spirals into the sea off the cost of Lebanon with the crew not having a clue how to recover. If ever this was proof that manual raw data flying skills are vital for airline pilots, then see this particular Air Crash Investigation.
Having said that, although I have read the original accident report, there is no guarantee the accident depicted in this TV series, is a faithful reproduction of what really happened in the cockpit. Expect the usual screaming passengers of course.
This crash was the archetypal lack manual flying skills versus automation dependency - a subject frequently discussed over recent years in Pprune. The 737 departs on an uncomplicated SID at night over water. The captain gets disorientated, the co-pilot is no help at all, the aircraft eventually stalls and spirals into the sea off the cost of Lebanon with the crew not having a clue how to recover. If ever this was proof that manual raw data flying skills are vital for airline pilots, then see this particular Air Crash Investigation.
Having said that, although I have read the original accident report, there is no guarantee the accident depicted in this TV series, is a faithful reproduction of what really happened in the cockpit. Expect the usual screaming passengers of course.
Thread Starter
The 737 FCTM has this to say if the overspeed occurs in high altitude cruise flight:
'When correcting an overspeed during cruise at high altitude, avoid reducing thrust to idle which results in slow engine acceleration back to cruise thrust and may result in over-controlling the airspeed or loss of altitude. If autothrottle corrections are not satisfactory, deploy partial speed brakes slowly until a noticeable reduction of airspeed is achieved. When the airspeed is below VMO/MMO, retract the speed brakes at the same rate as they were deployed. The thrust levers can be expected to advance slowly to achieve cruise airspeed; if not they should be pushed up more rapidly"
'When correcting an overspeed during cruise at high altitude, avoid reducing thrust to idle which results in slow engine acceleration back to cruise thrust and may result in over-controlling the airspeed or loss of altitude. If autothrottle corrections are not satisfactory, deploy partial speed brakes slowly until a noticeable reduction of airspeed is achieved. When the airspeed is below VMO/MMO, retract the speed brakes at the same rate as they were deployed. The thrust levers can be expected to advance slowly to achieve cruise airspeed; if not they should be pushed up more rapidly"