PPRuNe Forums - View Single Post - Practicing manual flying in jet transport ops.
Old 26th Mar 2014, 15:22
  #115 (permalink)  
LeadSled
 
Join Date: Jul 2001
Location: Australia
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I recall a B767 in Thailand I believe had a thrust reverser deploy on climb.
ThornBird,
As a matter of interest, a good mate of mine was the Captain of that Lauda flight into Bangkok, a problem with the thrust reverser was evident on that previous flight, and logged. It manifested itself as non-normal rudder trim inputs on climb. As a captain on functionally identical B767 at the time, my interest was more than casual. I agree entirely that the situation was recoverable by disconnecting the AP/AT, and hand flying, we tried just about every possible combination in the sim.

is in relation to this:
Lookleft,
Not so, it was a general statement, not quite Mr. Boeing's exact words.

Such as the 777 pilot facing a simultaneous overspeed/underspeed which Boeing said could never happen.
I would take a small bet that there is no statement in a B777 manual that could be reasonably interpreted as meaning the above.

Indeed, although not quite in these words: "If it can happen, it will", there is a statement in the Boeing aircraft I have flown, that tells the crew that Boeing do not claim to cover all possible eventualities, in (hopefully) rare cases, a properly trained and experienced crew will have to make it up as they go along.

Re. the two A330 incidents (accidents??) I mentioned, I am well aware of the details, and the eventual cause determined, the (Northrop??) ADCs were fitted to a variety of aircraft.

I find the difference between the Boeing and Airbus checklists interesting re. use of speedbrake. It always seems to me that Airbus logic in this area is a little strange. A bit like putting a foot on the brake, without taking your foot off the accelerator on a car.

Boeing has long cautioned the use of speedbrake, going back to the B707, the turbulent wake caused cumulative damage to the horizontal stab. Later model Boeing aircraft I have flown suppress inboard spoilers to limit turbulent air over the horizontal stabs.

I recall some of the logic in the A-310, where such as a flap overspeed with AP/AT engaged was "controlled" with an auto-trim pitch up, instead of a power reduction. This was in part the reason for the loss of an A-310 at Nagoya, and a spectacular loss of control over Paris, only a very smart pilot, handflying, recovered control. REcovery on AP was not possible.

Both accident reports are well worth reading, particularly those of you who doubt the value of keeping your hand flying skills 100% up to scratch.

Remember, it is modern "glass" aircraft that gave rise to significant additions to flightdeck vocabulary, being: "I haven't seen that one before" and " What's the bastard doing to us now". And: "Now I can't fly for sh1t, but I can type 100wpm". Make certain you can still fly.

As Asiana didn't realise, mode confusion can be a really seriously dangerous problem, hardly a new discovery. The guaranteed solution, in flight is: "Eliminate the suspect mode(s)" --- which will often mean hand flying.

Tootle pip!!
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