Paul Holmes and Erebus
Join Date: Feb 2008
Location: New Zealand
Age: 64
Posts: 523
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I'm assuming that a ground controller's silence would not have been regarded, either by the controller or the pilot, as confirmation of position. As you say, the controller is not necessarily looking at the screen at all times. The controllers of 1979 would obviously been aware of that but so too would have been the pilots. The transponder light only indicated that the aircraft was on the radar screen, somewhere. It didn't indicate whereabouts on the screen. That information could only be provided to the pilot by the controller. If Capt Collins went below MSA because the transponder light came on (which it didn't), then that would have been an equally bad piece of flying.
Join Date: Aug 1999
Location: Well it's an IRS nowdays, but the AHRS were fun.
Posts: 108
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I suspect that the significance of the transponder reply (which the crew probably didn't see), was more relevant to a question of were the McMurdo controllers aware that the aircraft was descending towards Erebus so therefore why didn't the warn them? And if they indeed did, was it via VHF or HF? There has been a suggestion that some of the ATC tape had been erased at that time.
The crews decision/acceptance to descend was based on maintaining VMC, which they clearly had and went to great lengths to maintain.
The crews decision/acceptance to descend was based on maintaining VMC, which they clearly had and went to great lengths to maintain.
Join Date: Feb 2008
Location: New Zealand
Age: 64
Posts: 523
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Clearly had VMC? Isn't it the opposite? After all, he flew the aircraft into the side of a mountain.
The issue is whether he knew that it was "very hard to tell the difference between the cloud and the ice."
The issue is whether he knew that it was "very hard to tell the difference between the cloud and the ice."
Join Date: Aug 1999
Location: Well it's an IRS nowdays, but the AHRS were fun.
Posts: 108
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Yup clearly (photographic evidence and something like 11-13 crew references to it) VMC under a cloud cover. And yes they flew into a 14 deg up-slope towards a mountain that they couldn't see due to sector whiteout; still in VMC.
Join Date: Oct 2000
Location: Southern Sun
Posts: 417
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The most isolated landmass on the planet,
No official government,
No permanent population...
No official government,
No permanent population...
Temperature: 120 Below zero
Wind speed: 200 miles per hour
No horizon! No Shadows!
There is only White...
Join Date: Apr 2008
Location: Australia
Posts: 669
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
About that transponder light:
I have just had a thought. Do we know for sure that McMurdo had secondary radar?
If the range was limited to 40 miles, then this suggests to me that it was primary radar only. In fact, there are a number of things that suggest it was primary only.
If it was indeed primary only, then the "reply" light could NOT have been flashing.
I will investigate.
I have just had a thought. Do we know for sure that McMurdo had secondary radar?
If the range was limited to 40 miles, then this suggests to me that it was primary radar only. In fact, there are a number of things that suggest it was primary only.
If it was indeed primary only, then the "reply" light could NOT have been flashing.
I will investigate.
Join Date: Jul 2002
Location: UK
Posts: 3,093
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
How do you know the light only came on once? Radio waves are a fickle beast at the best of times and they were higher than the mountain at TOD. Also I think the orbits were to set them up for a low-altitude sightseeing run down the Sound (which had some of the more spectacular scenery) as opposed to a straight descent which would - on the track they were expecting - have had them reach clear air just in time to turn left, round Ross Island to the south and start the trip home - not what the passengers paid for.
Last edited by DozyWannabe; 30th Dec 2011 at 15:54.
Join Date: Jul 2002
Location: UK
Posts: 3,093
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
It may or may not have shown on the radar, regardless of whether it did or did not show, by then Collins was accepted a VMC descent and, as I have already explained, had accepted complete responsibilty for his flight safety.
Knowing this, the controller might well have looked away from the scope to talk to a colleague, or perhaps perform some other admin task.
Knowing this, the controller might well have looked away from the scope to talk to a colleague, or perhaps perform some other admin task.
This is rediculous. The people arguing that the crew hold zero responsibility have never held that same resposibility, and will never fully understand that resposibility unless they retrain and take it on themselves. (thats not a dig, it's my experience that that is the case).
Dozy, when, as Pin C of a heavy jet, would you consider it prudent to fly 250kts, 1500ft, clean, straight and level?
FGD is the only one who answered my earlier question about this. He thinks as long as there is 20km viz. (what a coincidence).
How about, when you've never been to an area before, there are snow showers and a reported 2000ft cloud base, you've told your crew that 'it's hard to distinguish between cloud and ice', you know there is terrain in the vicinity and that you're not over the ocean. Is that the appropriate time to do it? I really want to know if you think that is reasonable as FGD would say. Also, we are not talking about allocating all of the resposibility to the crew, just pointing out that Holmes' proposition that the government acknowledge that they hold no resposibility for the crash is not on. They hold some responsibility for the aircraft being flown into Erebus.
Dozy, when, as Pin C of a heavy jet, would you consider it prudent to fly 250kts, 1500ft, clean, straight and level?
FGD is the only one who answered my earlier question about this. He thinks as long as there is 20km viz. (what a coincidence).
How about, when you've never been to an area before, there are snow showers and a reported 2000ft cloud base, you've told your crew that 'it's hard to distinguish between cloud and ice', you know there is terrain in the vicinity and that you're not over the ocean. Is that the appropriate time to do it? I really want to know if you think that is reasonable as FGD would say. Also, we are not talking about allocating all of the resposibility to the crew, just pointing out that Holmes' proposition that the government acknowledge that they hold no resposibility for the crash is not on. They hold some responsibility for the aircraft being flown into Erebus.
Join Date: Jun 2001
Location: due south
Posts: 1,332
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
DozyWannabe: No, Not an excuse, I am trying to point out to you what was likely to happen in the real world.
Second No: The fact that the radar controller agreed to the letdown does not imply he should be aware of the position.
The aircraft was still some way out, and only the pilot could make the decision about descending VMC,. The controller would not know what meteorological conditions the pilot was experiencing at the altitude he was at the time, or those conditions in the area the pilot was intended to let down in.
Let me make the point quite clear.
If I were to issue a VMC descent clearance requested by a pilot, I do not necessarily expect him to maintain his flight planned track. He may deviate from it to maintain VMC.
He is still on an IFR flight plan, so my responsibilty as the controller is to ensure his separation from other traffic is maintained.
In the case we are discussing, there was no other traffic.
Second No: The fact that the radar controller agreed to the letdown does not imply he should be aware of the position.
The aircraft was still some way out, and only the pilot could make the decision about descending VMC,. The controller would not know what meteorological conditions the pilot was experiencing at the altitude he was at the time, or those conditions in the area the pilot was intended to let down in.
Let me make the point quite clear.
If I were to issue a VMC descent clearance requested by a pilot, I do not necessarily expect him to maintain his flight planned track. He may deviate from it to maintain VMC.
He is still on an IFR flight plan, so my responsibilty as the controller is to ensure his separation from other traffic is maintained.
In the case we are discussing, there was no other traffic.
Join Date: Feb 2008
Location: New Zealand
Age: 64
Posts: 523
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
FGD135: According to Mahon's report (p128) the radar had an IFF mode (Identification Friend or Foe) with a range of 150 miles and an ASR mode (Aircraft Surveillance) with a range of 40 miles.
Most of the ground/air communications were between the aircraft and Mac Station on HF radio. The radar was not located at Mac Station. Instead, it was at the Ice Tower, by the runway. The Tower only had VHF radio. So Mac Station was in contact with the aircraft on HF, and Mac Station and the Tower were relaying messages to eachother on VHF.
The F/O was handling communications, but at one point, Capt Collins took over and attempted to contact the Tower on VHF. He had no success. Shortly thereafter, he saw the ground and went down VMC.
The probable explanation for the captain's decision to abandon the radar assist is that he suspected that he wouldn't be actually getting it. If he wasn't getting VHF radio at a range of 50 miles out then the same would probably apply to the radar within 40 miles. So if he maintained MSA to the waypoint, he would end up stuck above the cloud layer with no way of getting through it, given that he had been told that the NDB wasn't working.
Most of the ground/air communications were between the aircraft and Mac Station on HF radio. The radar was not located at Mac Station. Instead, it was at the Ice Tower, by the runway. The Tower only had VHF radio. So Mac Station was in contact with the aircraft on HF, and Mac Station and the Tower were relaying messages to eachother on VHF.
The F/O was handling communications, but at one point, Capt Collins took over and attempted to contact the Tower on VHF. He had no success. Shortly thereafter, he saw the ground and went down VMC.
The probable explanation for the captain's decision to abandon the radar assist is that he suspected that he wouldn't be actually getting it. If he wasn't getting VHF radio at a range of 50 miles out then the same would probably apply to the radar within 40 miles. So if he maintained MSA to the waypoint, he would end up stuck above the cloud layer with no way of getting through it, given that he had been told that the NDB wasn't working.
Last edited by ampan; 30th Dec 2011 at 20:38.
PPRuNe supporter
Join Date: Dec 2003
Location: Planet Earth
Posts: 1,677
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
FGD, thanks for your replies. I personally don't buy off on the excuse that company SOP dictated that they SHOULD descend at any particular waypoint, the crux of the accident appears to me to be this:
So based on a mistake by the crew, thence...
So the whole responsibility for the accident is based on the crews mistaken location influenced by the waypoint change doesn't totally let the crew off the hook in my opinion considering ones responsibility during VMC operations. This type of operation being accomplished by airline crews is crazy IMHO, that's what real tour operators are for.
The descent may have been VMC, but they tried to remain in contact with Mac Central, advising of their position and altitude as they went - remember that the crew were perceiving Lewis Bay as McMurdo Sound due to a combination of the track they were expecting to be on and the visual illusions that provided false confirmation.
So the whole responsibility for the accident is based on the crews mistaken location influenced by the waypoint change doesn't totally let the crew off the hook in my opinion considering ones responsibility during VMC operations. This type of operation being accomplished by airline crews is crazy IMHO, that's what real tour operators are for.
Join Date: Aug 1999
Location: Well it's an IRS nowdays, but the AHRS were fun.
Posts: 108
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Originally Posted by Dreamland
This type of operation being accomplished by airline crews is crazy IMHO, that's what real tour operators are for.
To make matters worse the people who should have kept them honest, the MOT CAD, seemed to be conveniently myopic as to what ANZ were up to.
They also failed the travelling public of NZ miserably by not ensuring that those flights were done by an appropriately qualified and skilled operator.
It bit them all in the arse very hard..!
Of course Chippendale wouldn't have considered any of this as he worked for CAD and old shredder was his personal adviser. Whether he acted in a biased fashion or was just way out of his depth is a debatable point.
Mahon"s accusations of "an orchestrated litany of lies" were found to be outside the scope of the commission by the court of appeal and subsequently the Privy Council.
However what is commonly overlooked in Erebus debates today is that the Royal Commissions findings on the cause of the accident still stand today.
So here we have (1) The findings (using an investigative process way ahead of its time) of a Royal Comission of inquiry that still stands, or (2) Chippendales much more simplistic report that really only should have formed part of the inquiry.
By today's standard, Mahons investigation and finding would appear completely normal as Chippendales now seems antiquated and obsolete.
Maybe that is why there are those here that would like to let sleeping dogs lie.
Join Date: Feb 2008
Location: New Zealand
Age: 64
Posts: 523
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Quite right: Justice Mahon's findings as to the cause of the accident still stand today. So do numerous other bad judicial decisions.
I don't understand the reverence in which this gentleman is held. As to the cause, he spent many months hearing evidence and tripping around the world (including a pointless trip to Antarctica), yet still managed to come up with the wrong answer. The taxpayer paid two lawyers to assist him as well as an aviation expert, all of whom recommended attributing a portion of the blame to the crew, particularly the captain. He ignored that advice, because he had developed a series of conspiracy theories, which culminated in that ridiculous "orchestrated litany of lies" comment.
The end result of His Honour's efforts is the only CFIT accident where the crew were entirely blameless. In other words, TE901 was doomed from take-off.
I don't understand the reverence in which this gentleman is held. As to the cause, he spent many months hearing evidence and tripping around the world (including a pointless trip to Antarctica), yet still managed to come up with the wrong answer. The taxpayer paid two lawyers to assist him as well as an aviation expert, all of whom recommended attributing a portion of the blame to the crew, particularly the captain. He ignored that advice, because he had developed a series of conspiracy theories, which culminated in that ridiculous "orchestrated litany of lies" comment.
The end result of His Honour's efforts is the only CFIT accident where the crew were entirely blameless. In other words, TE901 was doomed from take-off.
Guest
Posts: n/a
Of course Chippendale wouldn't have considered any of this as he worked for CAD and old shredder was his personal adviser. Whether he acted in a biased fashion or was just way out of his depth is a debatable point.
There are some unknown facts related to this crash, such as why the decision to descend was made when it was, why it continued with the weather, cloud base as it was, these facts will never be known.
But there are facts that are known, and the number of times in this thread that these have been distorted, or been completely wrong, time and time again, despite the correct proven, references given facts, physical impossibilities that some of the arguments are constructed on, no wonder it goes on and on.
Chippindale did not work for CAA. His office was completely independant, he reported directly to the Minister of Transport. The reason for this should be perfectly obvious.
Last edited by prospector; 1st Jan 2012 at 19:15.
Join Date: Feb 2008
Location: New Zealand
Age: 64
Posts: 523
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The decision to descend at 45 miles out, which was just as much a cause of the accident as the changed waypoint, might be explainable. Ten minutes beforehand, Capt Collins had accepted the offer of a radar assist, so the standard procedure would be to maintain MSA until his position had been confirmed and then go down through the cloud. The weather reported to the captain was a continous layer of cloud with a base of 6000 feet. After accepting the radar assist, the F/O tried to contact the Tower on VHF radio (being the only radio the Tower had) and then the captain took over and tried to get the Tower himself, without success. This was just prior to the decision to descend, so the two are probably linked.
The theory about the transponder light coming on cannot be correct, but the descent decision must have had something to do with the proposed radar assist, because that plan was obviously abandoned. The captain would have expected to be in contact with the Tower at least by 60 miles out. As he got to 45 miles out, there had been no contact, despite numerous attempts, so the captain probably concluded that the VHF radio was having one of its off days. If so, there could be no radar assist, whatever be the state of the transponder light. At the time, he was approaching the edge of the cloud layer which, he had been told, extended all the way to McMurdo Station. Without the radar assist, the only way that he and the passengers would get to see the place was VMC, and the only way to do that was to go down the hole while he still had a hole to go down. It was a 'now or never' situation.
Although the decision might be understandable, so too was Capt Van Zanten's, yet he is regarded as a villain, while Capt Collins is regarded as God's gift to NZ aviation. What Capt Collins did was hasty, stupid, negligent, and contrary to the warning he had given to himself only a few minutes beforehand.
All of this was compounded by what happened afterwards. Capt Van Zanten was stuck with his bad decision, but Capt Collins had a full 20 minutes to appreciate his mistake, yet instead of returning to MSA, he kept going down.
The theory about the transponder light coming on cannot be correct, but the descent decision must have had something to do with the proposed radar assist, because that plan was obviously abandoned. The captain would have expected to be in contact with the Tower at least by 60 miles out. As he got to 45 miles out, there had been no contact, despite numerous attempts, so the captain probably concluded that the VHF radio was having one of its off days. If so, there could be no radar assist, whatever be the state of the transponder light. At the time, he was approaching the edge of the cloud layer which, he had been told, extended all the way to McMurdo Station. Without the radar assist, the only way that he and the passengers would get to see the place was VMC, and the only way to do that was to go down the hole while he still had a hole to go down. It was a 'now or never' situation.
Although the decision might be understandable, so too was Capt Van Zanten's, yet he is regarded as a villain, while Capt Collins is regarded as God's gift to NZ aviation. What Capt Collins did was hasty, stupid, negligent, and contrary to the warning he had given to himself only a few minutes beforehand.
All of this was compounded by what happened afterwards. Capt Van Zanten was stuck with his bad decision, but Capt Collins had a full 20 minutes to appreciate his mistake, yet instead of returning to MSA, he kept going down.
Last edited by ampan; 1st Jan 2012 at 20:57.
Join Date: Jul 2002
Location: UK
Posts: 3,093
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
@ampan - Captain Van Zanten did not have clearance to take off and overruled an obviously hesitant crew to send his 747 down the Los Rodeos runway - he was improvising procedure due to a pre-existing emergency (the bomb at Las Palmas airport). Captain Collins had been given a set of information that the airline changed overnight without informing him, which he followed dutifully and with the consent of his crew, and when things didn't look right he began an escape maneouvre at the first sign of disquiet. The cases couldn't be more different.
The disaster that bears the most similarities to TE901 on Erebus to my mind is non aviation-related, and it is the Chernobyl nuclear disaster of 1986. In both cases, information that might have prevented a catastrophe was known by those further up the chain from the men at the controls, but that information was withheld for the sake of expediency - and in both cases the powers that be attempted to blame the disaster on the last link in the chain. The only reason this information is known is due to the work of Gordon Vette and Peter Mahon in the case of Erebus, and the last recorded testament of Valery Legasov - the First Deputy Director of the Soviet Institute of Atomic Energy - in the case of Chernobyl.
The disaster that bears the most similarities to TE901 on Erebus to my mind is non aviation-related, and it is the Chernobyl nuclear disaster of 1986. In both cases, information that might have prevented a catastrophe was known by those further up the chain from the men at the controls, but that information was withheld for the sake of expediency - and in both cases the powers that be attempted to blame the disaster on the last link in the chain. The only reason this information is known is due to the work of Gordon Vette and Peter Mahon in the case of Erebus, and the last recorded testament of Valery Legasov - the First Deputy Director of the Soviet Institute of Atomic Energy - in the case of Chernobyl.
Last edited by DozyWannabe; 1st Jan 2012 at 20:22.
Captain Collins had been given a set of information that the airline changed overnight without informing him, which he followed dutifully
The disaster that bears the most similarities to TE901 on Erebus to my mind is non aviation-related, and it is the Chernobyl nuclear disaster of 1986
1/ Erebus (FL 160 MSA)
2/ Perpignan (Airbus safety height FL140)
3/ Pukerua Bay Iroquois (NVG min height 600ft)
Dozy, when, as Pin C of a heavy jet, would you consider it prudent to fly 250kts, 1500ft, clean, straight and level?
FGD is the only one who answered my earlier question about this. He thinks as long as there is 20km viz. (what a coincidence).
How about, when you've never been to an area before, there are snow showers and a reported 2000ft cloud base, you've told your crew that 'it's hard to distinguish between cloud and ice', you know there is terrain in the vicinity and that you're not over the ocean. Is that the appropriate time to do it? I really want to know if you think that is reasonable as FGD would say.
FGD is the only one who answered my earlier question about this. He thinks as long as there is 20km viz. (what a coincidence).
How about, when you've never been to an area before, there are snow showers and a reported 2000ft cloud base, you've told your crew that 'it's hard to distinguish between cloud and ice', you know there is terrain in the vicinity and that you're not over the ocean. Is that the appropriate time to do it? I really want to know if you think that is reasonable as FGD would say.
Join Date: Feb 2008
Location: New Zealand
Age: 64
Posts: 523
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
DozyW: Each captain embarked on a foolish journey into the unknown, one down a runway and another down a hole.
Putting nuclear reactors to one side, a possible analogy is that of JFK Junior, flying VMC at night from New York to Martha's Vineyard. The weather was clear and his plan was to navigate by reference to the lights along the coast. But he abandoned the plan and tried to take a short-cut over 50 miles of open water. Once he lost contact with the lights on the coast, he lost all visual reference and couldn't tell up from down. It might be said that his ears deceived him, given that it's the little spirit levels in the human ear that give the sense of balance. Capt Collins' superior training would have prevented him from making that particular mistake, but what he did was similar, in that he went VMC into a situation where his eyes might deceive him, and made that situation potentially lethal by going below MSA.
Putting nuclear reactors to one side, a possible analogy is that of JFK Junior, flying VMC at night from New York to Martha's Vineyard. The weather was clear and his plan was to navigate by reference to the lights along the coast. But he abandoned the plan and tried to take a short-cut over 50 miles of open water. Once he lost contact with the lights on the coast, he lost all visual reference and couldn't tell up from down. It might be said that his ears deceived him, given that it's the little spirit levels in the human ear that give the sense of balance. Capt Collins' superior training would have prevented him from making that particular mistake, but what he did was similar, in that he went VMC into a situation where his eyes might deceive him, and made that situation potentially lethal by going below MSA.
Join Date: Jul 2002
Location: UK
Posts: 3,093
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I'm guessing that your last quote tag was in fact a question. This was not a normal, routine flight - but the procedures put in place by ANZ meant that for line crews it was accepted that it might as well have been. The "safety" altitude was explicitly rescinded in the briefing - what part of that is difficult to understand?
As PIC, Collins had faith in the people that had briefed him, the company he worked for and his own abilities. Going by character testimony he was a cautious and meticulous pilot, well regarded by everyone he worked with. There is nothing in the record to suggest that he was anything other than that when he boarded the DC-10 that morning. He was not expecting to have to improvise and followed the advice and information he was presented with - and I emphasise this again - to the letter. If he had experience of the Antarctic before then your argument would hold ground, but the fact is he was not - however he was told that if he followed the instructions (and computerised flight plan) given to him at the briefing he would be safe. ANZ changed the flight plan without telling him, did not communicate the change in co-ordinates to the radar controllers at McMurdo and did not impart to him the vital knowledge of whiteout at significant altitude - they set him up to fail.
As PIC, Collins had faith in the people that had briefed him, the company he worked for and his own abilities. Going by character testimony he was a cautious and meticulous pilot, well regarded by everyone he worked with. There is nothing in the record to suggest that he was anything other than that when he boarded the DC-10 that morning. He was not expecting to have to improvise and followed the advice and information he was presented with - and I emphasise this again - to the letter. If he had experience of the Antarctic before then your argument would hold ground, but the fact is he was not - however he was told that if he followed the instructions (and computerised flight plan) given to him at the briefing he would be safe. ANZ changed the flight plan without telling him, did not communicate the change in co-ordinates to the radar controllers at McMurdo and did not impart to him the vital knowledge of whiteout at significant altitude - they set him up to fail.